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


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The Handbook Series

Disarmament

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[From Labor, December 11, 1920]

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	Total	\$5,686,005,706	100%

[Analysis by Dr. Edward B. Rosa, of the United States Bureau of Standards]

THE HANDBOOK SERIES

SELECTED ARTICLES ON
DISARMAMENT

COMPILED BY
MARY KATHARINE REELY
"

NEW YORK
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1921

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

This is a handbook compiled from contemporary sources. The articles for reprint and, with few exceptions, the references, do not date back of 1920 and 1921. It is entirely a book of post-war discussion.

In some features it departs from the usual plan of this series and is not arranged as a debate. In the first place it seemed impossible to arrange a systematic debate if all the diverse points of view among advocates of disarmament were to be represented. In the second place there is comparatively little active opposition. There is, on the other hand, a counter propaganda, for a strong army, a big navy, and for aerial and chemical armament. In place of the usual division into Affirmative and Negative, the book, following the General Discussion, has accordingly been divided into two parts, with the headings: For Disarmament; and For Continued Armaments. The bulk of material is much greater on the side for Disarmament. The Big Army and Navy advocates are not doing so much talking now. They talked in the Preparedness campaign before 1916 when the navy building program was adopted and are now harvesting the fruits in the naval appropriation bill.

Under the heading General Discussion are presented: a summary of Congressional action, statistical material bearing on the size of armies and navies and the cost of war, some intimation of what war will be like in the future, and a group of articles discussing the underlying economic factors.

The student is referred to other books in the series closely related to this: Reely: World Peace, 2d ed. 1916 (now out of print); Bacon: National Defense, v 1, 1915 (now out of print); Van Valkenburg: National Defense, v 2, 1919; Johnsen: National Defense, v 3, 1921; Parsons: Non-Resistance, 1916; Phelps: The League of Nations, 4th ed. 1919.

August 10, 1921

M. K. R.

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ORGANIZATIONS

American Council of the World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches. 70 5th Ave., New York.
American Peace Society, 612-14 Colorado bldg., Washington, D.C.

American Union Against Militarism, 203 Westory Bldg., Washington, D.C.

Clearing House for Limitation of Armaments, 3 W. 29th St., New York.

Fellowship of Reconciliation, 108 Lexington Ave., New York.

Foreign Policy Assn. (formerly League of Free Nations Assn.), 3 West 29th St., New York.

Friends Peace Committee, 304 Arch St., Philadelphia.

National Security League, 17 East 49th St., New York.

Woman's Committee for World Disarmament, 717 Woodward Bldg., Washington, D.C.

Women's Peace Society, 525 Park Ave., New York.

World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston.



GENERAL DISCUSSION

THE BORAH RESOLUTION¹

The Borah amendment provides:

Sec 17. That the president is authorized and requested to invite the governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreement is to be reported to the respective governments for approval.

Adopted May 25, 1921.

Senator Borah introduced a resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 18, on April 3, authorizing the president to call such a conference. The above amendment to the naval appropriation bill took the place of the resolution.

ARMY AND NAVY APPROPRIATIONS²

The naval appropriation bill, after a storm-tossed career, has finally reached port. Of the approximate \$414,000,000 it provides, \$90,000,000 is for further construction of ships already under way, besides \$6,000,000 for additional air-craft building. No airplane carriers were authorized, but the defeat of that provision was not due to any desire for economy. It was voted down in the House on the ground that it should be brought up by the Naval Affairs Committee, which has charge of legislative matters. As the final sum is \$80,000,000 less than the amount demanded by the Senate, however, the advocates of economy have won a measure of victory. The enlisted personnel of the

¹ The Searchlight, May, 1921.

² From Bulletin issued by the American Union against Militarism. July 14, 1921.

SELECTED ARTICLES

Navy was reduced to one hundred six thousand and the Marines to twenty-one thousand. The officer personnel is not affected as it is fixed at a certain percentage of the *authorized* enlisted personnel which is at this time 137,431.

In the Army the situation is different. The enlisted personnel is to be reduced to one hundred fifty thousand by October 1, but the officer personnel, which is fixed by law at 17,717 men, will remain the same. In that huge officer corps lies the danger of the spread of militarism. There are not enough posts in the regular army for so many officers so a large group are sent to give military instruction in schools and colleges, and to organize paper companies of reserve forces. Their special task is to create interest in things military so they will talk preparedness and in every way facilitate the growth of the war machine. Until the law is changed and their number is reduced this menace will remain.

If you followed the debate on the reduction of the army to one hundred fifty thousand by October 1, you read much about the great hardship under which thousands of soldiers were to be placed by being ruthlessly thrown out of the Army before their enlistments expired. Therefore you will be interested to learn that by July 6, (the order went into effect July 1) indications were that 25 per cent of the men in the Army were seeking discharge. "Based on the early reports it was estimated that if all applications received during July were granted, nearly sixty thousand men would be discharged as a result before August 1. This reduction, coupled with the normal discharges, it appeared, would bring the Army strength down very close to one hundred fifty-five thousand men by August 15." (Army and Navy Journal, July 9, 1921).

The total of the Army Appropriation bill was \$328,000,000. This is \$18,000,000 less than the bill vetoed by President Wilson during the last session of Congress.

OUR NEW ARMY¹

The policy for National Defense, as conceived by Congress, is outlined in Section 3 of the National Defense Act, as amended by the Act of June 4, 1920. The pertinent part of this Section reads as follows:

¹ By Major-General W. G. Haan. Forum. 65:291-7. March, 1921.

"Section 3. The organized peace establishment . . . shall include all of those divisions and other military organizations necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a national emergency declared by Congress . . ."

This is really a Congressional mandate upon the War Department to prepare in a specific manner for the national defense. Various other sections of the Act assume to provide the means for accomplishing the result *"necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the National Defense."* The principal means thus provided are briefly as follows:

A Regular Army of seventeen thousand five hundred officers and two hundred eighty thousand enlisted men.

The National Guard with maximum expansion by 1924 to four hundred twenty-five thousand.

The Organized Reserves of indefinite strength.

*Immediate and complete mobilization—The Mandate—*What does it mean? Does it mean the mobilization of all available military personnel in the United States; or does it mean something else? I think a reasonable interpretation of this provision might be stated as follows:

Mobilization of organized and trained personnel and material in such strength and at such speed as will make reasonably certain that the most powerful probable enemy shall be successfully resisted until the potential military strength of the nation can be developed sufficiently behind this defense to insure ultimate victory.

The foregoing may be taken as the mission which the War Department assumes should be accomplished by the means placed at its disposal under the mandate of Congress already discussed.

The problem calling for solution must ever be indefinite until war actually comes, but a careful study of the world situation, taking into consideration the trend of political events since the Armistice of the Forest of Compiègne, gives us a reasonable basis for an estimate of the situation resulting from the world's political relations. Careful studies have been made by the War Department General Staff covering the world situation as it has developed since the close of the war and it is believed that reasonable conclusions have been reached as to the maximum efforts that could be made by

those nations or groups of nations, which might possibly and even most probably become our enemies in wars of the near future, should such wars occur. Our studies have gone so far as to make reasonable estimates of the intensity and speed with which such enemy efforts might be made, and the successful solution of the problem requires that our mobilization must be such and at such speed as will successfully resist the efforts of the enemy. Taking our studies on this line, we have attempted to set the requirements of the problem by showing what force is necessary to have ready to meet the maximum efforts of the enemy at certain definite periods after the day hostilities begin, and based upon these conclusions we have constructed what may be called "the man-power curve" showing graphically the rate of increase required in our organized forces taken as a function of time reckoned from the beginning of hostilities.

The peace establishment must be such as to permit of *immediate mobilization* of the necessary force to accomplish the mission as above stated. Mobilization to be *immediately effective* requires that those elements which cannot be provided *during the period of mobilization* must be provided beforehand; must be provided in time of peace; some of these elements requiring much time in the making may be mentioned as follows:

Trained commanders for the larger units.

The principal staff officers for the larger combat units.

Commanders, staff officers and subordinate officers for all units.

Officers for taking charge of corps areas and undertaking organization and training of the second and subsequent mobilizations.

Reserve equipment and supplies and an organization for mobilizing the industries of the country according to plans previously prepared to supply the field forces with all manner of necessities *before the reserve supplies are exhausted*.

The man-power curve forms the basis for all preparation. It is the *Directrix* of all activities in preparation for the national defense. It applies not only to personnel, but to material. It is the guide not only for the War Department General Staff, but for the great supply departments of the Army, and our Army school development.

Before approving the man-power curve, the highest authori-

ties of the War Department consulted with other departments of the government, particularly with the Navy Department. This matter is mentioned here merely to show with what care and caution the situation was studied before the man-power curve was accepted.

Having reached conclusions upon the man-power curve, the problem resolved itself into one of concreteness. It was possible then to make intelligent studies as to how best to make use of the means provided by the Congress to accomplish the mission contained in the Congressional Mandate. The essential means provided have already been stated. The best possible development of these means has been considered and studied from every angle. In accordance with the requirements in the National Defense Act, experienced officers of the National Guard and the Reserves have been detailed on duty with the War Department General Staff for the purpose of studying, with officers of the War Department General Staff, the best possible organization for the National Guard and the Organized Reserves. I am glad to state that there has been no difference of opinion between the Regular officers and these National Guard and Reserve Officers in the mission that is to be accomplished by the National Defense force and the best organization for accomplishing that mission with the means made available.

The most important element of an army, and the one that requires the greatest amount of time in the making, is the officer personnel. The various classes of officer personnel as to importance, and as to length of time required in preparation, are as follows:

Commanders and principal staff officers of large units (Above the Regiment).

Commanders and staff officers of subordinate units.

Subaltern officers.

For all those organizations that must be a part of the *immediate mobilization* prescribed by Congress, the entire officer personnel must be provided before the emergency, so that there shall be available, when the emergency is declared by Congress, sufficient officers to at once take charge of troops called into service and to proceed with the organization, concentration and deployment in accordance with the approved war plans.

The officer personnel that should be available by 1924, if

fully developed as contemplated, under the present law, would be approximately as follows:

Regular Army	17,500
National Guard (estimated)	28,500
Reserve Corps (estimated)	104,000
Total	150,000

This *in numbers* would be sufficient for a force consisting of fifty-four combat divisions, organized into nineteen corps and six field armies and, in addition thereto, officers for the War Department overhead and the personnel necessary for all the activities in the corps areas and the great supply system.

Under a preceding paragraph are given the various classes of personnel. Those under the first two classes require careful and special training, both theoretical and practical; those under the first class requiring, of course, more than those under the second; those under the third require basic theoretical and practical instruction in a lesser degree.

Our Army School System is being so developed as to give in the Special and General Service Schools the necessary facilities to instruct qualified officers from all available sources provided by law for various classes of officer personnel. This brings us to the mission of our schools for officers. General Orders No. 56, current series, War Department, gives us the mission of schools for officers as follows:

To provide officers trained correctly in theory and practice for all positions in command and staff for the Peace Establishment of the United States Army as organized under Section 3, Act of June 4, 1920, and to provide in addition thereto a reservoir of trained officers qualified for organizing and developing to its maximum capacity the potential military power of the nation in accordance with the approved war plans.

In order that we may carry out in time of war a complete and immediate mobilization as called for by Congress, we must provide in time of peace an eligible list of commanders and an eligible list of the important staff officers so trained that they shall be immediately available to take charge of this immediate and complete mobilization. This is the principal function of our Army School System for officers.

Officers included in the Regular Army list can be counted upon as definitely available in the near future. Those of the National Guard it is hoped may be maintained at near the maximum. The indefinite problem rests with the Reserves. At the present time and perhaps for five years in the future

sufficient Reserve Officers may be obtained from those who saw service in the War, to furnish the minimum required for the first mobilization. The National Defense Act makes provision for maintaining the Officers' Reserve Corps by commissioning new reserve officers as the present list gradually ceases to be available. The Reserve Officer Training Corps' at Educational Institutions being the principal source. The Civilian Military Training Camps under Section 47d, National Defense Act, should also generate a considerable number; and there are other channels of eligibility. A practical experience alone will determine whether the requisite number with proper qualifications can be obtained.

The enlisted personnel requires less time in the making if officers be available to give the instructions. With the enlisted personnel, as with the officer personnel, the Regular Army contingent peace strength may be counted upon with definiteness. The National Guard with less definiteness and less perfectly trained but fully organized; the Organized Reserve Force is as yet wholly theoretical as to enlisted component—no one can at present foretell with anything better than an estimate as to how this may develop; but in any case, if we are able to maintain the officer personnel in the numbers required in the various grades, by that alone much will have been accomplished, since with the officer personnel the *basis of organisation* for war can be made in time of peace. It is the policy of the War Department, as I understand it, not to ask for further legislation unless by actual trial the present law should fail to produce the means whereby the mission, which it clearly describes, can be accomplished.

I have spoken mainly of personnel so far. The War Department plans being prepared under the various provisions of the National Defense Act, as amended, include not only the adequate reserve munitions and equipment of all kinds, but careful studies and plans for the coordination and mobilization of the industries necessary to supply the Field Armies with all manner of equipment and munitions as the reserves become exhausted. These studies and plans are all based upon the man-power curve as the general guide.

The careful studies so far made and the policies thereunder in process of development are to be convincing proof that as a piece of constructive legislation involving a broad policy

covering the probable needs of National Defense, this law is by far the best and most rational ever placed on our statute books.

The mandate in Section 3, modestly interpreted by the War Department as its mission, is yet so large an undertaking that the means provided by the law may not be sufficient for its accomplishment. There are many of our best informed both inside and outside the Army who believe that universal training alone will be sufficient. The earnest and honest effort now being made should before long give us definite and sufficient information for intelligent recommendations as to necessary or desirable modifications.

NAVAL PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES ¹

Appearing before the House Naval Affairs Committee on January 11, Secretary Daniels declared that the time was ripe for a limitation of naval armaments by general international agreement. Such a movement, in his opinion, might properly be initiated by President-elect Harding, who could call and hold an international disarmament conference within two months after his inauguration. As President he would have complete authorization to call such a conference under the Naval Appropriation act of 1916.

On the following day Mr. Daniels presented to the committee the first complete official picture of the relative naval strength, present and prospective, of the three leading naval powers—the United States, Great Britain and Japan. One of his tables, which showed the tonnage and number of vessels of each type, was this:

GREAT BRITAIN		
	Tons	Ships
Battleships	635,650	26
Destroyers	356,418	334
Light cruisers	189,295	44
Battle cruisers	175,400	6
Submarines	85,505	98
Aircraft carriers	67,200	4
Destroyers' leaders	41,774	24
Cruisers	37,200	2
Total	1,588,442	538

¹ Current History Magazine. 13:189-190. February, 1921.

DISARMAMENT

9

UNITED STATES

	Tons	Ships
Battleships	435,750	16
Destroyers	308,200	260
Light cruisers
Battle cruisers
Submarines	35,361	54
Total	779,173	330

JAPAN

	Tons	Ships
Battleships	178,320	6
Destroyers	26,926	27
Light cruisers	25,350	6
Battle cruisers	110,000	4
Total	340,596	43

The authorized building programs were given as follows:

GREAT BRITAIN

	Tons
Battleships	None
11 Destroyers	14,390
5 Light cruisers	38,780
Battle cruisers	None
19 Submarines	21,970
1 Destroyer leader	1,750
Cruisers	None

Total: 36 units; 76,890 tons

UNITED STATES

	Tons
11 Battleships	421,900
38 Destroyers	48,100
10 Light cruisers	71,000
6 Battle cruisers	261,000
43 Submarines	38,100

Total: 100 units; 842,109 tons

JAPAN

	Tons
3 Battleships	112,050
15 Destroyers	16,710
9 Light cruisers	51,800
4 Battle cruisers	160,000
10 Submarines	8,500

Total: 41 units; 328,460 tons

Mr. Daniels said that in addition to this authorized program Japan had a "projected" building program of:

	Tons
4 Battleships	149,850
30 Destroyers	33,420
4 Battle cruisers	160,000
30 Submarines	25,500

Total: 68 units; 368,370 tons

SECRETARY DANIELS' STATEMENT ¹

With reference to the naval program of the United States, there are just two courses, and only two, open.

1. To secure an international agreement with all, or practically all, the nations, which will guarantee an end of competition in navy building, reduce the national burden and lead in the movement to secure the buttress world peace.

2. To hold aloof from agreement or association with the other nations as to the size of armament. This will require us to build a navy strong enough and powerful enough to be able, on our own, to protect Americans and American shipping, defend American policies in the distant possessions as well as at home, and by the presence of sea power to command the respect and fear of the world.

There is of course the third alternative of being content with a small navy in a world of big navies, exposed to certain destruction in case of war with a great power or powers. I dismiss that alternative without discussion, because it is a waste of money to spend money on an agency of war which would be helpless if needed. Whatever else the American people may approve they will not approve such an ineffective policy. Equality with the greatest or an international agreement alone can be seriously considered.

Of the only two plans for consideration I am here to press the first. The hour had arrived before the World War for international agreement if the statesmanship of the world had been equal to the opportunity. An international conference to end competitive navy construction was proposed by me in my first annual report in December, 1913, and proposed in every successive report and in every hearing before the Naval Affairs Committee for nearly eight years . . .

I held, in 1913, the opinion I wish to emphasize now: that no half-way measures would meet the world question. An alliance limited to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan would make for suspicion and distrust and be followed later by a counter-entente of other nations jealous of what they regard as an Anglo-Saxon and Japanese alliance to dictate to

¹ From the New York Times, January 12, 1921.

the world. The big world has too many different interests and convictions to look with favour upon an alliance of three great nations. I am sure these three would entertain no desire to use their allied power to oppress other nations, but I am equally sure that it would be impossible to convince all nations of our unselfish aims.

The suggested alliance or holiday between the United States, Great Britain and Japan ought not to be seriously considered. Instead of securing permanent reduction and contributing to lasting world peace, it would dig up more snakes that it would kill. Let us not be stampeded in a tripartite alliance under the propaganda of saving money today by affronting all other nations or notifying them that they are not in a class to be consulted upon one of the great questions which affects every nation and all the peoples of the world.

I would not ask the world to trust the United States to be always just and unselfish if it had a navy so big it could be master of the seas. The world would not trust the United States or any other two nations having an alliance either of reduction or expansion. They would say: "If these three nations are allied to take a holiday and reduce this year, why may they not increase next year and hold all the world at their mercy?" Let us not be a party to inviting such feeling upon the part of friendly nations willing to go into a world-wide agreement for reduction.

In 1913 I was opposed to naval holiday for one year. In 1921 I am opposed to the proposition for a half-holiday by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, or any other few powers. Holidays indicate a cessation from work for a brief period with a view to returning to the old job when the holiday is over. The only wise course is to end competitive navy building, not for one year or five years, and not by a few nations, but for all time by all nations.

The time is ripe for securing such agreement now, and I would regard it as a serious mistake to fail to embrace the opportunity for a permanent policy of reduction by accepting in its place a substitute in the shape of a terminable and unsatisfactory holiday. The world is asking for no play time but for serious business.

THE REPORT ON WHICH PRESENT BUILDING PROGRAM IS BASED¹

The navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. It should be gradually increased to this point by such a rate of development year by year, as may be permitted by the facilities of the country, but the limit above defined should be attained not later than 1925.

The General Board is convinced of the great advantages, both military and economic, which will follow upon the acceptance of the general principle of a building program extending over a period of years. . . . On one hand a continuing program enables the Navy Department to plan with greater foresight than is possible with an annual noncontinuing program. The military end to be reached at the close of such a period is thus made clearly evident by the Navy Department to Congress and to the country. On the other hand, a degree of financial security is offered the industries of the country by the foreknowledge which they thus obtain as to probable naval expenditures. This will encourage them to invest money in enlarging their plants for naval shipbuilding and all its allied industries. At the same time, the strong probability of continued work throughout the period of the program, will tend to reduce contract prices.

The General Board believes that the course of the present war in Europe affords convincing reasons for modifying the opinion which it has expressed for the past eleven years as to the proper size of the navy.

A navy in firm control of the seas from the outbreak of the war is the prime essential to the defense of a country situated as is the United States bordering upon two great oceans. A navy strong enough only to defend our coast from actual invasion will not suffice. Defense from invasion is not the only function of the navy. It must protect our seaborne commerce and drive that of the enemy from the sea. The best way to accomplish all these objects is to find and defeat the hostile fleet or any of its detachments at a distance from our

¹ From Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1915, 75-76, quoting report of General Board of the Navy Department.

coast sufficiently great to prevent interruption of our normal course of national life. The current war has shown that a navy of the size recommended by this Board in previous years can no longer be considered as adequate to the defensive needs of the United States. Our present navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in peace nor to enforce its policies in war.

THE NAVAL PROBLEM¹

Navies are more closely allied in the public mind with foreign relations than armies. Differences between nations that are contiguous to each other are comparatively few; they alone raise a question of employing armies. All other differences have had the navy in the background as a final resort. And there is a notable tendency on the part of the naval men to bank on that circumstance: "Our present navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in peace," according to the American General Board of the Navy.

Time was when that attitude was unquestioned and when the number of naval powers was great enough to justify it in some degree. But the situation has changed. The World War has given the naval rivalry an entirely new aspect. Just before it some figures were carefully compiled with the object of showing the monetary investment of the world in navies. It was found that the then eight powers had combined fleets with a conservatively indicated worth of \$3,958,327,000, while the twelve other powers having fleets of any size could value them only at \$397,931,000, or substantially one-tenth. Obviously, any possible rivalry then was confined to the leading eight. But after the World War there emerge but five powers with major fleets, and their naval armament is relatively larger than before the war, in comparison with the minor fleets. In fact, on the basis of tonnage, Great Britain in 1914 had the only fleet as big as the total minor navies, while today four out of the five majors each outranks all the minors together. Not only has the discrepancy between majors and minors increased, but the differences among the majors have become notably

¹ From *The Staggering Burden of Armaments*. World Peace Foundation.

large. The war, generally speaking, effected great reductions in tonnage by rendering ships obsolete, so that only Great Britain and the United States show increases from 1914 to 1921. For comparison, the figures are:

FLEET TONNAGES, 1914 AND 1921

	MAJOR		Percentage of 1921 to 1914
	1914	1921	
Great Britain	2,188,250	2,412,146	114
Germany	951,713	Minor	...
United States	765,133	1,196,281	156
France	665,748	514,584	77
Japan	519,640	492,652	94
Russia	270,861	Dispersed	...
Italy	285,460	145,891	51
Austria-Hungary	221,526	No navy	...
	5,868,331	4,761,554	81
MINOR			
Argentina	120,760	59,680	49
Brazil	117,591	46,600	39
Chile	113,508	38,630	34
Denmark	37,197	(?)	...
Greece	55,950	41,004	73
Germany	Major	94,964	...
Netherlands	95,907	4,766	04
Norway	39,288	1,623	04
Peru	19,122	7,000	36
Portugal	21,919	1,846	08
Spain	117,819	46,804	39
Sweden	89,179	1,880	02
Turkey	70,560	7,000	09
	898,800	351,791	39

What the war did to fleets was to send practically everything of any age to the junk pile or to the intermediate purgatory of being out of commission. The British naval list of March, 1914, gives seventy-six battleships; the United States Naval Intelligence now credits her with twenty-six, while the British return to Parliament of March, 1921, accounts for only twenty-two. Statistics of current value are discrepant, showing the doubts in the minds of the experts. The British return referred to arranges ships according as they do or do

not embody war lessons; Rear Admiral A. T. Long, Director of Naval Intelligence, writes that "it is not possible to state definitely what vessels embody the lessons learned at Jutland, but the Office can furnish you with what is believed to be the correct numbers of total ships in the various classes. This statement follows:

STRENGTH OF MAJOR NAVIES, MAY 1, 1921

	Great Britain	United States	Japan	France	Italy
Battleships, 1st line.....	26	16	6	7	5
Battleships, 2d line.....	6	16	4	10	3
Battle cruisers, 1st line.....	6	..	4
Battle cruisers, 2d line.....	4
Cruisers, 1st line	2
Cruisers, 2d line.....	4	10	5	7	3
Light cruisers, 1st line.....	45	..	8	4	5
Light cruisers, 2d line.....	14	3	1	1	3
Destroyer leaders	20
Destroyers, 1st line.....	237	286	35	10	14
Destroyers, 2d line.....	16	21	12	36	29
Submarines	147	102	?	62	23
Aircraft carriers	6

In connection with fleets as a whole, one of the most frequent arguments used is the necessity of defending coast lines. At first glance it seems clear that the relation between sea exposure and sea power is fundamental; but on closer examination no such conclusion follows. The character of a coast—the number, size and contour of its harbors, for instance—may throw theory awry. On our own Atlantic seaboard there are several good harbors to one on the Pacific. The British Atlantic coast includes not only the British Isles, but portions of Africa, North and South America and the West Indies. The Dutch colonial coasts are twenty-four times the length of that of the Netherlands itself and thousands of miles away from the métropole, etc. So it would seem that no general conclusions can be drawn from such figures; but as they have not been published¹ they are presented herewith for what they are worth:

¹ The statistics are rearranged from a photostat chart of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Office, with additions from the Serial No. 22.

SEA COAST OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD

	Statute Miles				Totals
	Pacific	Atlantic	Indian	Arctic	
Argentine Republic.....	2,418	2,418
Belgium	71	71
Brazil	4,007	4,007
Central American states.....	904	887	1,791
Chile	2,883	58	2,890
China	3,604	3,604
Colombia	1,002	1,071	2,073
Cuba	2,855	2,855
Denmark	2,503	1,842	4,346
Ecuador	835	835
France	2,291	4,941	3,017	10,250
Morocco	1,082	1,082
Germany	1,989	1,989
Great Britain	11,487	15,303	17,394	5,320	49,504
Greece	1,301	1,301
Crete	415	415
Haiti	737	737
Holland	12,506	607	4,698	17,811
Italy	2,815	1,347	4,163
Tripoli	1,048	1,048
Japan	5,286	5,286
Korea	1,393	1,393
Liberia	1,082	1,082
Mexico	3,777	1,675	5,452
New Hebrides and Santa Cruz Islands	449	449
Norway	1,559	794	2,353
Oman	1,520	1,520
Persia	967	967
Peru	1,762	1,762
Portugal	282	2,320	1,825	4,427
Rumania	138	138
Russia	7,210	2,637	10,571	20,417
San Domingo	668	668
Spain	3,025	3,025
Sweden	1,458	1,458
Tonga (Friendly) Islands....	311	311
United States ¹	2,410	10,467	12,877
Alaska	15,132	15,132
Philippine Islands	10,850	10,850
Porto Rico	362	362
Guam	84	84
Hawaiian Islands	810	810
Panama Canal Zone	29
Samoa Islands	91	91
Uruguay	345	345
Venezuela	1,330	1,330

¹ Tidal shore line, unit measure 3 statute miles, for United States and possessions. The general coast line of the United States proper is: Atlantic, 1888; Gulf, 1629; Pacific, 1366; total, 4883.

The cost of a navy is constantly rising and the types of vessels multiplying. The latest figures for naval matériel as given in House and Senate hearings in January and February follow:

COST OF NAVAL VESSELS¹

Battleship, with ammunition	\$43,145,000 ⁵⁴
Battleship, without ammunition	38,500,000
Airplane carrier, 35,000 tons	28,600,000
Airplane carrier, 25,000 tons	21,600,000
Cruiser, 10,000 tons	9,900,000
Submarine chaser	5,900,000
Fleet submarine	4,000,000
Transport	4,000,000
Mine-laying submarine	2,500,000
Destroyer	2,000,000
Gunboat	1,100,000

COST OF AIRCRAFT²

(Heavier than air)

Ships' spotting planes	\$41,000 ⁵⁴
Ships' fighting planes	38,910
Torpedo planes	87,400
Reconnaissance planes	34,540
Pursuit planes	34,980
Practice planes	40,090

(Lighter than air)

Non-rigid airship	\$160,000
Small touring airship	60,000
Kite balloons	15,000
Free balloons	5,000

Another phase of naval costs is deterioration. Vessels are retired after a period of service which is constantly decreasing in length. A battleship can not be expected in these days to hold its place more than ten years, though it may not be written off completely for a much longer time. German battleships, by the treaty of Versailles, may not be replaced for twenty years. In time of peace, "obsolete" is the cause of death of naval vessels. The very special character of naval craft is illustrated by the fact that they are worth practically nothing except for their designed purposes. The following table, drawn from British sources because American figures

¹ Testimony of Rear-Admiral David W. Taylor, Chief, Bureau of Construction and Repair, House Hearings, 547, 767, 769.

² Hearing before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 1921, 67.

seem not to be available, shows that ten years ago the junk value was negligible:

WHAT OBSOLETE MEANS IN MONEY

British Warships Sold in 1909-10

Name	Year of Completion	First Cost	Sale Price	Value of Gear Removed
Rodney	1887-88	\$3,741,825.78	\$103,761.00	\$25,680.24
Collingwood	1886-87	3,431,534.22	93,340.00	2,629.26
Snap	1872-73	43,944.12	4,568.40	466.56
Anson	1888-89	3,525,570.36	103,032.00	15,969.96
Benbow	1887-88	3,765,484.26	103,032.00	18,543.70
Thunderer	1877-78	2,151,070.02	94,770.00	8,733.42
Defiance II	1861	304,979.58	6,925.50	106.92
Hornet	1894-95	181,768.86	5,832.00	3,353.40
Torpedo boat	1887-88	81,432.28	1,458.00	340.20
Submarine	1907-08	234,567.90	83,623.88	53.46
Gladiator	1899-1900	1,397,757.44	73,507.50
Lee	1900-1901	277,885.08	315.90	10,045.62
Mooding Lighter No. 77	1827	Not known	73,507.50
Harpy	1845-46	83,557.98	972.00
Daisy	1878-79	6,546.70	315.90
Totals		\$19,227,914.58	\$676,207.38	\$85,922.74
Total receipts from sale			\$762,130.12	
Expenses of sale			2,721.84	
Net receipts			\$759,408.28	
Percentage of net receipts to first cost, 3.8%				

A BRITISH VIEW¹

America's naval plans dominated the debate on the British Navy estimates in the House of Commons last night. Sir Edward Carson appeared as the leader of the big navy party because of his belief in the necessity of building against the United States. His stand in this character is particularly important at this juncture, when the disappearance of Bonar Law is hailed by the Tory extremists as a great opportunity for them to assert themselves as the ruling faction.

He warned the Government if they failed through economizing to maintain the one power standard they should "tell it to the people, tell it to the empire, tell them there is another naval power which may interrupt the great highways of the empire. Let them see what they can do to prevent the greatest catastrophe that has ever happened in this country."

He expressed the hope that pressure had not been put to British naval experts to make them agree to the one-power

¹ From New York World. March 19, 1921.

standard and to assume the risks which may prove dangerous to the country. It was "a most unambitious programme, laid down solely because of economic conditions," he said.

Turning to the American programme, he echoed Sir Frederick Danbury, member for the City of London, declaring exactly the same thing—that America is not building against England—had been said about Germany.

"The remembrance of this," he exclaimed passionately, "burns in my very soul, and we all know that that is always the argument," adding "the United States will have eighteen capital ships of post-Jutland class, and assuming our programme is carried out we shall have only five," while Japan and the United States will have twenty-five against England's five.

He called upon the Government to "sternly watch the situation so next year they may bring forward a larger programme if necessary, when shipbuilding will have returned to more normal conditions."

NAVAL HOLIDAYS¹

This is not the first time in recent history that the air has been filled with talk about a "naval holiday." On the last occasion, in 1913, just ten months before the outbreak of the Great War, Mr. Winston Churchill, in his capacity as head of the British Admiralty, delivered a speech on the naval strength of the European Powers in which he said:

You will remember the proposals which I made in introducing the Navy Estimates of this year for what has been called a "naval holiday." . . . Our relations with Germany have greatly improved without the loss of our friendships with other countries. The moment, therefore, is not unfavourable for taking up the friendly reference to the question of a naval holiday which is to be found in the German Chancellor's speech. . . . Now we say, while there is plenty of time, in all friendship and sincerity to our great neighbour Germany: "If you will put off beginning your two ships for twelve months from the ordinary date when you would have begun them, we will put off beginning our four ships, in absolute good faith, for exactly the same period." That would mean that there would be a complete holiday for one year so far as big ships are concerned between Great Britain and Germany. There would be a saving, spread over three years, of nearly six millions to this country, and the relative strength of the two countries would be unchanged.

Now it is not an unprofitable exercise in these days to examine the conditions under which the spokesman for the

¹ From *The Freeman*. p. 604. March 9, 1921.

British Government made this proposal, apparently so fair and reasonable. First of all, British naval expenditure then, as now, had reached the breaking point; and the British taxpayer then, as now, was growing restive. But there were other and deeper reasons for the proposal—the secret naval and military plans of the Entente had been fully worked out and agreed upon. Among other incontrovertible testimony, Sazonov's letters to the Tsar are explicit on this point.

A glance at the British White Paper of 1914, giving the annual expenditure of the Great Powers on new naval construction, shows clearly the state of affairs when Mr. Churchill brought forward his proposal.

	Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
1909	£11,076,551	£4,517,766	£1,758,487	£10,177,062
1910	14,755,289	4,977,682	1,424,013	11,392,856
1911	15,148,171	5,876,659	3,216,396	11,710,859
1912	16,132,558	7,114,876	6,897,580	11,491,187
1913	16,883,875	8,893,064	12,082,516	11,010,883

There are, however, other figures to be considered if an impartial judgment is to be formed in this matter: namely, the figures showing the gross naval expenditure and the expenditure on new construction of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance in the year preceding the outbreak of the war.

GROSS NAVAL EXPENDITURES, 1913

Great Britain	£49,625,636	Germany	£23,030,633
France	21,292,422	Austria	7,332,703
Russia	25,392,784	Italy	13,333,762
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Triple Entente.....	£96,310,842	Triple Alliance.....	£43,697,098

NEW CONSTRUCTION, 1913

Great Britain	£16,883,875	Germany	£11,010,883
France	8,893,064	Austria	3,288,937
Russia	12,082,516	Italy	3,933,000
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Triple Entente.....	£37,859,455	Triple Alliance.....	£18,232,820

Italy's naval expenditure, of course, did not give much aid and comfort to her partners in the Alliance, because they knew well enough that her thrifty diplomatists had already bound her to France by a secret naval treaty which would prevent her from taking part in a war against the Entente.

In a word then, the amiable suggestion of a "naval holiday" was merely another case of heads, I win; tails, you lose. How

could it be expected that the German Admiralty would entertain the idea as long as Britain's allies, France and Russia, were increasing their naval expenditures by leaps and bounds? No one knew better than Mr. Churchill that the German Government would not even consider the suggestion to cease building unless the building plans of France and Russia were checked as well as Britain's. Indeed the attitude of Germany at that time is accurately reflected in an official report from Berlin to M. Pichon, then French Minister of Foreign Affairs; which makes it pretty plain why the proposal for a holiday received such scant attention at German hands.

It would not be amiss if those who are now talking so easily about the notion of an Anglo-American naval holiday would take a backward glance at the naval expansion of the great Powers from 1887 when the German imperialists first raised the cry for colonies. A few years later the Franco-Russian Alliance was consummated, and England began at once to build against the combination; and Germany also took what are pleasantly called "precautionary measures."

GROSS NAVAL EXPENDITURES, 1887

Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
£12,375,000	£8,452,000	£4,352,000	£4,179,000

GROSS NAVAL EXPENDITURES, 1897

Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
£21,972,000	£10,444,000	£6,239,000	£6,467,000

After the Boer War, in 1904, the year in which the Anglo-French agreement was signed, the figures for gross expenditure were:

Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
£42,431,000	£12,517,143	£12,072,381	£11,659,000

Let us now glance at what was happening in Germany. The German Fleet Law was laid down in 1905 (the year after the publication of the Anglo-French agreement), and was amended in 1906, and 1908. At the time of the second amendment the navies of the first three Powers were as follows:

	Battleships	Armoured Cruisers	Destroyers
Great Britain	57	34	142
France	21	19	48
Germany	22	8	61

So the fateful year was ushered in and the race for naval supremacy reached its disastrous end. The moral of the whole miserable story, in our view, is something like this: That no one suggests a naval holiday unless it is quite convenient to have one, and that the road to war is paved with preparedness. But moral or no moral, we should like to suggest to those who are interested in the present agitation for an Anglo-American naval holiday that they would do well to study very thoroughly the motives which underlay the last proposal, the reasons why it came to naught, and how dire were the consequences of turning nations of men into nations of jingoes cowering behind dreadnaughts.

THE DOOM OF THE TAXPAYER¹

The financial aspect of armament may properly be first considered in connection with the world war. The total direct costs of the war, not counting interest charges, is officially given at \$186,000,000,000 for all belligerents. The capitalized value of human life destroyed, soldiers and civilians, on a conservative basis is given as \$67,102,552,560. The claims for damages against Germany, constituting part of the price she pays for the privilege of using her armament, preferred under the treaty of Versailles by the parties thereto as officially reported to the Reparation Commission, but without review, was \$47,639,092,718, or about a billion a month for the duration of the war. Shipping and cargo losses are given as \$6,800,000,000; loss of production at \$45,000,000,000; war relief and loss to neutrals at \$2,750,000,000.² These figures total \$355,291,719,815.

It may roughly be said that \$350,000,000,000 is the financial handicap that the world has taken on since 1914.

The loss of life is given in a compilation of the Danish Research Society on the Social Results of the War as follows:

	Dec. in Birth Rate	Loss Through Inc. of Death Rate	Among Those Killed in War	Total Loss
Germany	3,600,000	2,700,000	2,000,000	6,300,000
Austria-Hungary	3,800,000	2,000,000	1,500,000	5,800,000
Gt. Britain, Ireland.....	850,000	1,000,000	800,000	1,850,000
France	1,500,000	1,840,000	1,400,000	3,340,000

¹ From *The Staggering Burden of Armaments*. p. 213-20. World Peace Foundation.

² Ernest L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the World War*, 299.

Belgium	175,000	400,000	115,000	875,000
Italy	1,400,000	880,000	600,000	2,280,000
Bulgaria	155,000	130,000	65,000	275,000
Rumania	150,000	360,000	159,000	510,000
Servia	320,000	1,330,000	690,000	1,650,000
Europe	8,300,000	4,700,000	2,500,000	13,000,000
Russia and Poland.....	20,250,000	15,130,000	9,829,000	35,580,000

In the English House of Commons on December 20, 1920, Mr. Lloyd George, replying to Sir A. Shirley Benn said the Government was considering whether a return, showing the cost of the Great War to each nation which had been engaged in it, could be compiled without labor or expense disproportionate to its value. Sir A. Shirley Benn.—Is the right honorable gentleman aware that it is reported that there were 30,000,000 casualties, including 9,000,000 deaths, and that the cost amounted to £50,000,000,000 direct and £67,000,000,000 indirect, and would it not be advisable to have an authoritative statement to hand down to future generations, so that they might know what war meant? Mr. Lloyd George.—These figures are substantially accurate. I agree it would be very desirable, if possible, to get full returns, but it does not depend entirely upon this country. It involves investigations abroad, and in some countries where the losses were very heavy the return would be, at the best, conjecture. In Russia, Austria and Turkey we could not get anything like accurate estimates.

The worst of these percentages is not their size. The worst of it is that these post-war figures would only be cut about 15 per cent, if the world returned to its former habits. The United States, which just now is setting the pace in armament competition used to spend more than 70 per cent of its total annual budget for war purposes, not in a single year only, but on the basis of the running of the government since 1870. Here are the figures:

EXPENDITURES FOR ARMED PEACE AND WAR

	1870-1916 Omitting Spanish- American and World Wars 47 years	1870-1919 Including Spanish- American and World Wars 50 years
Army	\$3,956,346,000	\$19,334,031,000
Navy	2,594,530,000	6,229,612,000
Interest	2,455,865,000	3,294,001,000
Pensions	4,906,803,000	5,469,874,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
All other purposes.....	13,913,544,000 = 71.5 5,543,727,000 = 28.5	34,327,578,000 = 76.4 10,672,148,000 = 23.6
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	\$19,457,271,000 = 100.0	\$44,937,065,000 = 100.0

The burden of this debt brings it about that every belligerent has such staggering taxation as to hamper all the processes of national and individual life. For the first time in history a nation, dismembered Austria, has gone into the hands of a receiver. Moreover, eleven out of twelve European states, even with tremendous taxation are spending far beyond their income, and three out of four countries in the world are unable to

raise the taxes to meet their running expenses. The United States, widely heralded as the richest nation in the world, this year shows an estimated Treasury deficit of \$2,005,037,000 and in 1922 of \$1,448,581,000,¹ taking into account as part of expenditures refunding operations of the fiscal periods. In Europe the situation is so bad that any nation which can even approach normal conditions of solvency regards that as a triumphal accomplishment.

GROWTH OF MILITARY AND NAVAL EXPENDITURE, 1872-1921

COUNTRY	1872	1912	1921	1912 percentage of increase based on 1872	1921 percentage of increase based on 1872
Austria-Hungary.	\$51,081,000	\$130,557,000	155%
France.....	111,073,000	259,349,000	\$1,316,130,000	133%	1085%
Germany.....	71,824,000	312,967,000	335%
Great Britain....	125,461,000	351,044,000	1,121,318,000	180%	794%
Italy.....	43,971,000	125,143,000	126,527,000	185%	188%
Russia.....	118,330,000	371,871,000	214%
United States....	56,621,000	244,177,000	1,422,752,000	331%	2413%
Totals.....	\$578,361,000	\$1,795,108,000	210%

Italy, for instance, after a herculean effort at paring down national expenses proudly announces that this year's deficit has been cut from 14,000,000,000 lire to 10,000,000,000; and the cabinet got a vote of confidence as a result.

The United States is but little better off than Europe. The year after the war, Congress appropriated 92 per cent of the total allotment of money for the year ending June 30, 1920, for purposes of war, leaving 8 per cent for the rest of the Government. By a certain amount of luck and a slight disposition toward economy the expenditures fell below the appropriation and the percentage of disbursements for that year was 86.4 per cent for war purposes and 13.6 per cent for the normal activities of civilization.

¹ Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. 1920, p. 278.

Meantime, the army and navy had acquired billion dollar habits, and the percentages since then stand as follows:

CURRENT FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES

By the United States Bureau of Efficiency¹

	1921 Appropriations	1922 Estimates
Past wars	\$2,838,118,400 ² = 67.9%	\$1,794,575,915 = 44.10%
National defense (Army and Navy)	855,956,962 = 20.5%	1,548,025,312 = 38.05%
Total, past wars and present defense	3,694,075,362 = 88.4%	3,343,601,227 = 82.15%
General purposes (except Post Office)	481,744,726 = 11.6%	725,848,630 = 17.85%
Total for all purposes (except Post Office).	\$4,175,820,088 = 100.00	\$4,068,449,857 = 100.00

It is a notable fact that after every war expenditures for military and naval purposes have tended to rise. The reason is not far to seek. The "experts" who before the war explained that their current weapons were absolutely necessary, on emerging from a war, discover that much of the armament they went in with was a broken reed. The guns did not shoot far enough, the ships were not big enough: and expenses take another jump. A war in which a nation is an onlooker has the same effect. And so, after conflict, "the danger of bleeding to death in time of peace" is increased. The World War is no exception to the rule, as witness these figures:

GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS AFTER WAR

Country	ARMY		NAVY	
	1912	1921 ³	1912	1921 ³
Belgium	\$13,119,000	\$107,823,000	No navy	
France	177,656,000	1,148,331,000 ⁴	81,693,000	167,799,000 ⁴
United Kingdom	134,850,000	710,713,000 ⁵	216,194,000	410,605,000
Italy ⁶	83,284,000	80,815,000	41,859,000	45,712,000
Japan	47,066,000 ⁷	106,285,000	46,510,000 ⁷	176,072,000
United States....	107,787,000	771,530,000	136,390,000	651,222,000

¹ Prepared from table of the U. S. Board of Efficiency, Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations on H. J. Res. 424, 43.

² Includes cost of Federal Control of Railroads in 1921.

³ Values of foreign money in dollars calculated on a gold basis, as most nearly representing the burden upon the populations affected.

⁴ Figures for year 1920.

⁵ Including air force.

⁶ Figures for fiscal years 1912-13 and 1919-20.

⁷ Figures for the fiscal year 1912-13.

A member of Congress has figured about the same thing for the United States in the terms of the cost per capita of the army, based on the army appropriation bills. These comparative figures follow:

COST OF ARMY PER CAPITA¹

Year	Officers and Enlisted Men	Army Appropriations	Per Capita Cost
1909.....	84,133	\$94,371,000	\$1,121
1910.....	84,500	100,459,000	1,189
1911.....	81,363	95,341,000	1,171
1912.....	87,094	92,587,000	1,063
1913.....	91,384	90,907,000	994
1914.....	94,890	94,241,000	993
1915.....	103,403	101,019,000	976
1916.....	105,120	101,959,000	969
1917.....	141,420	267,801,000	1,893
1918.....	1,358,713	1,358,713,000	3,863
1919.....	2,516,719	12,271,868,000	4,876
1920.....	294,015	772,324,000	2,630
1921.....	187,946	392,558,000	2,088

It is perhaps neither new nor startling to learn that armies have been steadily increasing in size, but the progress toward the military system of universal draft in case of hostilities is not unenlightening. In the following table the years 1800, 1854 and 1870 indicate the current effects of the Napoleonic, Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars. The later years were periods of peace. It will be noticed that in 1921 Germany and Austria had both ceased to be what they long had been, the European pivot of the armament race.

GROWTH OF STANDING ARMIES

	1800	1854	1870	1880	1900	1906	1921
Great Britain.....	169,428	417,046	302,405	307,494	513,363	445,731	425,000
France	160,230	260,000	393,500	609,983	672,565	677,581	735,000
Austria	280,000	539,000	800,000	291,876	375,291	409,838	22,000
Russia	433,000	677,000	733,000	947,000	1,119,000	1,225,000	1,500,000 ²
Germany	220,000	127,000	315,000	427,000	495,000	610,000	150,000 ³
United States.....	5,000	10,000	54,000	25,000	65,000	67,000	222,000 ⁴

¹ Congressional Record, April 30, 1921, 849.

² Probably not efficient as compared with other armies.

³ Since reduced to 100,000, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Versailles.

⁴ The figures for 1921 were given out by the War Department on February 16.

DISARMAMENT AND TAXATION¹

The driving power behind disarmament is still the question of its high cost. Some effective graphic representations of our expenditures on militarism are now in circulation. According to a report of Dr. Rosa of the United States Bureau of Standards for the year ending June 30, 1920, our expenditures were divided as follows:

1 Per Cent—Public welfare, including agriculture, development of natural resources, education, public health, and labor.

3 Per Cent—Public works.—

3.2 Per Cent—Administration of the government.

92.8 Per Cent—War and military establishment, which is divided as follows:

67.8 Per Cent—Past wars.

25 Per Cent—Present armament.

The taxes in this same year average about \$50 a person, of which \$50 was spent for research, education, and development.

WHAT WARS DO TO TAXES²

In the Debate on the naval bill, Congressman Burton, of Ohio, formerly a Senator from that State, gave some illuminating comparative figures as to the cost of Government, as follows:

The total expenses of the United States Government from its beginning, in 1789, until the 30th day of June, 1861, a period of seventy-two years, were \$1,970,000,000.

Then commenced the great Civil War. In the first three years of that struggle, from 1861 to 1864, expenditures surpassed the total for all the preceding seventy-two years and amounted to over \$2,000,000,000. If we add to that amount the expenses of the following year, 1865, they would reach the sum of \$3,396,000,000. In order to be entirely accurate it is necessary to disentangle from that total the civil expenses of those four years and incidentally to remark that in every

¹ From World Tomorrow. 4:36. February, 1921.

² From Searchlight. 5:17. May, 1921.

period of war there is an inevitable tendency toward expansion and extravagance in civil expenditures as well. But when due allowance is made for all these so-called civil expenditures, the total cost of the Civil War was \$3,100,000,000 down to the 30th of June, 1865, and that did not include a very large sum due upon claims thereafter liquidated between 1865 and 1870. So that the cost of the Civil War alone makes this startling showing of expenses nearly twice as great as the governmental expenditures in the seventy-two years preceding that time.

The late war has its lessons that are equally striking. The final estimate has not yet been made up. We can not tell how much is due to the direct and indirect costs of this conflict, but it is probable that the total cost will be quite as much as the total expenses of the Government in the one hundred twenty-eight years preceding.

The total estimated cost of this Government down to 1917 was approximately \$33,000,000,000; or if we make a computation merely to the 30th of June, 1916, the total was \$31,880,905,000. When we take into account the expenses of the following years including loans to the Allies, care of soldiers, vocational education, the expenses of maintaining the Shipping Board, deficits in railway operations, and interest on the public debt already paid, it is a safe estimate to say that the total amount will exceed the \$33,000,000,000 preceding 1917.

I am making these statements to show how futile it is to attempt any pruning without a radical change of the policies of our country in regard to war and peace. An estimate has been made that by a partial reorganization of the departments twenty thousand employees can be discharged. What does that mean? A saving about equal to the cost of a single battleship. Large expenses will continue as an aftermath of war. In the year that ended June 30, 1920, appropriations aggregated nearly \$5,900,000,000, of which barely \$400,000,000 was for the civil expenses of the Government. Thus 93 per cent was associated with war and 7 per cent for peace. For the disabled and suffering who fought in the late great struggle provision ought to be made to the last scruple in the Treasury. We all agree to that.

THE COST OF WAR ¹

Senator Spencer, of Missouri, contributed to the Congressional Record some interesting figures relating to gross war costs for the allied nations. These were prepared by Mr. Fred A. Dolph, and show a grand total of nearly one hundred eighty billions, divided as follows:

United States	\$44,173,948,225
Great Britain	51,052,634,000
France	54,272,915,000
Italy	18,680,847,000
Belgium	8,174,731,000
China	565,376,000
Japan	481,818,000

Against this cost Mr. Dolph estimates German indemnities at \$37,700,000,000, of which, in round numbers, he sees the United States getting two billion, Great Britain ten, France sixteen, Italy three and a half, Belgium six, China one hundred million, and Japan two hundred fifty million.

What the United States actually paid out for the great war is itemized as follows:

Military cost as per Secretary Houston.....	\$24,010,000,000
Extra cost Government functions under war conditions, as per Secretary of the Treasury	4,500,000,000
Civilian damages, lost shipping, and pensions to be paid....	2,300,000,000
Red Cross contributions	978,512,225
Other contributions estimated at one-half Red Cross amount.	490,000,000
Congressional European relief	100,000,000
Credit extended by Grain Corporation	60,375,000
Credit given by War Department	50,000,000
Credit given by Shipping Board	3,580,000
Credit given by American nationals to European nationals, as per bulletin of Bankers Trust Co.	1,921,481,000
Government loans to European nations, including unpaid interest	9,760,000,000
Total	\$44,173,948,225

ADDITIONAL FIGURES ON THE CASUALTIES
OF THE GREAT WAR ²

[An extract from a paper by Margaret Hatfield, compiled from Professor Ernest L. Bogart's book, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War."]

Let me give you a few figures which show the costs of one thousand, five hundred seventy days of war to the peoples of Europe. They are authentic figures, carefully compiled from

¹ From Searchlight. 5:11. March, 1921.

² From Disarmament: Hearings on H. J. Res. 424.

official sources by Professor Ernest L. Bogart, of the University of Illinois.

In war there are two kinds of costs, human costs and property costs. The former are immeasurably more important, but the latter are also significant because when a great deal of property useful to the support of life is destroyed, men, women and children suffer. Property losses, therefore, directly affect human beings.

First, let us see what the insurance of armaments, practiced by all the fighting nations, did toward insuring human life. In the one hundred twenty-three years from 1790 to 1913 there were nine big wars, including the great wars of Napoleon. In all these nine wars, four million four hundred forty-nine thousand men were killed in battle. In the four years and three months of the late European war ten million men were known to have been killed in battle and two million, nine hundred ninety-two thousand were "missing," which means that they also had been killed, shot into such fragments that they could not be identified. Altogether then almost thirteen million men were killed in battle or nearly three times as many as were killed in the nine previous wars in one hundred twenty-three years. So much for insurance against death in battle.

In addition to the thirteen million men killed there were twenty million, two hundred ninety-seven thousand men wounded. Studies have been made of the percentage of them that recovered from their wounds. It was found that a little over nine million of them, or 44 per cent recovered completely and became normal men again; ten million, five hundred thousand, or 52 per cent, recovered but they did not get back to normal—their ability was permanently reduced; 4 per cent of them either died from their wounds or became totally incapacitated—helpless, crippled, blind, armless, demented.

So much for the losses on the field of battle. To these human costs must be added those resulting from disease, pestilence, privation, and exhaustion suffered by the civilian population who were, you will remember, most particularly insured.

Over six million persons died from influenza, a war disease. Tuberculosis made gigantic strides during the war. Eighty-six thousand men were dismissed from the French Army in one year because of tuberculosis. They had been physically fit when

accepted as soldiers. This disease increased 75 per cent among the little children of Germany.

Famine and disease killed eight hundred thousand people in Roumania. Serbian and Austrian civilians, due to famine and spotted typhus, paid a death toll of nearly one million lives. In Russia two million civilians died in excess of the normal death rate. At the end of the war Dr. Lee, of the War Trade Board, traveling in Poland reported that children under six years of age had practically all perished from starvation.

Over one hundred thousand neutral seamen and fishermen were drowned at sea. I will not pursue this ghastly tabulation except to say that it may be fairly estimated that the loss of civilian lives, directly due to war, equals if it does not exceed that suffered by the armies in the field.

Twenty-five million people, including millions of women and children died in these one thousand, five hundred seventy days and millions more were weakened and exhausted by famine and disease. And all of them insured.

Turning now to the property destruction. Great areas in France, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Italy, and Austria have been literally blown to pieces, churned and riddled by trenches and shell holes and saturated with noxious gases, chemicals and liquid fire, so that the productive properties of the soil have been destroyed for generations. In Northern France one thousand, five hundred schools, one thousand, two hundred churches, three hundred seventy-seven public buildings, and over one thousand industrial plants were completely obliterated. The total of all property loss has been estimated at \$30,000,000,000, to which must be added \$7,000,000,000 more for the fifteen million tons of shipping sunk at sea. How much was the insurance worth on this \$37,000,000,000 of destroyed property?

Lastly, let us look at the money cost of the war to the various belligerent governments. This cost is not all dead loss for some of it went to feed and clothe soldiers but the great bulk of it was blown away or thrown away on purposes that served no useful human end.

Up to November, 1918, the Allied Governments had spent \$126,000,000,000 to prosecute the war while Germany and Austria had spent \$60,000,000,000, a total of \$186,000,000,000.

NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS ¹

(Figures presented by Senator King)

In 1900-1901 Great Britain expended for her navy—and it included all expenditures for construction, maintenance, and so forth—\$145,000,000 plus. I will give the first figures—not the hundreds of thousands. The United States in the same year expended for her naval purposes \$61,000,000, Germany \$37,000,000, and France \$72,000,000.

In 1901-2 Great Britain expended \$150,000,000, the United States \$68,000,000, Germany \$46,000,000, and France \$67,000,000.

In 1902-3 Great Britain expended \$150,000,000, the United States \$82,000,000, Germany \$48,000,000, and France \$59,000,000.

In 1903-4 Great Britain expended \$173,000,000, the United States \$104,000,000, Germany \$50,000,000, and France \$59,000,000.

In 1904-5 Great Britain expended \$179,000,000, the United States \$116,000,000, Germany \$49,000,000, and France \$60,000,000.

In 1905-6 Great Britain expended \$161,000,000, the United States \$109,000,000, Germany \$54,000,000, and France \$61,000,000.

In 1906-7 Great Britain expended \$152,000,000, the United States \$98,000,000, Germany \$58,000,000, and France \$59,000,000.

In 1907-8 Great Britain expended \$156,000,000, the United States \$120,000,000, Germany \$80,000,000, and France \$62,000,000.

In 1909-10 Great Britain expended \$181,000,000, the United States \$122,000,000, and Germany \$95,000,000. The Kaiser had determined to prepare in a military and naval way to carry out his ambitious projects and he felt the importance of a large navy. For the same year France appropriated \$64,000,000.

In 1910-11 Great Britain expended \$202,000,000, the United States \$111,000,000, Germany \$103,000,000, and France \$74,000,000.

In 1911-12 Great Britain expended \$211,000,000, the United States \$123,000,000, Germany \$107,000,000, and France \$80,000,000.

In 1912-13 Great Britain expended \$224,000,000, the United States \$129,000,000, Germany \$109,000,000, and France \$81,000,000.

In 1913-14 Great Britain expended but \$237,000,000, the United States \$136,000,000, Germany \$112,000,000, and France \$90,000,000.

In 1914-15—that would carry Great Britain into the period of the war—Great Britain expended \$260,000,000, the United States \$141,000,000, Germany \$113,000,000 only, and France \$123,000,000.

¹ Congressional Record. 61:1401. May 13, 1921.

So that, Mr. President, the highest figure reached by Germany for naval expenditures prior to the war and including one year of the war was \$113,000,000, and our highest appropriation was \$141,000,000. Now we are appropriating \$500,000,000 plus, because I make the prediction that if this bill shall pass in its present form we will be called upon to meet deficits and other expenditures for the Navy which will swell this sum millions of dollars.

THE WORLD'S DEBTS¹

In the light of the following facts, can the world pay its debts and continue the war game, and if not, what then?

NATIONAL POPULATION IN 1918 AND NATIONAL DEBTS BEFORE THE WAR AND AT PRESENT

	Population	Pre-War Debt	After War Debt
Great Britain.....(1914)	46,089,249	\$3,444,000,000	\$37,985,000,000
Great Britain.....(1918)	52,698,000
United States.....(1910)	91,972,206	1,103,000,000	26,116,000,000
United States.....(1919)	106,871,294
Russia.....(1915)	166,657,900	4,537,000,000	25,750,000,000
China.....(1911)	320,650,000	(estimated)
France.....(1911)	39,602,258	6,346,000,000	34,842,000,000
Italy.....(1915)	36,120,118	2,921,000,000	15,600,000,000
Japan.....(1913)	53,362,682
Japan.....(1918)	57,784,935
Germany.....(1910)	64,925,993	1,194,000,000	37,150,000,000
Great Britain Colonies.(1914)	437,947,432	3,297,000,000	6,971,000,000
Belgium.....(1914)	7,571,387	156,000,000	4,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary.....(1914)	50,000,000	1,044,000,000	25,799,000,000
Turkey.....	843,000,000	1,485,000,000
Bulgaria.....(1914)	4,755,000	223,000,000	486,000,000

COST OF WAR TO NEUTRAL NATIONS

Holland.....	\$672,000,000
Switzerland.....	250,000,000
Sweden.....	429,800,000
Norway.....	130,000,000
Denmark.....	90,000,000
Other countries.....	178,200,000

Total.....\$1,750,000,000

INCOMES AND COST OF ADMINISTRATION, JUNE 30, 1920

Country	Estimated Receipts 1919-20	Total Disbursements
United States...	\$21,499,790,327 (1918)	\$23,441,383,565
Great Britain....	1,201,100,000 £	1,665,772,928 £ (Expend. 1920)
France.....	10,064,657,897 Fr. (1918)	8,926,534,330 Fr.
Italy.....	5,099,929,886 Lire (1919)	4,810,654,310 Lire
Russia.....		49,100,000,000 Roubles
Germany.....	372,038,381 £ (Tot. Rev.)	387,938,381 £
China.....	472,838,584 (1916)	472,838,584 (Expend. 1916)
Japan.....	1,037,000,000 Yen (1919-20)	823,305,480 Yen (84,045,768 1)
Austria-Hungary.	4,854,789,000 Cr. (1918-19)

¹ By William G. Brown in Forum. 65:619-22. June, 1921.

It is apparent that the world's bonded debt has been increased by one hundred billion dollars and that the disbursements of the several countries are exceeding their receipts, and thus new sources of income must be found or the present tax rate increased. The young men killed in the war numbered 12,990,570. Property on land worth \$29,960,000,000 was destroyed, and \$45,000,000,000 in production of the useful things of the world was prevented. Of sea-going merchant vessels 13,007,650 gross tonnage was destroyed and lost at sea. The direct costs of the war were \$186,333,637,097 and the indirect costs of the war were \$151,646,942,560, making the total direct and indirect costs of the war \$337,980,579,657.

Great Britain, United States, France, Italy, and Japan have appropriated for the year 1920, two billion dollars more than these same countries appropriated during the fourteen years prior to 1920 for military establishments; and the United States under the present program is spending more for war purposes than all these others combined. The rates of exchange with the other countries clearly indicate that they cannot liquidate their indebtedness, unless the time is extended, and when the United States cannot sell its surplus manufactured articles abroad on account of exchange rates, in due course a similar condition will obtain here.

Without a complete, frank understanding and agreement between the peoples of the world for the liquidation of their mutual indebtedness, over such a period of time that will permit the world's production to pay the debts and the immediate stopping of the costs of future international wars, there can be but one end, viz.: the confiscation of property, with the inevitable consequences that have followed such action in the past.

THE NEW REGIME IN EUROPE¹

The armament problem was inevitably one of the subjects to be considered in the settlement of the World War. There were two possible points of view at the time of the armistice. One was to arrange for a change at the time and the other was to arrange for the future. The Allied and Associated Powers,

¹ From "The Staggering Burden of Armaments." World Peace Foundation.

the victors, decided not to change their own status at the moment, except to record in the several treaties of peace that the armament clauses there set forth were imposed upon the enemy "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." In other words, limitation was made a price of defeat, and the moral effect of a self-denying ordinance on the part of the victors was carefully avoided. Clinging to armament at a time when it could very easily be relinquished is one of the easiest things that civilization does.

Looking to the future, the Allied and Associated Powers were not quite so cautious. Their mutual engagement, which was framed for the immediate participation of neutrals, and now is binding upon forty-eight states, is to be found in Articles 8 and 9 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In those articles are positive injunctions from which something must come if good faith exists in the world. The details will be fully discussed forthwith, but it is for the moment desirable to see how the enemy powers, which before the war were undoubtedly the pivot of armament increase, have been treated in this respect by our victory over them.

Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey had their level of armaments set for them at Paris, and in each country military, naval and air commissions of the victorious powers are now established with the sole duty of seeing that the imposed conditions are fulfilled. It should be understood in reading the following summary of the treaty provisions that they have been revised to accord with the undisputed facts secured from Allied sources. Looking at the situation as a whole, none of the enemy states except Germany and Turkey are under suspicion of non-fulfilment, and the treaty with Turkey is not yet effective. As to Germany, the outstanding matters in dispute are technically rather than actually important from the present armament point of view. For instance, by the note of January 29, "there remain to be surrendered, in accordance with certain estimates, one thousand four hundred airplanes and five thousand motors." This demand was accomplished by a ruling that "Germany shall accept the definitions established by the Allied powers which shall distinguish civil aviation from military forbidden by Article 198." Inasmuch as such definitions had not previously been put into effect, it is not clear whether the demand was a result of them.

Germany had previously surrendered sixteen thousand air and twenty-five thousand motors. It is not to be doubted that the disarmament of Germany under the treaty is as complete as the very technical conditions of fact permit. The following summary of the existing conditions is official, revised official documents:¹

Military Forces—The German army strength may not exceed one hundred thousand including four thousand officers with not over seven divisions of infantry and three of cavalry to be devoted exclusively to maintenance of internal order and control of frontiers. The divisions may not be grouped with more than two army corps headquarters staffs. The German Great General Staff is abolished. The army administrative service, consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives, is reduced to one-tenth the total in the 1913 budget. Employees of the German states, such as customs officers, forest guards and coast guards, may not exceed the number in 1913. Gendarmes and local police may be increased only in accordance with the growth of population. None of these may be assembled for military training. The reserve of officers with war service is permitted. The high command confines itself to administrative duties.

Armaments—All establishments for the manufacturing, preparation, storage or design of arms and munitions of war except those specifically excepted have been closed and the personnel dismissed.² The exact amount of armament and munitions allowed Germany is laid down in detail tables, in excess to be surrendered or rendered useless. The manufacture or importation of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids is forbidden, as well as the importation of arms, munitions and war materials. Germany may not manufacture such materials for foreign governments. No reserves of munitions may be formed. No tanks may

¹ The provisions summarized are Part V, Articles 150-213, of the German treaty; Part V, Articles 118-159, of the Austrian treaty; Part I, Articles 64-104, of the Bulgarian treaty; Part V, Articles 102-143 of the Hungarian treaty; Part V, Articles 152-207, of the Turkish treaty, signed at Sévres, August 10, 1920.

² Turkey, 50,700 officers and men; Hungary, 35,000; Austria, 30,000 and Bulgaria, 20,000.

³ The Krupp works at Essen and the famous Skoda works are now both devoted to industrial manufactures. Cf. Commerce Reports, April 2, 1921.

armored cars shall be manufactured or imported. The Germans are obliged to notify to the principal Allies for approval the names and situation of all factories manufacturing munitions, together with particulars of their output. The German government arsenals are suppressed and their personnel has been dismissed. Munitions for use in fortified works will be limited to one thousand rounds apiece for guns of 10.5 cm. caliber and under, and four hundred rounds for guns of a higher caliber. Germany is prohibited from importing armaments and munitions.

Conscription—Conscription is abolished in Germany.¹ The enlisted personnel must be maintained by voluntary enlistments for terms of twelve consecutive years, the number of discharges before the expiration of that term not in any year to exceed 5 per cent of the total effectives. Officers remaining in the service must agree to serve to the age of forty-five years, and newly appointed officers must agree to serve actively for twenty-five years. No military schools except those absolutely for the units allowed shall exist. No association such as societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, educational establishments or universities may occupy themselves with military matters. All measures of mobilization are forbidden.

¹ The text of the act abolishing conscription in Germany as passed by the Reichstag on August 21, 1920, is as follows:

"1. The German defense force consists of the state army and the state navy, formed of volunteers and noncombatant officials. All members of the defense force must be of German nationality. Conscription (*allgemeine Wehrpflicht*) is abolished. All decrees to the contrary are rescinded.

"2. The number of men in the state army from January 21 next will be 100,000, and in the state navy, 15,000. In addition, there will be the requisite medical and veterinary officers.

"3. Any man wishing to enlist in the defense force must undertake to remain uninterruptedly in the state army or navy for 12 years.

"4. Before promotion to officer's rank a candidate must undertake to remain uninterruptedly in that rank for 25 years from the day of promotion.

"5. Members of the former army, the former navy, the former defense corps (*Schutztruppen*), the provisional state army and the provisional state navy, will be paid according to the provisions of the army pay act and budget act.

"Officers of both forces must agree to remain in the service until they have completed their 45th year.

"Noncommissioned officers retain their former insignia of rank, but may not claim to be given employment consonant with their former rank.

"6. This act comes into force on the day of its publication."—Translation from *Economic Review*, September 10, 1920.

A revised law was passed on March 19, 1921, in compliance with an allied demand.

Fortresses—All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in German territory within a zone fifty kilometers east of the Rhine are dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications there is forbidden. A few fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers remain.

Naval—The German navy is allowed six small battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, twelve torpedo boats and no submarines, either military or commercial, with a personnel of fifteen thousand men, including officers, and no reserve force of any character. Conscription is abolished, only voluntary service being permitted, with a minimum period of twenty-five years' service for officers and twelve for men. No member of the German mercantile marine will be permitted any naval training. All German vessels of war in foreign ports, the German High Sea Fleet, forty-two modern destroyers, fifty modern torpedo boats, and all submarines, with their salvage vessels were surrendered, and all war vessels under construction, including submarines, broken up. War vessels not otherwise provided for were placed in reserve or used for commercial purposes. Replacement of ships, except those lost, can take place only at the end of twenty years for battleships and fifteen years for destroyers. The largest armored ship permitted is of ten thousand tons. Material arising from the breaking up of German warships may not be used except for industrial purposes, and may not be sold to foreign countries. Except under specified conditions for replacement, Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships, and the construction or acquisition of any submarine whatever is prohibited. Vessels of war have a fixed allowance of arms, munitions and war material. All excess of arms, munitions and war material was surrendered, and no stocks or reserves are allowed. All Germany fortifications in the Baltic defending the passages through the Belts have been demolished. Other coast defenses are permitted, but the number and caliber of the guns must not be increased.

Air—The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigibles shall be kept. The entire air personnel is demobilized. No aviation grounds or dirigible sheds are allowed within one hundred fifty kilometers of the Rhine or the eastern or southern frontiers, existing installations within these limits to be destroyed. The manufacture of aircraft and parts of aircraft was forbidden for six months.

All military and naval aeronautical material under a most exhaustive definition was surrendered within three months.

Control—Interallied commissions of control are seeing to the execution of the provisions for which a time limit is set. Their headquarters are at the German seat of government—and they may go to any part of Germany desired. Germany must give them complete facilities, pay their expenses, and also the expenses of execution of the treaty, including the labor and material necessary in demolition and destruction of surrendered war equipment.¹

League of Nations Provisions

The articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations referring to the subject appear in the treaty of Versailles in this form:

ARTICLE I, 2. Any full self-governing state, dominion or colony not named in the annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guaranties of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

ARTICLE VIII. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each Member, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

¹ Marshal Foch reported German deliveries of arms on December 31, 1920, as follows:

Cannon (complete)	41,000
Cannon (barrels)	29,000
Machine guns (complete and barrels)	163,000
Rifles	2,800,000
Airplanes	16,000
Airplane motors	25,000

The German commissioner for disarmament of the population announced totals of arms, voluntarily delivered, purchased or confiscated up to January 10, 1921, apparently additional to the above, as follows: 932 cannon; 18,067 machine guns; 2,201,584 rifles and carbines; 78,325 revolvers and pistols; 85,616 hand grenades; 3,553 pieces of firearms; 246,357 pieces of machine guns; 312,905 pieces of rifles; and 4,624,189 cartridges. (*Le Temps*, January 15, 1921.)

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

ARTICLE IX. A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military, naval and air questions generally.

WHAT THE NEW GAS DOES ¹

This is the latest, the quotation being from D. B. Bradner, chief of the Chemical Research and Development Division, United States Chemical Warfare Service:

"The Chemical Warfare Service has discovered a liquid approximately three drops of which, when applied to any part of the skin, will cause a man's death . . . One plane carrying two tons of the liquid could cover an area one hundred feet wide by seven miles long in one trip and could deposit material to kill every man in that area by action on his skin. If the men were not protected by gas masks, which would be the case if the attack were made on a city, the fatal area would be several times as great... The only limit to the quantity of this liquid which could be made is the amount of available electric power, as nearly every nation has practically an unlimited supply of the necessary raw materials. It would be entirely possible for this country to manufacture several thousand tons per day, provided the necessary plants had been built.

¹ From "The Staggering Burden of Armaments," p. 224-5. World Peace Foundation.

... During the Argonne offensive in the past war the entire first American army of a million and a quarter men occupied an area of forty kilometers long by twenty kilometers wide. If Germany had had four thousand tons of this material and three or four hundred planes equipped for its distribution the entire first army would have been annihilated in ten to twelve hours. ... During the past war, gas produced over 30 per cent of our casualties. In the future the percentage will be far higher. New methods of defense will be devised to meet this particular new development."

The gas referred to was invented by W. Lee Lewis, head of the chemistry department of Northwestern University, in a series of experiments costing \$250,000 and conducted during the war by direction of the President. Speaking at West Point on April 20, Professor Lewis is reported as saying:

"We face the possibility in the naval warfare of the future of armor-piercing, toxic and tear shells, smoke screens, toxic smoke clouds and invisible toxic fumes. We also consider in this connection parallel defensive measures, such as a gas mask for a whole battleship. Gas weapons are capable of a much finer adaptation to purpose than explosive weapons and the future will see worked out a great degree of scientific refinement in the development of gas weapons for all types of military operations. Future battles will not be to the strong, but to the superior in intelligence. Warfare will become less a matter of brute strength and relative man power, and more and more a matter of scientific acumen."

THE NEXT WAR¹

I now predict that in the next great war the airplane is going to play the most important part of all arms of naval and military service. It was formerly supposed that no nation would dare to use poisonous gases for fear of retaliation. For the same reason it is now believed by many that no nation would dare to spread germs of deadly diseases. History proves that in warfare any nation of people will resort to any

¹ By Hudson Maxim in N. Y. Tribune. Reprinted in Minnesota Daily Star, July 23, 1921.

expedient whatsoever that promises success—that promises tory.

In the next great war not only will the most deadly poisonous gases be spread broadcast over actual contending forces, on land and sea, but also over inland cities. Not only the actual fighters be attacked, but non-combatants also will be attacked. In the next great war we may look for the most disastrous and far-reaching results from the use of the airplane as a sower of death and destruction.

In the next great war, we are going to see germs of the most deadly diseases sown broadcast by airplanes. We are going to see inland cities smothered in poisonous gases, tens of thousands of inhabitants, men, women and children killed in a few minutes.

Fleas and cooties or body lice will be infected with bubonic plague and typhus fever and other deadly ailments and sown by billions over the inhabitants of enemy countries. Rats and mice will be infected with bubonic plague and let down from airplanes to spread contagion. There will be no place that a man may hide himself and be safe from attack. All non-combatants will be exposed to destruction, as the sinful, according to Revelation, are to be exposed on the Day of Judgment.

Bombs carrying from half a ton to a ton of high explosives can now be carried by airplanes and dropped with most disastrous results, either upon or about enemy warships, and upon enemy fortifications and enemy cities.

Warfare today has lost most of the old heroics of combat between man and man, with pistol and clanking sword. Present-day warfare is viperous work; it is murder, pure and simple. There is nothing glorious about it, for there can be nothing glorious in smothering with poisonous gasses a city full of women and children.

Is it possible that we have reached a stage of intellectual development and mechanical accomplishment that is going to be suicidal? Is it possible that the human race is going to turn all its wonderful instrumentalities of this great mechanical age to the destruction of humankind? Are the same instrumentalities which have lifted mankind out of barbarism to be employed to send him back to barbarism?

It is time for the nations to take counsel of one another—time to call an armament truce and to make serious inquiry

as to whether or not there is some better use to which we can put our science and our inventions than mutual destruction.

THE AIRPLANE AND "WIRELESS" IN THE NEXT WAR¹

In Europe, and especially in France, military and naval experts are taking it for granted that there will be a "next war." According to Denis Gwynn, writing in the *Review of Reviews* (London), these experts are concentrating their attention upon the future developments of warfare in the air. Marshal Foch himself recently declared that "war in the future will be waged under the water and in the air, for both on land and on the sea it is impossible to escape destruction."

Expert opinion is gradually but surely awakening to the fact that the decision as to whether another Great War is to take place is being worked out silently and unobtrusively day after day, in the aeronautical schools of the Great Powers, and most especially in their wireless laboratories. For the future conquest of the air is going to depend less on the mechanical improvement of the airplanes and airships with which we are familiar than upon the application to aeronautics of the amazing wireless experiments which have been occupying the attention of electrical engineers during the past three years, and in which the French have had the earliest and most conspicuous success.

The French electrical engineers have already demonstrated that the strategy of all countries will, within a few years, have to reckon with the existence of airplanes capable of flying under the direction of wireless control exercised at great distances from the scene of their operation. Submarines and torpedoes will be navigated and manipulated in the same way. They will be made to change their course at will in pursuit of the ships they are sent out to destroy.

After a long series of experiments in 1918 the French Air Service succeeded in getting an airplane equipped with a wireless apparatus to rise in the teeth of the wind and maneuver successfully in the air for fifty-one minutes until it had completed the circuit of a hundred kilometers which it was

¹ From *Review of Reviews*. 64:96-7. July, 1921.

intended to cover. Although this airplane flew without any pilot on board, its course was completed without a single error.

The technical details of the invention may be left to scientific men. It is sufficient to say that for the success of this amazing experiment two essential conditions had to be fulfilled. First, it was necessary to devise means which would secure automatic stability for the aeroplane, no matter what position it might assume; and secondly, to apply to aeroplanes the mechanism by which it had been found possible even before the war to move heavy objects by wireless electrical power. But if these technical matters are complicated and abstruse, the results of aviation by wireless are quite obvious and concern everyone. That the conquest of the air will continue so long as science lasts cannot be doubted, and its results may bring incalculable blessings to mankind. But so long as the possibility of war continues to menace the civilized world, the consequences of wireless aviation are appalling to contemplate. It cannot fail to revolutionize the functions of the Air Service as they have hitherto been understood.

This means, of course, that if airplanes unmanned by any crew can be sent out and controlled from long distances, aviation, merely as a means of observing the enemy's movements and preventing his observation, will become relatively unimportant. It means that the air service will no longer be auxiliary to the army and navy but must itself become in time the most important arm, whether for attack or for defense.

In the application of wireless control to torpedoes an American inventor, Mr. John Hays Hammond, Jr., has been notably successful. One of his inventions was an aerial torpedo to be fired at targets on the ground from a distance of twenty-five miles, but the most sensational of his discoveries concerns the direction and control of boats by wireless at long distances.

In one of his official demonstrations he showed that a hydroplane flying at about nine thousand feet and at a distance of six or seven miles was able to maneuver a ship traveling at top speed, in and out among other boats in a large port; it successfully avoided a number of mudbanks and nine times out of ten succeeded in reaching its goal. In another demonstration a motorboat traveling at twenty-three miles an hour was steered through a crowd of merchant ships at Fort Monroe under the control of an airplane flying at five thousand feet and

from two to five miles away, while the pilot of the airplane had no more difficulty in managing the ship than would a good pilot on board her. By using one hand to guide his machine and the other to manage the apparatus controlling the boat, he was able to direct both with ease. A fleet of such boats controlled at long distances from the air would revolutionize the practice of naval war, and all the more if the strategists on either side should decide to sacrifice their ships—which require no crews—in the attempt to reach their goal.

The introduction of torpedoes controlled by wireless is the worst nightmare of all, and its feasibility has long been proved.

CAUSES FOR WAR—1921¹

M. Scelle, professor of international law at Dijon University, presents an arresting classification of the causes for war, which he declares are more numerous in 1921 than in 1914. He lists them as follows:

1. A portion of Asiatic Turkey is pregnant with immediate conflict, even among the Allies. Four or five nations are engaged in this struggle.

2. Baltic competition is more bitter than ever.

3. The Saare Valley contains the germs of a conflict for the future.

4. The blaze may break out in the Ruhr at any moment.

5. Patchwork reconstruction of Poland, the Danzig corridor and the isolation of East Prussia are so many wasps' nests of trouble.

6. Silesia is a burning question. Teschen puts Poland and Czechoslovakia in brutal opposition.

7. Yugoslavia cannot achieve her unity.

8. Reactionary Hungary is simply awaiting her hour to spring upon her neighbors.

9. Austria cannot live alone.

10. Bulgaria is sulky and stealthily is plotting revenge.

11. Greater Greece of the Sevres Treaty is an absurd and impossible conception.

12. Rumania is threatened by her neighbors both on the Bessarabian and Transylvanian flanks.

¹ From *World Tomorrow*. 4:57. February, 1921.

13. Anglo-American rivalry.

14. Antagonism of the Japanese and Americans in the Pacific.

Over the whole dark picture the shadow of Bolshevism throws still darker gloom.

He ends this statement with an appeal to his fellow citizens to take new interest in foreign politics and to reject dictations of secret diplomacy and extreme chauvinism.

UNDERLYING CAUSES¹

What is the place of disarmament in the whole scheme of things? Why, when everybody wants it and is universally after it, can't we have it? Dr. Iyenaga has stated the reason pretty well—we are all interested in "self-preservation." Self-defense is the protection of their communications and necessity force them to keep arms. Every nation has the same reason, thoroughly convincing to itself. Also, each one agrees that some other nation should commence the disarmament. Now, it is because they all seek the same goal that they can't reach it without conflict and hostility; these concurrent aims tend to conflict and obstruct each other; they get in each other's way.

The argument for universal military service as the protection against war and armaments was the prevailing German argument, and I thought the war had probably settled it for good. I don't believe, at all events, that it is the way out. Mr. Cobb very properly asked, What are we preparing for? We don't know ourselves. We are preparing for emergencies and eventualities, of unknown character. Fear, suspicion, distrust create the motive and reason and dictate the preparation. My object, in the few minutes that I have, is to try to point out why this fear and why this distrust exist.

Armament, in my judgment, is merely an incident, an effect, of an underlying cause and process, and until you get at the underlying cause your chances of eliminating armament are very modest, although nothing is impossible. If you look at our Canadian boundary you will see that disarmament—or, rather, limitation of armament, for that's what we really mean—is within the realms of practical statesmanship.

¹ From a speech by Dr. Edwin M. Borchard. Reprinted in Bulletin: League of Free Nations Assn. 4:4-5. March, 1921.

Now, Mr. Cobb's argument is addressed to your logic and common sense. There is no question of the logic of his argument; it's absolutely sound logically. The nations can't go on in this way without committing suicide. But, unfortunately, emotion easily displaces logic, and emotion is dictating the policies of today, of yesterday, and probably of tomorrow. It is only the unimportant decisions in life that are dictated by logic; the big ones are dictated by emotion. I happened to see this morning Mr. Lamont's account of our American attitude toward the war debts and find Mr. Wilson quoted by Mr. Lamont this way: "Logic," Mr. Lamont said the President exclaimed, "I don't give a damn for logic!" That is a quotation.

If logic could solve this problem it would have been solved long ago. But competition in armament is not, I repeat, a problem of logic; it's a problem of emotions. It is the consequence of distrust and apprehension which gives rise to fear, and fear creates hatred. It is a natural and psychological human process. Mr. Cobb mentioned the prevailing delirium. The Peace Treaty was conceived in delirium and we are paying the penalties and Europe is paying the penalties now. Logic wasn't present. Emotions are dictating the course of events, and until we get at the underlying reasons for these emotions, we will never get anywhere near a solution, I believe.

Now, what is this problem? In our domestic relations we find that our legal system has created certain instruments for the maintenance of the equilibrium between groups; that is, it tends to keep one group from attaining an unfair advantage over another group, under a standard of fairness that is dictated by the *mores* of the time. So we have the Sherman anti-trust law, the Federal Trade Commission law, the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Trade Commission law designed to prevent unfair competition. The police power continually intervenes to limit the liberty of action of the private individual in the public interest. We have that machinery. In the international domain there is no such machinery. Each nation drives forward toward its own objective and necessarily collides with other nations out for the same objective. The conflict of interest leads to conflict of policy.

Let us in the few minutes I have try to get a general picture of what this international life is, this international

economic life, because today at least 75 per cent of the conflicts of interest between nations arise in the economic field.

There are two dominating motives in every national policy. Dr. Iyenaga has mentioned one of them—self-preservation, security; it's fundamental in human beings, it's fundamental in nations; you can't get away from it, and if you try to reason without taking those factors into consideration you are not reasoning from the premises—you are reasoning from an arbitrary assumption. The other motive is prosperity. Now, nations have their devices, their methods of obtaining these two great objectives of every national policy.

The underlying motives and aims being security and prosperity, the instruments for attaining these ends are those with which we are all familiar. The principal ones are the assurance of a steady supply of raw materials and the assurance of overseas markets. With the arrival of the industrial age, with the application of machinery to mining, agriculture, manufacture, came this need for overseas markets. You manufactured more than you could use at home; you had to get overseas markets. This but strengthened the demand for colonies, which was a pretty old system, and as we know the old colonial system existed largely for this very purpose, to insure markets. The colony was the preserve of the home country. That largely underlay the British objection to American independence. They had this market and they wished to hold it—a perfectly natural wish. The colony developed more modern progeny, the sphere of influence, the mandate and the protectorate—and you don't need these to insure markets, for financial investment alone often enables you to control them.

With this development of the industrial machinery and the surplus production involved came certain national policies—the protection of the home market first, then the insurance of foreign markets, and finally the most important and the very modern phenomenon of investment of the surplus income in foreign countries, thus increasing both the market abroad and the source of supply of raw materials. All the more or less great industrial nations, with which we are now primarily concerned, pursue these same policies, though in varying degree. Of course, sooner or later they lead to conflict—it can't be avoided. The promotion of her foreign trade today, Dr. Iyenaga said, explains why Japan is developing her

navy—to help build up her foreign trade and protect her communications. Now mind you, this is the most honest argument in the world—only they are all playing the same game, they are all after the same markets. They are not distributing these markets according to capacity and need; they are competing for them.

The investment of the surplus income overseas brought into being naturally a political interest in the resulting national prosperity. One of the phenomena of the present time, reflected likewise in domestic economy is that the doctrine of *laissez faire* is steadily losing ground. The government is now identified more or less with business. Look only as far as Washington—the trade-promoting functions of our Departments of Commerce and of State have increased enormously, the appropriations have gone up all the time, and we regard it as one of the most fundamental necessities of our national welfare. We produce normally, according to statistics, about 20 per cent more than we can consume at home. We must therefore find foreign markets.

The inevitable alliance between finance and politics, of course, has many ramifications, and in the few minutes that I have I couldn't begin to go into the subject.

Those two major instruments, the development of colonial domination—we call it imperialism more or less—and the investment of the surplus income overseas, tend, of course, to strengthen economically the home country, and require for successful operation a certain minor equipment in tools, partly in the economic, partly in the political field. In the economic field the minor instruments lie largely in the category of communications—the development of a merchant marine, regarded as a national asset. A nation without a merchant marine, as the recent war demonstrated, carries on foreign trade by sufferance only. Hence our own efforts to get one, and what our natural ability can't attain and retain we seek to secure by placing handicaps on our competitors, such as Section 34 of the Jones Act. This, of course, merely invites reprisals.

Then we have the cables. Those who read the papers with some knowledge of foreign affairs can draw a beautiful lesson from the recent cable conference in Washington, where each nation sought to monopolize some particular cable route. I fear, notwithstanding the avowals in the Covenant of the League

of Nations, that disinterestedness among nations isn't any more prevalent now than it was in 1913. Each of those nations is attempting to control certain cables for itself. Why should that be? Why should anybody wish to hold a cable line alone? The reason is obvious—for the power it gives, the power to read your competitor's cables; not that they will use it, but they have the power to use it when the emergency arises, and they are the judges of the emergency. The control of coaling stations and trade routes are collateral economic tools.

Now, then, the political equipment in this vast enterprise is, of course, primarily the army and navy, and they strengthen diplomatic notes immensely. They are also used, as Dr. Iyenaga says, to protect communications, because if you have a large merchant marine, if you have cables, you have got to protect them against those who are ever ready, because of this very economic competitive game, to take them away from you if they can. It ought not to be so, certainly not. But it is so.

Then, of course, comes the casting about for alliances. That also gives a feeling of strength in enforcing national policies. Of course it is realized that they merely enlarge the area of conflict and frequently lead to ruin. The reason that so many nations got into this war was primarily due to the fact that they were tied by alliances. If there is one thing that is dangerous for this country it would be to form an alliance, I don't care with which nation. Washington's advice should be a cornerstone of principle for us; we have less reason than any other nation to encumber our future by any alliance, avowed or disguised.

There naturally comes certain incidental equipment, such as secret diplomacy—a necessary part of this game, which cannot lead to open covenants, openly arrived at. It is impossible. It is inconsistent with the game itself.

And then, propaganda—that wonderful, new invention coincident with the growth of the newspaper, the rapidity of communication, and the "movies." That is one of the most subversive elements in modern civilization, I believe, because it debauches the intelligence; and yet I know of no way to combat it except by an intelligent judgment. The preservation of the freedom of printing is more necessary even than

suppressing propaganda. The only way of combatting it is by the cultivation of intelligence, and that's a very difficult thing.

Now, these are roughly the forces and factors operating in international life. I leave you to judge for yourselves how warranted is our hope that at an early day we can get rid of armament. Armament is but an incident in this game, a mere effect in this relentless economic struggle. I do not believe the problem of armaments will be solved until we are willing to cut pretty deep.

I won't say much about the Treaty of Peace. I can understand the psychology in which it was conceived and sympathize with it, too. It is hopeless, of course, as a solution for anything, but we can understand it very well. One of the things they wrote into that Treaty makes disarmament among investing nations a very difficult one. I refer to the confiscation of private property in time of war. That's exceedingly dangerous. The very safety not only of your public, but of your private, property now depends upon success in arms, and that very fear of losing your private property in itself promotes armament as an insurance against loss.

Moreover, the stakes of war have gone up. No nation today would want to lose a war; for not only its army and navy, but its merchant marine, overseas investments, economic and political independence, are now liable to seizure.

Nations whose primary motive, now as always, is national security and national prosperity face these facts. Even though we cannot always analyze these things, nevertheless the resulting emotion, the resulting state of mind, is there. It is in every Congress, in every legislative body, and it dictates appropriations for armament.

Now, I would be the first to recommend that we take a lead in limiting our tremendous armament program because I believe, with Mr. Cobb, that we have economic resources which, if our program isn't followed by other countries, will enable us to get back where we were. For that reason I think we can make the attempt. But the analyzer of facts and the searcher for truth cannot afford to disregard the underlying factors which constitute the decisive make-weights in present armament policy.

THE WAR OF OIL AND SHIPS¹

"Always," he insisted, "capitalism competes and scrambles. It is the antithesis of collective action. It cannot develop into social unity, or into world unity." As I read these remarks of Lenin to Mr. Wells my eye fell upon the headlines of the day's Times. The contest of the naval schools provided columns of big type, displayed with rotund and eloquent headlines. Must we have more super-dreadnoughts, or shall it be more submarines and aircraft? A really modern post-Jutland super-dreadnought costs, it seems, about £9,000,000 to build, and when the monster is afloat under war conditions, it requires a whole armada of destroyers to protect it from submarines, and a bomb-proof dockyard for shelter. To some pockets the cost and the vulnerability of the capital ship may seem a disadvantage: to others it is clearly the reverse.

Behind this rivalry of the naval schools looms a new rivalry of the naval forces. The German fleet is at the bottom of Scapa Flow. It is not quite clear where the next enemy will be discovered, but in our island story we were never long at a loss. I am old enough to have written unpopular leading articles in the distant days when we were building against France and Russia. The new facts are, of course, that the American program will give that kindred "associated" power a bigger navy than ours by 1924, and the new American ships, like those of our ally, Japan, will be individually more formidable than any we have yet laid down.

Simple minds might rejoice at such an accession of strength to an ally and an associate. Are not these part of the combination which made the world safe for democracy? Should we not rejoice that this insurance for democracy is paid in dollars and yen instead of pounds sterling? I have not heard that view expressed. There is in some quarters a shudder of alarm at the thought of competing in ship-building with a power which has twice our population and four times our wealth, but no one ventures to suggest that the Americans are relieving us of a burden. And yet, between us and our cousins there is much identity of purpose. We both want oil.

¹ By H. N. Brailsford in London Daily Herald. Reprinted in N. Y. Call, December 31, 1920.

It needs a wide sweep of imagination to grasp the new phases of world rivalry which open up after the war to end war. Our next war will not originate in Europe. Europe is a ruined continent; its dying cities and gasping civilization will lure no conqueror whose fleet can carry him further afield. We are not vultures to quarrel over this corpse. The French, indeed, may have parochial interests in the Ruhr coal-field, but that is not our concern. A German thinker named Spengler, who has lately written a book on the decline of Western civilization, predicts that the future lies in the Pacific. We are a mobile power. The Syrian chief in Disraeli's "Tancred" invited Queen Victoria to remove herself, with her court and crown, from London to the East. One need not do that. But it would not be surprising if the now superfluous fleet which Lord Fisher concentrated in the North Sea should gradually transfer itself to the Pacific.

A few weeks ago I was watching a Chinese general and his staff, very smartly dressed, motoring past the Kremlin. The same evening I saw at the Moscow opera that mysterious Mr. Vanderlip who has since become famous. I was told to observe silence, and I have done so, but since Lenin gave the secret to the world and Mr. Wells I need no longer be reticent. I read the quaint document addressed to "His Excellency N. Lenin" by a group of American bankers who boasted themselves deep in the counsels of the Republican party. It was an odd mixture of high morality and shrewd business, and I gathered that its main purpose was to secure the oil of Kamschatka, together with an eligible naval station, for the use of the American fleet.

Oil is always useful, wherever found, but when Providence has placed oil on the shores of the very sea hitherto dominated by your chief rival, what godly republic would resist the call of its "manifest destiny"? Mr. Vanderlip has got his concession. Japan has already protested, and in the Kremlin a shrewd face raises a cynical eyebrow, as it watches the perpetuum mobile of strife which a stroke of its pen has set going among the capitalist powers.

No one, of course, is thinking of war. One arms to prevent it. Nor do I see how Japan with her present disparity of force could face a war with the United States. Our alliance with her has a clause which relieves us of the obligation to come

in against America. Moreover, it will want the efforts of more pens than Mr Bottomley's to work up a war fever against our cousins and associates. The thing might be done, however; one of the biggest naval scares and building booms in our history was directed against France, immediately after our cooperation with her as an ally in the Crimea.

In any event ships are useful for the dry warfare of diplomacy. A great many occasions and much valuable raw material can be allocated, as the Moroccan affair showed, merely by arming and counterarming. That may go on for years until someone murders a king. Two gaps in the peace settlement made the renewal of the old war of steel and gold inevitable. Firstly, we refused even to discuss the freedom of the seas, and thereby forced America to build against us. Secondly, the League of Nations was created without power to ration the world's raw materials. Already from Baku to Kamchatka, from Mosul to Mexico, the scramble for oil has set the ships and the aircraft moving, to an accompaniment of diplomatic notes. There is talk of disarmament, and there will be more, but there will be arming until the world's wealth is distributed by consent. "Always," he insisted, "capitalism competes and scrambles."

ECONOMIC RIVALRIES¹

Some nation, or some group of nations has always been in control of the known world or else in active competition for the right to exercise such a control. The present is an era of competition.

Capitalism has revolutionized the world's economic life. By 1875 the capitalist nations were in a mad race to determine which one should dominate the capitalist world and have first choice among the undeveloped portions of the earth. The competitors were Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia and Italy. Japan and the United States did not really enter the field for another generation.

The War of 1914 decided this much:—that France and Italy were too weak to play the big game in a big way, that Germany could not compete effectively for some time to come; that the Russians would no longer play the old game

¹ From the *American Empire*, by Scott Nearing. p. 235-41.

at all. There remained Japan, Great Britain and the United States and it is among these three nations that the capitalist world is now divided. Japan is in control of the Far East. Great Britain holds the Near East, Africa and Australia; the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere.

The Great War began in 1914. It will end when the question is decided as to which of these three empires will control the Earth.

Great Britain has been the dominant factor in the world for a century. She gained her position after a terrific struggle, and she has maintained it by vanquishing Holland, Spain, France and Germany.

The United States is out to capture the economic supremacy of the earth. Her business men say so frankly. Her politicians fear that their constituents are not as yet ready to take such a step. They have been reassured, however, by the presidential vote of November, 1920. American business life already is imperial, and political sentiment is moving rapidly in the same direction.

Great Britain holds title to the pickings of the world. America wants some or all of them. The two countries are headed straight for a conflict, which is as inevitable as morning sunrise, unless the menace of Bolshevism grows so strong, and remains so threatening that the great capitalist rivals will be compelled to join forces for the salvation of capitalist society.

As economic rivalries increase, competition in military and naval preparation will come as a matter of course. Following these will be the efforts to make political alliances—in the East and elsewhere.

These two countries are old time enemies. The roots of that enmity lie deep. Two wars, the white hot feeling during the Civil War, the anti-British propaganda, carried, within a few years, through the American schools, the traditions among the officers in the American navy, the presence of 1,352,251 Irish born persons in the United States (1910), the immense plunder seized by the British during the War of 1914,—these and many other factors will make it easy to whip the American people into a war-frenzy against the British Empire.

Were there no economic rivalries, such antagonisms might slumber for decades, but with the economic struggle so active, these other matters will be kept continually in the foreground.

The capitalists of Great Britain have faced dark days and have surmounted huge obstacles. They are not to be turned back by the threat of rivalry. The American capitalists are backed by the greatest available surpluses in the world; they are ambitious, full of enthusiasm and energy, they are flushed with their recent victory in the world war, and overwhelmed by the unexpected stores of wealth that have come to them as a result of the conflict. They are imbued with a boundless faith in the possibilities of their country. Neither Great Britain nor the United States is in a frame of mind to make concessions. Each is confident—the British with the traditional confidence of centuries of world leadership; the Americans with the buoyant, idealistic confidence of youth. It is one against the other until the future supremacy of the world is decided.

American business interests are engaged in the work of building an international business structure. American industry, directed from the United States, exploiting foreign resources for American profit, and financed by American institutions, is gaining a footing in Latin America, in Europe and Asia.

The business men of Rome built such a structure two thousand years ago. They competed with and finally crushed their rivals in Tyre, Corinth and Carthage. In the early days of the Empire, they were the economic masters, as well as the political masters of the known world.

Within two centuries the business men of Great Britain have built an international business structure that has known no equal since the days of the Caesars. Perhaps it is greater, even, than the economic empire of the Romans. At any rate, for a century that British empire of commerce and industry has gone unchallenged, save by Germany. Germany has been crushed. But there is an industrial empire rising in the West. It is new. Its strength is as yet undetermined. It is uncoordinated. A new era has dawned, however, and the business men of the United States have made up their minds to win the economic supremacy of the earth.

Already the war is on between Great Britain and the United States. The two countries are just as much at war today as Great Britain and Germany were at war during the twenty years that preceded 1914. The issues are essentially

the same in both cases,—commercial and economic in character, and it is these economic and commercial issues that are the chief causes of modern military wars—that are in themselves economic wars which may at any moment be transferred to the military arena.

British capitalists are jealously guarding the privileges that they have collected through centuries of business and military conflict. The American capitalists are out to secure these privileges for themselves. On neither side would a military settlement of the issue be welcomed. On both sides it would be regarded as a painful necessity. War is an incident in imperialist policy. Yet the position of the imperialist as an international exploiter depends upon his ability to make war successfully. War is a part of the price that the imperialist must pay for his opportunity to exploit and control the earth.

After Sedan, it was Germany versus Great Britain for the control of Europe. After Versailles it is the United States versus Great Britain for the control of the capitalist earth. Both nations must spend the next few years in active preparation for the conflict.

The governments of Great Britain and the United States are today on terms of greatest intimacy. Soon an issue will arise—perhaps over Mexico, perhaps over Persia, perhaps over Ireland, perhaps over the extension of American control in the Caribbean. There is no difficulty of finding a pretext.

Then there will follow the time-honored method of arousing the people on either side to wrath against those across the border. Great Britain will point to the race-riots and negro-lynchings in America as a proof that the people of the United States are barbarians. British editors will cite the wanton taking of the Canal Zone as an indication of the willingness of American statesmen to go to any lengths in their effort to extend their dominion over the earth. The newspapers of the United States will play up the terrorism and suppression in Ireland and there are many Irishmen more than ready to lend a hand in such an enterprise; tyranny in India will come in for a generous share of comment; then there are the relations between Great Britain and the Turks, and above all, there are the evidences in the Paris Treaty of the way in which Great Britain is gradually absorbing the earth. Unless the power of labor is strong enough to turn

the blow, or unless the capitalists decide that the safety of the capitalist world depends upon their getting together and dividing the plunder, the result is inevitable.

The United States is a world Empire in her own right. She dominates the Western Hemisphere. Young and inexperienced, she nevertheless possesses the economic advantages and political authority that give her a voice in all international controversies. Only twenty years have passed since the organizing genius of America turned its attention from exclusively domestic problems to the problems of financial imperialism that have been agitating Europe for a half a century. The Great War showed that American men make good soldiers, and it also showed that American wealth commands world power.

With the aid of Russia, France, Japan and the United States Great Britain crushed her most dangerous rival—Germany. The struggle which destroyed Germany's economic and military power erected in her stead a more menacing economic and military power—the United States. Untrained and inexperienced in world affairs, the master class of the United States has been placed suddenly in the title rôle. America over night has become a world empire and over night her rulers have been called upon to think and act like world emperors. Partly they succeeded, partly they bungled, but they learned much. Their appetites were whetted, their imaginations stirred by the vision of world authority. Today they are talking and writing, tomorrow they will act—no longer as novices, but as masters of the ruling class in a nation which feels herself destined to rule the earth.

The imperial struggle is to continue. The Japanese Empire dominates the Far East; the British Empire dominates Southern Asia, the Near East, Africa and Australia; the American Empire dominates the Western Hemisphere. It is impossible for these three great empires to remain in rivalry and at peace. Economic struggle is a form of war, and the economic struggle between them is now in progress.

The War of 1914 was no war for democracy in spite of the fact that millions of the men who died in the trenches believed that they were fighting for freedom. Rather it was a war to make the world safe for the British Empire. Only in part was the war successful. The old world was made safe by the elimination of Britain's two dangerous rivals—Germany

and Russia; but out of the conflict emerged a new rival—unexpectedly strong, well equipped and eager for the conflict.

The war did not destroy imperialism. It was fought between five great empires to determine which one should be supreme. In its result, it gave to Great Britain rather than to Germany the right to exploit the undeveloped portions of Asia and of Africa.

The Peace—under the form of “mandates”—makes the process of exploitation easier and more legal than it ever has been in the past. The guarantees of territorial integrity, under the League Covenant, do more than has ever been done heretofore to preserve for the imperial masters of the earth their imperial prerogatives.

New names are being used but it is the old struggle. Egypt and India helped to win the war, and by that very process, they fastened the shackles of servitude more firmly upon their own hands and feet. The imperialists of the world never had less intention than they have today of quitting the game of empire building. Quite the contrary—a wholly new group of empire builders has been quickened into life by the experiences of the past five years.

The present struggle for the possession of the oil fields of the world is typical of the economic conflicts that are involved in imperial struggles. For years the capitalists of the great investing nations have been fighting to control the oil fields of Mexico. They have hired brigands, bought governors, corrupted executives. The war settled the Mexican question in favor of the United States. Mexico, considered internationally, is today a province of the American Empire.

During the blackest days of the war, when Paris seemed doomed, the British divided their forces. One army was operating across the deserts of the Near East. For what purpose? When the Peace was signed, Great Britain held two vantage points—the oil fields of the Near East and the road from Berlin to Bagdad.

The late war was not a war to end war, nor was it a war for disarmament. German militarism is not destroyed; the appropriations for military and naval purposes, made by the great nations during the last two years, are greater than they have ever been in any peace years that are known to history.

The world is preparing for war today as actively as it was

in the years preceding the War of 1914. The years from 1914 to 1918 were the opening episode; the first engagements of the Great War.

There is no question, among those who have taken the trouble to inform themselves, but that the War of 1914 was fought for economic and commercial advantage. The same rivalries that preceded 1914 are more active in the world today than ever before. Hence the possibilities of war are greater by exactly that amount. The imperial struggle is being continued and a part of the imperial struggle is war.

RESTORATION MUST PRECEDE DISARM- AMENT¹

(The Woman's committee for world disarmament recently wrote to former United States Senator R. F. Pettigrew of South Dakota, asking his help in its efforts to bring about an international conference on disarmament, Senator Pettigrew replied giving his reasons for believing that such a conference would be useless, in the following letter, which was given to the press.)

In calling a conference of the robber nations of the world—the so-called Christian nations—you are working right into the hands of the armament people. That is exactly what they want you to do—call a conference. Call a conference of the thieves to see who shall quit stealing first. Call a conference of the pirates of the world who are out robbing the majority of mankind and who are armed to the teeth, and discuss the question a few years, and then adjourn without doing anything, and call another conference. In the meantime, keep on building battleships and inventing new implements of death.

The remedy is not in a conference. It would be absurd and childish to call a conference. That is just exactly what the profiteers and scoundrels who now compose the so-called civilized world want you to do. Do you think England will disarm? She has control of fully half of the whole earth, and much more than half of the population, and she is robbing and exploiting these people in the name of Christianity for the benefit of a few aristocrats in England. She cannot disarm.

¹ By former U.S. Senator R. F. Pettigrew from Minnesota Daily Star. June 27, 1921.

All in the Same Boat

Call a conference with France? She is engaged in the same business as England is. She cannot disarm—she has a large piece of China, northern Africa, a portion of Arabia, and is engaged in the same desperate business of piracy and robbery that England is engaged in, and all for the glory of our God!

Call a conference with Italy? She is out for empire the same as the others. Or is your conference to be with Japan—the heathen Jap who is also well on the course of empire, following England's model? A conference with Japan might do because Japan would undoubtedly agree to decrease her armament, and do it quick, just as soon as the conference got together; and then she would keep right on building battleships. She has learned all about hypocrisy and deceit from England—she is out to rob Korea, Formosa and China.

But what's the matter with the United States that it wants to disarm? The United States will no more disarm than will any of the others. To call a conference for that purpose is pure hypocrisy. We started on the course of empire when we stole Hawaii, and put a black page of infamy in our history; when we turned upon the ally and began butchering our allies—the people of the Philippines and annexed their country; when we took Porto Rico; when we occupied Panama by force of arms; when we entered Haiti and Santo Domingo purely as conquerors under the pretext that we were collecting a debt for the City Bank of New York upon which those people had not paid the interest, and now we have purchased, without consulting the people, the Danish West Indies, have landed our troops in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and are in a quarrel with Japan about the rock in the Pacific ocean called Yap.

We have fifteen thousand three hundred American soldiers quartered in Europe on the German people; we have seven thousand men in Hawaii, five thousand nine hundred in Panama, ten thousand in the Philippines, one thousand eight hundred in Porto Rico, and one thousand four hundred in China.

Give Back Territories

In the face of all these facts you people want me to join in a petition to Congress, which is composed of the attorneys

of the profiteers, to hold a conference of the robber nations of the world and see if we can't agree to reduce armament!

If the women of America will organize and insist upon our restoring our stolen colonies to the people who inhabit them, and will insist upon taking the government of the United States out of the hands of the New York gamblers who now completely own it, and their attorneys out of Congress, and put in members who believe in the rights of man, I shall be very glad to join in the movement.

You can, in that way, accomplish something for humanity.

THE DISARMAMENT CONGRESS ¹

Under the guise of a disarmament congress President Harding actually has called a conference on world politics. Invitations have been extended to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China to participate. The topics of the conference are to be disarmament and far eastern affairs. There is likely to be much talk of far eastern affairs and little of disarmament.

Our own militarists constantly have held up Japan as a bogey. That nation is presented as the main obstacle to disarmament because of its menace to our peace.

Therefore it will be a good thing to discuss our relations with Japan and all the far eastern situation which contains the seeds of possible trouble.

There are very serious and difficult problems in the far east. The future of China alone is a tough nut to crack, to say nothing of Siberia, which is fully as serious. Many careful observers think the orient is the quarter from which "our next world war" is to spring, if we are to have a next world war.

For that reason it is highly important to do two things. One is to arrive if possible at some working basis for the adjustment of the far eastern questions; and the other is to determine how we are to settle a definite issue between two of the principal nations having interests in the far east if such a definite issue should arise.

The nations chiefly interested in the Pacific coast of Asia are China, Russia, Japan, Great Britain and the United States. Representatives of all these nations are to sit in Mr. Hughes'

¹ By Herbert Gaston, in *Minnesota Daily Star*. July 11, 1921.

and Mr. Harding's conferences at Washington except Russia. We have not heard even that the republic of Eastern Siberia, with its headquarters at Chita and claiming jurisdiction clear to the Pacific, has been invited to participate. This nation—which is not “bolshevik” nor communist—is not a “recognized” nation. It does, however, represent the people of Eastern Siberia. Japan has an army in Eastern Siberia carrying on war against the far eastern republic. When the allies ceased to back the Cossack brigand Semenov and others of his stripe, Japan took them up. They aid by creating a condition of anarchy which is favorable to Japan's scheme to seize a lot of territory in Russia. Japan also is said to be working through the Mongols. These wild horsemen of the plains have been induced to declare their independence of China and Russian counter-revolutionaries with headquarters in Urga are organizing raids into Siberian territory.

The activity of the Mongols will recall to those who have read a little ancient history vague stories of repeated invasions or “overflows” of the wild barbarian hordes of this central Asian territory into Europe. It will recall recollection of the Huns and of that great oriental conqueror Genghiz Khan, with his domain in the early thirteenth century, running from eastern Europe to the Pacific, and of Tamurlane, another mighty yellow man.

Britain is interested, too, in the Pacific coast of the orient. Britain has her port, Hong Kong, on the southern coast of China below Canton and is seeking to make it the commercial capital of China. In a recent article in the New Republic John Dewey, the American educator, tells how British capital has conspired to seize practically all the coal supplies of the rich province of Kwantung and through the construction of British railroads to divert the traffic of South China from Canton to Hong Kong, making the great Chinese city of South China a mere way station.

Given possession of the coal supplies for which it is conspiring, with the opposition of the South China government, Great Britain practically will control the industrial future of China.

It is common political gossip in the orient that there is a tacit understanding between Great Britain and Japan that the British will be left free to exploit and rob South China if

Japan is permitted a free hand to do the same thing in the north. Whether title to undisturbed aggression in Mongolia and Siberia as well as in Shantung, Manchuria and Korea is to be included in the parceling out of privileges between Japan and England is not stated.

This is just a glimpse of what is involved in the far eastern questions. Just the other day Secretary Hughes reaffirmed on behalf of the Harding administration that the United States would continue to stand by the principle of the "open door" in China. If we are really serious about this, and if we intend to see justice done to China—to say nothing of Siberia—we have something serious on our hands.

The principle of the "open door," enunciated by John Hay apparently with the intention that the United States would interpose to prevent the same fate happening to China as has happened to India, to Egypt and to Korea, can mean something or it can mean nothing. If it means nothing China is going to be looted by Japan and by England, each in their spheres of influence. The pretty language of diplomacy and the hypocritical pretensions of statesmen cannot conceal that fact. Both England and Japan today are busily at work on their schemes of theft.

In raising these questions Mr. Hughes may be seeking a way to disarmament or he may be seeking to show that the United States cannot disarm. But he is thoroughly right in laying down the principle that we must have some kind of agreement or settlement regarding the orient. We should induce England and Japan to cut out the cant and tell us what they really intend to do and then we should decide what we are going to do about it, if anything.

If the three nations are to go on building up armaments and then stand growling at each other while the bones of China and Siberia are being picked, a war some time in the future is about as certain as anything can be.

If there is any hope at all for a fair settlement of the far eastern question it is in settlement which will include disarmament and a way to adjust disputes.

But something more than that is needed to insure peace. The kind of exploitation being carried forward now both by England and by Russia is incompatible with continued peace, no matter what may be the diplomatic relations between nations.

The schemes of these two nations mean the robbery by foreign capitalists of already impoverished peoples.

It is probable that we shall have a conference on the far east and disarmament. That conference is as important to the future of the world as the Versailles conference. If any good is to come out of it the nations will have to deal on a basis different from that on which they dealt at Versailles and with a different spirit. Another such settlement as that at Versailles, with continuation of the race in armaments, means world ruin on a scale impossible to comprehend.

FORMAL CALL TO CUT ARMAMENTS SENT TO POWERS BY PRESIDENT ¹

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the subject of limitation of armaments, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed.

Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress.

The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation.

The time is believed to be opportune for these powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought

¹ Text of the formal invitation to the disarmament conference, August 11, 1921.

best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. *It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.*

It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application.

It is the earnest wish of this government that through an-interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.

It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference, in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy will govern the final decision.

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of Great Britain (the name is changed in other invitations) to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.

FOR LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

THE NECESSITY FOR DISARMAMENT ¹

The question that is occupying the attention of the whole world at the present time is that of disarmament. The naval programs of two nations, the United States and Japan, are mainly responsible for this tense interest. The two countries which led in naval rivalry for the twenty years preceding the World War, Germany and Great Britain, are at the present time building no large warships. The United States is continuing the program authorized by Congress in 1916, and the General Board has recommended that, as soon as these ships are finished, we immediately begin work on a program that will precisely duplicate that ambitious scheme. Japan not only is completing the vessels laid down in the course of the war or immediately afterward, but also is contemplating other extensive additions to her navy. If no more warships are authorized, the American Navy, in two or three years, will be much more powerful than Great Britain's; that of Japan will not be very much smaller. Should Mr. Daniels's grandiose plan be adopted, the American Navy would in five or ten years be more powerful than that of Great Britain and Japan combined. It is not surprising that these realities and these possibilities have set the world to thinking. What national purposes inspire these great ship-building undertakings? What ambitions or fears are driving these nations into naval expansion on an unprecedented scale? What effect will it all have upon the world's peace, and upon those hopes, now so generally entertained, that a new order is dawning for mankind?

So far as the United States is concerned, there is much misapprehension in Europe. A reading of the European press gives the impression that, casting aside the League of Nations, the United States has suddenly embarked on a career of huge naval expansion. For this a good deal of loose and silly talk from the present Secretary of the Navy is mainly

¹ From *Worlds Work*. 41:425-30. March, 1921.

responsible. For two years Mr. Daniels has been threatening the civilized world with an American Navy larger than the combined navies of all nations. Doubtless he has personally inspired the recommendation of the General Board for a duplication of our present building program. Yet Mr. Daniels is practically the only person in responsible position who has engaged in such irresponsible forecasts. On this side of the water the Daniels proposals are not seriously taken. The foreign critics who accuse the American people of going in for "navalism" ignore the fact that the programme which so arouses their excitement now is the same one which inspired their applause when originally adopted in 1916. For our shipyards are at present merely engaged in carrying out a law passed five years ago.

"Preparedness" in 1914 and Now

This law was the result of the "preparedness campaign" which had aroused only a languid interest for several years preceding the World War, but which took on a new intensity when Germany crossed the Belgian frontier. It is only when we turn back and read the speeches and books and articles on this once burning subject that we gain a proper viewpoint for the present discussion of "disarmament." In all this vast and now antiquated literature there was a clear appreciation of the fundamental fact that a nation's military policy necessarily rested upon its national policy. The idea that in building dreadnaughts and creating armies we had no particular enemy in view, was pure hypocrisy. Possible enemies, then as now, always assumed a definite form; the extent to which we should arm depended, then as now, on the likelihood that we should have to defend ourselves and uphold our national policies against aggression from sources that were always kept clearly in mind. A survey of the international field in 1914 disclosed that the United States had assumed heavy responsibilities. In upholding the Monroe Doctrine we had announced our determination of defending two great continents from any possible foe. In acquiring Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Philippine Islands we had extended our radius of naval action more than six thousand miles. John Hay's "open door" policy in the East had certainly given us a strong interest in the integrity of China, even if it had not definitely committed

us to defending that policy with arms. The building of the Panama Canal had created a vulnerable point in the Caribbean which we must stand ready to protect at any cost. Thus those who, discussing "preparedness" six years ago, asked whether the United States had undertaken obligations outside her own border which might conceivably call for battleships and armies, found themselves compelled to answer the question in the affirmative.

At the same time we discussed not only policies but possible enemies. There were only three that were seriously considered. What was the chance that we should have a conflict with Great Britain? At that time we had not been Britain's ally in a great war: yet, even then, an honest survey of the field disclosed few causes of possible trouble. The outstanding fact was that, for twenty years—ever since the Venezuelan incident—the British Government and the British people had shown every desire of maintaining the most harmonious relations with this country. This desire was a conspicuous note in British foreign policy, and almost an ostentatious one. Such misunderstandings as had arisen in the course of a century had been adjusted by diplomacy or arbitration. In the only policy which could conceivably cause friction—the Monroe Doctrine—Great Britain had long since acquiesced. Thus no intelligent American regarded the British navy—Great Britain had only a small army—as anything which we should "build against." With Japan, their case was not so clear. It was not necessary to accept the forecasts of a Hobson and the wildest Californians to conclude that, after all, there were matters which might make trouble between Japan and ourselves. The fact was that only President Roosevelt's prompt and energetic behavior in 1907 had prevented war between the two countries. Our ideas about China did not coincide with Japan's. Our possession of many of the best strategic points in the Pacific might perhaps be regarded by Japan as a provocation. Our inhospitable attitude toward Japanese immigrants was a constant irritation to a proud and valiant people. Many Americans suspected that Japan nourished imperialistic ambitions indeed, it was unquestionable that the military spirit in that country was powerful.

Yet the influences working for peace in both Japan and the United States were so strong that war was by no means

regarded as likely. The one enemy who loomed large in all "preparedness" debates was Germany. The aggressive policy of the Kaiser was always blatantly manifest. Long before 1914 the German Foreign Office had demonstrated that its ideals were those of a mediæval bandit. In 1902 the Kaiser had attempted to destroy the Monroe Doctrine; since then Germany had scarcely concealed its hostility to this, the main feature of American foreign policy. With the outbreak of war Germany threw off all pretensions to decency and stood confessed as the world's great buccaneer. In case the Allies should be defeated, there was not the slightest question that the United States would be attacked. Thus, of the three possible enemies against whom we were preparing in 1916, Great Britain was not a possible foe, Japan was a possible—though not a likely one—and Germany, in case she won the late war, which then seemed not improbable, was almost a certain foe. It was in this state of mind that the naval program of 1916 was conceived. It was not adopted as a preparation for immediate war with Germany. Any adequate preparation for the war in which we ultimately engaged would have taken the form of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, not of battleships and battlecruisers, which could not have been built for many years. So far as any logical policy controlled at all, our proposed fleet was regarded as preparation for war with Germany after Germany had defeated the Allies, or as a possible preparation against a Japan which might refuse to accept certain implications of our domestic and foreign policy.

A Radical Change in the International Situation

Such then was the position of the United States when the building program which is now under way was adopted. It is quite apparent that our position has radically changed. The great enemy that seemed so powerful in 1916 is now, in a military sense, contemptible. The German fleet could now hardly make war on Spain or Norway. Her great battleships are either in the hands of her enemies or at the bottom of the sea. The Kaiser's hope of a great German colonial empire, of taking Great Britain's place in Canada, India, and South Africa, and of converting the Monroe Doctrine into a dead letter, has gone. Nor is it likely that, in the lifetime of the present generation, Germany will ever build another fleet. So far as the new American Navy was intended as a protection

against Germany, it has outlived its usefulness. Far from needing more dreadnaughts, we cannot possibly use those which we already have.

Despite certain influences now at work to make trouble between the United States and Great Britain, the relations of these two nations have not changed. They have not changed because the fundamental facts have not changed. The reasons which existed five years ago for good relations between the United States and Great Britain are even stronger today. Temperamental causes for irritation are plentiful enough, but the war emphasized the fact that the ideals of the two countries are the same, and that the welfare of mankind depends upon their close understanding and cooperation. An Anglo-American war would mean the end of modern civilization. It would mean the rejuvenation of Germany and of German Kaiserism. It would mean the reconstitution of Austria-Hungary and the Hapsburgs. In a word it would mean the loss of everything which has been gained by the dreadful struggle which has just closed. The war has ended with Great Britain a greater friend of the Monroe Doctrine than ever before. It has left the British Empire more dependent upon friendly relations with this country than most Englishmen care to admit. To the United States Great Britain has surrendered, temporarily at least—perhaps permanently—her position as the world's financial center. The debts which the British Government owes the American Government are greater than she can pay in a generation, and in the coming years England will become more and more dependent upon American trade and American finance.

Certain new facts have, indeed, appeared that are usually accepted as having a tendency to estrange friendly nations. Those mistaken philosophers who attribute all wars to economic causes may point out that the United States is now "going out" for that foreign trade and that shipping upon which the prosperity of Great Britain has depended for a century. Again we shall be told that it is Great Britain's historic policy to "crush" any nation that attempts to dispute her ascendancy on the sea. The fate of Spain, Holland, and France will once more be paraded before our eyes. But these phantoms do not disturb an America whose display of power in the recent war was as much a revelation to itself as to the

world. Its matchless strategic position, its economic independence, the youth and energy of its people, its industries, its resources—no American can survey these advantages, contrasting them with a bankrupt and devastated and heart-sick Europe, and entertain any fear of an attack from overseas. And, despite certain discouraging features of the present situation, a common idealism does control the minds of both peoples. Between them arbitration is a practicable method of settling disputes. An important influence is the fact that the incoming Administration is far more friendly to Great Britain than the outgoing. No better guide to Anglo-American relations could be asked than the letter which Mr. Harding has recently addressed to Mr. John A. Stewart, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Sulgrave Institute. As definitely committing Mr. Harding to a policy of cooperation it is worth quoting in full:

Dear Mr. Stewart: The labor of uniting into still closer amity and understanding the English-speaking peoples of the world has a significance of good to all Americans and to all nations and races of the world.

Destiny has made it a historical fact that the English-speaking peoples have been the instrument through which civilization has been flung to the far corners of the globe. I am impressed not so much by the glory that English-speaking peoples may take to themselves as by the profound duties that God has thrust upon them—duties of being restrained, tolerant, and just. These duties will find their greatest recognition in a united, unshakable friendship and understanding and oneness of purpose—not for the exclusion from brotherhood of others, but for a better brotherhood flowing toward others.

I believe that when the wisdom of America is summoned to assist the world in building a workable, as distinguished from a bungling agreement or association for the prevention of war, unity of English-speaking peoples will play no small part, not to invade the rights or exclude the fellowship of other nations, but to protect and include them. Faithfully yours.

WARREN G. HARDING.

Japan as a Possible "Foe"

The only remaining possible "foe" of the United States, according to the world situation of 1916, is Japan. The observer most friendly to Japan must admit that our relations have changed. In 1916 the so-called "gentleman's agreement" seemed to have definitely settled the problem of Japanese immigration. It is now all too apparent that it has not done so. The antagonisms between the Japanese and the citizens of the Pacific coast are much more strained now than then. California has passed referendum laws, against the holding of property by Japanese, that have made conditions fairly acute. The restriction, very likely the prohibition, of Japanese labor immigration into

the United States is now a fixed national policy. The Asiatic situation has also become more tense. Most Americans believe that Japan used the World War as an opportunity to solidify her position in China. She emerged from Versailles with a powerful hand upon Shantung, China's richest province. That it is Japan's highest aspiration to control the whole of China and monopolize its trade is the well-grounded suspicion of the United States and Europe. Moreover, the Japanese strategic position in the Pacific is much stronger than in 1916. At that time it was possible to draw a diagram and show how impregnable the United States could make itself, with such points as Manila, Guam, Samoa, Hawaii, and Kiska, Alaska. The Peace Conference, however, acting in obedience to what seemed a necessity, awarded Japan all the German Islands north of the Equator. Regarded strictly from a naval point of view, this cession is a very serious thing for the United States. If Japan establishes naval bases in the Caroline, Marshall, and Ladrone islands, she has simply cut communications between the United States and the Philippines. Unless this country should station a fleet more powerful than the Japanese in Manila, Japan would have no difficulty in capturing the Philippines and Guam. With Guam and the German islands in Japanese possession, the United States would have the utmost difficulty in regaining its Pacific possessions, as our nearest base, that of Hawaii, would be more than three thousand miles away.

These are the purely military and political aspects of American-Japanese relations; more important than either is national sentiment. Though it would be absurd to maintain that the average American feels as friendly toward Japan as in the days of the Russo-Japanese War, there is no real hostility in this country. The attitude is one of a somewhat distrustful curiosity. Just what does Japan wish to do? The Japanese themselves are apparently divided into two camps. There is a purely jingo element, ready for aggression; but the wisest Japanese—those who really govern the country—probably realize that Japan cannot afford to antagonize mankind and that the safest course is not the path which Germany trod. The fact that Japan finally joined the Chinese Consortium on terms satisfactory to the United States and Europe indicates that the saner elements are gaining the upper hand over the Military Party. The most fiery Japanese probably realizes that war

with the United States would be something quite different from the war with Russia.

Naval Superiority Over Britain and Japan

Thus of the three possible enemies against which the present building program was aimed, Japan is the only one which can conceivably be regarded in that light at the present time. And Japan hardly belongs to that class. It is, therefore, quite apparent that the United States certainly needs no larger navy than the one provided by the law of August, 1916. This program will give us a navy very much more powerful than any Great Britain can complete by 1924. The mere statement that our tonnage then will amount to 1,150,650 and that of Great Britain to 883,290 only tells part of the story. The really important fact is that our ships will be immeasurably more powerful than those of Great Britain. A new nomenclature is now applied to battleships; we no longer refer to them as super-dreadnoughts and dreadnoughts. The far more descriptive phrase now used is pre-Jutland and post-Jutland. The first is meant to describe the type of ship which went into the Jutland battle, the second the vessels built since, with all the increase in size and improvements which that struggle showed to be necessary. By 1924 the British navy will contain just one post-Jutland warship, the battlecruiser Hood, forty-one thousand tons; the American Navy will contain sixteen. Moreover, of our pre-Jutland fleet, seven are larger than any ship in the British navy except the Hood. Over the Japanese fleet our superiority will be even greater; we shall be nearly three times as powerful.

Any discussion of disarmament does not involve the question whether we are to build ships additional to the program of 1916—that would be sheer folly in any event; the only point is whether we are to stop construction on that program in whole or in part. Work has started on all the one hundred fifty-six ships, though on some, especially the battlecruisers, not much progress has been made. Mr. Daniels takes the stand that the United States is to have the largest navy whether or not we make an international agreement for disarmament. Evidently the only question open to argument in his opinion is whether we are to have a fleet larger than all others put together. But this is hardly a conciliatory atti-

tude with which to begin the discussion; and it is not necessarily the attitude of the American people. Mr. Borah has presented a resolution which calls for a meeting between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan on naval armament, "with a view of promptly entering into a treaty by which naval building program of each of said governments shall be reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon." That represents the wisest method of procedure.

It is apparent that the task is not to be an easy one. Such a discussion must involve more than the mere question of ships; it must discuss matters of international policy. Every nation, in constructing a navy, presumably has some reason for doing so. For the same reason it cannot change its naval plans unless there is a change in the situation which brought them into being. Thus the proposed meeting between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan should logically consider the relations that exist between these three countries. Any possible causes of friction should be removed. In 1904 Great Britain and France agreed on the disposition of their navies—one to guard the North Sea and the other the Mediterranean; an essential preliminary to this arrangement, however, was a definite settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries, especially Morocco and Egypt. Such an understanding must precede any agreement on American, British, and Japanese naval policy. A settlement of the questions of Japanese immigration and Japanese aspirations in China would make the scrapping of "naval programs" a simple matter. And there are indications that such a settlement is possible. Economic forces, as well as a decent national sentiment, are working for disarmament. Perhaps the most pathetic sight on the international landscape is the attempt of a poor country like Japan to construct a great navy. English experts figure that a modern battleship, with the auxiliary vessels necessary for its protection—destroyers, submarines, scout cruisers, and airplanes—represents an investment of about \$75,000,000. Such figures show the sheer madness of naval competition. Great Britain is now building no new battleships for the very good reason that she cannot afford them; temporarily at least she has withdrawn from the race. There is probably only one country that can stand the luxury of an

expensive modern navy, and even the United States does not find the experience altogether comfortable. When one thinks of the public schools that a single battleship could build, of the work which this money could accomplish in stamping out disease and promoting agriculture, the wickedness of the whole thing stands manifest.

A Great American Army Unnecessary

The Borah resolution contemplates a discussion only for limiting naval disarmament. That is probably wise for the question of armies each nation can settle for itself. The United States is already decreasing the size of its army. The military bill of 1920 limited the Army to two hundred eighty thousand men—at least that was the interpretation of Secretary Baker, who has been working hard to bring it up to that quota. At present there are about two hundred thirty thousand soldiers in khaki. Even the men who were most strongly advocating preparedness in 1916—such men as Julius Kahn in the House and James W. Wadsworth in the Senate—regard any such standing force as excessive under present conditions. The debate as to whether the figure should be placed at one hundred fifty thousand or one hundred seventy-five thousand strikes most observers as futile. What is really needed is a "skeleton force" large enough for routine purposes, and so organized that it can be rapidly enlarged in case of emergency. The policy of Great Britain seems to be about the same. So long as these two countries have already taken a stand for limiting the size of their armies there is really no need of an international conference to discuss this subject. A land force such as is now proposed for this country involves no possibility of aggression. Indeed, the one thing which lies least heavily upon the American mind today is the fear of an attack from any source—from the sea or from the land. Our position is quite different from that in the few years which preceded the World War. The rapidity with which we gathered our resources, the skill and spirit with which we sent two million men to Europe, the fighting qualities they displayed—these things gave the world an object lesson it will not soon forget. Thus the United States has everything to gain from disarmament and nothing to lose.

American interest in the question of disarmament, and

British as well, is thus largely on the naval side. With continental Europe, however, the situation is reversed. So far as can now be foreseen, the time for continental navies has passed. Spain has never rebuilt the navy which the United States destroyed in 1898. The only continental navies that ever assumed any size, the Russian and the German, exist no longer. France and Italy, though the European alliances preceding 1914 required them to create a naval force, never became formidable on the ocean, and they are everyday becoming less so. The matter of disarmament with these Powers concerns the possible decrease of their land forces. This question is far more complicated than that which primarily interests the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and it is one with which, at the present time, the United States has little to do. Senator Borah has done well, therefore, in limiting the proposed discussion to the three great sea Powers.

SENATOR BORAH'S POSITION¹

It has been stated here before, and I want to state it again, that it may go into the Record, that 93 per cent of the money expended by the Government during the year 1920 was on account of wars, past and future, closed and anticipated; 7 per cent for all the other operations of the Government, civic, educational, and everything which has to do with the building up of a Government and maintaining it.

The cost of all the civil-service activities of the Government from July 1, 1909, to July 1, 1919, averaged \$2.15 a year per capita, and during that period the cost increased practically with the population. From 1834 to and through 1919, the War Department actually disbursed \$23,002,390,008. In the same period the Navy Department expended \$6,907,369,032. This makes a total for those two departments of \$29,909,759,040.

Now, Mr President, for comparison, the total cost of the Civil War, from June 30, 1861, to June 30, 1866, was \$3,500,000,000. I have somewhere the total expenditures of the Government for the first seventy-two years of its existence, which is a little more than the increase in this naval appropriation bill.

The net cost of the World War to the United States was,

¹ From Congressional Record. 61:1401. May 13, 1921.

up to January 1, 1921, \$24,010,000,000. According to the appropriations passed prior to May 1, 1920, including the deficiency bill, our expenditure for that year was \$5,686,576,000. Of this expenditure there was expended for the War and Navy Departments \$1,424,138,667.57, or 25 per cent of the entire amount; \$3,855,482,000, or 67 per cent was for previous wars, in the way of pensions, and so forth. For primary governmental functions \$181,000,000 was expended, in round figures, or 43 per cent of the entire expenditures of the Government. There was expended for public works, \$168,203,557.46, or 2.097 per cent of the entire amount. For research and educational development work there was expended \$57,093,600, or 1.001 per cent of the entire expenditures.

For research, for educational work, for the building of citizenship, for the building of character upon which republican institutions must rest, we appropriate 1 per cent of the entire expenditures of five billion and odd dollars, and 93 per cent for war.

Now I ask you, not as an academic question but as a practical proposition, how long can a republican form of government exist under that condition of affairs? It is not guns alone, or ships alone, which constitute the safety and the security of a free government; it is the intellect and the character of the citizenship upon which the government rests. One per cent for laying the basis of character and citizenship and 93 per cent dedicated to the purposes of destruction and death, that is a road to speedy and certain breakdown in republican government.

Mr President, it is often stated, in answer to those who would like to curtail naval expenditures and Army expenditures, that the distressed condition of the world, the discontented condition of the world, the unrest throughout the world, will not permit of it at this time. The discontent and disorder which prevail throughout the world at this time are due very largely to the great debt which has been and is being imposed upon the people by reason of these Army and Navy expenditures throughout the world.

Almost equal to the crime of those who were guilty of the bringing on of the war was the crime which the allied and associated powers committed, when, after the signing of the armistice, they each and all begin to arm against one another—for there was no one else against whom to arm—upon a more

stupendous scale than had ever before characterized the nations of the world.

Let me call your attention to the fact that in 1920, two years after the war had closed, when the German navy had been destroyed and her army reduced to two hundred thousand, the allied and associated powers, the five great nations, expended for their armies and their navies \$16,442,251,101.

Those powers which were victors together impose upon their people the burden in one year of over \$16,000,000,000 for armament, for armies and navies, and against whom? That is the source of the discontent. That is the source of the disorder. The promise that this war was to end war has resulted in a preparation for the next war upon a scale which the human mind never before conceived.

Now, I ask again of my friends, how are you going to stop it except through an agreement, except through a conference? How are you going to lift the burden which is now creating unrest and dissatisfaction not only throughout Europe, but throughout this country, except by an agreement among the powers which are laying on the debt?

Look at the condition in France today. France has an army of eight hundred thousand men. She has her military alliances with some seven or eight of the European powers. She is extending a network of militaristic power throughout Europe, and yet the condition of the French citizen today is one of object poverty. How shall we assist in aiding France to get from under that situation? Shall we do it by building battle-ships, by increasing our Army and our Navy, or shall we bring about an agreement by which the great naval powers of the world may disarm the ocean and at least initiate a program of peace which will bring poise and contentment to the other nations of the world?

A RECORD OF BARBARISM¹

Our country has a Navy, according to expert authorities, almost equal in effectiveness to that of Great Britain, with no colonies or distant dependencies to maintain or protect. We have a Navy twice as powerful and expensive as that of any

¹ From a speech by James A. Frear in the House of Representatives, April 29, 1921. Issued by Women's Committee for World Disarmament.

other country in the world, barring alone Great Britain, our ally in the recent war. Jingoism who want war live in every land. In Japan they declare our country is an international bully looking for war, while American jingoism see red whenever Japan is mentioned. Today mutually they would force two great nations to fly at each other's throats over the possession of an island five thousand miles distant from our shores and less than three miles square.

With feverish haste we are now building warships at a cost to the Government of about \$40,000,000 for each of the capital ships under construction, a tax of about two dollars for the average family of five for each of these seventeen ships. This is more than twice the cost of the National Capitol Building for a single battleship or cruiser; over two-thirds of all Government appropriations in 1920 for education and science combined—spent for a single vessel.—It has been demonstrated that 92 per cent of all our annual Government expenditures are made for wars, past, present and future, counting charges directly occasioned by war, while only 1 per cent is spent by Congress for educational purposes. What answer can we make to this record of barbarism that rivals the worst pages of history, ancient or modern?

Nearly four years after the armistice Congress will be asked to vote \$400,000,000 to \$500,000,000 in a bill for naval purposes for 1922 alone. The world lies devastated and prostrate; England, mistress of the seas for centuries, refuses to continue this mad battleship-building race, yet a powerful propaganda in our country demands more ships and still more ships at \$40,000,000 cost per ship, dwarfing the combined naval preparations of England and Germany eight short years ago.

If the voice of the people back home who are paying the enormous tax legacy of the war could be heard, what think you would be their opinion of nearly \$500,000,000 naval expenditure three years after war had ended and a scarcely less cost for the Army? Would they advise us to throw wide open the Treasury doors in order to lead the race in naval domination on the Atlantic and the Pacific? What would be their judgment?

An ounce of international confidence and friendship is worth a ton of war materials when it comes to insurance against war.

One of the most vital questions of the day is whether the hand of international greeting extended by Governments, one to the other, contains a token of genuine friendship or grips a weapon that may again threaten the peace of the world. That is the call of disarmament.

If the policy of world domination is to be our aim, then indeed the future is obscured by dark clouds. But I can not believe that the everyday folks, the God-fearing, peace-loving people who pay the bills and who speak with the voice of ultimate authority, will indorse a program that foreshadows strife and misery for those who must ever bear the burden. This stupendous naval program in time of peace, I believe, will provoke a protest from the people, and that protest should be heeded at both ends of the Capitol.

The following war statistics carry their own lesson:

NATIONAL DEBT BY WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Revolutionary	\$170,000,000
War of 1812	119,000,000
Mexican War	173,000,000
Civil War	3,478,000,000
Spanish War	1,902,000,000
World War	24,000,000,000

MONEY APPROPRIATED BY THE U. S. FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

1909-1910	\$279,000,000
1920-1921	828,000,000
Estimates 1921-22	1,379,000,000

ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1919-20

Research, education, public health	\$59,000,000
Ordinary Government Functions	226,000,000
Public Works	85,000,000
Army and Navy	1,348,000,000
Pensions, interest, and expenditures due to past wars	2,690,000,000

CAN WE AFFORD NOT TO DISARM?¹

The appropriation by the House of Representatives a few days ago of \$396,000,000 for current year naval expenditures will probably be increased by the Senate, if the "big navy" group have their way, to \$500,000,000. The adoption of this program would probably involve the expenditure of an even

¹ By James G. McDonald, Executive Chairman of Foreign Policy Association. Woman Citizen. 5:1213. May 7, 1921.

larger sum for the navy during 1921-1922 and henceforth, because \$500,000,000 would provide for only a partial fulfillment of a program which tends each year to increase in size and costliness.

For the naval and military services combined, the estimates recently presented to Congress contemplate, as General Pershing explained, "an appropriation for the next fiscal year of more than \$5,000,000 for every working day." Dr. Edward B. Rosa, of the United States Bureau of Standards, has analyzed the United States appropriations for 1920 as follows:

1. Past Wars	\$3,855,482,586	68 Per Cent
2. Future Wars	1,424,138,677	25 Per Cent
3. Civil Departments	181,087,225	3 Per Cent
4. Public Works	168,203,557	3 Per Cent
5. Education and Science...	57,093,661	1 Per Cent
Total	\$5,686,005,706	100 Per Cent

Recently the Bureau of Standards has also estimated that during the last four years, for every man, woman and child in the United States \$130.32 has been contributed directly or indirectly for the expenses of the army and the navy. In view of these figures; in view of the present industrial depression, the urgent need for funds for education, agriculture, scientific research, etc., is it not our Government's duty to canvass every possible method to minimize those military expenditures, which are absorbing approximately *nine-tenths* of the nation's revenues?

According to the most recent estimates, we are told that the war cost approximately \$348,000,000,000, a sum roughly equivalent to the total worth of the entire United States. Having destroyed this much property during the years 1914-1918, the nations are now spending between eight and ten billion dollars yearly on past and future wars. This means that the interest on about \$200,000,000,000 is being used for war purposes.

It is everywhere admitted that most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are actually if not nominally bankrupt. Even the states west of the Rhine are facing economic problems of appalling difficulty. Great Britain and Belgium only are able to balance their budgets without excessive and costly internal or foreign loans. It seems obvious that the European and Asiatic States must drastically limit their armament, if they are to avoid complete disorganization.

But there can be no material limitation of armament, particularly naval, in Europe and Asia, unless the United States also limits her naval expenditures. Enlightened leadership by the United States is essential if the world is to be relieved from the unbearable burdens of unrestricted military preparedness.

It is reasonable to inquire what relation there is between the proposed increase of our navy to a size equal to or greater than that of Great Britain and our foreign policy. To arm on such a vast scale without a definite conception of possible enemies against whom such a navy might have to be used would be absurd. Only two such enemies are conceivable: Japan and Great Britain. The former alone cannot within the next two years be a serious danger; the latter is bound to us by the strongest ties of race, language and common interest.

But might not the Anglo-Japanese Alliance bring Great Britain to the support of Japan in a war against us? This alliance specifically relieves either of the signatories from taking up arms against a country with which it has a general treaty of arbitration. There is such a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. But even if there were not, it is inconceivable that Great Britain would follow Japan's lead in a struggle with us. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and probably South Africa would certainly refuse to follow the mother country in such a venture. It is unthinkable that Great Britain would risk the disruption of the empire to support her Asiatic ally against the United States. Then why do we need the largest navy in the world?

What does "adequate preparedness" mean? Does it mean a navy equal in efficiency to that of Great Britain? Or does it mean a navy as strong as that of Great Britain and Japan combined, or a navy as powerful as that of Great Britain, Japan and France combined? The fact is that we are as likely to have war with all three of these powers as we are to have war with Great Britain. How adequate therefore is the suggestion for a navy as large only as that of the British Empire? If we are to be adequately prepared against every contingency, we must arm against the world. Even for us, with all our wealth, that would involve something akin to bankruptcy.

Are we sure that the types of ships called for in our present building program are adequate? Very serious doubts have been raised by military experts as to the efficacy of the

battleship in modern warfare. Many critics have urged that the submarine and hydroplane and other new devices have made the capital ship obsolete. Without presuming to judge as to the merits of this controversy, is it not questionable wisdom for our Government to continue to spend hundreds of millions in the construction of gigantic ships of war which may, before the next international conflict, be utterly obsolete?

A striking lesson in the fallacy of "adequate preparedness" is supplied by the experience of Germany in the recent war. If ever a power had been adequately prepared, it was the German Empire. Yet within three months of the opening of the war German preparedness had shown itself quite inadequate. After the Battle of the Marne, Germany was forced to reconsider in the light of new experiences her whole military problem. Like all the other belligerents, she found that the issues in modern warfare are not determined so much by the military machines, armies and navies, as by the basic economic strength and the moral and physical fiber of the whole people. The moral is plain: The only hope of "adequate preparedness" lies in the full and harmonious development of our economic life and in the strengthening of the quality of citizenship rather than in the enlargement of our army and navy.

International rivalry in naval armament produces suspicion. Suspicion produces jealousy and distrust. From these easily follow serious misunderstandings, which not infrequently result in war. All economic considerations aside, we ought seriously to consider the effect which our increased naval program will have upon the programs of the other naval powers and therefore upon the relations between us and Great Britain.

It is frequently urged by the elder statesmen of both parties that the biggest navy is necessary to make the voice of the United States respected in the councils of the nations. Is not this judgment based on a philosophy of international relations very little different from that which we were told dominated the German imperialists before 1914? Does not this belief in the necessity for the big stick to support America's international policies ignore our unique industrial, agricultural, commercial and financial strength? Much of Europe and Asia is starving and bankrupt. We alone, as a nation, can be constructively helpful. Who can believe that we must needs have

an enormous navy to induce the rest of the world to listen to us?

The world needs peace—real peace, and opportunity to work and to produce and to exchange commodities. In short, to live again as it did before the holocaust which burst upon Europe in August, 1914. We may help to rebuild the shattered structure of the world's economic life. We alone are relatively disinterested; relatively without bias or the spirit of national hatred and revenge. Shall we not lead the world onward toward reconstruction by taking the initiative in the movement for limiting the burdens of naval armament? Or shall we be satisfied to stimulate, through international naval rivalry, the already ruinous cost of preparedness? We are at the cross roads.

Quoting the statement, "Of every dollar paid in as Federal income tax the Government will be compelled to spend 88 cents to cover the expenses of past wars and to prepare for possible future wars," Mr. Christopher Morley, in his column in the New York Evening Post, said: "We would like every citizen to paste that statement inside his right-hand trouser pocket (or, in the case of the ladies, inside those little handbags), and ask himself, every now and then, whether war is seven times as important, enjoyable and satisfactory as all the other business of mankind put together."

THE SO-CALLED ARMAMENT RACE¹

It is a strange anomaly that though there is just now a world-wide discussion of the so-called race in armaments, such a competition does not in fact exist. On the other hand, if the present talk by the Secretary of the Navy and his immediate advisors about the necessity for us to build the biggest navy in the world is carried on much longer, the armament race will begin in good earnest. It cannot too frequently be impressed upon the American people that, as the naval situation stands today, there is no other country which has a large program of construction in hand. Japan, it is true, drew up a program for new battleships and battlecruisers, prompted, so her statesmen tell us, by the declaration of our Naval Secre-

¹ From Scientific American. 124:62. January 22, 1921.

tary that, if the nations of the world would not join the League of Nations in the form in which the present administration had drawn it up, he would be in favor not only of completing our present large program but of doubling it—a policy which would call for the expenditure of another billion dollars of the taxpayers' money to see it through. The new Japanese proposal is purely on paper and apparently, so far as anyone can ascertain, no appropriations have been made to carry it on. There is certainly no race in naval armaments that can be called such so far as active Japanese building operations are concerned.

With regard to Great Britain, it is sufficient to say that in the face of Mr. Daniels' threat, she deliberately scrapped all of her pre-dreadnought battleships, broke up three sister ships to the Hood, vessels of forty-two thousand tons which were already in course of construction, and made a sweeping clean-up of armored cruisers, protected cruisers, destroyers and submarines that were not of thoroughly modern construction. Furthermore, she reduced her personnel from some four hundred fifty thousand men to about one hundred thousand, which is over thirty thousand less than the present enlisted strength of our own Navy. And for two years past, in spite of the, shall we say, militaristic attitude of our formerly pacifistic Secretary, she has drawn up no program whatsoever for future new construction. Evidently, there is no race in naval armaments between the United States and Great Britain.

Nevertheless, in spite of the mortification with which the great body of the American people have witnessed this ill-timed and uncalled-for "swash-buckling," it has not been without its good effects. It has served to call forth, mainly through the efforts of one of our great leading dailies, a widespread protest against the continuation of huge appropriations for naval and military construction, which has been surprising in its world-wide range and unanimity of sentiment. Both here and abroad, statesmen of all shades of political opinion, naval and military officers of the highest rank, leaders of thought in the church, at the bar, in education, and in literature, have responded in no unmeasured terms of approval to the suggestion, that the nations of the world should get together in an endeavor to reduce their existing naval and military programs

and cut down future appropriations to the requirements of post-war conditions.

Among the very few dissenting opinions are those of a few men who fear that the present agitation may throw this country back into the condition of unpreparedness with which it was confronted at the beginning of the late war. The Scientific American does not believe that there is ground for any such anxiety. Not during this generation at least will the American people forget the lesson of that feverish period, when we endeavored to do in one year what could have been so much more cheaply and better done in the previous ten years. When they are engaged in the pastime of filling in their annual tax papers and enclosing the accompanying check, they will have a periodical and very poignant reminder of the costliness of unpreparedness. Nobody, of course, who is qualified to speak on the subject of disarmament would wish to see the wholesale scrapping of our fleets, razing of our forts, and destruction of our accumulated artillery. What is needed and what we believe will come is a great reduction of present shipbuilding and a mutually agreed upon adjustment of the relative strength of armies and navies to the several needs of the nations concerned.

So far as the great peoples which fought together for the principles of justice and humanity are concerned, this adjustment should present no insuperable difficulties. Such unrest and mutual distrust as seems to have developed among the Allies since the armistice has been altogether artificial in its origin. It is the result of an insidious propaganda, largely racial in its origin, which has been deliberately designed to break up that unity of feeling between us and our Allies, and particularly between the United States and Great Britain, which was, and ever will remain, the greatest asset of the late war.

The slogan of this propaganda is the phrase, "Freedom of the Seas," which had its origin centuries ago, and was resurrected by Germany when she began to feel the pinch of the blockade. It was aimed, of course, against the British fleet, which, thank Heaven, was strong enough to preserve the freedom of the seas, for herself and her Allies to move their armies when and where they would. For all law-abiding and peaceful merchant ships the seas have been "free" for a hundred years past.

BATTLESHIPS AND BANKRUPTCY¹

The entire sum needed to save the lives of three and a half million starving children in the war-devastated areas of Europe is less than the cost of one modern battleship, as Mr. Hoover recently pointed out. An English superdreadnought of the latest type is said to cost £9,000,000, or over \$32,000,000. Correspondents put the cost of Japan's new fighting monster, the Mutsu, at \$40,000,000. A United States battlecruiser of the formidable type shown above costs the taxpayer about \$23,000,000 to build. Our naval estimates for 1921, the New York World notes, are nearly \$700,000,000, as compared with naval appropriations of about \$400,000,000 in Great Britain and about \$150,000,000 in Japan—and we are facing a deficit for the current fiscal year of approximately \$2,000,000,000. An official statistician recently showed that 93 cents out of every dollar collected by the United States Government goes to pay for past or future wars. And from Germany comes the estimate of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg that "the lowest cost of maintaining the armed establishments of the world today is between seven and eight billion gold dollars—all unproductive."

Such facts and figures explain the international interest roused by the New York World's crusade against what it describes as "the crime of competitive armament." "Disarmament," says Major-General Tasker H. Bliss, who was military representative of the United States on the Supreme War-Council and Commissioner Plenipotentiary on the American Peace Commission, "is the only means of preserving the world from bankruptcy and civilization from ruin." "The piling up of armaments is causing general bankruptcy, anarchy, and perpetual and universal war," avers Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, chairman of the Air Commission of the French Senate; and he adds: "If governments, after the lesson of the war, do not agree simultaneously to limit their armaments, they commit suicide." A London dispatch quotes Lord Cowdray, the British "oil king," as saying that the chief rivalry between great nations today should be a rivalry in disarmament. "Why should the nations waste thousands of millions on probably useless battleships, about the future utility of which the best experts

¹ From *Literary Digest*. 68:7-8. January 15, 1921.

are now violently divided?" too much asks Lord Northcliffe, owner of the London Times and other English newspapers, who welcomes The World's campaign for a "naval holiday" because "governments need the support of public opinion when they do anything that may seem to affect national security." Any move in the direction of disarmament by America, asserts the editor of the Berlin Neue Welt, an ex-officer of a crack Prussian cavalry regiment, "will give a knock-out blow to Prussian militarism," "initiate a new era for Europe," and "restore America's pre-Versailles prestige in Germany." "It is foolish and it is tragic to think of the big states of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan competing in a race for armament," exclaims Baron Hayashi, Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain; and, he adds, "Japan can not afford it." Everywhere, reports The World, its appeal for an international agreement to limit naval armament meets with enthusiastic response from organized labor. But the replies from France, it says, "tend to reflect the dread of German militarism and Russian bolshevism that still prevails there."

General Pershing adds his impressive warning to that of General Bliss. Speaking at a recent dinner of the European Relief Council in New York, he called attention to the fact that the estimates presented to our Congress for naval and military purposes contemplate an appropriation for the next fiscal year amounting to over \$5,000,000 for every working day in the year; and he went on to say:

"It is a gloomy commentary upon world conditions that expenditures several times greater than ever before in peace times should be considered necessary, especially when the most rigid economy in governmental administration is essential if we would avoid national bankruptcy.

"But we are only one of the many nations that contemplate taking upon themselves such an enormous burden in addition to their tremendous war-debts.

"The world does not seem to learn from experience. It would appear that the lessons of the past six year should be enough to convince everybody of the danger of nations striding up and down the earth armed to the teeth. But no one nation can reduce armaments unless all do.

"Ours is not an aggressive nation. We want no territory, and we have no designs on other people. If other nations have

the same attitude, it seems unreasonable not to believe that all would be willing to prove it by consenting to limit armaments. Unless some such move be made, we may well ask ourselves whether civilization does really reach a point where it begins to destroy itself, and whether we are thus doomed to go headlong down through destructive war to darkness and barbarism."

"When professional fighters talk in this strain, what excuse can civilian legislators give for their blind adherence to a suicidal policy?" asks the Syracuse Herald. "There is no more inconceivable folly than this continued riot of expenditure on battleships at a time when great masses of humanity are dying of starvation in certain parts of the world, parallel with bursting warehouses of rotting food in other places," declares Mr. Hoover, who points out that the money spent on naval armament since the armistice "would have contributed materially to the entire economic rehabilitation of the world." To meet this situation, Senator Borah has offered a resolution authorizing the President to advise the Governments of Great Britain and Japan that the Government of the United States is ready to take up with them the question of naval disarmament with a view to arriving at an understanding to reduce "during the next five years 50 per cent of the present estimates or figures." At the same time Senator Walsh offers a resolution requesting the President to appoint an American member of the League of Nations disarmament commission.

In England Lloyd George has apparently anticipated the proposal contained in the Borah resolution by ordering Great Britain's military and naval estimates for the coming year cut in two. Commenting on this order, the New York Evening Post says:

"Its boldness lies in the fact that it is made in the face of our tremendous estimates—estimates which are being discust in every European capital. British periodicals teem with articles showing that by 1924 the United States will actually have incomparably the biggest navy in the world.' For the first time since modern navies began Great Britain will take second place. But Lloyd George is not afraid. He sets out from the proposition that war between Great Britain and the United States is unthinkable. To deny that is to invoke disaster on civilization.

"We owe Lloyd George a debt of gratitude for his action—

not because it enables us to gain upon England, but because it throws into strong relief the folly of our huge army and navy estimates. We should have been the nation to set the example of drastic reduction in preparations for war. Doubtless when the Budget Committee finishes with the figures submitted by Secretaries Baker and Daniels we shall be setting such an example. But the credit and the honor of having led the way will belong to another. Lloyd George has taken the leadership in reduction of armaments away from us. But we can still do our duty."

Dispatches tell us further that Great Britain has ceased building battleships while she waits to hear from her Committee of Imperial Defense, which is expected to report on a naval program in May. Walter H. Long, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty, says in a cablegram to the New York World:

"In my speech on the estimates in the House of Commons this year I express the hope that any competition of the future would be in reduction, not in increase of armaments. My board and the Government showed their sincerity by bringing forward no building program. We even did not finish the ships then and now under construction.

"We have held the control of the seas to the advantage of the world and to the securing of peace for over three hundred years. We are an island Power, entirely dependent upon the outside world for our supplies of all kinds; we must have a navy capable of maintaining our ocean highways. We have had different standards; our strength was at one time superior to the three next strongest Powers; then to the two; now all that we are suggesting is that our strength be equal to the next Power. Is not this proof of our desire for general reduction of armaments?"

British papers "without exception," according to a London correspondent of the New York Tribune, support The World's plea that the United States, Great Britain, and Japan should lead the way in an agreement to reduce their programs for naval construction. But even more significant, in the opinion of our press, is the attitude of the British Navy League, which is regarded as representing the most militant school of naval opinion in Great Britain. On January 1 the Executive Committee of the Navy League issued a remarkable statement, which reads in part:

"With the disappearance of the German Fleet the world's naval position is changed.

"Today civilization is not threatened by any maritime Power.

"There is no alternative to competitive building of ships of war except an international naval agreement. . .

"It would seem that science, as applied to destructive agencies, is forcing us ever more rapidly to the conclusion that the highest idealism of all is the only practical alternative to world suicide.

"The Navy League holds that the sea history in the past of Great Britain and the United States imposes on them mutually the duty of attempting to render to the world still greater service, and for this reason it urges that the invitation to the proposed conference should come from the two great Anglo-Saxon nations jointly."

"When a navy league, which has existed to promote the naval strength of the British Empire, adopts the idealism of the disarmament principle and says the only alternative is world suicide, we are getting ahead," exclaims the Springfield Republican.

JINGOES¹

Talk at this time about disarmament is futile. In a world as upset as this, no nation is actually going to disarm unless compelled to by major force. The effect of such talk is a muddling of ideas.

Limitation of armaments is another thing, and the call for this, especially for the limitation of naval armaments, is assuming an imperative tone. The great German fleet is at the bottom of the sea. Great Britain has at last called a halt in the construction of great battleships, partly for economic reasons, partly to study the lessons of the war and the relative values of dreadnoughts, submersibles and air craft. France is not much concerned about her navy, nor is Italy much concerned about hers. The two nations that continue to pile up their naval armaments with feverish haste are the United States and Japan.

According to figures given by Admiral Coontz, the capital

¹ From Current Opinion. 70:151-4. February, 1921.

ships in the three chief navies of the world rank today as follows: Great Britain, 864,600 tons; United States 468,000 tons; Japan, 326,000 tons. But if we add to these the capital ships now under construction we shall get the following figures (Great Britain having suspended construction of such ships): Great Britain, 864,600 tons; United States, 1,191,000 tons; Japan, 667,000 tons.

The question is, are we going to keep up this pace, set when the war was at its height, and compel Japan to continue and England to resume a similar pace? There is no doubt about the feeling in England. The Navy League over there says that "with the disappearance of the German fleet the world's naval position is changed," and it would welcome a conference of naval powers to limit naval armament.

The Committee on Foreign Relations in our Senate is considering a resolution offered by Senator Borah requesting the President to enter into negotiations with Great Britain and Japan for a reduction of 50 per cent in naval programs for the next five years. Another resolution, presented by Senator Walsh, would authorize the President to appoint a representative to meet with the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations.

But the jingoes are on the rampage already, and, strange to say, they are receiving aid and comfort from such a pacific person as Secretary Daniels. The New York Sun, for instance, gets out its tape measure and finds that we have a coast line to defend that is forty-eight hundred miles long, while that of the United Kingdom is but thirty-two hundred miles, and it takes seven times as long for a ship to pass from one extremity of our coast line to the other as in the case of the United Kingdom. Logically, therefore, tho the Sun does not pursue the argument to its logical end, we should have a navy about ten times as large as Great Britain's. The Hearst papers are, of course, in the game, and the New York American assures us that "nothing is more certain" than that, if we fight Japan, the latter will have "the cooperation of England and the very probable benevolent assistance of France." Consequently we must have a navy able to resist any such combination.

The Washington Post is perfectly willing that we enter

into an agreement to curtail naval armaments—not now but three years from now, “when the Stars and Stripes float over the most formidable armada ever put to sea by a nation.” The Butte Bulletin finds an insurmountable obstacle to decreasing armaments. It is oil. Trade supremacy in the future will be based upon the control of oil fields, and the fight for that control is the cause for increasing armaments. Secretary Daniels believes the time is ripe for an international agreement, but he wants no half-way measures. Unless “all nations” enter into the agreement, not for one year or five years but for “all time,” he thinks we should go ahead to build the largest navy in the world.

But such utterances are few and far between. The sentiment, as voiced in the American press, is overwhelmingly in favor of our joining in a movement with Japan and Great Britain to limit naval armaments. The Chicago Tribune thinks that political realities permit a naval truce at the present ratio of strength, because our policy is a defensive one and England can not conquer us by land. It argues, even, in favor of an “unreserved departure” from the Philippines in order to relieve the strain on our relations with Japan, and facilitate an agreement for limitation of navies. The New York Tribune thinks that our guilt will be worse than that of Germany if we fail at this time to unite with Great Britain and Japan to prevent the possibility of another World War. We should be willing to preserve the present *status quo* in naval armaments, as England is the only country in Europe that could war with us upon the sea, and “such a crime as a war between the two countries is unthinkable.” War with Japan would be almost as criminal as war with England, and, if it were to come, our navy is almost 50 per cent stronger than Japan’s. The New York World has been running a series of editorials and interviews in favor of a naval holiday by the three nations, and it terms the proposed program of spending \$5,000,000 for every working day in the year on naval and military purposes “madness unworthy of the race.”

To these utterances by the press—and many more could be given—may be added two statements made by eminent citizens. Says Mr. Herbert Hoover: “There is no more inconceivable folly than this continued riot of expenditure on battleships at a time when great masses of humanity are dying of starvation

in certain parts of the world, parallel with bursting warehouses of rotting food in other places."

Says General Pershing: "Ours is not an aggressive nation. We want no territory, and we have no designs on other people. If other nations have the same attitude, it seems unreasonable not to believe that all would be willing to prove it by consenting to limit armaments. Unless some such move is made, we may well ask ourselves whether civilization does really reach a point where it begins to destroy itself, and whether we are thus doomed to go headlong down through destructive war to darkness and barbarism."

Assuming that this nation is ready, as England is apparently ready, to enter into an agreement, how about Japan? Japan has her jingoes and militarists, just as we have ours. Premier Hara has had some embarrassing moments from them in the last few weeks because of their fear that he is favorably impressed by the "Anglo-Saxon scheme" for limitation of armaments. The clansmen who find voice in the Jiji and Yomuiuru and other like journals say the scheme is for a union of Great Britain and the United States, on a naval basis, for the purpose of dividing between them the empire of the seas. The strength of such opposition can not be gauged at this time, but it is taken seriously in London. California's treatment of the Japanese, and the crisis that may grow out of it, may block any agreement for naval limitation. Says the Yorodzu, of Tokyo:

"Even were the California question disposed of for the time being, it would be out of the question to dispose of the whole problem of anti-Japanese feeling in the United States. It is a hard matter, as it is, to settle this California question. Our people have been brought to see at last how grave it is. Our people have become aware that the California question is not at all like the anti-Japanese difficulties of the past. Nevertheless, the rise or the fall of our race depends upon the settlement of this very problem. It is a subject of rejoicing here that efforts to rouse the Japanese people to the peril from this source confronting them have finally succeeded. Our people must take all possible measures in advance to meet the developments sure to come."

The jingoes, in all countries, are a vociferous lot. They appeal to fear, to prejudice, to patriotism, to national pride.

If they are to have their way for the next few years the world will not be fit for any but savages and beasts to live in. The trouble is not that they are corrupt and designing but that they are so often terribly sincere. They are as sincere, many of them, as a child crying in the dark for fear of hobgoblins. And one of the most dangerous things in national life is a panicky fear of this kind. There is no limit to the terrors the imagination can conjure up once it is set in action.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS¹

Several weeks ago Professor Borchard and I discussed this question of disarmament before the Cosmopolitan Club, and after we had finished there seemed to be some differences of opinion about what we had been discussing.

Therefore, I shall begin at the beginning by defining the question. I am not going to talk about disarmament in the absolute sense of the term. I am going to talk about it in its contemporary sense, by which I mean the rigid limitation of all defence armament to the actual necessities of defence and the complete elimination of competitive armament, which after all is the head devil in the whole controversy.

The world has just finished a war that was the direct product of competitive armaments. A great many people think it was due to the fact that the Germans were inherently base and wicked and everybody else was pure and virtuous. But wars don't happen that way. The competition of armament had reached a point where the overhead had become prohibitive to the imperial system and the imperial system thereupon adopted the oldest expedient of imperialism, which is that when you are facing an impasse at home the best way out is a successful foreign war—a very good recipe sometimes, but it doesn't always work.

Now, that war cost, in a purely financial way, according to the most recent estimates, is a little matter of \$348,000,000,000, which is equivalent to wiping out the United States from the economic system of the world; it amounts to that, and the nations are now trying to adjust themselves to this situation.

¹ From a speech by Frank Irving Cobb, editor of *New York World*. Reprinted in *Bulletin. League of Free Nations Association*. March, 1921.

Three years before this war began Lloyd George, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a speech in the House of Commons in which he estimated that the nations were then spending about \$2,500,000,000 a year for war, past and future, and he predicted that their economic systems could not long endure that strain. That speech attracted the same kind of attention that a speech of that kind always attracts: everybody said something ought to be done about it—and nothing was done about it.

At the end of a war which has cost \$348,000,000,000 in property and production, the nations are now spending, according to the best estimates you can get, between \$8,000,000,000 and \$10,000,000,000 a year on past and future wars. Lloyd George's \$2,500,000,000 at that time meant that about \$50,000,000,000 of the world's assets were segregated to earn interest for war purposes, and now after burning up \$348,000,000,000 the world is segregating about \$200,000,000,000 more to pay interest on war policies.

Now, the economic systems of the world cannot stand that strain; it can't be done. Government has no money of its own. Every dollar it gets it takes out of somebody's pocket, and before it takes that dollar out of anybody's pocket somebody else has to earn it in the sweat of his face—there is no other way out of it—and the production of the world cannot stand the strain that government is putting on it. The white man's civilization has always rested on his economic supremacy. Even his military force has been due to his economic force, and this war has shown in a most striking way that economic energy can be almost instantaneously converted into military energy, but military energy can't be converted back into economic energy. It is like the radiated heat of the sun: nobody can gather it up and weld it into another sun. The stronger a nation is economically the better prepared it is to defend itself. The weaker it is economically the less prepared it is to defend itself, even if every man, woman and child is carrying a gun.

Now, preparedness has probably bemuddled more minds than anything that ever happened except predestination and perhaps the Armenian heresy and a few things like that. It is a lovely word, but it doesn't mean anything; there isn't any such thing. Armies don't go to war; nations go to war.

You mobilize everything. Strictly speaking, there are no non-combatants, except the children, and they are potential combatants. The German General Staff boasted on the 1st of August, 1914, that it was prepared for war to the last button, and I suppose that that was probably the most perfect military machine that the mind of man ever put together, and the whole thing was in the ditch in six weeks. They were not prepared for war at all; they were prepared for one brief campaign, one might say they were prepared for one battle. Then they had to go to work and mobilize their economic resources and provide for a long struggle in which they were finally worn out and after which they collapsed.

What are we preparing for? You know, I have talked that matter over with Senators—and Senators are the source of all wisdom—and I haven't been able to find out. In this war three military empires were completely destroyed, and so we are spending twice as much on our army as we spent before. Three navies were completely obliterated, there is nothing left of them—and we are spending nearly four times as much on the navy as we did before. What is it all about? I cannot find out. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs announced the other day that we had to have a navy at least equal to that of any other power, which means, of course, the British navy. What are you going to do with it when you get it? The United States is all dressed up and no place to go.

Now, there was at least method in the German madness when they created their military establishment. They were devising an army that could attack on two fronts simultaneously if necessary, wedged in as they were between Russia and France, which had an offensive and defensive military alliance. They were building a navy which, without any hope of being equal to the British navy, could at least menace the British line of communications. That might have been a foolish thing to do, but it was at least a logical thing to do—you can understand it, you know what it is about. There has always been a similar method in the British naval policy based upon the very simple fact that Great Britain does not produce enough food to feed itself and therefore can be starved to death within sixty days if its communications are cut; and therefore the British people have had to maintain a navy that could protect their food supplies. That is what it is all about.

But we are not wedged in between two nations. Nobody is going to cut off our food supplies. What great international question faces us that we need today to be spending more money on the army and navy alone than we spent for all the purposes of government six years ago? Do you know? I don't think any of you do; but you are going to have a still clearer view of the question about the 15th of next March when you begin to pay your income taxes.

Now, Lloyd George recently, in one of his lapses into sincerity, said that the test of the League of Nations was disarmament. You might go further and say that it is the test of statesmanship throughout the world, for the simple reason that the economic structure is crumbling under that strain and the most important thing in the world today is to restore that economic structure from the wreck of this war. If you don't begin the work of restoration pretty soon it may be too late. I know that, according to eminent authorities, the American people voted last November that they were isolated, had nothing to do with the rest of the world—a peculiar people—but I notice also that the American farmer is flat on his back because the millions of people who are starving to death in Europe can't buy his farm products. I notice also that about three million men are out of work in the United States for the same reason. In other words, while we are bankrupting Europe, or helping to bankrupt Europe in this armament race, we are incidentally helping to bankrupt ourselves; we are getting a great deal of armament but not much food out of it. Now, it is all very well to talk about armament as a matter of insurance, but when a man gets to the point where he is bankrupting himself to pay the premiums on his insurance policies, he might better cancel some of them and take a few risks.

And that's where all of the world is today. Now, there probably was never a time in the history of the United States when we had so few foreign complications that we didn't manufacture at home. There are only two nations in all the world that have any power to do us any harm whatever, so we habitually insult both of them. There isn't a diplomatic issue which confronts the United States which any two ordinarily intelligent men couldn't settle in a back room in an hour; yet the United States Senate cannot settle anything. Apparently we have started out to take the place of Germany as the great

disturber of the peace of the world, and we are rattling the sabre rather awkwardly. Unless we are doing that, we are not doing anything that's intelligible, it doesn't mean anything.

Now, I am very certain that anybody can give fifty excellent reasons for continuing the cost of armament. I can give fifty excellent reasons why I need a new automobile, and I can give only one why I am not going to get it, which is that I haven't the money; and that's soon going to be the condition of government in the world today. It is trying to maintain a Rolls-Royce outfit on a "flivver" income, and it can't be done. With all due and necessary apprehension of our foreign foes, I can say to you what I said to the Republican Club last Saturday, namely, that if God Almighty will protect us from Congress we can take care of our enemies.

ONE CONDITION OF EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT¹

In the newspapers and in Congress there has been much discussion recently about the desirability and the best means of bringing it about. The man who started the discussion was Senator Borah, the ablest and most resolute among the irrecconcilable opponents of American participation in the League of Nations. But the support which he has received has come chiefly from newspapers, such as the New York World and Evening Post, which were strongly in favor of the American ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. In general those Americans who are urging the immediate importance of disarmament belong to the group who ignored the errors, the vindictiveness, and the bad faith of the Treaty and considered that document a desirable legal foundation for the future peace of the world. At present they are using their influence in favor both of disarmament and of the ratification and the execution of the Treaty. In our opinion the two policies are contradictory. As long as the Treaty of Versailles remains the foundation of the public law of Europe it is as vain to expect effective disarmament as it was to expect it when the Treaty of Vienna determined the relations one to another of the Powers of Europe.

¹ From New Republic. 6:281-2. May 17, 1921.

By calling attention to the incompatibility between executing the Treaty of Versailles and expecting the world to disarm, we are not disparaging the proposed negotiation with Japan and Great Britain for a limitation of naval armaments. It is possible, if not probable, that the governments of these three countries can reach an agreement to restrict the building of capital ships which under subsequently favorable conditions might constitute the first step in the direction of general and permanent disarmament. The American government should open negotiations for such an agreement. But in that case it becomes a matter of the utmost importance to bring into existence the "subsequently favorable conditions" and so prevent a relapse into the mad waste of competition for naval supremacy. The standards of international behavior established by the Treaty of Versailles will render the general conditions of international politics hostile to disarmament.

The presupposition of disarmament is that nations feel enough confidence in their fair treatment by other nations to count in the event of disagreements upon a conciliatory discussion of the issue and its impartial adjustment or adjudication under some jointly accepted rule. It implies the will and the means to base international government on consent. This implication has no reality in the world of today. It can have none under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and under the dictatorship of the Supreme Allied Council. The victorious nations in their dealings with the vanquished nations have subordinated all other laws to one supreme law, the law of force. Those nations which were disarmed and lacked power of resistance were ruthlessly coerced in so far as they refused to submit to the will of the victors. But the nations which retained some feeble power of fighting and used it to resist the dictates of the Supreme Council have fared better than they otherwise would. At no time in the history of the world has armament seemed more indissolubly associated with national independence and self-respect than it has under the existing government of Europe.

Take the case of Germany. She is for all practical purposes completely disarmed and is enjoying all the advantages in the way of economy and demilitarization which disarmament can produce. She is the first great and economically powerful nation in the history of the world which has ever

disarmed. It might have been supposed that considering she surrendered her arms on condition that she be treated in certain specific ways fairly and considerately, the victors would have shown themselves scrupulous to vindicate in their policy toward Germany their own pretensions to higher standards of international behavior. Instead they have taken the utmost advantage of the helplessness of the German people. Disagreements they have almost always decided in their own favor, irrespective of the terms of the armistice, and then driven home their decisions by force. They are now invading Germany for the purpose of exacting payments in money and kind which the German nation considers itself physically unable to deliver and which, if delivered, would injure the victor as much as the victim.

On the other hand take the cases of Russia and Turkey. The Supreme Council was just as willing to ignore the wishes and interests of the Russian people as it was to ignore the wishes and interests of the German people. It despatched armies and supplies to Russia and allowed them to be used by emigrés who would have destroyed the Revolution and set up in its place a military dictatorship. If Russia had disarmed as Germany did, they would have succeeded. But she did not disarm. The Soviet government put up a stubborn resistance to the Kolchaks, Denikins and Wrangles who represented in Russia the policy of the Supreme Council of the victors, and in the end it conquered. Russia is consequently being let alone and its government is even obtaining a measure of recognition from some of its former enemies. Something similar happened to Turkey. If she had been incapable of resistance, the Turkish people would have had nothing to say about the Treaty which determined their future status. But they could still fight a little, and by fighting the ragged armies of Kemal Pasha have won for their nations a larger measure of consideration than the victors have granted to helpless Austria and Germany. We may feel sure that the meaning of this lesson is not lost upon the peoples of Europe. The penalty of disarmament, as they very well know, is to have your interests and wishes spurned and your national life threatened with extinction.

Those Americans who favor disarmament should attack the roots of the tree of militarism instead of trying to cut off

the leaves with their scissors. The policies of the victors, as embodied in the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain and in the penalties which are exacted for failure to carry out these instruments, are policies and penalties which call for the continued armament of the victors and which breed in the minds of the vanquished an overwhelming craving for armed self-protection. These treaties render general and progressive disarmament inconceivable. They are based on the present and future possession by the victors of an irresistible armed force and on the corresponding helplessness, indignation and instability of the vanquished. The only fundamental way to approach the problem of disarmament is to seek the revision and the amelioration of the treaties. They were born of the psychology and the morality of war, and as long as they last they will render pacification, disarmament, confidence and co-operation among nation's vain words.

The lesson of the recent events from the point of view of an American who wishes to bring about disarmament and ultimate pacification is surely clear. War has again broken out in Europe. France and Great Britain are using force in order to obtain from Germany consent to demands which the German people of their own free will unanimously reject. The Treaty has provoked this demonstration of force without providing any remedy for it. When Germany appeals to the League of Nations, she is told that the League which was framed to prevent war has no power to mediate in the existing war. That is true. But what a commentary it is upon the League as an agency of European peace. The existing war has not as yet caused any bloodshed, but unless statesmen can work out some means of quieting the feud in which it originated, it will inevitably breed bloodshed and war and then more bloodshed and more war. The League by its own admission cannot deal with the existing quarrel between nations, which, if it is not adjusted with the consent of both parties, is certain to bring about a future war.

They must fall back on other and more effective means. If they wish to vindicate disarmament, they should take care that the nations which are trying the experiment of disarming are considerably treated. The American nation has the power not merely of mediating between the victors and the vanquished but by its mediation really to deprive the victors of

their chief motive and reason for ruthlessly imposing their demands on the vanquished. It can use its resources of credit to scale down the swollen liabilities, the burden of which threatens to be so ruinous to Europe. It can, but at present it will not. One reason why it will not is that the Americans who feel most keenly the national responsibility to Europe and wish to intervene are committed to a policy of ratifying in toto the war-provoking document and thus of embroiling America in the feud which she is able and should be willing to pacify. Their attitude instigates other Americans to oppose any intervention as a dangerous entanglement of America in European quarrels. But she is not limited to a selection between these two profoundly dubious alternatives. She can intervene as a disinterested friendly and powerful third party. She can accelerate pacification and disarmament by making such intervention contribute to the revision of the Treaty and so to the eradication of the most urgent motives of the European nations for quarreling and arming. Whether she will ever do so depends largely upon the ability of those Americans who believe in the need of a positive American contribution to pacification and disarmament to relinquish a policy of partizan intervention and substitute a policy of disinterested mediation in the interest of a new, more conciliatory and more humane handling of the issues and consequences of the Great War.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE LEAGUE ¹

To limit or not to limit armaments, that is the question. Secretary Daniels says we must have the largest and most powerful navy in the world, unless we enter the League of Nations. Senator Borah, anti-leaguer and bitter-ender, rejoins by introducing a bill into the Senate requesting the President to open negotiations with Great Britain and Japan, to the end that these three greatest naval powers may agree to take a naval holiday and to work out feasible plans for proportional armament reduction.

What ought to be the attitude of the American people on

¹ By Hamilton Holt. Independent. 105:161-3. February 12, 1921.

this great question? In order to understand the problem it will be necessary to go back a little and survey some recent history.

When the Tsar of Russia called the First Hague Conference of 1899 his fondest hope was that the burdens of overgrowing and ever-growing armaments that were impoverishing the peoples of the world might in some way be taken off their backs. He did not see that disarmament cannot take place until the world is politically organized and that it is just as absurd for nations to disarm before the existence of international courts, parliaments and executives as it would be for cowboys to discard their pistols before there are sheriffs and justices of the peace. The First Hague Conference started in bravely enough. The limitation of armaments was the "frontispiece" of the Circular of the Russian Government. The Russian delegation strained every nerve to have the Conference take some action in the matter. Yet despite all Russia's efforts to the contrary, the Committee which had the matter in charge made the following report:

"It would be very difficult to fix, even for a term of five years, the number of troops, without regulating at the same time other elements of the national defense; second, that it would be no less difficult to regulate by an international agreement the elements of this defense, organized in each country upon very different principles. Hence, the committee regrets its inability to accept the proposition made in the name of the Russian Government. The majority of its members believe that a more thorough study of the question by the governments themselves would be desirable."

The Conference accepted this memorial from the Committee and adjourned after having passed the following resolution:

"The Conference is of the opinion that the restriction of military charges which are at present a heavy burden on the world is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind."

It also added the following wish (*voeu*):

"The Conference expresses the wish that the governments taking into consideration the proposals made at the Conference may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea and of war budgets."

During the interval between the First and Second Hague

Conferences the governments paid no attention to these suggestions, but went ahead increasing their armaments at a rate and on a scale hitherto unprecedented. The only two utterances by responsible heads of States against this militaristic aggrandizement that I recall were made by the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in a notable speech at Albert Hall, London, in December, 1905, said:

"I hold that the growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world. A policy of huge armaments keeps alive, and stimulates, and feeds the idea that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores and to create new sores, and I submit to you that as the principle of pacific arbitration gains ground, it becomes one of the highest tasks of a statesman to adjust those armaments to a newer and happier condition of things. What nobler role could this great country assume than at the fitting moment to place itself at the head of a League of Peace through whose instrumentality this great work might be effected?"

And Theodore Roosevelt, in a letter to the New York Peace and Arbitration Congress held in April, 1907, wrote:

"The most practical step in the diminishing of the burden of expense caused by the increasing size of naval armament would, I believe, be an agreement limiting the size of all ships hereafter to be built."

England and the United States accordingly "reserved the right" to bring up the discussion of the limitation of armaments at the Second Hague Conference, of 1907, especially as Russia had abandoned her championship of the cause and was proposing to bar it out of the discussion. Not, however, until after the Conference had been in session over eight weeks was the subject introduced. Then England made the following tentative proposition, although Germany, Austria, Russia and Japan had announced that they would take no part in the discussion:

"The Government of Great Britain will be ready to communicate each year to the powers that will do the same, its plan of constructing new warships and the expenditures which this plan will require. Such an exchange of information will

facilitate an exchange of views between the governments on the reductions which by common agreement may be effected. The Britannic Government believes that in this way an understanding may be reached on the expenditures which the States that agree to pursue this course will be justified in entering upon their budgets."

After Mr. Choate in behalf of the American delegation had "expressed his sympathy for the views which have been stated by His Excellency the First Delegate of the British Delegation," the discussion was solemnly dropped and the whole question was tabled again in the following resolution:

"The Second Peace Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the governments should resume the serious examination of this question."

Thus the matter rested until the Great War began. Naturally under these conditions the greatest issue before the nations was not how to limit armaments, but how to increase them. But the war had not progressed many months before far-seeing men in every land began to perceive that the war would be fought in vain unless plans were worked out at the peace table to make future wars impossible. The Great War thereupon became the war to end war.

When I went to Europe in those black days just before the tide turned in 1918 it was quite evident that the peoples of the world, no matter what the Kings and Captains might say, were determined that when the war was over armaments should be reduced. It was the first issue in the hearts of the people, and it was evident that any government that should dare to thwart the popular aspiration would be swept out of office bag and baggage. In the United States there has never been a widespread fear of militarism. Our people have never been cursed with an arrogant and overbearing military caste who have attempted to arrogate to themselves social and political power. Nor have we been taxed to death to support a colossal army. In Europe, however, things are different. There they have seen and felt all these things, and I am sure

I am speaking within the bounds of truth when I assert that they are sick and tired of the whole military system.

While in Paris as a delegate of the League to Enforce Peace I conferred with representatives of other organizations from other countries pledged to the establishment of a League of Nations. I was instructed by the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace not to commit the League to any program of armament reduction in our joint deliberations, as the League had never expressed itself one way or the other on that issue. But I very soon learned that the limitation of armaments, if not disarmament itself, was not a question at issue at all, but a settled policy which all Europe, except, of course, the little pro-military and reactionary groups, were bent on carrying into effect at the earliest possible moment. So when the Covenant was framed I was not at all surprised that it contained Article VIII, the first sentence of which reads:

"The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international agreements."

The League of Nations began its official existence on February 10. At the eighth meeting of the Council held at San Sebastian, Spain, from July 30 to August 5, a permanent Armaments Commission was created under Article IX of the Covenant to advise the Council on military, naval and air questions. This Commission consists of one military, one naval and one air representative nominated by each of the powers having membership in the Council. It was decided to have on the Commission only military experts so as to forestall the military parties within the respective nations from charging the League with tackling the problem amateurishly.

The Commission immediately organized itself and started to work. But manifestly it will naturally take much time before it can properly investigate the problems awaiting it, let alone making any report to the Council.

When the Assembly met on the 15th of November one of the first things to engage its attention was the question of the reduction of armaments. As I wrote in *The Independent* of January 29, the Assembly was not unmindful of the "cosmic urge" for disarmament now so prevalent thruout the world.

It felt, however, that as the Armament Commission had scarcely had time to begin work, and as Germany was still outside the League, and as America was holding up the world with her fiddling and fuddling (the Assembly of course was too polite to use such terms) it was time to take things a little leisurely. So all the Assembly did was to recommend that the Council suggest to the member states that they should not increase their military budgets for the next two years, and that a temporary committee of political, economic and social experts be added to the Commission, it being felt that the question of disarmament was a problem for statesmen and students as well as for generals and admirals. The Assembly further recommended that the large stock of implements accumulated during the war should not be permitted to find their way into the less civilized zones of Asia and Africa.

Here the whole matter rests at the present moment. The world has evidently learned something since 1914. The failures at the two Hague Conferences have given way to the unequivocal acceptance by all nations of the principle of the limitation of armaments and the League is already engaged in working out the problem.

Will the League succeed where the Hague Conferences failed? It will if it apprehends the problem aright. The problem is of course nothing but the problem of the use of force. This has always been the bone of contention between the militarists and the pacifists. The militarists claim that armaments insure national safety. The pacifists declare they inevitably lead to war. Both disputants insist that the Great War furnishes irrefutable proof of their contentions.

As is usual in cases of this kind the shield has two sides. The confusion has arisen from a failure to recognize the threefold nature of force.

1. Force used for the maintenance of order—police force.
2. Force used for attack—aggression.
3. Force used to neutralize aggression—defence.

Police force is almost wholly good.

Offense is almost wholly bad.

Defence is a necessary evil, and exists simply to counteract force employed for aggression.

The problem of a League of Nations is how to abolish the use of force for aggression, and yet maintain it for police

purposes. Force for offense will of course automatically cease when force for aggression is finally abolished.

How can this be done? The principle is very simple. Let the League always keep a force sufficiently large to protect it from any nation or group of nations using aggression against it either within or without the League. Evidently then, the nations can only in safety disarm as far and as fast as they are assured of equal or greater protection from the League than from their own might. But they will only come to trust in the protection of the League after the machinery is provided whereby their differences may be settled by courts and councils and assemblies and there has been proof that these agencies for arbitration, conciliation and adjudication work and promote international justice.

Now it happens that the existing League of Nations is so constituted that it meets all the above conditions for international disarmament. If the new administration or Senator Borah or any other group or individual is seriously desirous of having the United States disarm it must see that we enter the existing League or one so nearly like it that only a microscope could detect the difference. All talk of any other method of disarming is so much time and effort wasted.

But what of Senator Borah's proposal for a joint naval holiday for Great Britain, Japan and the United States? It will manifestly not solve the problem of disarmament since disarmament must be universal to be effective. But as Germany is now militarily impotent and will continue to be so for another generation at least; as France and Italy are no longer in the running; and as both Britain and Japan are straining every nerve to maintain and extend friendly relations with us we have everything to gain and little or nothing to lose by entering into a naval holiday with them. It will save the staggering taxpayers of each nation a pretty penny. In this country for instance approximately 90 cents out of every dollar collected by the Government is spent for military purposes. It will also set a good example to the less wealthy nations of the world by calling a halt to this mad scramble for greater and ever greater armaments whose end is bankruptcy for every competitor except the richest, and moral and material ruin for all.

Let the United States, therefore, invite Britain and Japan

to take a Naval holiday with us. It will not interfere with our taking up later thru the agency of a League of Nations the fundamental question of a scientific program for disarmament.

The sensible thing to do is to push both programs. Unless the United States soon joins her sister nations in promoting international justice and progress we shall succeed if we have not already succeeded, to Germany's former place as the chief obstacle to the peace of the world.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW ¹

The Peace Conference did not attempt to solve it [the problem of general disarmament], but in its final work there are one or two references to it couched in phrases which, to me at least, glow with the rays of a radium light, illuminating the document from within through the densest covers with which you may bind it. Simple as they are I shall dwell for a moment on the essential military peace terms with Germany, inasmuch as I find the subject of my thesis in the preamble to those terms, which reads as follows:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow."

Is not that phrase pregnant with hope to every father and mother here tonight, whose son gave his life in order that that ideal might be realized? Now you will note that when Germany affixed her signature to one side of the last page of that document twenty-seven other nations of the earth, including all the great Powers, signed it on the other side. Therefore, in all good faith and honor these nations have pledged themselves to initiate, as soon as practicable, a general limitation of armaments after Germany shall have complied with her first obligation. Germany is compelled to limit her armament in order that the other nations may be able to do likewise. It will be interesting to note what we compelled Germany to do, as throwing light

¹ By Tasker H. Bliss. Nation. 112:727-30. December 22, 1921.

on what it was intended that all the rest of the world should do as rapidly as is practicable. . .

[After protracted discussion the Council of the Powers ruled in favor of allowing Germany an army of one hundred thousand men, of voluntary enlistment, and the abolition of conscription. In order to complete the destruction of the military system it was further provided that universal military service and training shall be abolished; also that] there should be only the amount of arms, ammunition, and equipment necessary for the small authorized army to perform its function of maintaining internal order. The accumulation of stocks of arms and munitions of any kind was prohibited¹ . . . What I have given comprises the essentials of the conditions imposed upon Germany by the unanimous judgment of the world. "In order"—to quote again those words of far-reaching meaning in the preamble which I have already read—"in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." . . In other words, the nations have bound themselves, at least so far as a solemn form of words can do, to begin at the earliest practicable moment a general limitation of their armaments, culminating in the abolition of military systems and all military material, the sole object of which is international war.

Why is it that this question is now, more than before, a problem of such grave moment? The only answer that I can give is that it is due to the radical change in the character of war, with its attendant results in cost, loss of life, and destruction of material wealth. This change has come to stay, and will be manifest, in an increasing intensity, in future wars so long as the present system of universal preparation for it throughout the world continues. If the present system continues, the next war of the nations in arms will be as much more horrible than the recent one as the devilish ingenuity of men can make it.

But, some will say, in future wars we will prohibit the things that made this one so horrible. How? By another Hague convention? We had prohibited the use of toxic gases, the ruthless use of the submarine, had restricted the use of aerial bombing, and put limitations on the ruthless blockade. All of these

¹ For summary of terms imposed on Germany see "The new regime in Europe." p. 34 of this volume.

restrictions were violated by both sides during the war. It is safe to say that only a little while ago every person in this audience was crying out against the inherent wickedness in the use of toxic gases, and saying that when we have won the war that, at least, is one of the things that we will put a stop to. And you would have represented the average sentiment of the United States. Well, a short time ago an act of Congress reorganized the military establishment of the United States in order to profit by the teachings of the war. One of the things that they did—so far as I know without a dissenting protest—was to create a chemical warfare bureau, the sole function of which is to employ the genius of our chemists in devising formulae for newer and more deadly toxic gases and more effective methods for their use. And that is true everywhere.

I have referred to a radical change in the character of war. This has been entirely due to the military doctrine of the "nation in arms," heretofore adopted by the great Powers of Europe and Asia and now, perforce, being gradually accepted by the United States. The application of this doctrine seems to have a tendency, it is true, to reduce the frequency of wars. But the ultimate result is inevitable. The pent-up dynamic forces of the nations reach a point of tension at which resistance ceases and then comes an explosion which rocks the world to its base. A little spark, a slight shock is all that is required. The killing of a man and woman in a mountain town of Bosnia brought on the World War, but it was the pretext for it, not the cause of it. . .

If nations are armed to the limit against each other and each knows that the armament of the other has no use against any other than himself, can we not all see that when one approaches its limit and believes the other to be capable of further expansion, war, without warning, is almost inevitable? It is this alone which enabled many military men to predict the war of 1914 and forecast the approximate time when it came. Experience shows that we cannot depend upon honor to prevent the outbreak; nor do universal armaments presuppose a strong sense of honor. . .

You will now see why it is that in a war of "nations in arms" it becomes increasingly difficult for any nation, with however little original interest in the matter, to maintain its neutrality, until the war finally becomes one of the "world in arms." Modern

agencies of warfare have already made it impossible to blockade directly and close at hand, with any certainty, enemy ports and coasts. Therefore, when it has become necessary, in order to effect our purpose, to blockade whole seas and oceans; when, to stop all trade of every kind whatsoever with an enemy country, to prevent every possible pound of food or supplies of any kind from leaking through a neutral country to an enemy country, whether their borders are contiguous or not, it has become necessary to put those neutrals on short rations of food, of clothing, of fuel, of everything—then those neutrals can escape many of the hardships of war only by joining in it on one side or the other. And it may be that some will join a side because they think it will win, rather than because they think it is right. In such a case the horribleness of future war will be equaled only by the horribleness of the injustice that will result from it.

The basic reason for the ruthless blockade is not far to seek. With the modern nation in arms every woman, old and young, who can knit a woolen sock for the soldier at the front; every child able to knit a mitten; every old man who can cultivate a bushel of potatoes or wheat beyond his own needs—each of them is a soldier; their work is commandeered and directed by the government for the purposes of the war. The merchant deals in the goods that the government permits him; the farmer sows the crops that the government orders him. Every one is drafted for the war—the labor of some at the front, the labor of others at the rear in order to enable the former to stay at the front. The tendency has been to abolish the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, to treat all as soldiers, the mother rocking the cradle at home, as the husband or son in the trenches. Until recently nations at war settled their differences by a sort of prize fight. They raised limited armies which marched and countermarched and fought battles until one side won and the other side lost the purse. The vast mass of the populations had so little to do with the war that they were really noncombatants. Yet each of these populations was, in a sense, part of the body of one or the other of the contestants and the laws of war, like the "gentleman's rules" of the prize ring, were made to protect him against unfair blows. The prize fighter must not hit below the belt, the soldier must not use toxic or asphyxiating gas; the civilian must be protected as far as possible from the hardships of the war. But suppose that the prize

fighter, after he has come to blows with his adversary, discovers that it is no longer a fight for a purse and half the gate money, but is a fight for his life. From that moment neither contestant will regard the rules, but will do what he thinks necessary to save his life and destroy his adversary.

It is the unhappy fact that the rules made to govern the parties in one war grow, in large part, out of the violations of the rules made for a previous one waged under different conditions. When the recent war began the use of noxious gas was contrary to the rules. One side violated the rule and began to use it; then the other side, perforce, used it, and now all the world contemplates its continual use. And so the modern blockade which grew out of a gradual violation of rules made for wars of a different character has doubtless come to stay in future wars, so far as the circumstance of the moment will permit it to be applied.

Note another thing: The antagonism growing out of opposing commercial interests or out of racial differences is no longer confined to any two nations. These interests bind them together in groups on each side. The result is great alliances bound to stand together until changed conditions result in new alliances, because the interest of one is the interest of all. By the very necessities of war one side or each of them begins to put restrictions on neutrals, with a tendency, sometimes with the object of forcing them into it. When the relations of all kinds between the nations, especially the great ones, were not so close as now, when war meant generally a relatively small indemnity, with or without a relatively small loss of territory for the defeated side, other nations found it not difficult to keep out of it. But now the war of two nations in arms is so serious that the victor feels he must leave his enemy powerless for generations to come. It becomes a war almost, if not literally, for life and death. Some nations may think they have an interest in bringing this about for one or the other of the contestants. But there are others who are vitally interested in preventing it. So there is a tendency to bring one after another into the maelstrom until, as I have said, the war of two nations in arms becomes one of the world in arms.

Now, I think that we have sufficient reason to apprehend that future wars, whether more infrequent or not, will come with increasing suddenness, will be of increasing magnitude and

intensity, and will be an increasing menace to our civilization. The kind of wars which we have passed through, to be repeated if they are to continue, you know only too well. The repetition of some figures may be of interest in focusing your attention on this phase. I doubt if many of you know that, for this war, the allies of Europe and Japan, and excluding the United States and the Central Powers, mobilized 35,404,864 men. Not all of them, of course, served under arms, though many millions of them did. The Central Powers and the United States did, more or less, the same to the extent of many additional millions, probably doubling the above figure. And all of the labor thus conscripted was engaged in the production of material a large part of which was to be immediately destroyed after accomplishing its own sole purpose of destroying life and the slowly accumulated wealth of centuries, the rest of it lying idle and useless in time of peace. No business man here needs more than these figures to understand the world convulsions in industrial life due to the readjustment of this labor in normal productive channels. Of the total mobilized, 4,705,665 were killed outright in battle, 10,870,025 were wounded, and an unknown number of millions of these have had their lives shortened or will continue a burden upon others; while 4,941,870 were captured or reported missing, a large part of whom were dead at the time of the armistice. And more than these are the millions, mostly women and children, who died as the direct result of the hardships of the war.

To kill and wound these men it cost in money actually raised by taxation and in debts yet to be paid something like \$200,000,000,000, with an additional \$50,000,000,000 of previously accumulated material wealth destroyed and to be replaced.

If all armaments could be abolished tomorrow there would still be an annual interest bill of at least \$9,000,000,000 to be paid by the belligerent nations on the debts incurred in the last war alone. If these armaments are to be maintained, you must note that the military and naval expenditures of the great Powers for the year 1913 amounted in round numbers to \$2,300,000,000. The economic loss due to withdrawal from productive industry could then have been assessed at \$1,000,000,000. That meant a total annual loss due to the mere maintenance of military establishments of \$3,300,000,000. To maintain these same establishments now will cost approximately double that sum, or

near \$7,000,000,000. Nor does this take into account the accumulation of military material of expensive types in far greater quantities than has been deemed necessary heretofore. So we have staring us in the face a total annual bill of about \$16,000,000,000, and this only for a very small number of nations, for many others are staggering under lesser similar burdens which are all that they can bear.

If, in the future, nations are to rely for their security upon their individual preparedness for war, it will not suffice if the measures taken for this are confined, as heretofore, to the training and equipment of armed forces. Perhaps the most striking development of the recent war was that which imposed upon each belligerent the necessity of mobilizing all its civil activities for war purposes. In future no nation can rely upon its preparedness unless it conducts these activities in time of peace with a view to their best employment in war. Military utility will then be a large and frequently a controlling factor in determining the nature of its industries, the training of its workmen, and even the use of its land for agricultural purposes. The resulting conditions will be economically wasteful, and thus increase indirectly the cost of the maintenance of armaments. Moreover, they will keep the threat of war more constantly in the minds of the people than was the case even under pre-war conditions, the result of which will be to produce national and popular tensions which will be a material factor in bringing on war. The status of the civilized part of the world will be literally that of an armed truce, with its entire population ready for prompt mobilization, industrial as well as military. And that status will grow to be so intolerable that war itself may come to be regarded as a relief.

All admit the imperative necessity of finding a remedy, but it has not been found. National and international societies and conferences pass resolutions, expressing alarm at the overgrown militarism of the age. But every proposition made has been too vague to force the attention of practical statesmen, or so arbitrary and drastic, so far beyond the possibilities of the moment, that they have rejected it. During the war I happened to be in a company of gentlemen who were playing a great part in directing the energies of their countries in the prosecution of it. They began to discuss the after-the-war problem. They spoke of the appalling burdens their people would have to carry and the

necessary readjustments of every phase of national life. They seemed to think that now, if ever, with all the nations brought to the verge of ruin under the existing system, now if ever, those nations would eagerly sink all differences and agree upon some other system. I said to them "Suppose the representatives of these nations, including our enemies, were seated about a table, and you were to ask them the question, 'Do you desire to put an end, as far as possible, to international war,' what do you think would be their answer?" They said that, in their opinion, the answer would be "Yes." Then I said, "Ask them this other question: 'If you honestly mean what you say, are you ready to reduce your armaments to a limit beyond which they have no use except for international war?' What will be their answer to that?" They still said they believed it would be "Yes." Then I asked: "Do you suppose that, when they say 'Yes,' they include in the word 'armament' vessels built and armed solely for international war?" "No," said one of them. "I am afraid my country could not accept that. We are dependent on the outside world for our food and raw material and we must protect our trade routes. It is true that with no vessel afloat on the seven seas more powerful than a coast guard or a revenue vessel, it is hard to see how these routes can be seriously endangered; but you cannot convince our people that there may not be some deception and then that they may be irretrievably ruined."

We are saying to the world, "We do not wish to join in any formal association with you because we fear it will not make for our peace, but war." They are saying to us, "We want you because without you there can be no continued peace." Why should not the United States say to the nations, "We will take you at your word and will test it to decide its worth. Will you, the nations that accepted the preamble to the military peace terms with Germany, sign this further document with us?"

"We will agree with you that each nation that so desires shall keep and build whatever frontier and coast fortifications it wishes. Fortifications cannot stride across the earth devastating fields and destroying cities.

"We will agree with you that each nation may maintain its

navy. No navy without an army can conquer and hold foreign territory.

"We will agree with you on a date when we shall simultaneously abolish any military system which is solely necessary for international war.

"We will agree with you on a date, as remote as the existing conditions make absolutely necessary, when we shall begin the gradual reduction of our armed forces until they are at the limit necessary for the maintenance of internal order. In coming to an agreement about this we will accept any reasonably just principle of proportion, provided it results in a reasonable and material reduction, but admitting in advance that reduced armaments can no more be equalized than excessive ones. We will trust to the ultimate good sense of the common peoples of the nations, who suffer most from excessive armaments, to see to it that when the movement has once begun it is pushed as rapidly as may be to its proper limit.

"We will agree with you on the proper amounts of material to be kept on hand for the reduced forces. And we will further agree with you to cease the manufacture of material until the amounts now on hand are reduced to what we agree upon as necessary for the reduced force."

Are these propositions reasonable? And if agreed upon will they accomplish anything in the maintenance of international peace? Manifestly, they do not guarantee against war, and I know of nothing that now will. But they will undoubtedly have a tendency to deter any nation from undertaking international war. They will ultimately minimize the chances of the occurrence of another war, such as the last one, and they will tide over the long period of mutual fear that will exist before the nations understand that they can be menaced by no sudden war in which defeat means death. They will retain as long as they choose their material defenses on land and sea. They will be left with gradually reducing military forces. And this reduction being made at simultaneous periods, they may gain a gradually increasing confidence in each others' good faith. They will not be required to destroy their present stocks of material, but will agree to stop the manufacture of any new material. France and England and Italy during this period of reduction and for

long thereafter need have no military fear of Germany, due to a reduction in their forces and stoppage of manufacture of material. Because, while there are now millions of young men in civil life on both sides trained in the recent war, on the one side there will be ample reserves of the present material for these millions if called to arms, while on the other side there will be none at all. But, above all, we will have gradually accomplished a radical change in a system which alone is a standing threat to international peace.

I agree that perhaps the greatest difficulty will be in coming to an agreement with the European Powers as to the reasonable force that each nation requires to maintain internal order. But I do not believe that this difficulty is insurmountable. Underlying this question is the latent fear of Germany. Under present conditions we can hardly understand this. Nevertheless, I see no reason why an agreement cannot be reached. They all admit that a large part of their forces have been maintained solely because of the menace of the German system. With that menace removed—removed not only as coming from Germany but from anywhere else—the peoples themselves are not likely to allow any excessive number under the guise of preserving order. And whatever that number is for each Power, let it retain it plus enough to give a reasonable excess over the small army they have allowed to Germany and which cannot be increased without the consent of these Powers.

Those of you are mistaken who may think that there can be an enduring and effective association of the nations for the maintenance of peace so long as those nations are armed to the teeth, solely against each other. And those are mistaken who think that, so long as the military system exists, there can be any successful international court of arbitration. Had Germany and her allies belonged to such a league with such a court in 1914 they could have said "With our preparedness we can defy the league and the decisions of the court," as they did say then, "We can defy the world."

Why should not the United States take the lead in a definite proposal and demand for a reasonable limitation of armaments? Who can do it better than we?

A STATEMENT FROM GENERAL PERSHING¹

As we contemplate the causes of war and realize its horrors, every right-thinking man and woman must feel like demanding that some steps be taken to prevent its recurrence. An important step would be to curtail expenditures for the maintenance of navies and armies.

The estimates recently presented to our Congress for the naval and military services contemplate an appropriation for the next fiscal year of more than \$5,000,000 for every working day in the year.

It is a gloomy commentary upon world conditions that expenditures several times greater than ever before in peace times should be considered necessary, especially when the most rigid economy in governmental administration is essential if we would avoid national bankruptcy.

The world does not seem to learn from experience. It would appear that the lessons of the last six years should be enough to convince everybody of the danger of nations striding up and down the earth armed to the teeth. But no one nation can reduce armaments unless all do.

Isn't it, then, time for an awakening among enlightened peoples to the end that the leading powers may reach some rational agreement which would not only relieve the world of this terrible financial load, but which in itself would be a long step toward the prevention of war?

Ours is not an aggressive nation. We want no territory and we have no designs on other people. If other nations have the same attitude, it seems unreasonable not to believe that all will be willing to prove it by consenting to limit armaments. Unless some such move be made, we may well ask ourselves whether civilization does not really reach a point where it begins to destroy itself and whether we are thus doomed to go headlong down through destructive war and darkness to barbarism.

¹ From an address at New York, December 29, 1920. Reprinted in the pamphlet, *Disarm or Perish*. Issued by American Union Against Militarism.

THE UNFAILING BREEDER OF WARS¹

It is incredible to me, when I hear men talk of the next war in a matter of fact way. It cannot be that they have any mental conception of what the next war will be like. It will be so hideous in its devastation, that it will matter little which side wins, for both will be ruined. Look at the effect of the last war—and America had not begun to fight. We were just completing means for wholesale devastation that were beyond comprehension. Those means still exist, and other nations will equal or exceed them.

We face today an unknown future. We sense but cannot analyze the working of mighty forces. Our leaders meet the sporadic manifestations of these forces with the best expedients at hand. But everywhere is mystery and suspicion and portents of struggle. . .

We say that while human nature remains what it is men are going to fight. Right. But shall we therefore sit quietly by and let them fight? The fact but emphasizes the need for laws, for courts, and for efficient police. Our great grandfathers said that gentlemen had to fight duels—but we have outgrown that. . .

We say, "Let America build as big a fleet as England and both can then police the seas to the safety of the world." The seas are no vaster than they were twenty years ago when England's smaller navy policed them alone. We reverently uncover to that sacred fiction of the "Absolute Sovereignty of Independent Nations." It is in reality the present curse of mankind. It is the inexorable builder of armaments, and the unfailing breeder of wars—and so, it is unworthy of our continued acceptance.

This is our actual problem: In the face of the world's uncertainties, rivalries and suspicions, are we going to withdraw from each other, and, nursing our fears and jealousies, plan independently each for his own good as he imperfectly sees it through selfish, fearful eyes? No, not if we are men of reason. For that means inevitable war and ruinous preparation for war—a stupid solution!

¹ From a speech by General Lincoln C. Andrews. Reprinted in Bulletin. League of Free Nations Association. March, 1921.

As a nation we are very like our prototype, Cooper's hero Leatherstocking. He wanted independence and could not endure the restrictions of community living. But civilization continually followed him up and hemmed him in. So it has hemmed in this nation and all nations—even the centuries-old isolation of China has been absorbed and lost. The inexorableness of modern communications and transportation, modern trade and finance, has made the nations of the world a collectivity whether they will or not. Let the nations therefore recognize this, and employ their vaunted civilization in devising regulations for reasonable community living rather than in devising engines for mutual destruction. Let America satisfy her national pride through being known as "the leading citizen of the community," rather than the town bully. Let her help organize the necessary town council or at least a common vigilance committee. Then when responsive representatives of the peoples of all nations meet continually face to face around a council table, armaments and the need for armaments will gradually disappear, and the various armies of the earth will become as the National Guards of the various States of America.

THE POSITION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE¹

In furtherance of its policy of active advocacy of world disarmament, announced last winter by its Executive Committee, the National Security League has inaugurated a national educational propaganda on the subject along certain specified lines.

Details of Platform

The principal points enumerated by the League for emphasis in its educational propaganda are:—

1. Agreement by the leading nations of the world to reduce their armies to "skeleton organizations" and to build no more ships for five years.
2. Universal Military Training for the youth of the United States, at an annual expenditure of not more than \$130,000,000.

¹ From a leaflet issued by the National Security League.

3. Maintenance of records of industrial facilities by the United States, at an annual expenditure of not more than \$500,000.

4. Education of the American people in the physical, mental and moral benefits of Universal Military Training, with special emphasis upon the Americanization influence it would have upon the foreign born.

Foreign Sentiment

Commenting upon the Security League's position, Charles D. Orth, President of the League, said:—

"Disarmament must be accomplished if it is humanly possible, but is a hopeless dream unless the other big powers cooperate. They will do so if their people want disarmament. In order to obtain a reliable report on the state of British sentiment, we cabled to Captain Stanley Abbott, the Director of the Middle Classes Union in London, which is an organization in England similar to the National Security League here. Our message was:—

"Middle Classes Union, London, England.

"Public sentiment favoring world disarmament is rapidly growing in America. Does similar sentiment exist in England. Would appreciate your cabled views.

"National Security League."

"The reply of the Middle Classes Union reads:—

"National Security League, New York, U. S. A.

"Strong feeling favours drastic reduction of armaments if universal.

"Middle Classes Union."

Disarmament Economy

"The expenditure for the maintenance of industrial records and for Universal Military Training, which the League advocates, is but a drop in the bucket compared to the saving which will be accomplished by disarmament. We are aware of the antagonism for Universal Military Training felt by many women and some men, but believe that, if superficial impressions of the subject were displaced by fuller knowledge, Universal Military Training would be disclosed as a benign and humane, as well as a wise and proper, policy. The blind semi-hysteria which prefers pitilessly to send

boys to face death in a helpless and unprepared manner, rather than to give them a fighting chance, is hard to understand. This will happen again, as it did in 1917, if we are forced into war. If, fortunately, we are never forced into war, the boys who have had the training will be better off morally, mentally, physically and vocationally, and a stronger source of happiness to themselves and everyone with whom they come in contact."

Security League Policy

The Security League's policy and program for its national educational propaganda on disarmament are laid down in the following resolution passed by the League's Executive Committee,—

"RESOLVED: that the National Security League hereby declares itself unreservedly in favor of world disarmament, to be brought about by an agreement among all of the first and second class powers of the world, such agreement to provide that no war ships shall be built for a period of at least five years, and that the armies of all nations be maintained only as skeleton organizations of officers and men;

"Be it Further RESOLVED: that the National Security League advocate, as the immediate policy of the United States, a radical reduction in the expenditures for military and naval purposes; also that the army of the United States be reduced to a skeleton organization of officers and men sufficient only for police purposes; also that the League advocate that there shall be no new expenditures for naval or military purposes except:—

"(a) Not to exceed \$500,000, per year for the establishment and maintenance of a Bureau which shall maintain a survey of the industrial resources of the United States, as related to possible war requirements.

"(b) Not to exceed \$130,000,000, annually for a moderate and reasonable degree of Universal Military Training.

Training Benefits

"Be It Further RESOLVED: that the League undertake a national educational propaganda to demonstrate to the American people that Universal Military Training is not a militaristic measure but is a sane and beneficent insurance and police measure; that it would not take young men away from their families or

their work except for three or four months at a period to be selected by themselves, during their eighteenth or nineteenth year, at a time when the physical, mental and moral training and discipline involved would be of invaluable benefit to them, their families and the nation; furthermore, that such moderate and reasonable Universal Military Training would constitute a much needed method of Americanization in that it would provide coordination and assimilation of the foreign born, thereby making them real Americans."

THE CHURCH'S CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ¹

"Ground arms," cries the Church, in effect, in taking up the widely circulated appeal for reduction in the world's military and naval establishments. Disarmament, it is pleaded, would mean bread instead of bullets, plowshares instead of swords, and a "topsy-turvy world" would have a breathing space in which to right itself. Once the churches gave at least tacit adherence to the slogan, "in time of peace prepare for war"; but now, we are told, the waste of war and the moral ruin which it spreads have awakened religious thought to agree with Lloyd George that armed peace is "organized insanity." Arms and armor have too readily lent themselves to the use they were designed to avoid, it is complained, and in the present race for military supremacy "we are pursuing the very course which is most certain to lead to the suicide of civilization." Protestant, Catholic, and Jew are at one on this viewpoint, and a beginning in naval and military reduction is urged as a step toward world peace. From Rome comes the message that the Pope would rejoice at such a happy event. Some would have the United States start the movement, arguing that this country is safe against attack and that the war-racked nations of Europe would willingly accept our leadership. All would have disarmament, by whatever method achieved. To what extent the movement has taken hold was shown in a symposium recently printed in the New York World, in which representatives of all shades of religious belief take up the new crusade with the same unanimity of spirit with which they answered the call to arms in 1917. In the religious press many writers regard the issue as being

¹ From Literary Digest. 68:30. February 12, 1921.

economic as well as moral, pointing to the fact that the price of one battleship would save millions of children, and that halving the budgets proposed for armament would check famine, save Europe, and be a factor for international amity and peace greater than any council of ambassadors could otherwise devise. None of the great nations can afford the armaments they are now maintaining, says The Reformed Church Messenger, and it urges that—

"Now is the time for the Churches of Christ to speak in favor of a 'naval holiday' and the reduction of armaments in general. It has been well said that 'the way to disarm is to disarm.' And when all the great governments realize the desirability of this procedure it should not be deemed impossible to get together and find a way. It is a monstrous thing that the people should be asked to pay for such incitements to their own destruction, and it is a deplorable thing that our country should have such an unenviable preeminence and should be setting such an un-Christian example. It does seem as tho one theme concerning the application of Christian principles to present-day duty on which all American preachers should be able to unite at the beginning of this new year is in a demand for American leadership in this duty of hastening disarmament. Not even America can afford to be regarded as 'the leader in militarism and the champion of war.' And we can not help but feel that it will be infamous if Congress does not authorize some union with other nations in a universal reduction of armies and navies, and thus put our great Republic on the side of disarmament and peace."

Lately it has seemed that America alone stands in the way of the reduction of armaments, thinks The Christian Century (Disciples), but this weekly is relieved to notice that "there are signs of approaching sanity in the councils of the nation." The time is ripe to proceed with this great welfare scheme "and strong affirmations on the part of groups of citizens in this country may result in saving all the money that is needed to rehabilitate a broken and discouraged world." Otherwise,

"To go on in the mad race for armaments means wasting the money that should be used to restore the industries and feed the helpless little children who will perish without help. This is the time to agitate world peace. When the passions and prejudices of war arise there is no opportunity. But America

holds the key to the peace of the world, and the Church holds the key to America. Men and women who hate war may accomplish more during this new year than they will have an opportunity to accomplish for a generation afterward."

And the duty of every Christian man is clear, says The Lutheran. It is to use his personal influence, wherever possible, in the direction of international peace:

"First, every warlike expression, every prediction of war or argument in favor of it, should be challenged and combated. All the selfish and sinister influences that are at work against any international agreement should be met, checked, and overcome. This nefarious tide must be stemmed by a stronger one. These deadly ideas must be displaced by sound and healthy ones. . . Only by the use of these methods can the Christian idea of peace among men be brought nearer to a practical rule of conduct in this crisis. The Christian citizen's duty is plain."

The Christian Register (Unitarian) argues that the American people do not want a great navy. Rather, "the voice of the people demands that America cast the weight of its influence on the side of an era of moderation and good feeling." Religious influences must immediately be put to work, for, says The Western Christian Advocate (Methodist), "the only safeguard of the future against the sprouting of the seeds of war that have been sown broadcast is the intensive propagation of the Christianity that now prevails in America. If this is not done, there will be another war within the next fifty years as sure as time passes and the years roll round."

The head of the Catholic Church is deeply interested in the movement, writes Cardinal Gasparri, Cardinal Secretary of State at the Vatican, to the New York World. He calls attention to the fact that the Pope issued an appeal to the belligerents for diminution of armaments on August 16, 1917, and adds: "In view of the fact that the Holy See first set forth such a proposal and officially urged it, you can imagine with what joy it would hail the realization." "Both victors and losers have discovered that war doesn't pay," declares the San Francisco Monitor (Catholic). Economic reasons alone, it says, "should arouse the conscience of the world against this monstrous evil of war. When to these are added the religious motives of universal brotherhood and the common love of humanity, there is hope that the conscience of humanity will

soon be aroused to exercise this evil demon of fratricidal warfare." "Why, then, when all the world is hungry for peace, should we not make plowshares out of our howitzers?" asks *The Jewish Voice* (St Louis). A weapon in a man's hand is "the best seed of hate that can be invented." So—

"Let us take the death-dealing guns from the hands of the millions of men and give them useful tools of production. As Jews we can not view in any other light this disarmament proposal. As Americans we must urge our country to take the lead in this movement. America's word will mean much in the council of the nations even tho for the time being we are still out of the League of Nations. Now that 'politics has adjourned' we shall surely be part of the League and our voice will mean much. It can mean much if our deeds and our professions harmonize, but not otherwise."

THE QUAKER CHALLENGE TO A WORLD OF FORCE¹

Our present social institutions are based too largely on the conviction of the reality and power of the evil, with too little faith in the equal or greater potency of the good in man. Our political, social and industrial life is amply prepared to deal with evil action by force, but not equally expectant of or reliant on good. Our jails, courts, police, business safeguards, diplomacy, armies and navies are all ready to deal with men when they do evil. But there is no such preparedness for co-operation when they do good. How slow and unwieldy was European diplomacy when trying to prevent war in 1914! How prompt and sure its procedure in declaring war! How prompt we are to defend our rights, property, and privileges by doing violence to others: how slow to self-sacrifice in order to provide opportunities for others and to supply their needs. Our Government is provided with plans for mobilizing our resources of men and money to resist foreign aggression by military force; but we have neither in church or state provision for mobilizing thousands of men of good-will and millions of money to meet such campaigns as those now carried on by

¹ From an address by Elbert Russell delivered in New York City, April 10, 1921. Reprinted in part in *Friends' Intelligencer*, April, 1921.

press and platform to embroil us with Japan and Mexico. Our education prepares each oncoming generation with rules, standards of honor, and codes of conduct for using or invoking force against the evil that men do. But there is no equal education to make, as a matter of course, love, unselfishness, and self-sacrifice the basis of their relations with their fellows. The Quaker reaction to evil is to meet and overcome it with good; to meet hate and force with kindness; and to heal the wounds of violence by good-will. We hold that the ministry of love should not only bind up the wounds of the wronged, but anticipate violence, prevent it by right conduct, and build Society on foundations that make right conduct easy and natural.

Altruism is as ancient in the history of even prehuman life as selfishness. The "struggle for the life of others" is as primeval a law of life as the struggle for individual existence. Kropotkin has shown in his "Mutual Aid," that the popular misconception of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest is far from scientific. It does not mean the survival of the most selfish or most brutal or even the strongest physically. God is not always on the side of the heaviest battalions. We have learned that men can be trained to courses of conduct within limited areas controlled by altruistic motives. Parents give themselves for their children; patriots die for their country. Tradition, history, literature, monuments, public ceremonies and celebrations glorify the deed, praise the heroism, and perpetuate the motive. A similar all-pervasive education enjoining the practice of universal brotherhood, calling out in us altruistic motives and trusting in others a code of unselfish honor in all personal and international relations, would produce a Christian universalism as reliable as the basis of social institutions as is nationalistic patriotism; and as far above it, as modern patriotism is above the tribal clannishness of ancient Scotland or Israel.

We believe there is ample basis in history, as well as in the science of life, for belief in the sufficiency of the higher forces,—justice, sympathy, kindness, love and faith,—to provide for the preservation of all that we value in our present social order. We often forget that life becomes secure in proportion as men abandon the resort to force and rely on the common sense of justice and respect for law to protect their rights.

When the American Union was formed, the States, "in order to provide for the common defense and to promote the general welfare", disarmed against each other. Succeeding generations, trained to recognize common obligations throughout the Union and to trust the processes of justice, have found these far more effective in making life, person and property secure, than the armed protection of medieval castles or the individual preparedness of the western frontier. Under the hypnotism of an inherited social philosophy of force, we too often overlook the fact that the great bulk of human society is, judged by its lack of adequate physical force, quite unprotected. Women and children are safe in any society, where the appeal of their needs and winsomeness is sufficient to beget in the hearts of men respect and chivalry. It is usually only in war that women and children suffer violence, when the force invoked in their defense fails to protect them, as it did in Belgium and Northern France.

There was a time when men believed that Christian faith could only be preserved in the last resort by violence. The dungeon, rack and stake were used to protect the faith and preserve the church. Today in America the church still survives without the use of force, and there was probably never an age when Christian faith was so widespread and genuine. The family still survives, held together by affection, though we have ceased to force unwilling women into the marriage bond and the rod is little used on the child.

We do not expect the immediate application of the law of love to solve all difficulties or to have no failures, certainly not at once in a world organized on another basis and among men trained to another way. There are men who are ready to concede that Jesus' methods and ideals were spiritual and not military. But they remind us that we live in a wicked world where might often tramples upon right; where even professedly Christian nations are guilty of aggression and injustice. In such circumstances, they tell us, we must be prepared to resist evil by armed power, when love and truth and righteousness do not seem sufficient for our protection. The reply to this assertion—which ought to be sufficient for all who regard Jesus as a Divine Master—is that Jesus did not think so. He did not meet force with force, nor resist armed evil in kind. When reviled, he reviled not again. When smitten illegally, he

appealed to his persecutor's sense of justice. When arrested, he refused Peter's sword and submitted. On the cross he prayed for his executioners. He met violence with love and sought to overcome evil only with good, and blessed those who suffered persecution in the cause of righteousness.

We may be reminded that Jesus lost his life; that love and truth were not sufficient to protect him. Nietzsche takes several volumes to say just that: Look what happened to Jesus! But we must not forget that a large part of those who attempt to defend their property or life, or country, by armed force suffer the same fate. It is a curious mental twist that leads so many to assume that a person or nation that is armed and defends itself is safe; while a person or nation that follows Jesus' method is sure to be injured or destroyed. Both assumptions are historically false. Not all wars of defense are successful. Witness the fate of Egypt, Greece, Judea, Poland, the Boer republics, Belgium, Serbia! Remember what happened to Leonidas, to Coligny, to Kosciusko, to Casement! The rise and dominance of the great military empires means that most wars of self-defense have failed.

But the Early Christians, the seventeenth century Quakers in England, and Penn among the American Indians, won without fighting and suffered less than most soldiers. In estimating the efficacy of the two methods we must take account of the effect on character and the ultimate welfare of one's people and of posterity.

We do not claim that reliance on spiritual forces would always and infallibly succeed. We only believe that after a *century* of such trial, as the methods of force, hate and national selfishness have had, it would not fail as they failed in 1914, after having formed the basis of international relations for *millenniums*.

We believe that the solution of the problems which confront us in Japan and Mexico, is not in the resort to arms or the show of force, but in the service of the missionary and educator. Ten thousand missionaries, teachers, editors, sanitary engineers, and statesmen, sent to Mexico twenty-five years ago, when it became evident that Diaz's policy was robbing the peons and unfitting the Mexicans for self-government,—sent to Mexico to help Mexico, not to exploit her as the Americans who got concessions from Diaz often did—would have done

vastly more to make the border secure and to protect American interests than a hundred thousand soldiers on the border in 1916 or warships on the coast today. And if a mere handful of our best young men and women compared to the number a war would call for, not waiting for the call of a limited patriotism to fight these countries in defense of our supposed interests, would now volunteer at the call of the brotherhood of Christ to help Christianize and civilize these lands, and if our people at home were willing to treat the citizens of these countries with impartial justice and equal good-will, the dangers of war would disappear.

Meanwhile we must defend ourselves by acts of helpfulness which will secure the trust and gratitude of the peoples of the world. We made Japan our friend by Peary's peaceful mission. She will become our enemy only if we scorn and mistreat her people or infringe selfishly her rightful interests. We won the confidence of China by returning some \$12,000,000 of the Boxer indemnity. It was the price of a fourth-rate battleship, but it ensured the friendship of one of the most potent peoples of the future. We need no armies or navies to protect us from her. When we repealed the Panama tolls act, freed Cuba, and sent help to stricken Messina and Martinique, and contributed to the relief of Belgium, Armenia and China in her present famine, we disarmed possible foes.

We should equip ourselves as a nation with special governmental agencies for works of Christian neighborliness to other nations. It is unfortunate that such work as the sanitation of Havana, Vera Cruz, and Panama, the digging of the Panama Canal, the direction of elections and the management of the finances of countries like Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua must be done by soldiers under the direction of a secretary of war. Such are essentially deeds of peace, not soldiers' work; and the fact that the agents are soldiers arouses fear that countries so helped may be subjugated. It touches the pride of sensitive peoples to have soldiers in the uniform of another nation managing their affairs. We ought to have a Secretary of Peace in the Cabinet to direct such work. Under him should be a force of workers as effective as the army, but as inoffensive to the pride and liberties of other peoples as the Red Cross. They should be engineers, financial experts, administrators, teachers, missionaries, editors,

physicians, nurses and statesmen. He should have direction of the Red Cross. The American Consuls should report to him all cases of need in other nations; famines and floods, conflagrations and earthquakes; oppression and destitution that breed desperation and provoke riot and revolution such as the taking of the peons' land by fraud in Mexico or the present hunger of eastern Europe; race friction and national hatreds, such as produced the Boxer uprisings in China, the Second Balkan War and now disturb relations with Japan in California and Australia; incipient revolutions, due to despotic abuse of power or personal political ambition, such as sometimes cause civil wars in Latin America; plagues and epidemics, which threaten the health and impede the commerce of the world, like the "Spanish influenza," the bubonic plague in India and typhus in Poland and Russia; ignorance and superstition, such as make popular government so difficult in Mexico; acts of aggression or policies of irritation on the part of Americans holding concessions, or doing business in foreign countries; and all other conditions that threaten the internal peace and welfare of less favored nations or which might involve us in conflict with other peoples. The secretary of peace would then use the forces at his disposal in a way to help the needy peoples without any suspicion of aggression or evil designs against their rights, territory, or sovereignty on our part. By such measures we would most securely protect ourselves from attack or aggression.

The Quaker believes that we draw out from others largely what we give them. War produces hate, and hate produces war. Good-will educes a response of good-will. In 1871 Germany imposed an enormous indemnity on prostrate France and took Alsace-Lorraine from her. It refreshed an ancient enmity, made Germany and France armed camps for a generation, and ended in the deluge of blood in 1914. Now France is demanding exorbitant reparations from prostrate Germany and seizing her territory. She must henceforth squander the earnings of her peasants on an army to guard against German revenge. We Quakers believe that the only way to end this continuous entail of hate and fear is by active good-will; by the healing grace of mercy and the ministry of reconciliation. A part of the people of the United States have done Friends the honor to entrust us with the distribution of their gifts of mercy to the

underfed children of Germany, Austria and Poland. The work is making the name "America" a talisman with which to conjure up in the hearts of the coming generation of Germans feelings of friendship rather than of hate. One of our workers recently came upon a group of German children holding United States flags. Recognizing him, they waved the flags and called out, "Uncle Sam is our uncle too."

Our friendly challenge to a world tempted to settle its industrial problems by violence, and beginning again the mad international rivalry of armaments, is to try this more excellent way.

SHOULD AMERICA DISARM NOW?¹

The disarmament of the nation is one of the most pressing questions that confronts the world today, and one that particularly concerns the American people. The coming of world-peace is contingent upon many conditions. We shall never destroy war until we do away with the causes out of which war inevitably springs,—causes both mental and moral that inhere in the present political and economic organization of society, and of which armament is itself a natural product. But it is becoming increasingly clear that definite steps in the direction of the reduction of armaments is one of the first things we can do, if we are sincere in our professed desire to realize peace on earth and good-will to men. Disarmament, in and of itself, will by no means solve all the great world problems, but at least it would be one definite step in the direction of their solution; it would help to clear the air of the dread fears and the wild-eyed rumors of war that now fill the world, it would lessen the crushing burden of taxation against which the peoples of all lands are crying out, it would mean that nations had learned something from the great tragedy and were beginning to turn from their blind and implicit reliance upon force as the supreme arbiter of human destinies toward those higher forces that exist in the life of mankind, it would mark the return of sanity and the reemergence of conscience in human affairs, it would bring new hope and fresh confidence to a world that now stands under the dark shadow of bitter disillusionment, above all,

¹ By John Herman Randall, Associate Minister of the Community Church, New York City. For sale at 10c. Address, Community Church, Park Ave. and 34th St., New York City.

it would awaken a dynamic faith in ourselves as possessed of the moral courage to do the only sensible and wise and right thing in this critical hour for humanity.

I do not need to remind you that in the war waged upon the Central Powers, the avowed purpose of the Allies was to crush utterly militarism, which we all declared on every possible occasion was the greatest menace of civilization. But in the process of crushing German militarism, the virus of the dread poison has been transferred to the veins of the allied nations, so that today both the spirit and the organization of militarism are stronger in the allied countries than ever before. And we rub our eyes in amazement to find that our own country, that before the war was the least militaristic of all the great powers, has in the past six years exchanged places with Germany and is even now leading the world in the mad race for armament. Such a complete transformation is inconceivable unless we admit frankly the deadening and corrupting influence of war, and confess with shame that, in spite of all our boasted ideals, we ourselves are not immune to the same poison that has brought about the downfall of the Central Powers.

It is now two years and a half since the armistice was signed, and what has been done? The fatal influence of war upon civilization has been made pitilessly plain in what has taken place. If any doubt remained as to whether Civilization could withstand another general war, that doubt has been swept away by the logic of facts. The masses of the people are crying out more and more insistently against the hydra-headed monster that has plunged millions into sorrow and destitution and left the world bankrupt and helpless and hopeless. If it was clear during the struggle that war must be ended or else humanity go down to ruin, it is a thousand times more clear today.

Why has there been this long delay? Why after two years and a half has nothing yet been done? Why is it so difficult to get any action on a matter of such supreme importance? Why should it be necessary to discuss and debate and argue this question through long months of weary waiting? The only way to disarm is to disarm. If an inhabitant from Mars were to visit our planet and witness all that we have suffered and are suffering from war, after listening to all that our publicists and that papers like the New York World are saying, as to the duty and necessity of disarmament, would he not be

inclined to ask in surprise, "Why, then, do you not disarm?" What would be our answer? Let me give you the real answer in the words of Carlton J. H. Hayes, Professor of History at Columbia University.

He tells us that the actual supporters of militarism, either directly or indirectly, fall into the following classes:

1. Traders and merchants desiring protection for trade.
2. Foreign investors desiring protection in undeveloped countries.
3. Holders of government bonds desiring prestige and strength.
4. Conservatives desiring to suppress internal unrest.
5. Manufacturers of munitions,—the worst and most unscrupulous,—the Krupps in Germany, the Schneiders in France, the Armstrongs in England and the DuPonts in America.
6. Patriotic interests, claiming need of national defense, honor, pride in warfare and war traditions.
7. Professional militarists,—vested interests again.
 - (a) Retired Army and Navy officers, writing books, e.g., Bernhardt, Lord Roberts, Mahan, Wood, etc.
 - (b) College professors of the inferior sort,—weak-kneed professors seeking support and popularity, e.g., Cramb, McElroy, Hobbs, etc.

And then Professor Hayes sums up the methods pursued by these conscious or unconscious militarists as follows: (1) By emphasizing armed strength of neighbors, thus creating alarm and fear at home. (2) By boasting of one's own strength, thus inspiring distrust and fear abroad.

Modern warfare is identified with big business today as it never was in the past; in fact, it is the biggest "business" in the world today, and more people profit from militarism, and in more different ways, than ever before in human history. It can readily be understood that the war business that has created in the United States alone twenty-two thousand new millionaires in the last five years, and a proportionate number in all other countries, is pretty strongly entrenched in modern society. What difference does it make if eight million young men were killed and thirty million more crippled for life and millions of others, women and children, died of slow starvation and the whole structure of society was well-nigh destroyed and the nations left bankrupt and all the finer ties of the spirit

wiped out,—if only in each nation a few thousand new millionaires can be added to the privileged classes? It seems monstrous to put it in such words, but are not these the plain facts, and is it not high time that the world faced the facts as they are as respects this business of war?

But in view of these facts, it should not surprise anyone that it seems difficult to secure action in the matter of disarmament, for "we are wrestling not against flesh and blood, but against spiritual wickedness in high places"—and also in low places. We can destroy war if we will, but it will never be done without a heroic struggle in which every true lover of his kind must dare to engage. And the time is now. For I dare to believe that in every land the vast majority of men and women are ready and eagerly desirous for disarmament if only there could be found some channel through which their desires might be made articulate. In the presence of the expressed will of the people the governments of the world would be forced to take some action.

Let me emphasize just a few of the reasons why it is imperatively necessary that, without further delay, immediate steps be taken toward disarmament. And I shall begin with the lowest motive first.

1. The economic reasons why the nations should disarm are unanswerable. Senator Borah has recently published the following significant figures: In 1920, the five great Nations,—the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy,—expended for military and naval purposes a total of \$16,442,251,101, which was over \$2,000,000,000 more than all these nations together expended for military purposes in the fourteen years from 1900 to 1914. And this remember, was two years after we had waged the war that was to end war! Italy is carrying today an armed force of four hundred thousand men, while France has an army of nearly eight hundred thousand men, and yet all the world knows that both France and Italy are bankrupt. The papers stated that in M. Viviani's first conference with President Harding he said that the budget of France today is double the amount of her total income. Our papers are strangely silent as to the economic condition of England, but the official figures state that before the last miners' strike, there were not less than one million seven hundred fifty unemployed in England, which meant that seven million

individuals were fast approaching the state of destitution. During the month of February, England's imports fell off £73,000,000 while her exports for the same month dropped £32,000,000. England has cut her naval program from a two-power navy to a one-power navy, not, as Lloyd George said, from motives of idealism, but chiefly for economic reasons. Japan is straining all her financial resources to keep her naval program at least in sight of ours.

The total revenue of the United States for 1920 was appropriated as follows: For past wars, 68 per cent; for future wars, 25 per cent; for civil departments, 3 per cent; for public work, 3 per cent; for education and science, 1 per cent. That means 93 per cent of the total Federal revenue was devoted to wars, past and future, while only 7 per cent was devoted to all the pursuits of peace. The appropriations for 1921 are slightly better. For past wars, 68 per cent; for future wars, 20 per cent; for all other purposes, 12 per cent; or 88 per cent of the total revenue for wars, past and future, and 12 per cent for the pursuits of peace. Secretary of War Weeks made the recent statement that the Federal Government would need not less than \$17,000,000,000 in the next thirty months for running expenses and other obligations. This country is bending under a public debt of \$24,000,000,000 due to the war, while our annual interest charge of over \$1,000,000,000 is linked with railroad, army pensions, war risk and similar expenditures to upwards of \$3,000,000,000 to \$4,000,000,000 annually. In addition to this stupendous amount, we are asked to spend nearly a half billion dollars for naval vessels that will be of no more value than so many huge iron kettles, long before another war can be provoked by any other country.

The growth of militarism in the United States in respect to its navy is indicated by the following figures. We spent on our navy in 1890—\$25,000,000. In 1904—\$62,000,000. In 1916, \$313,000,000. And in 1921 we propose to spend \$500,000,000.

In the present depleted condition of all the nations, where can we look for retrenchment if not in the matter of armaments? Here in the United States the 68 per cent we are spending for past wars is a debt of honor. We would not repudiate it if we could. Time alone can cut that amount down. But it is in the 20 per cent for future wars that we not only can, but ought to retrench. There is no time to delay. To

postpone action is to invite world-wide disaster. How long, think you, will the peoples of all lands endure this backbreaking burden of taxation for the sake of wars yet to come? If anything could plunge the world into the throes of a purely destructive revolution, it will be the continuation of these armament programs, for everywhere the nations face economic collapse and their people cry out for relief from the burdens too heavy to be longer borne. In the common economic interest of the world, if for nothing else, the armament race should be halted. Madness and utter ruin lie that way.

2. Another unanswerable argument for immediate reduction of armaments is found in the field of scientific discoveries. It is even more convincing than the economic argument for those who have any concern for the future of humanity's life on this planet. Ever since the time of Francis Bacon man has believed increasingly that his advance in the knowledge of the world of nature was limitless, and that through science the time must come when man would stand as the master of the mighty forces that are operative in this material universe. The discoveries of the last fifty years and, especially, of the last generation have more than justified this hope. The imaginative stories of men like Jules Verne and later of H. G. Wells that once seemed wild and fantastic are now known to be based on scientific possibility, and many of these imaginative dreams have already been translated into reality.

We of this generation have been brought up to believe that science is the greatest friend of man, and that through science true progress along every line is eventually to be achieved. Through science, we have been taught, man is to conquer disease and obliterate poverty and even destroy war,—in a word, science is the great constructive force which is to enable man to reach the far-lying heights of his ideals for the world. But the thing that we have learned of late is that science may become the greatest destructive force in human life just as easily as it may be employed for constructive purposes. The fault is not in science as such, but in the men who use the wonderful knowledge that science discloses. Science in itself is neither moral nor immoral; it is unmoral. What gives it either a moral or immoral value depends solely on the men who employ it.

During the war we have witnessed that science which has

done so much to preserve and enrich human life prostituted, with apparent ease, into channels that are purely destructive of human life, and employing methods so unspeakably barbarous and inhumane that, in comparison, the "cruel savages" of early times are made to appear like veritable angels of light. The engines of destruction used in the last war make the weapons of even a generation ago look like the merest toys. When it was found that the Central Powers were resorting to poisonous gases and liquid fire and all the other diabolical inventions of hell, a cry of horror went up from the Allied nations at these inhumane methods of modern warfare. And then immediately the Allied Governments set their expert chemists at work to go the enemy one better, and if the reports are correct, they succeeded. In the United States and England and all the "civilized" nations today there are chemical warfare service departments of the governments that are devoting their whole attention to the discovery of still more poisonous gases and more deadly disease germs and more powerful explosives that can be employed in the "next war" to the utter annihilation of the enemy, whoever it may chance to be. It is already stated confidently by military authorities that, owing to these new discoveries of science and to the aircraft, the next war will be a war upon the civilian populations, that armies and navies will not be required, and that women and children and civilians generally will be stricken down in their homes and as they go about their peaceful pursuits. Incredible as it sounds, the last war revealed the fact that it is not only possible but highly probable, for the only justification that the Allies used for resorting to poisonous gas, was that "it was employed by the enemy; we must use their methods." In the next war, let a single government use disease germs or attack a civilian population with poisonous chemicals and, we have learned, under the madness of the war spirit, all the other governments involved would speedily follow suit.

3. Still another reason why immediate steps should be taken in the reduction of armaments is found in our clear knowledge today that preparation for war inevitably brings war, sooner or later. No sophistry in the last few years has been so completely riddled as the idea that "preparedness is the best prevention of war." I do not know how many people there still are who honestly believe this falsehood, but it ought

to be obliterated once and forever from the human mind. Let me mention but three facts. (a) We have learned that no matter how ~~peace-loving or peaceabiding~~ a people may be—and most people are just this,—the policy of “preparedness” or the general spirit of militarism in the daily life of a people inevitably infects the minds of people, so that when any crisis occurs it is easy and natural for the ~~war-like~~ spirit to break out. This is simply a matter of psychology. |Any system of ~~universal military~~ training, any glorification of army or navy, any appeal to the pomp or glory of war, the continual appeal to youth to serve their country in arms is a constant mental suggestion through eye and ear to all members of the population that their country's greatness and strength and safety depend primarily upon armed force. It is inevitable therefore, when the crisis comes, that the people generally should clamor for recourse to arms. We have seen demonstrated in this country that it is just as easy today to make people narrowly patriotic and belligerent as it is to make them international and pacifist in spirit. It all depends upon the appeal that is made to them. The presence of armaments in the life of a people, with all that this involves, is a daily suggestion of militarism and war, in the presence of which all teaching and preaching of peace is futile and absurd.

(b) We have been learning much of late of the influence of militarism and diplomacy. The object of diplomacy is to get what you want for your particular country. The method of modern diplomacy is to get the desired thing by threats, and it has been found by experience that the value of the threats that are made depend upon the strength of the armed force behind the threat. The greater the force, the stronger the threat. This is one of the common arguments used for the perpetuation of armaments, but entirely apart from the degradation of diplomacy that this involves, it is clear from history that this method of threats and counter-threats which is used in just the degree that there is strong armament behind them, sooner or later reaches the breaking point, the bluff is called and war follows.) The diplomatic history of Europe from 1900 to 1914, not to go back of that, is the proof of this statement. In 1905 Germany threatened Russia and France over Morocco. In 1908 and 1909, Austria threatened Russia over Bosnia-Herzegovina while Germany declared she “stood in shining armor

behind her ally." In 1909 and 1911 the threats were made again over Morocco. And in 1912, 1913 and 1914 Austria threatened Russia over the Balkans,—and at last in 1914 Russia called the bluff and the great tragedy, precipitated by diplomacy whose method of threats was itself made possible by the armaments behind the threats, was finally on.

(c) The study of the secret war documents—the Kautsky documents in Germany, the Red Book in Austria and the secret documents in Russia which the revolutions in these respective countries gave to the public,—has revealed the fact that the war was precipitated not by civilians but by the military officials. According to a series of articles recently published in the American Historical Review by Professor Sydney B. Fay upon the "Origins of the War," the statement is made that it is clear from a careful study of these documents that the Kaiser, the Czar and Chancellor Bethmann did not desire the war at this particular time and tried to avert it, but that they were over-ruled by the military staff in both countries, who believed war to be not only inevitable but desirable at just this time. In other words, the future historian will not think of the rulers of Germany and Russia as deep-dyed villains, wickedly planning a world war, but rather as weak, short-sighted fools who allowed a military machine to be built up in their respective countries that eventually became so strong and powerful that in the moment of international crisis it over-rode the actual rulers and took the reins of power into its own hands. This is the general verdict of the historian today as to the immediate cause of the war. And if this means anything, it proves that the preparedness of militarism, instead of preventing war, tends inevitably toward the building up of a military power in the state that, when the crisis comes, sets aside the civilian rulers and councillors for its own ends.

I have referred before to the strange contradiction running through Christendom. Its professional and official ideal is that of love, sacrifice, renunciation, charity, justice, peace. But its daily practices advertise its real worship of self, its reverence for might, its insistence upon mastery over others, its supreme joy in the triumph of force. With its soul it yearns and broods for peace; with the passions of the heart it is hot for war. It carries the spirit of war into its business, into its industries, into its clashes of race with race, into its adven-

tures to the ends of the earth, into its world-wars. But a world thus divided against itself cannot long endure. It must resolutely will to commit itself to one path or the other. It must cease its hypocrisy and begin to take seriously the moral ideals it professes with its lips. Bernard Shaw said when the war broke out: "It would be a great deal better if all the churches would close their doors and keep them closed until this miserable business of war is over." They did not take his advice and for the most part they basely surrendered their ideals to the madness of the war spirit. But the war is over, and how many churches have yet lifted their voices in favor of disarmament? It takes no gift of prophecy to declare that unless the churches and the synagogues of whatsoever name or persuasion in all civilized lands join now heart and hand in the great task of securing the disarmament of the nations, it will not be long before they will be obliged to close their doors for good and all, for then men and women will have completely lost all faith in their ideals and all respect for their official professions.

✓ Think of the moral effect on the world if the news could be flashed to all lands that at last the governments had decided to begin disarmament. It would mean that sanity and reason were returning to their throne and the madness of the past few years was finally being overcome. It would mean that the first step had been taken away from a slavish reliance upon Force as the arbiter of the destinies of mankind, and that at last men and nations had awakened to the supreme value of reason and good-will in the conduct of human affairs. It would bring new hope to a world that is today well-nigh despairing, and would inspire all with the confidence that, in the same spirit, all our great problems could eventually find solution. It would release new energies and new moral and spiritual forces that now lie dormant under the dark shadows of bitter disillusionment. At least, it would be the first honest step that has yet been taken toward the building of a new and better world.

I wonder how many of us realize the incredible and monstrous position that America holds today toward the matter of disarmament. Of all the nations, we are the only one that can afford financially to continue to build up armament with-

out bankruptcy, and by our absurd naval program as at present proposed, we are forcing the other naval powers to a pace in armament that they cannot in any sense afford. This means that we are directly responsible not only for the taxation of our own people, but what is worse, for the crushing burdens of taxation on the people of England, of France, of Italy and of Japan. England and Japan have both signified their willingness and desire to begin naval disarmament, but we still continue to boast that by 1924 we will have the greatest navy in the world. Strange as it may sound when we remember our professed ideals in the past, it is literally true that the United States constitutes today the greatest single menace to the peace of the world in its proposed naval program. As Atherton Brownell strikingly puts it in his play, "The Unseen Empire."

"Christendom! And it is Christendom that makes war! Who builds the biggest battleships today? The Christian Nations. Who fights for the supremacy of the world by the threat of leashed monsters whose breath is of the pit? The Christian Nations. Who lays the pavement over which men march to the fight in the struggle of brother against brother? The Christian Nations."

And we must add, with shame and indignation in our hearts, it is the United States today that leads the world and sets the pace in the mad race for armaments among Christian nations.

THE PRICE OF PEACE: ARE WE WILLING TO PAY IT?¹

One of the first lessons that is taught us in our lives, and one of the last that we ever really learn, is that everything in this world has its price. There is nothing either good or bad that can be obtained without our paying for it. In saying this I do not have in mind the buying and selling of material things in the market-place for money—the thing which James Russell

¹ By John Haynes Holmes, Minister of the Community Church. For sale at 5c. Address, The Community Church, Park Ave. and 34th St., New York City.

Lowell referred to in the *Vision of Sir Launfal*, when he wrote that

"Earth gets its price for what earth gives us."

Rather do I have in mind the fact that if we want to do anything or be anything, if we desire to become remarkable for any achievements or qualities of virtue, we must be willing to pay the price in terms of moral and spiritual sacrifice.

Now it is this question of the price of peace which I propose to discuss with you this morning. I shall not attempt to lay down any detailed program for the establishment of international order. I am not concerned with the details of political and economic reforms, which make up the items of such a program. Rather is it my intention to leave behind me these lowlands of ways and means, and mount this morning to those high tablelands of the spirit, where we can encounter those general principles or ideals which must be the inspiration of any successful program of reform. I shall deal, therefore, not with details of procedure, but with those generalizations of comprehensive understanding and vision in which all such details are necessarily involved. And from this standpoint may I say that, to my mind, the price of peace means today, as it has always meant in the centuries gone by, three very definite and fundamental things. I venture to name and discuss each one of these in order:

First of all, I would point out that the price of peace is the abolition of war and all the things of war. This would seem to be an elementary proposition, for peace by its very definition means the absence of armed conflict, does it not? And yet nothing is more evident than the fact that men have always persisted in the idea that it is possible to establish peace upon the earth and still not surrender the luxury of war. In other words, we are victims, in this particular case, as in so many others, of the silly superstition that it is possible to eat our cake and have it too.

The reason for this extraordinary notion that peace can be secured and war retained at one and the same time, is to be attributed, I believe, to our failure to understand what the nature of warfare between nations really is. For war is not confined to the struggle and carnage of the battlefield. Conflict is joined

not merely when the guns are fired, the swords unsheathed, and the soldiers ordered "over the top." War is an atmosphere and a condition, it is an anticipation and a preparation. It is an attitude of one group of men toward another group, and the consequences which are sooner or later bound to follow upon this attitude. It is a power latent as well as active, existent in elements before as well as after the moment of explosion. I always think of war as best illustrated by the analogy of a volcano. When we stand before Mt. Etna, for example, we are told by our guide that this great mountain is an active volcano. It looks to us to be peaceful enough. Its sides are clothed with pleasant verdure; all up and down its lower slopes are the vineyards cultivated by the tireless peasantry. Only now and then is there wafted from the summit a little whiff of dull black smoke. And we do not understand the significance of this waving plume, until we climb the mountain, and come to the jagged crest. Then, as we peer over the lips of the crater down through its yawning mouth into the bowels of the hill, we suddenly see that mass of boiling lava and flaming gas which tells us of the hell which is hidden behind those vine-clad slopes. Now we know what is meant by those occasional whiffs of smoke which streak the clear blue of the Italian sky. The volcano is alive; and sooner or later, at some moment, unforeseen, there is certain to come that vast eruption which will spread destruction and death throughout the countryside.

Such is the phenomenon of war as it exists in the days which we describe as days of peace. We gazed on Europe, for example, in the period preceding the stupendous cataclysm of 1914, much as we might gaze on Etna today, and found everything quiet and reposeful. Here were busy cities and teeming farming lands, friendly peoples living in happy concord with their neighbors. Then came the whiffs of smoke from Fashoda, Agadir, the Balkans, Asia Minor; and we looked a little more carefully to see what was signified by these sudden clouds. Then suddenly did we see, what was so carefully hidden from our eyes, that Europe was not at peace at all, but at war. The eruption of armed conflict, to be sure, had not come. The war was in a state of suspended rather than active animation. But here, in the diplomatic manouverings and debates, in the alliances

and balances of power, in the strategic frontiers and buffer states, in the gigantic competing armaments on land and sea, above all in the jealousies, suspicions and hatreds generated in the hearts of governments and peoples, was the flaming lava which some day was certain to boil over the yawning crater of European dissension, and bury the world beneath its consuming flood of arms. Never in our time has Europe been at peace! Do you suppose, for example, that Germany made war on England only in 1914? On the contrary, the Kaiser declared war against England when he organized his conscript army, fortified Heligoland, and began the building of his high seas fleet. Do you imagine that England took up arms against Germany only at that fateful moment when the German legions broke the frontier of Belgium? On the contrary, England began her fight against the Teuton when she established her two-power navy, organized her "territorials," and made her armed alliance with France and Russia in the west and the Empire of Japan in the east. Always in this modern age has war been with us. Our psychology is a war psychology, our economy a war economy. The whole vast structure of our civilization has been built in the fear of war, and to the end of victory in war. In spite of all our pretenses, and all the elaborate camouflage of our outward life, we live in conflict and not in concord with our brothers. Ours is the dishonest cry of the ancient prophet, "Peace, peace, when there is no peace."

Now it is this understanding of war which leads me to the categorical declaration that the condition or price of peace is the total abolition of war—war latent as well as active, war in preparation as well as in explosion. "Over the thin and intermittent pipings of peace," wrote Israel Zangwill, before the Great War, "crash the imperturbable hammers of the War Devil, fashioning his ships, the great furnaces roar, forging his cannons, the war drum beats, the trumpet blares, the kings go to their thrones to the sound of tramping soldiers, the great captains of industry, the chiefs of art and learning, thrust into the background, hidden away like poor relations. So long as the War Devil dictates the very symbols of our civilization, he will remain the master." It is these symbols, both of thought and action, which must be removed, if international peace is to be achieved.

"REASONABLE PACIFISM" ¹

It is a substantial and encouraging victory for the disarmament movement which Senator Borah has won in forcing the administration not to oppose his amendment to the naval appropriations bill, directing the President to call a conference with Great Britain and Japan on the subject of limitation of armaments. These powers set the pace in navalism and they are the ones who can effect the naval agreements. It is also encouraging that public interest in the subject increases. The institution of Disarmament Sunday and a church conference on disarmament are both good. It is, however, disquieting that Dean Shailer Matthews, presiding over a disarmament conference, feels compelled to protest so eagerly that "we are not what you would call a pacifist crowd."

Limitation of armaments may save taxes and have some psychological effect in preserving peace; it will not do much for the latter cause so long as preparations for chemical warfare continue, and the prevailing capitalist-imperialist philosophy and organization of society go unchallenged. It is not "reasonable pacifism," but unreasonable credulity to believe that you can take the beast of militaristic imperialism, file down his teeth, and make him as harmless as an old watch dog.

AMERICA MENACED BY MILITARISM: AN APPEAL TO WOMEN ²

All women, I trust, want to use their new political power in such a way as to help humanity. We have beneficent dreams that we want to see realized, dreams of a glorified earth without sickness or poverty or ignorance or crime. We have been thinking all along that once we had the ballot we could use it to make those dreams come true. Well, we can in time, but not directly, as most of us think. Not yet! There is one thing more to do before we can settle down to the business of positive reform. We must eliminate from Congress the men who are

¹ From *World Tomorrow*. 4:164. June, 1921.

² By Harriet Connor Brown. In *Searchlight*. 5:8-13. November 15, 1920.

misappropriating nearly all the wealth of the country, leaving us women next to nothing with which to do our work.

The Irony of It

See the irony of the position in which we find ourselves! We went into the World War to end war—at least the women of the country did, though I doubt if the general staff of the army and the manufacturing interests of the country which secured contracts from the War Department would have answered to that call, since in the nature of things a war to end war would put many of them out of business. But certainly the rank and file of mothers and sisters and sweethearts who sent their men to the trenches did it in the high spirit of sacrifice, as a duty they owed humanity, and those young men went generally, many of them to their doom, in the same lofty spirit, and in full expectation that when the fight was over and they were either dead in Europe or back here victorious, their swords were to be beaten into plowshares, and they were to live amicably with the world forever after.

But what has really happened? The men are again at home—except for one hundred and fifteen thousand brave boys who have paid the supreme sacrifice, fifty thousand of them dead in battle, sixty-five thousand dead of wounds and disease—but there is no promise of disarmament as the reward of all their toil and bloodshed, of all their women's tears and labor. On the contrary, a vast increase of armament has actually been authorized, which is to be paid for by a cruel levy of taxes that will take away not only from them, but from their children and their children's children, if not the very bread from their mouths and the clothes from their backs, at least the laughter from their lips, the sweetest luxuries of life, the choicest fruits of science and education and benevolence for at least a century.

It seems like a trick, a hideous, gigantic trick—and perhaps it is!—that weak, smug, misguided or wicked congressmen have played upon us while our boys were dying. I am inclined to think that some of these congressmen were tricked like ourselves, that they are as honest as are the bulk of women, the mass of mothers in the world. But if so, they are certainly misled by corporate interests and by military potentates while we women, unenfranchised and brooding, were looking the other

way. However it happened, someone put it over on us while we thought we were fighting for human liberty and for our political freedom.

Sacrificing Peace Pursuits

Viewed as a breach of faith, the action of Congress was bad enough, even if we were perfectly able to pay the bill. But we are not able to pay it. We have a vast load of unpaid bills amounting for this year to over \$2,838,000,000 which will make us stagger, as we try to climb upward, even without the extra burden of over \$855,000,000 for enlarged military and naval establishments. Our unpaid bills are for past wars, chiefly the war with Germany. They are composed of items like pensions, war risk insurance, compensation for disability, the vocational education of mutilated soldiers, the restoration to health of diseased soldiers, the upkeep of soldiers' homes, the return to America of the soldier dead, the interest on the war debts, and so on.

The sum of these two items, one for the wars of the past, the other for the wars of the future, is so gigantic, over \$3,694,000,000 for just one year's appropriations, that Congress was of course not able to appropriate much for all the other functions of government. Rich as we are, the country has to be carefully combed with a fine-tooth comb to yield four billion dollars a year in taxes. The result was that Congress appropriated only \$481,000,000, for all the non-military activities of the government, only about half what it did for the combined military and naval establishments. It trimmed to the bone every appropriation for commerce, agriculture, public works, public health, science, research, and education. The interests of the common people were sacrificed without apology or compunction.

Nor is that tremendous total of \$4,000,000,000 the whole story for this year. A deficiency bill will be passed to cover the items for the general service that simply have to be covered, since certain functions of government, which were not adequately provided for last spring, are required by law to continue. And much as the army has had, it is said to be still unsatisfied and a deficiency appropriation is now demanded since the War Department went to work as soon as the Reorganization bill was passed to recruit the army up to full strength although well aware that the funds appropriated were not sufficient to maintain the number of soldiers authorized. If

provision is made for a bonus to soldiers at a cost of from one to two billions and if provision is also made for "universal military training" at another billion and a half, our expenditures for the year will be not four but seven thousand million dollars.

On the average, each one of you will have to pay about \$40 of that four thousand millions. If you and your husband have the average American family of three children, your contribution this year to the State will be about \$200 for your family of five. That is enough to pay the fees of one child at the university this year. Instead, it will go toward the support of some stoker on an idle battleship or some orderly at a useless army post.

A Vivid Comparison

I am afraid you will not see how these taxes discriminate against the non-military population unless I give you some concrete illustrations. Here in Washington live many officers of the army. Here is Mrs. A. living comfortably on her husband's salary, he being an officer in the army and fifty years old, likely at that age to be a lieutenant-colonel, drawing from \$4,100 to \$5,100 a year, according to the length of his service. Do you happen to know what the duties are to which he may be assigned at the War Department? He is perhaps supervising one poor, underpaid, civilian clerk. Or, if he is more fortunate, he may, with numerous others of similar military distinction, be at work for the general staff of the army, planning the campaign to be made against Mexico when that campaign is made. In any circumstance, he is adequately paid and not overworked! If ever he goes to war, he is safely far from the battle line. When he reaches the age of sixty-four he will be retired on retired pay of at least \$3,100 a year, possibly as much as \$3,800, even though not advanced in rank after age fifty, considerably more if he reaches higher rank. At all times he has the privilege of feeding his family and clothing them to some extent out of commissary stores at rates very much below the general market prices. If he is not provided with a good house in which to live, furnished largely in Philippine mahogany at government expense, he is allowed commutation for quarters. His fuel and lights are also furnished him. He can get his drugs from the hospital steward, his automobile tires from the quartermaster general when Congress does not

allow him an automobile for his especial use. When his children are ill, yes, even when they are born, he may call in the army doctors and when he or anyone of his family goes to the army hospital for an operation his fees are merely nominal. These perquisites and allowances, together with his salary, seem to you and me rather generous payment for supervising one poor civilian clerk, but then you must remember that the War Department has an appropriation of over \$418,000,000 and can easily pay him large sums. Mrs. A. may tell you, plaintively, that army people are poor, and, of course, cannot compete in society with business people, but I notice that she never finds it necessary to help support her family and that they have all the necessities and what many of us call luxuries.

But look at Mrs. B.! Her husband is a chemist in the Department of Agriculture. Perhaps he is a chemist, or a physicist, or a plant pathologist. The chances are he is an authority in his line. His discoveries may have added greatly to the wealth of the nation, may even have saved it from terrible pest or plague. The work may have been done under most hazardous conditions, in the swamps of Central America or in the forests of Brazil, where his life was more imperiled than was ever that of the army officer at headquarters behind the lines. And all the time he has been serving science and his country thus devotedly, Mrs. B. has been trying to make his salary of from \$2,500 to \$2,700 buy bread and boots for her little brood of children. Many eminent men of science are receiving from this patriotic country considerably less than \$2,500 a year for their services, not because their work is unsatisfactory, but because Congress appropriates only \$31,000,000 for the great productive Department of Agriculture as against the \$418,000,000 for the great non-productive War Department. When the scientist retires from the service, at seventy years of age, instead of at sixty-four as in the case of the army officer, he will be allowed a pension of only \$720 a year, one-third of which is of his own saving. He pays for one-third of this pension, but receives in amount only about one-fifth of what the lieutenant-colonel receives for nothing. The last time I heard of Mrs. B. she had gone into a government office herself to earn money to educate the children.

I am sure that you women will agree with me that there is unfair discrimination here. You will acknowledge, too, I

think, that such discrimination against men of science and learning, men who are saving and increasing our material resources instead of spending them, must be harmful to the nation. There is something wrong with our way of thinking and acting when we acknowledge our indebtedness to men like General Pershing by granting them honors and competence and deny it to men like Dr. Howard, head of the Bureau of Entomology. The one is rewarded for having led our forces against a foreign foe and the other is ignored, although for every thousand enemies of the nation Pershing has slain, Howard has slain his tens of thousands. In fighting the mosquito, the boll weevil, the gypsy moth and other enemies of man and his crops, Dr. Howard has served humanity more truly than has ever any general of great armies.

Now, what are we women going to do about this distribution of our national wealth? Are we going to accept the situation? Some of you may say that we cannot reasonably do otherwise, that we could not ourselves make a better disposition of public funds than the men have done, or appropriate less. Let us see.

I think we shall agree that there is no argument about the 68 per cent allotted for payment of obligations on account of past wars. These are debts of honor. They cannot be repudiated. It is fundamental that an honorable nation, like an honorable person, must pay its debts. In a way, it is proper, too, I think, to remind some of our creditors that we expect them to be just as honorable as we are and pay their debts, too, and when we come to talk to honest British working women about cooperation for the sake of peace, that is one thing we shall want to say to them, that we are sure they will prefer to have their taxes spent in paying back to us what we loaned them rather than in building new battleships to coerce us.

Then too, our boys were gathered up from our farms and city homes, from our fields and factories, our shops and mines and offices. Some of them volunteered but more of them were drafted—driven like cattle into pens where they were instructed in the art of slaughter, and shipped then overseas to their doom in the trenches. They had no choice in the matter. The least we can do to make it up to them in some faint way is to pay their insurance to their families, nurse them and care for them in sickness, and set them on their feet if their

mutilation will permit. No, there is very little of the 68 per cent to be spent this year for our past wars that could be saved. Go over to the War Risk Insurance Bureau in Washington and you may see there a machine that is issuing checks to the families of these boys—pouring them out as steadily as you can count, all day long and every day in the year. Each count means from \$10 to \$150 of real money. There is no way of saving that.

Now, it may be that the 12 per cent of appropriations allotted for the non-military activities of the government is more than needed, small as it seems in proportion to the huge appropriations for war. A great deal has been said in the press for a number of years about wastefulness in the government offices. It is undoubtedly true that something can be saved by reorganization of the government departments and by elimination of duplicate activities in different departments. That reorganization and elimination are in progress and when completed will put the service on a more efficient basis and save some money. But the point I want to make perfectly clear is this, that when it is all done and the government's house is in perfect order from garret to cellar, not a stick of furniture out of place or a shred of wasted food in the garbage pail, the saving cannot possibly be more than 1 or 2 per cent of the total tax bill or from forty to eighty million dollars only out of the four thousand millions appropriated. Do you not see that, even if we cut out every function of the government except those supervised by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Postmaster General, we should save less than 12 per cent of the total appropriations, *but we should deprive ourselves in the meantime of nearly every useful function which the government performs for us.*

It is as if patient mother tried to save on the children's meals by a careful study of food values while graceless dad went down town and blew in seven-eighths of his pay-envelope on a spree.

The Army and Navy Budgets

Many people seem to think that a budget system will enable us to save large sums. Most assuredly it will be to our advantage to have estimates of expenditure and estimates of revenue presented to Congress in balanced form and considered

together, budget-fashion. But please observe that if the Bureau of the Budget were composed of archangels from heaven, all accomplished accountants, it could not save more than the entire amount of the appropriation for general purposes—and that is only 12 per cent of the whole. The 1 or 2 per cent which might possibly be saved will hardly be reflected in the individual's tax bill. It is only a dribble at the spigot. If the Bureau of the Budget is given supervision of the army and navy estimates, some larger reduction may be accomplished. There at least is the bung hole that should be plugged.

But as long as appropriations for the Army and Navy are granted in lump sums there is no hope that even an inspired Bureau of the Budget could save enough to affect taxation. The saving accomplished in one or another division of the War Department by simplification of routine jobs will only be applied to new works of war, to enriching a new batch of contractors or granting additional perquisites to officers. It is not generally understood that civilian employees—clerks, stenographers, messengers, all those who wear citizen's clothes—in the War Department are carried on the legislative, executive and judicial appropriation bill, not on one of the military bills. When, therefore, efficiency experts improve War Department office methods, they affect the 12 per cent and not the 20 per cent area shown on our chart. There is only one sure way to introduce economy into the conduct of the War and Navy Departments and that is to cut the appropriations for those departments to a minimum.

The operations of the Army and Navy should be restricted at once to military operations. Adherents of the Army and Navy will tell you how much useful work of a non-military character is performed by those services, of how roads are built by them, maps made, harbors dredged, sanitation improved, human beings educated. Every word of this is true but it constitutes the chief offense of the system. That the civil functions of our Government are now largely performed by the War and Navy Departments shows that the curse of militarism is already upon us. The Army is building roads that the Bureau of Public Roads in the Department of Agriculture should build, making maps that the Geological Survey should make, dredging rivers and harbors that a Department of Public Works should dredge, carrying on sanitary work that the Public Health Service should perform, educating human

beings to whom a dozen civilian bureaus of the Government could furnish equally good instruction if Congress would only support those bureaus a fraction as well as it supports the Army and Navy. Duplication of work and subversion of democracy are the ends chiefly served by the War and Navy Departments. The most serious feature of the whole stealthy campaign of the militarists against our peace and freedom is just this much-lauded fact that a great proportion of the appropriations for the Army and Navy are for non-military purposes.

The objection to the non-military activities of the military and naval establishments is twofold; first, that the cost to the country is much greater when the War Department undertakes the performance of a civil function than when the proper civil department undertakes it; and secondly, that it is not becoming to require a free people to live under military discipline in times of peace, even if it could be shown that such a system promotes economy and efficiency. *In view of the fact that the country allowed four million of its youth to be drafted and thirty-three and a half billion dollars of its treasure to be spent in an effort to break up a similar system of military despotism in the government of Imperial Germany, the efforts of the War and Navy Departments to establish such a system in the United States can only be characterized as an impudent disregard of the people's fundamental convictions.* Will not the mothers of America be justified in raging with a truly divine wrath against those who make such an effort?

Now it is generally recognized that there will have to be a reorganization of the departmental service before any thorough-going financial reforms can be instituted. Let us insist then that the non-military activities of the War and Navy Departments be assigned to the proper civil branches of the Government. Most of them could be taken care of logically in the proposed new Departments of Public Works and of Public Welfare. The spectacle that would follow of seventeen thousand officers and two hundred eighty thousand enlisted men living in idleness might help people to see them in their true light as nonproductive burdens carried by the rest of us.

Military and Naval Establishments Must be Reduced

It seems clear that the only item of appropriations that can be reduced materially is that 20 per cent for military and naval establishments. If anyone reduces that it will have to be

the voters of the country. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department is accustomed to return to the Treasury an unexpended balance. We women are voters now. We can force a reduction in that 20 per cent, if enough of us desire it.

If we are not willing to force that reduction our situation is likely to grow worse and worse. The huge appropriations of \$855,000,000 for the Army and Navy during the current year are appalling enough, but the War Department alone has presented estimates for 1921-22 for nearly that much and the two services together have asked for approximately a billion and a half dollars. At this rate, the military caste of the United States will soon be firmly seated on our backs. Like the military caste of Germany, it will then find a war necessary in order to justify its existence and it will be amply and ably assisted by the predatory interests of the country that fatten on wars. When that happens, even our little 12 per cent appropriation for general purposes will be in jeopardy, for this 68 per cent expenditure for past wars will increase so inevitably and rapidly that we shall be fortunate indeed if more than the merest fraction of our revenue can be devoted to the works of peace, to the interests of women and children and the race.

No Need of a Next War

But there are people who will tell you that we must have this big army and navy, that we must even subject our sons to "automatic peace-time conscription" in order to prepare for "the next war," and that if we do *not* prepare for it we shall be beaten.

Well, in answer to that, I have this to say, now while we are at peace with the world: that *if you women will work as hard to prevent the next war as most of you would work to win a war, if it were declared, that next war will never come.* Let us rouse ourselves and use our power. Without our help there will be no war with Mexico, England, Japan, or any other country; with our help our beloved country may live in peace with all the world. British and American voting women alone, if thoroughly organized, can keep the peace of the world. Certainly, the United States of America can only be invaded with the help of Canada or Mexico. Let us try to join hands with the women of Canada and the women of Mexico, who have

suffered far more from war in recent years than we have, in a common effort to maintain peace.

The Congressional program is pretty well defined and amounts to this:

A big army and navy are already authorized. The Army Reorganization Act will be amended to provide for "automatic peace-time conscription" of our boys. Julius Kahn, of California, head of the Military Affairs Committee of the lower house, has declared that he means to push that measure in Congress. The "next war" will then come soon. Some of us will be greatly enriched, but most of us will be impoverished by it. We may be in alliance with Great Britain or against her, but, whatever the alignment, one thing seems clear: it is the idea of those promoting this program that we emulate Great Britain's policy of continual warfare in foreign parts, our ruling class sitting tight at home like hers, receiving the feudal taxes and tributes of the world.

What Women Have to Do

Knowing this, what should be the program of women who want the nation's funds for constructive work, who want their sons saved for such work? What the voting women of the world decide shall be has to be. The problem is no longer to obtain the power. We have taken the first great step. Our problem now is how to use that power.

I see four things for women to do at once. Every woman who reads this paper can give valuable help to the development of a comprehensive and effective plan for disarmament:

I. Organize Non-Partisan Clubs

The first thing for women to do is to organize for united action against military legislation. Establish in each congressional district a non-partisan union of women for the purpose of sending to Congress representatives who will work for disarmament. Until this waste of public money on armaments is stopped, it is worse than futile for women to affiliate permanently with political parties. It is indeed senseless and wicked of you, since, by so doing, you throw away the precious privilege you have of holding the balance of power.

Do you not see that the hope of the world, the power of the world, lies now with us? No longer do we need to beg.

We can say to the men: "We are done with armies. We shall not let you have them any more. Now, what are you going to do about it?" And if we refuse to listen to their foolish tongues, they cannot help themselves, they will have to take what we consent to let them have, for we hold the balance of power. There are many splendid men who feel about these great armies exactly as we do, but without our aid they cannot make their ideas prevail.

I have talked with a number of such men recently, men on the Hill and men in the departments who know the ways of Congress and watch the preparation of estimates, year after year, and they say: "There is no hope for the people at large, for the world, unless you women save us from this crush of militarism."

To these men I say: "We are coming, Father Abraham, coming twenty-seven million strong, in the next election. Hold the fort until we get there!" Surely women will not fail their noblest men.

The program for these non-partisan clubs of women to follow is clearly indicated. The first thing for such a club to do is to subscribe to the *Congressional Record* and *The Searchlight*, the next to detail members of the club to follow through the pages of these sheets the speeches and votes and absences from roll-call of the three men in Congress (two senators and one representative) who represent them in the legislative branch of the Government at Washington. The words and acts of these men should be reported with regularity at the meetings of the club, and the effect of their words and acts analyzed and summarized at the close of each session of Congress. If those representatives are found to be speaking or voting for increase of armaments, indifferent to the needs of the civil branches of the Government, the secretary of the club should be authorized to write them official letters of warning. All that some Congressmen need is to be reminded frequently that among their constituents are a large number of mothers as well as a small number of profiteering manufacturers; you can make them do your will under threats of withdrawing them from Congress, if they waste your money on war and the preparation for war. See to it that the local papers report your club meetings.

As your power is recognized, your opportunities for more

direct application of your ideas will increase. You may send some of your number to Congress and you may put others in important executive positions where they will have the spending of money appropriated by Congress. Julius Kahn is insisting that the supplies of army materials must be purchased by the assistant secretary of war, who should be "an expert in commerce and industry." Personally I should like to see an honest, thrifty woman, an experienced buyer from some big mercantile house, get that job. I feel sure that nobody but a man would do what a lieutenant in the War Department did in 1918, order one hundred thirty thousand branding irons at a cost of \$44,850. Did he think that branding irons for mules were like sanitary drinking cups for humans and only to be used once? The army purchased only one hundred twenty-eight thousand horses and mules in 1919.

The Winter's Work for Non-Partisan Clubs

During the coming winter there are three definite things for women's non-partisan clubs to tell their congressmen and their congressmen's wives.

First, not a penny of increase for armaments! The appropriation of \$855,000,000 for 1920-21 is sufficiently disgraceful and must not be increased. It should indeed be decreased and recruiting for the Army and Navy should be stopped at once.

Second, no conscription of our youth under the heading of "universal military training," "selective draft," or any other euphemism!

Third, a reorganization of the Government Service that will strip the War and Navy Departments of their civil functions, leaving them their proper military duties and no others.

II. Petition the President-Elect

The second thing to do is to demand of the new President-elect that, as soon as he takes office, he call a conference of representatives from every de facto government of the world for the express purpose of agreeing to disarmament, and for that purpose only. We should ask that each country be requested to name three delegates, one of whom shall be a woman, one a representative of labor, and one a representative of science or learning in the permanent employ of his or her respective government. I suggest that the conference be composed

of representatives of women, labor, and learning, rather than representatives of armies and navies, of diplomacy and finance—

First, because the latter have had their turn at running the world and have made a mess of it, and,

Secondly, because women, the working classes, and the intellectual classes, are the backbone of the world, the people whose interests should be paramount and never yet have been so.

III. Sign a Pledge of Passive Resistance to War

The third thing to do and the most effective thing we can do is to sign a pledge of passive resistance to war and the preparation for wars. By "passive resistance" I mean resistance made with tongue and pen, with brain and ballot, with moral and spiritual forces and with those weapons only. Such pledges will be in effect a notice to men, given now while the nation is at peace, that if they go to war, they must go without us.

All women who long for disarmament will make a real contribution to the cause by adding their names to the roll of those pledged to passive resistance. As long as only a few hundred or thousand women have taken the pledge, the idea of disarmament seems visionary, it is true, but once a million voting women have done so, it is no longer a vision, but a program, no longer an idea, but a command to Congress. The following pledge should be signed with your name and address and sent with 25 cents registration fee, to the United States Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 125 East 37th Street, New York City:

Believing that true peace can be secured only through reconciliation and good-will and that no cause justifies the organized destruction of human life, I urge immediate and universal disarmament and promise never to aid in any way the prosecution of war.

IV. Join The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

The fourth thing to do is to promulgate this program among the women of other countries, urging them to concentrate this winter on the three preceding items; securing pledges of passive resistance to war and the preparation for war;

staying the increase of appropriations for armies and navies; and working for a conference on disarmament at Washington next spring.

Happily, the contact with women of other countries is already established. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, with headquarters in Geneva, has for its President Miss Jane Addams and for Secretary-Treasurer Miss Emily G. Balch, both American women, known and beloved by us all. Miss Mabel Hyde Kittredge of New York City is Chairman of the United States Section. Membership in the League does not require the signing of the above pledge. It is hoped, however, that all members will desire to sign it.

If we make our demands on Congress and the incoming President sufficiently clean-cut and clear, we can get the people of the country behind us, and, in the last analysis, the people rule. For the time being, all other public work or charity work should take second place with women. Let men do the relief work of the world in the next year, even the Red Cross work. *Women alone, ordained of God to be noncombatants, are in position to bring peace to the world.* Woe be to them and their children's children if they shirk their plain duty now!

THE CHALLENGE OF WOMEN TO CONGRESS¹

What is the womanhood of America thinking and what is she preparing to do about the growing menace of militarism? The best answer is to be found in the quick, spontaneous, country-wide organization of women for the specific and single purpose, not only of ending war, but also of lightening the burdens of peace-time armaments. Congress supplies the background against which to project her opinion and her program.

In the past few weeks I have talked with or heard from leading women all over the country: I shall try to express their thoughts and intentions.

On the other hand, I have seen the new Congress in action. It is again traveling the road of least resistance, the pathway of its military-minded predecessors. It has neither the vision nor the courage to blaze the way to peace and national happiness.

¹ By Dora B. Haines. Searchlight. 5:11-14. May, 1921.

Already the House has repassed both navy and army appropriations, as big as before, with the Senate adding to their staggering totals. Wherever opposition appeared it was crushed by the brutal power of the machine.

Only fifteen among the four hundred thirty-five Congressmen, on a viva voce vote, objected to the \$396,000,000 naval bill. *And only four stood up to demand a roll call on the final passage of the bill*, through which the public might have known the friends and the enemies of disarmament upon the seas.

The final passage of the big army bill in the House reveals an identical situation, with the same smoke-screen of secrecy. The minority against it was unable even to secure a record vote.

Throughout the consideration of both these military measures, *hair-splitting parliamentarians revelled in Hind's Precedents, with the result that practically every important attempt to change the bills through amendment was ruled out of order.*

In the Senate, a hundred millions were added to the amount of the House bill to be spent next year on the naval establishment. That body did, in response to woman's work for disarmament, adopt the Borah amendment authorizing the President to invite Great Britain and Japan to join with us in a disarmament conference; but the Senate did not withhold a single cent of appropriations until it could be determined whether or not such a conference would be effective.

On the day that the Senate voted unanimously for the Borah amendment, it was passing naval appropriations more than three times as large as those immediately before the great war. Nor did it suspend by one cent the "1916 building program." Thus did it show its own faith and desires!

The identical measure in which our late allies were bidden to a conference proclaimed to them that we were at once to spend half a billion for naval supremacy.

To woman's universal cry for love and peace, Congress is answering in the only way it understands—tariff monopolies, trade concessions, more burdensome taxes, deficits, bonds, pensions, reparations, continued armaments.

Centuries of blurred and biased thinking appear to have culminated in the present Congress. It is blind, ignorant, hopeless. It will go on to the end without comprehension or constructiveness.

Thousands of thinking women of America see all that. They are preparing to play their part in the saving of our civilization. This war against war in which they are enlisting, means just that to woman—the saving of civilization.

Both men and women, all of them who think, are agreed that civilization could hardly withstand another world war. Even Lloyd George, with a mind both military and imperialistic, has expressed that opinion. In a speech at Manchester soon after the Armistice, the British premier said:

This must be the last war. The last, or believe me—I have been studying all the machinery of war for months as a business and for years as a part of my business—believe me, if this is not the last war there are men here today who will see the last of civilization.

On the side of its cost in wealth, no argument is necessary. Its consequences in all other respects will soon be as completely understood.

Certainly there is no dispute between men and women as to the extent of the devastation another war would entail, or upon whom it would fall. The next war would not be fought with armies and battleships: gases and germs would be its most effective instruments of destruction. The forces on land and sea would be only incidental to forces beneath the sea and throughout the air. The strife would not be among armies, but directed through death-dealing science against non-combatant populations.

Civilization cannot survive another great war. If there is agreement as to that, where then, do men and women differ?

Congress, man-made and man-minded, while talking disarmament, is proceeding upon the theory that we must be prepared for war: Women believe down deep and through and through, not only that competition in armaments will make for war, but also that continued armaments, even without fighting, will break the back and crush the soul of humanity.

Even though Congress, through a lack of vision and its fear, is contributing to the causes of war, every thinking woman believes that there cannot be another world war within this generation, *because the plain people will not again consent or be coerced into participation in that supreme folly.*

Every war, directly or indirectly, is caused by the assumption of power on the part of a few politicians, with that assumed

power exercised in secret. *The citizenship of no nation will ever again consent to the misuse and abuse of their sovereignty for that purpose, if the facts can be got to them.*

Then the people throughout the whole world would strike against war. When fortified with information, the women alone are strong enough to outlaw all politicians who would plunge their country into war.

War has all its sources in politics. That is the first and last thing to be clearly comprehended. There are numerous secondary causes of international conflict, but they all culminate and become powerful through politics. Politics no longer means statesmanship: it has come to be the instrument of spoils and privilege. *War is the final expression of perverted politics.*

There will never be an end of the causes of wars until every civilized country has had a thorough political housecleaning.

Let us reduce this monstrous menace to terms which even a Congressman should be able to understand. Take no more than three or four great nations, governed as all great nations are by master politicians. Assume that John is king of one, James president of another and Henry czar of the third. These rulers, prompted by jealousy or false pride, might have a personal quarrel. If they were individual citizens, their differences would be adjudicated without involving other people. But because they happen to be presidents and kings, politically powerful and in control of machinery through which to distort public opinion, their quarrel as individuals could easily cost the world billions in wealth and rivers of blood.

The attache of a foreign embassy might not appeal to the wife of the politician at the head of a nation. She might get him discharged. That might in turn be construed as an insult to the sacred "honor" of the country from which he came. An apology could be demanded, and then—

Does this seem silly? It is—beyond the power of words to describe. But wars have come out of just such absurdly foolish situations. And remember this, whatever the cause, war itself is the supreme folly.

Perhaps master politicians have advanced so far that they will never again set the world on fire through some government's failure "to salute a flag" or because some individual ruler is insulted or assassinated. The fact remains that political

systems as they exist and are manipulated give them that power over national life and death.

What women will soon understand, and men apparently can not, at least most men in authority do not, is that all the racial and economic causes of war operate through politics; that if our political affairs were conducted openly, honestly and democratically, no special interest, nor any combination of the beneficiaries of war, could exert their selfish power to profit by plunging the world into war.

Out of modern politics comes imperialism. Imperialism is nationalized selfishness. It means "trade" and "concessions" for the greedy, poverty and subjection for the people.

Except for their control of politics, neither imperialism nor the money-mad economic sponsors of imperialism could prevail for a day.

With selfishness as their motive and politics as their instrument, without which they would be powerless, what, then, are the chief causes of war?

1. On the economic side, tariffs and governmental concessions stand out. "Trade follows the flag," and too often "the flag" stands only for "trade." If a country has great natural resources upon which to found monopolies, sooner or later it will be the scene of competition and conflict. The strife will be "national" in just so far as the seekers after "trade" and "concessions" are able to prostitute "patriotism" and control "politics."

2. War always means debt. Debt means interest. Interest means luxury and ease for those who possess and have power. Every war results in greater poverty and harder struggles for the masses, with that much added to the parasitical lives of those whose only labor is the clipping of coupons. Consequently, and it follows that they are the most active in politics, the money leaders of the world have believed in war and have been the breeders of it.

3. Do I need to discuss the munition makers in this connection—or their influence in politics?

4. There has grown up, just as a political machine has developed, a military machine, which is its own lobby. War is its business, its background. In this country today the Army and Navy Departments, seeking always their own aggrandize-

ment and growth, are almost all-powerful in government. They draft and virtually initiate legislation. Only a tidal wave of disarmament sentiment can lessen their control of Congress.

What are the inevitable results of war? This issue, through quotations from several Senators and Congressmen, reveals much that always follows in the wake of war. Let me present a brief summary:

1. The last war cost more than the whole previous expense of the national government from the adoption of the Constitution. We have now a debt upon which the interest equals what the government was costing before the war. Moreover, the regular expense of the federal government has jumped from four to six times what it was in 1916.

2. In terms of human life, who can estimate the losses or measure the pain and suffering, not only when war is on, but ever after. Within forty years, say experts, *this nation will have two million dependent ex-soldiers.*

3. Legitimate industry is weakened almost to the point of paralysis. Before conditions become normal, profiteers have had their billions, and the masses must face vastly increased handicaps and hardships for generations to come.

4. Everything most fundamental to democracy becomes more and more remote. Even in "a war for democracy," the victor and the vanquished are almost certain to exchange characters in that respect.

But the greatest of all truth about war is that it leaves disputes more difficult of adjudication than they could possibly have been without fighting.

For centuries men have conducted the government of the world. The result is a stricken world, war-weakened, with bankruptcy in the background. Civilization itself is threatened. In this crisis, women are preparing to take a hand. They have trusted male politicians as long as it can safely be done. There are no present signs of improvement, not even of comprehension. They themselves must play their part.

I predict, and it certainly should come to pass, that in the next campaign there will be a strong, courageous woman candidate in every Congressional district where the situation demands it. There is no other way.

The women are already setting up the machinery through which to know most intimately the record of every present

member of Congress, not only on militarism, but on every important question. They will not oppose, on the contrary they will support to the last ditch, every true friend of the people in both branches.

They already know most of the statesmen in the national legislature, as distinguished from those who are professional politicians.

But there must be a candidate, man or woman, in every district who is not a professional politician. The call has come to the womanhood of America to attend to this civilization-saving matter of nominating and electing a new kind of Congress.

DISARMAMENT—ENGLAND'S POSITION¹

The world today is confronted by the most solemn decision in the history of mankind. While the embers are smoldering, the Great War is over, and the question is whether civilization as shattered in Europe and as shaken elsewhere is now to be reorganized on a basis of life or of death. If we prepare for war, we now know that inevitably we shall get it, and in the years to come there can be no peace unless we disarm. Every observer agrees that Britain is today swept by anti-militarism.

The population of this planet where we live is stated to be seventeen hundred millions. It cannot be said that the peoples are as yet organized consciously for peace, but it can be said that they are in the main unorganized for war. On sea there are only three navies worth attention, supported as follows:

By Great Britain	45,000,000 people
By the United States	105,000,000 "
By Japan	78,000,000 "
	<hr/>
	228,000,000 people

Even if we add France and Italy as naval powers, this means that the rule of the waves is confined to few over three hundred million actual taxpayers out of seventeen hundred million persons belonging to our species. This result follows from the fact that the British Navy is paid for entirely by British subjects living in the United Kingdom itself. On the ocean, therefore,

¹ By P. W. Wilson, New York Correspondent of the London Daily News. In Review of Reviews. 63:155-8. February, 1921.

the outstanding fact which emerges is not the present extent of the preparations for the next war, but the vast and hitherto untapped possibilities for future preparation. If one-sixth of the human race can maintain such navies as we see today, what will the empire of Neptune be like when the other five-sixths have joined the rivals?

The land on which men live can be divided into five great areas. In the table that follows there is shown for these areas, first, the population maintained and, secondly, the approximate number of soldiers actually under arms today:

Land Area	Population	Soldiers	Proportion
Europe	464,000,000	3,500,000	1 in 132
Australasia	16,000,000	76,000	1 in 210
America	206,000,000	675,000	1 in 300
Asia	872,000,000	1,500,000	1 in 584
Africa	142,000,000	200,000	1 in 710

These figures indicate that there are today under arms about six million soldiers, or one soldier to every three hundred people, approximately. Here again there is evidence of infinite untapped possibilities of mischief. If the whole world were raised to the European standard of militarism today there would be not six million soldiers under arms, but nearly thirteen million. Yet even in Europe the largest armies are only as follows:

France	350,000
Germany	100,000
Britain	300,000
Russia	600,000
Italy	250,000

If the men in Europe who have actual knowledge of war were called up, the total would be multiplied several times. One of the essentials of peace is that the old generation of conscripts should pass away without a new generation arising to take their place. Again, take the African figure. No fewer than one hundred thousand out of the two hundred thousand there allotted are in fact the somewhat nominal and unequipped troops of Abyssinia. On the other side of the account, however, the forces of the Commonwealth of South Africa are reckoned as being entirely in reserve—a remark which applies also to Canada and Australia, which countries have not ten thousand men under arms between them. If the white man arms for the next war against himself, we may take it as certain that he will also enlist the reserves of the black races, who are

now becoming more than ever conscious of their place in history.

In Asia there is no militarism except in Japan, whose army accounts for six hundred thousand out of the above total of one million five hundred thousand soldiers. Yet Japan has only a population of about eighty millions. The inhabitants of British India are four times as numerous as those of Japan, yet India, with a land frontier to defend—Japan being islands—and unity to be maintained amid hitherto divided races and religions, has only three hundred thirty thousand troops, of whom hardly a quarter are European. The percentage of militarism in India is barely one-seventh that of Japan. In China militarism may be said not to exist as yet.

Taking North and South America, the only army to be considered seriously in world politics is that of the United States, which is two hundred and eighty thousand men. And this army—to be further reduced—is voluntary. It therefore follows that the curse of conscription is today limited to Italy, France, Russia, some small European states, and Japan. If, however, the world is to be prepared for further war, we must expect that slowly but surely conscription will become universal. In fact the situation is that as navies sometimes commission battleships with so-called "nucleus crews," so are the nations in their exhausted condition depending for the moment only on "nucleus armies."

In the next war everything on land would depend on equipment. And equipment means chemistry in its most fearful activities. Although the citizen, his home, his wife and family, his property, will be destroyed wholesale by the engines certain to be invented by the experts of rival governments, the citizen has not been permitted to know hitherto what is being done in his name. It is indispensable to disarmament that all laboratories be scheduled and rendered open to inspection. To this course objections will be raised, but the question is whether any objection is so serious as to outweigh the alternative peril of accumulated stores of inconceivably hideous poisons and explosives, easily transportable over immense distances by aircraft, so to be dropped at will on cities like New York and London and Paris.

War is no longer waged by armies against armies and navies against navies. Every war in the future will be fought without

mercy against the civilian, including the women and the children. How to limit the building of lethal aircraft must be considered. Germany is accused of having as many aeroplanes as Britain and France combined. And Britain today prefers battleplanes to battleships. She is building the former while she is scrapping the latter. On her air service she is spending \$100,000,000 a year.

If, in this respect, we wish to make the world safe for our boys and girls to live in, there is a method whereby we can certainly do so. During the war there was a careful record kept of all the main metals and raw materials used for the making of munitions. Foods and many other commodities were also rationed and, while doubtless there was some evasion, the inspection was sufficiently effective to secure the broad results desired. In large cities like New York there is a similar record kept of all dynamite used in building operations. Occasionally explosives will escape detection and there will be a disaster in Wall Street, but with inspection it would be impossible for the manufacturers of these things to elaborate a chemical arsenal on a scale that would threaten other nations without the fact being known.

Such inspection of shipping, designed to guide underwriters of insurance, has been for three generations conducted on an international scale by Lloyd's Register, without offense and with absolute reliability. Every vessel launched has been watched during construction and is still watched as it goes to sea. Yet Lloyd's Register is an exclusively British concern, acting without the sanction of any government or league of nations. The international inspection of dangerous chemicals and disease germs would be the more feasible, because, after all, the firms affected do not want to kill people except as an incident of their profit-earning business. If they know that no government dare buy their prohibited wares and that in the nature of the case no one except a government can use these wares, they will follow the market into safer fields.

Land Disarmament Easier Because of Change in Sea Power

Disarmament on land is rendered the simpler because the nature of sea-power has changed. Before the war it used to be said that Britain could not be invaded because she had a bigger navy than that of Germany. Today we see that, owing to the inevitable development of submarines and aircraft, no country

at any time will be able to invade any other country across the ocean. Assuming for the moment the truth of this proposition, which I will elaborate a little later, it follows that armies may be disbanded, continent by continent. This is the reason why, under the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America is able to regard soldiers merely as police. The Japanese Army is important because it is penetrating the mainland of Asia. It is not important as a menace to Australia, New Zealand, and North America. As practical politics, the concerted limitation of armies is thus a manageable problem, particularly important for Europe and especially for France and Germany. Russian manpower might become a menace, but the Soviet Army is, at present, incapable of any aggression disturbing to general peace. If this be the situation left by the war, it rests with the Continent of Europe whether she will handicap herself in future by maintaining vast numbers of men in criminal idleness merely in order to foster ancient feuds, while the new world, saved from such folly by the intervening waters, goes ahead and elaborates new standards of comfort and happiness. Whatever be Europe's decision, her armies will be localized by the submarine and the aeroplane, while the cactus hedge called the Himalayas, with the Isthmus of Suez—the Thermopylae of Africa—will restrain, if they need it, the armies of Russia.

Submarines and Aircraft versus Battleships

The fact is that whereas seapower used to make the sea safe, seapower now makes the sea impassable. When the war broke out Germany had only thirty-six submarines. With ten times that number she would have won. Usually there were not more than eight or nine U-boats in use at any one time. But on the average each U-boat sank \$100,000,000 worth of shipping. In the last week of the war, with her sailors in mutiny, Germany concentrated on tankers and actually sank nine of them. To the end she destroyed shipping in the narrow Irish seas, yet the Irish seas were patrolled by two thousand five hundred vessels of all descriptions. With six hundred destroyers and six thousand auxiliary craft on the watch day and night for four and a half years the Allies captured or sunk only two hundred five submarines, and these submarines were of a type as yet rudimentary.

The submarine is now supplemented by the larger submersibles and by aircraft which can discharge not bombs alone,

but torpedoes also. So formidable are these novel engines of sea-war that Britain has not only ceased building any new battleships or battle cruisers, but has actually scrapped three of the latest type which were at various stages of construction. So far as Britain is concerned, therefore, the race in battleships is dropped. Our private yards are completing three for Japan at Japan's expense—that is all. Acting on expert advice, Britain thus holds her hand for a while, as she did in the years 1906-1918, when the first *Dreadnought* with uniform armament of big guns was under design. Most British Admirals consider that the monster battleships now under construction in the United States, at forty million dollars apiece, would never go into battle in any war fought with the new weapons of attack. Britain has also scrapped more than six hundred warships and the scrapping merrily goes on. In addition she has handed to Canada, for use on the Pacific Coast in harmony with the United States forces, a squadron consisting, it is believed, of eight cruisers and twenty-four destroyers. At the moment, then, it is not easy to make out a case for naval rivalry on the British side, whether against Japan or the United States. Whatever be her motive, Britain thinks it well to save her money to pay her debts.

The comparison between the three powers may now be stated, type by type:

	VESSELS			TONNAGE		
Battleships	Complete	Building	Total	Complete	Building	Total
United States....	33	10	43	707,990	389,600	1,097,590
Great Britain	46	none	46	962,750	none	962,750
Japan	11	8	19	244,800	256,000	500,800
Battle Cruisers						
United States....	none	6	6	none	211,800	211,800
Great Britain	10	none	10	307,500	none	307,500
Japan	4	none	4	101,100	none	101,100

In "capital ships," therefore, it follows, from figures published in American books of reference, that when the Daniels programs are complete, the United States will have forty-nine vessels to Britain's fifty-six and Japan's twenty-three, while tonnage will be: United States, 1,309,390; Britain, 1,279,250; Japan, 601,900. That is the situation as it will be in 1924.

But the statistics should be read in the light of the fact that the United States fleet will be of a later construction on the average than the British, with larger units, heavier guns, and

higher speeds. In the British figures are included six pre-*Dreadnoughts* which were obsolete even when war broke out, and the real position in 1924, as stated by Mr. Archibald Hurd, the naval expert of the London Daily Telegraph, will be:

Capital Ships	United States		Great Britain		Japan	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
First Class.....	27	983,000	18	487,450	14	438,000
Second Class.....	8	167,650	18	395,840	3	59,950
	35	1,150,650	36	883,290	17	497,950

First-class ships are armed with 14-inch guns and over, and it will be noticed how much more modern, comparatively, are the United States and Japanese vessels, judged by this test, than the British. Mr. Hurd claims that the superiority of the United States Navy over the British will be, in 1924, about 30 per cent in capital ships and big guns. Other factors, of course, enter into the reckoning. There is considerable doubt whether the American 16-inch guns will prove to be in practise more effective than the British 14- and 15-inch.

With different wage scales in different countries, comparisons of expenditure on navies are almost wholly fallacious. And it so happens that we are quite in the dark as to appropriations for the coming fiscal years. But at the normal reckoning of \$5 to the pound sterling, Britain is today spending on her navy at the rate of \$400,000,000 a year. The British estimates for 1921-1922 are, at this moment, before the Cabinet, and large reductions have been ordered. If Mr. Daniels obtains his \$670,000,000 or thereabouts, he will be spending about double what Britain, so far as I can see, will spend—this without making any allowance for the depreciation of the sovereign. The Japanese estimates are, in dollars:

		Increase
Army	\$178,000,000	\$34,000,000
Navy	237,000,000	85,000,000
	<u>\$415,000,000</u>	<u>\$119,000,000</u>

These figures show that while Japan is increasing her Navy expenditure, it is, on her estimates, less than half the appropriation for Navy by Mr. Daniels. In fact, Japan is spending on her Army and Navy together only two-thirds of what the United States is asked to spend on Navy alone.

It must not be supposed that Britain is alarmed by all this.

It is a fixed principle of her policy that she will under no circumstances enter into naval competition with the United States. She notices certain unmistakable indications of what objectives American statesmen have in view. She sees the gradual transference of the United States Navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the large expenditure on Pacific bases, the almost continuous negotiations with Japan, and the now admitted *rapprochement* between the United States and self-governing British Dominions, which cherish similar aims in the Far East. What Britain fears is not the huge American *Dreadnought*-cruisers, eight hundred feet long—an incomparable target, by the way, for torpedo and aerial bomb—but a much deadlier peril to an island power. From being the mistress of the seas, Britain is, for the time being, deposed, not by American expenditure, but by inevitable geography. She is surrounded by the potential submarine bases of Ireland, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Being the only country in the world that cannot feed herself except by imports overseas, she is the country, of all others, most vulnerable to deadly attack, even by the weakest of her neighbors. An American battleship a mile long, with a hundred 30-inch guns, would matter less to England than half a dozen submarines, built against her by Norway, at a hundredth the cost.

Navies, like all institutions, are conservative. Years after the battle between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* wooden ships, all of them obviously valueless, were built and launched. The *Dreadnought* is popular with contractors, it impresses the public, it is the pride of the crew, it looks well at maneuvers. To fight for one's country in a submarine requires heroic nerve and courage. It is, literally, a martyrdom to patriotism. But a nation like England that has been nearly starved out by a foreign foe can afford no mere sentiment to interfere with scientific conclusions. And Americans may assume that the British Admiralty is entirely unmoved by megalomaniac statistics of tonnage and engine-power. Even with deck armor, as shown to be necessary at the Battle of Jutland, the *Dreadnought* has to fear and will probably succumb to aerial bombs from a flight of seaplanes. This means for Britain something much more vital than the loss of *Dreadnoughts*. She is thinking of her food ships. What if aircraft can destroy them also?

THE MENACE OF NAVAL COMPETITION¹

Admiral A. T. Mahan wrote in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* in 1889: "The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of a military establishment. As the United States at present has no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet." Naval competition is the normal accompaniment of competition in merchant marine. As long as the United Kingdom is dependent on foreign commerce for its sustenance, as long as it is determined to carry this commerce largely in its own ships, as long as the British Empire has dependencies, ports, concessions, and fuel stations to defend on every trade route, and as long as there is any possibility of war, Great Britain will place naval supremacy first among her national policies, and will go to almost any length to maintain it. Likewise, now that the United States has determined to enlarge her foreign commerce and to compete with Britain in the carrying trade, there has been, as Admiral Mahan shrewdly put it, "enough shipping interest to compel the revival of the war fleet."

It was on February 3, 1916, that President Wilson said at St. Louis, "There is no other navy in the world that has to cover so great an area of defense as the American Navy, and it ought, in my judgment, to be incomparably the most adequate navy in the world." The most adequate navy to the largest area must necessarily be the largest navy. And "area of defense" is not a precise phrase. It might mean merely the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of continental United States. But that would not be so large as the coastal and sea area of the British Empire. It might include also Hawaii, and the Philippines, and the Panama Canal. But if we remember the fact that at the time of the speech, over a year before our entry

¹ From *Nation*. 112:681-2. May 11, 1921.

into the war, we were still contesting vigorously with Great Britain as to the rights of our commerce in respect of blockades and seizures, we may infer that in the back of Mr. Wilson's mind "area of defense" had something to do with merchant ships on the Seven Seas. At any rate, the distinction between offense and defense in naval affairs is a meaningless one. It is an established principle of naval strategy that the best defense is an attack, and consequently the largest navy adequate for defense would be capable of a general supremacy. Naval boards of strategy in considering their building programs take into account capabilities rather than existing intentions.

On August 29, 1916, in response to the words of the President, Congress passed a naval appropriation act authorizing, in the words of Secretary Daniels, "a continuous building program comprising one hundred fifty-six war vessels, with sixteen capital ships, the largest number ever provided for at any one time by any nation." During the war, in order to concentrate on the anti-submarine campaign, most of our naval building energies went into modern destroyers—of which we now have over three hundred—and the rest of the program was delayed. Many thought that this enormous program was adopted chiefly for its moral effect on Germany; but now the war is won, and in spite of the fact that Great Britain has authorized no new capital ships, our program is going ahead full speed. The delay enabled us to take into account the lessons of the Battle of Jutland in designing the capital ships. Before 1925, on the basis of the programs at present authorized, we shall have a navy markedly superior to that of Great Britain both in tonnage and in effective fighting strength.¹

We shall have twelve battleships of post-Jutland design to Britain's one. We shall have twenty-one battleships of the first line in all, to Britain's eighteen. We shall have six battle cruisers carrying fourteen-inch guns to Britain's four, ours of later design than hers. We shall have two hundred eighty-five destroyers capable of 34 to 36 knots, to England's one hundred ninety-three. We shall have one hundred sixty-three modern submarines, ninety-four of post-war type, to Britain's total of one hundred five modern subsea boats. Our navy will be

¹ The new British building program, recently announced, though it does not greatly enlarge the total tonnage of the British navy, will increase its effectiveness not a little.

inferior only in cruisers for commerce-destroying and other accessory ships. But the three-year program recommended by the General Board last September is chiefly designed to make up this deficiency. Our navy will also be about twice as strong as the Japanese, even if Japan's full projected program is completed. Secretary Denby, giving the Republican indorsement to the policy adopted by the Democrats, says, "I am in favor of a navy equal to the greatest in the world." And, not content with that, Admiral Huse, commandant of the Third Naval District and former member of the Allied Armistice Commission, declares at a dinner of the American Legion that he is in favor of "a navy equal in strength to that of any two navies in the world." Thus we cement the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by forcing Britain to look for help on the seas.

The Imperial Defense Committee, sitting in secret conclave on the naval policy of the British Empire, is likely to take these facts more seriously into consideration than Admiral Huse's declaration that a war between Great Britain and the United States is "inconceivable." If that be true then what is our need for a two-Power navy? The sober truth, obvious alike to the expert and to the newspaper reader, is that the United States Government appears to have chosen to wrest the supremacy of the seas from Great Britain, and perhaps from Great Britain and her chief ally combined. Yet British tradition of the past three centuries interposes a forcible veto on such an attempt by any nation. No people in all that time has made the attempt without being checked by war. John Lloyd Balderston writes from London to the New York World, "To put the matter bluntly, I believe that if the British feel compelled to make the sacrifices involved in a cut-throat naval competition with America, war between the two peoples in the not distant future will be not impossible."

Of course, there remains the chance that naval competition will be alleviated by mutual disarmament. It would be foolish and impossible, say all the authorities, for one nation to cease building before the others do. We should all come to some agreement limiting the size of our navies. In the meantime, naval opinion seems to favor the building of as large a navy as possible by the United States, in order to be in a favorable position when we come to dicker about the future size of the respective navies, and to enforce on our poorer friends a

sense of the folly of pouring so much treasure into dreadnoughts. It is their argument dealing with the enormous expense of the modern navy that is ordinarily cited in favor of armament limitation. Yet, while it would be highly beneficial to the public treasury and the pockets of the taxpayers to limit armaments in this fashion, the argument overlooks the crux of the whole matter in its relation to possible war. "You must bear in mind," said Admiral Huse, "that there is no such thing as a powerful navy, used as an absolute term; the power of the navy is purely a relative term. Suppose all the great nations should agree among themselves to cut down these building programs by one-half or three-quarters or nine-tenths, if you like; the relation of the forces would remain the same as before." So the general intention to reduce navies does not solve the problem of whose navy is to be the largest. We go to a conference on disarmament resolved that our navy shall be as large as Great Britain's, or as Great Britain's and Japan's combined; Great Britain goes to the conference resolved to retain her sea supremacy. Such a conference can lead to nothing, without reconsideration of fundamental national policy. Is Great Britain willing to renounce her control of the seas? Are we willing to allow Great Britain to retain it? Such questions, the imperialists stridently insist, must be answered before disarmament is possible, and they must be answered before long unless the situation is to grow worse rapidly.

A conference capable of solving such problems must go in to the whole region of international relationship. Is total disarmament feasible? Or can navies be internationalized through the establishment of some super-government capable of exercising its power impartially? There can be little doubt that the existing governments might answer an unqualified negative to both these questions. On what terms, then, should any nation be allowed to retain naval supremacy? This leads us back to consideration of freedom of the seas, merchant marine and commerce, and forward to considerations of finance, oil, communications and canals, and imperial policy. If the United States is prepared to yield naval supremacy to Great Britain in exchange for concessions in related fields which Great Britain is prepared to grant, there may be another way to avoid a naval competition. A move toward mutual limitation of armaments might possibly lead to a stable agreement on these

weighty questions, but when traditionally minded statesmen get to bargaining with threats against commercial advantages, we are in the outer eddies of the whirlpool. Yet how incredible it seems that two such kindred nations should be pouring out treasure to arm against one another because the conventional statesman's mind is so bound up in trade questions and in regard for precedent! What the situation calls for is frank, straightforward world disarmament. If that is not possible, then at least an agreement between Japan, the United States, and England. If that is also not possible, we agree with ex-Secretary Bryan that the United States must take the risk and go it alone; it must set the wise and Christian example of cutting armaments before they bring the great Anglo-Saxon countries to war.

THE NAVAL SKIN GAME¹

The Admiralty, it is said, are demanding that new capital ships shall be laid down. Other reports say that there is a party of opposition in the Cabinet. Evidently the matter is in suspense, and we desire to look at it frankly from the point of view of our national interests. The argument for fresh shipbuilding is obvious enough. The United States and Japan are both going in for considerable navies; the United States is planning to build twelve capital ships, and Japan sixteen. All these ships will be of the post-Jutland type—that is to say, ships incorporating the lessons learned at Jutland with regard to the need for speed, for larger guns, and for armour with greater resisting power. Every one knows that when naval power is reckoned up only the latest type is supposed to count for the purposes of battle, but against these programs Great Britain has not laid down a single post-Jutland ship, though the Hood, which is being modified in certain respects, may perhaps be described as a post-Jutland ship. It is declared, therefore, that within a very few years Great Britain will have sunk to the third position as a naval Power. The Admiralty case is, as we have said, obvious enough.

Opposition to the Admiralty program may take either of two forms or even both forms. It can be argued that as the

¹ From Spectator [London]. p. 765-6. December 11, 1920.

secrets of Jutland are not yet fully revealed, it is by no means certain that a Fleet of post-Jutland capital ships would be our best weapon of defence. Opposition may also come from those who, though they would not criticize the Admiralty program on its bare merits, hold strongly that we ought not to spend a great deal of money on new ships (at all events, until the necessity is absolutely proved), partly because we cannot afford it, and partly and chiefly because under the Treaty of Versailles we profess to be engaged at this very moment in building not ships but a theory of international relations in which the competition in armaments will play no part.

Now to revert to the first of these two lines of opposition. We should be rather surprised if the Admiralty, on what we have called the bare merits of their program, were not able to establish a good case. Dire though the submarine peril was through the greater part of 1917, and nearly as Germany came to clearing the seas of merchantmen and winning the war, an answer to the submarine was after all found. It was proved that destroyers equipped with hydrophones and with depth-charges were more than a match for the submarine. The Grand Fleet, surrounded by destroyers, could at last cruise with impunity in the North Sea. The destroyer, by reason of her light draught, need not greatly fear torpedoes; a torpedo to be effective has to travel at a depth of about fifteen feet, which is more than the draught of destroyers. Again, with the help of the latest hydrophones, the position of a submerged submarine can be placed with accuracy. When this has been done, the depth-charges dispose of her almost as a certainty. But it may be said that though an answer was finally found to the submarine, would capital ships be safe from the air? We might remark that a Fleet steaming in line ahead or in line abreast presents a very small target for aeroplanes which would have to manoeuvre at a great height. When both ships and aeroplanes are moving, the aiming of bombs is very difficult. Moreover, some kind of answer is invariably found to every new danger, and if it be conceded that the huge floating platform for gun-fire—in other words, the capital ship—is the best form of naval offence and defence, an answer to the danger from the air would no doubt be found. It is not, then, for such reasons as we have presented that we are heartily opposed to the Admiralty program of building capital ships.

This brings us to the second ground of opposition to the Admiralty program—a ground upon which we wish earnestly to take our stand. We believe that it would be utterly wrong from the point of view of good faith and of national interests to enter into a new competition in shipbuilding. This skin game would ruin us financially, it would postpone indefinitely the hope of controlling international relations by conciliation and, in the end, it would not even give us the physical safety which, of course, we all desire. It must be understood that since Germany was defeated the whole situation has changed. While the German menace existed, no one more ardently advocated adequate shipbuilding than we did. As our readers know, we never doubted the evil intentions of Germany, whether on land or on sea. On land she built her system of strategic railways along the Belgian frontier, and they could have had no conceivable purpose except to violate Belgian neutrality and facilitate the invasion of France. As for her naval policy, she was evidently not building ships for fun, or to establish an interesting naval museum, or to admire them as showy toys. She meant business, as was proved by the fact that, whenever we offered to reduce our naval program, Germany found an excuse for refusing to deal. In spite of all those grim and patent signs, some people in this country were foolish enough to believe that Prussianized Germany was more to be trusted than Liberal France. When those same people are deploring the fearful toll of slaughter, they really ought to remember that their own share of the blame is not the least considerable. But that is all past history, and the situation is now wholly changed. We have not a single naval enemy in the whole of Europe. If, therefore, we entered into the skin game once more, against whom should we be building? Let us be quite clear on this point. We should be building either against America or against Japan. We should not be building against both, for an alliance between them against Great Britain is inconceivable.

As regards America, we want to say most emphatically that, in our opinion, a competition with America would be absolutely disastrous. We hope that the nation will never consent to it. The Americans, like ourselves, are a determined and undaunted people; they are so obstinate that, if hard put to it, they would rather die in a ditch than fail to do what they had

set themselves to do. To encourage them to a competition would be of all foundations for a policy of British self-defence the most silly. The Americans can now spend more than we can on a hobby, and as the years went on they would be able to spend even more. Moreover, even if we could establish a slight margin of power over America in a desperate rivalry, it would not satisfy any British naval expert. "Two keels to one" used to be the motto for the competition in capital ships against Germany. Imagine such a motto inspiring a rivalry with America! The whole thing does not bear thinking of. It is quite true that the Americans are not at present such good shipbuilders as we are, nor have they a genius for the sea, but their defects might be turned into positive achievements if they were pushed. History shows many examples of nations deliberately recognizing their weaknesses and making them good. *We must not found our policy on the possibility of a war with America.* Let us rule that possibility out altogether, and save our energies and resources for cooperating with America in the new era of international relations which can alone save civilization.

We pass to the case of Japan. We may be reminded that Japan is still our Ally, and that we could call her to our aid if ever we were threatened by America. All we can say in answer to that is that if ever we joined with Japan in fighting against the English-speaking people of the New World, we should have sounded the knell of the British Empire. No doubt Japan, when she has her new capital ships, will be in a tremendously strong position in the Far East, but we must remember that Japan and America, so far as they are building against anyone in particular, are building against one another and not against us. There will always be that restraint upon the Japanese will in the Far East. If it came to a dispute between Japan and ourselves in the Far East—a dispute which concerned nobody else except, of course, China, and she would probably be passive—we should not wish to enter upon an adventure which, if carried on on a grand scale, would mean transferring most of our naval power to the East, and would require Eastern bases and docks on a scale corresponding to the hugeness of the effort. All that is very unpleasant to think about, and we mention it only because we want really to

face the situation. Fortunately, we can end with a much more agreeable note.

Have those Englishmen who advocate a great new Navy reflected upon the possible alternatives? Japan has been our Ally for several years, and has been a loyal Ally. If the reports of the League of Nations at Geneva do not mislead us, the Japanese representatives there were as deeply interested, as helpful and as sincere as those of any other nation. Japan, we are convinced, is on the side of civilization. Is there any reason for supposing that if we talked the matter over with the rulers of Japan, they would not be found to be as eager as we are to preserve the peace of the world, and to enter upon the new way of life? We have suggested the right roads to explore, the best roads to safety. No doubt there must always be risks in this troublesome world when we are dealing with men of other races and of temperaments different from our own. But the most risky, the most false, and the most ruinous policy we have yet heard of is that we should immediately enter again upon the game of naval competition.

A JAPANESE VIEW¹

As regards naval disarmament, it should be, and it would be, a feasible proposition if the powers concerned approach it in the right spirit and in good earnest. Japan's naval program was formulated with a view to assuring the defence of the island empire, to safeguarding the vital communications with its territories across the sea, and to protecting its oversea trade. This, however, my friends, may sound to you a mere platitude, for every naval power will insist that this is the principle governing its naval policy. Manifestly, more plain talking is therefore demanded. As the case stands, as already the preceding speaker has said, there are only two navies in the world that are likely to endanger, in case of conflict, Japan's safety and threaten her communications. It is then, clear that to provide against the possible dangers feared from the activities of these two navies Japan is spending a vast sum of money for naval

¹ By Dr. Toyokichi Iyenaga, Director of the East and West News Bureau. From Bulletin. League of Free Nations Association. 2:4. March, 1921.

armament. To spend almost half of her entire revenue for armament, including the military and the naval—more than ten times the expenditure allotted for the important item of education—this is in itself an absurd, if not tragic act. But the irony of it all is that this tragic act becomes comic when you consider that one of the naval powers is Japan's ally and the other her best friend. Japan might, in her turn, very well inquire of her friends, "What is your purpose in maintaining such vast armaments as you are maintaining—more especially of your expanding them, as America is doing, on a gigantic scale?" Well, America will answer, "Japan, we are not going to expand our navy in order to intimidate you, but simply to have a navy 'at least equal to that of any other power'." It is not within my province to say what should be the extent or proportion of the British and American navies. . . . The question of armament is nothing but that of proportion—of ratio. Two million tons to one million tons holds the same ratio as two to one. Why not then convert the useless wasteful millions, which are devoted for the construction of engines of destruction, to the building of ships that carry messages of good-will and commerce between nations, or to the building of schools and hospitals?

To conclude, my friends, it is then clear, first, that the initiative of curtailing naval armament must come from the chief offender, . . . ; second, that the ratio to be maintained among the three great naval powers, however delicate and difficult may be the task, must be agreed upon. Otherwise, I agree in thinking that these nations are clearly heading toward bankruptcy, if not still worse consequences.

AMERICA AND JAPAN¹

The perennial question of American-Japanese relations has many aspects of which western land legislation is but one. Perhaps the most serious question at present is that of the naval control of the Pacific. Unless a definite agreement as to naval limitation is reached, either by special arrangement with Britain and Japan as suggested by Senator Borah or as part of a world-wide disarmament program thru the League of Nations or otherwise, there will be one of those strange armament

¹ From *Independent*. 105:114. January 29, 1921.

rivalries in which each nation believes that it is merely following the lead of the other. In the United States it is the Japanese naval building program which causes apprehension, and the American program is looked on as a counterbalance to it. But to the Japanese it looks as tho we were forcing the pace. Baron Hayashi in a recent interview put the matter from the Japanese standpoint very vividly. He said that "Mr. Secretary Daniels, who conceived the idea of a fleet nearly three times as strong as that we are now building," was "like most Americans" a lover of peace, "but precisely on account of his ardent pacifism and of his belief in the moral infallibility of his nation he has set out to construct a fleet so strong as would reduce all others to a mere cipher, and incidentally enable America to dictate her conception of right to others." He said that America is more righteous than other nations, but "the most righteous sometimes lapse thru pride or aberration" and Japan could not "consent to be at the total mercy of any other navy." But if the United States would stop building so would Japan, as the Japanese had no military ambitions and no intention of challenging American naval superiority.

Thus it would appear that the threatened naval race in the Pacific—really no race at all, since we have no desire to challenge and could only compete under the severest handicap—might yet be avoided by an arrangement compatible with the material safety and national dignity of both of us and of yourselves. Unofficial proposals to this effect already put forward in the United States are sure to meet on the part of Japan with a ready and cordial response.

A statement from Washington summarizes the relative strength of the chief naval powers in an Associated Press dispatch. The British navy has twenty-six battleships of the largest class (twenty thousand tons and upward and carrying at least ten twelve-inch guns); the United States sixteen, Japan six, France seven, Italy four. Great Britain has no new ships of this class now building; but the United States has eleven under construction, Japan seven, France four and Italy four. The British have ten battle cruisers, and Japan four, with eight more projected. The United States, France and Italy have no ships of this class completed, but the United States is now building six. In cruisers and destroyers also the British hold a lead. For submarines and submersibles of all types the British have

one hundred sixty-five vessels and the United States ninety-six; France sixty-three, Japan forty, and Italy twenty-two.

An incident in connection with the Japanese occupation of the Siberian city of Vladivostok has led to explanations and apologies on the part of the Japanese. On January 8 Lieutenant Langdon of an American cruiser was shot by a Japanese sentry for failing to halt when challenged. Japanese officials in high position promptly expressed their regret for the occurrence. Admiral Gleaves of the American Asiatic fleet has appointed a court of inquiry.

The Japanese excuse their continued occupation of parts of eastern Siberia on the ground that Bolshevism is widely spread. General Oi, Japanese commander, has warned the Siberian towns that "the Japanese troops will not recognize communism in the districts in which Japanese troops are stationed." The Bolsheviki are endeavoring to gain complete political control over that part of eastern Siberia which has been for several months virtually independent of the rest of Russia and which the Japanese hoped to erect into a permanent barrier state against the eastward march of Bolshevism.

DISARMAMENT IMPETUS IN JAPAN¹

The cry for disarmament is beginning to penetrate "even Japan," it is noted by those who are imprest with the continuous reference to the subject in various Japanese newspapers of importance. Even some politicians have taken it up, altho at the loss of a certain amount of their popularity, we are told. The Japan Magazine (Tokyo) is sufficiently moved by the views of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma, as set down in the Japanese Taikwan, to condense them for the benefit of readers of English, and it emphasizes the fact that this distinguished elder statesman is "not prepared to favor unconditional disarmament so heartily as other advocates seem to do, but bases his hope that Japan will adopt this policy upon the supposition that England and America will lead the way, as the two nations most vitally concerned." Before the war there were eight Great Powers, the Marquis Okuma reminds us, and three of them were naval Powers—England, Germany, and America. Germany, Austria,

¹ From *Literary Digest*. p. 18. May 7, 1921.

and Russia are now in "a desperate or at least struggling position," and the two great naval nations are England and America. If the world sincerely desires peace let the strongest nations make the first move, the Marquis suggests, for if the weaker nations were to initiate such a movement it would be "tantamount to unconditional surrender," and he continues:

"To be sure the weaker nation can use its armaments only as a threat, but being so weak it can not disregard armaments altogether. The nation which has greater defenses can not demand that the weaker nation disarm first. If the strong have no aggressive designs, they do not need so powerful a fleet for defense merely. That Japan and Italy have no aggressive designs is proved by the weakness of their respective fleets. To be sure, Japan's 8-8 program may sound big, but compared with England and America, it is not even one-half as large. Hence, Japan has only the minimum, and can not begin to reduce. By all means let England and America begin. That will be the one short method of securing world-peace, and Japan will delightfully welcome such an arrangement.

"No one can deny the fact that the world is spending immense sums on armaments and is feeling severe financial embarrassment on account of this enormous expenditure. At a time when the nations are suffering serious financial depression after a war extending through nearly five consecutive years, and when provision for the national defense can hardly be made even with the utmost effort, how does Japan feel about this matter? We are, indeed, not strong either financially or economically, yet we can not neglect our national defenses even for a day, since we are as dependent upon these for existence as a bird upon beak and spurs or an animal upon teeth and claws. . .

"If the Great Powers could mutually agree to reduce their armies and navies it would, indeed, be a blessed thing for Japan as well as for this war-weary world. Merely from the financial relief alone, Japan would sing for joy. And, in closing, I would repeat once more that, as the usual order of procedure is for aggression to come from the stronger upon the weaker, we are looking for America and England to set our hearts at ease by taking the initiative in disarmament and giving a good example to the world in this regard. As the first gleam of light I look to see England and America negotiate this question successfully, after which I trust France, Japan, and Italy will follow suit."

OUR ARMAMENT RACE WITH JAPAN¹

The governments of the United States and Japan are both suffering from an acute attack of navalitis. Both sufferers greatly need a mild injection of common-sense. During the past fiscal year we added to our navy one battleship, ninety-six destroyers, eighteen submarines, and one hundred nine other vessels; and we had under construction on October 1, eleven battleships, six cruisers, and one hundred twenty-three other ships, practically all fighting craft. Meanwhile, Secretary Daniels and a train of admirals go before Congress and talk profoundly about "rounding out the navy," whatever that may mean, winding up with the genial recommendation that as soon as the capital ships now under way are launched we enter upon a new three-year program of eighty-eight additional vessels, including three battleships and a battle cruiser.

What is the excuse offered for this amiable lunacy? Getting down from vague talk about "the present state of the world," "protecting our commerce," having "incomparably the most adequate navy in the world," and other meaningless phrases, we come to the brute fact that, unless we are crazy, we are building against a potential enemy. At the moment, despite anti-British propaganda, it can scarcely be Great Britain; for the one-time mistress of the seas has suspended all construction of capital ships until the Admiralty can determine whether the dreadnought is of any further use, until the Treasury can find money to build ships, and until the Foreign Office can discover whether the Government of the United States is going utterly daft. Lord Rothermere points out that no nation will henceforth enjoy naval supremacy and that Great Britain cannot afford to spend any money on naval construction at present. It is not Great Britain against whom we are building, but Japan.

In that distant island empire our own folly is being matched. The Japanese people are already taxed almost beyond endurance. Yet the naval program finally authorized (after years of discussion) in 1919 requires them to provide the money to build during the next eight years eight battleships and eight cruisers, along with seventy-five destroyers, submarines, and other fighting

¹ By Henry Raymond Mussey. From *Nation*. 112:79. February 2, 1921.

craft. Work already appropriated for is to cost 584,000,000 yen (about \$292,000,000), and when this first part of the program is completed in 1923 it is expected at once to go forward with the remainder of the plan, though the funds are not yet appropriated. Japanese financial resources are strained to the breaking-point, yet the mad race goes merrily forward. According to the Japan Year Book, there is reason to believe that the authorities have in mind a still more ambitious project. No intelligent man will doubt it; naval authorities always have more ambitious projects in mind. Fortunately they are not always realized.

And why must Japan build? Against us, of course. Can-
did Americans must admit, certainly, that the Japanese Government has more shadow of justification for its fear of us than our Government for its fear of the Japanese. Recalling Hawaii, Guam, Yap, Samoa, and the Philippines (now with their two naval stations), not to speak of Mr. Washington Vanderlip's concession in Kamchatka, and remembering the loudly avowed plans of our Navy Department for expansion in the Pacific, it is not wholly strange that public opinion is "jumpy" concerning the future designs of our diplomats and financiers. Yet no one in this country, outside a few blatherskite editors and politicians, really wants to attack the Japanese, despite the tons of print paper annually misused in misinforming us about that interesting people. The sins of the Japanese Government in Korea and Manchuria and China are of a piece with the excesses of imperialism everywhere and always, but they do not threaten us with attack or even with serious injury. Moreover, there is no possibility that we can ever make the Japanese Government repent of those sins by building warships, or even by using them. The wild naval scramble of today on both sides of the Pacific is simply dominated by the psychology of fear, not of reason.

Its consequences, however, will be none the less inevitable and appalling on that account. We have sunk \$735,000,000 in new naval construction since 1916, to say nothing of special building during the war, while our naval appropriations for the same years have totaled \$5,325,000,000. Expecting 1922 to be a year of peace, Secretary Daniels thinks he can worry along on \$696,000,000—a sum equal to our entire naval appropriations from 1900 to 1907, and considerably more than we

spent in building warships from 1900 until we entered the war. Possibly we can stand such a pace, but we shall certainly drive our rivals into bankruptcy and bolshevism, unless war intervenes as the culmination of the mad delirium.

And, meanwhile, what of the trade whose maintenance is alleged on both sides as a necessary reason for the wild armament race? Curiously enough, more than a third of all our Asiatic imports come from Japan, and she takes materially more than half of our exports to the greatest of continents. Our Japanese imports rose from \$66,000,000 in 1910 to \$527,000,000 in 1920, and exports from \$22,000,000 to \$453,000,000 (more than twenty-fold). Just how we are to cultivate our best Asiatic customer by building battleships and ultimately making war on her is hard to see. But we are told that Japan is stealing our Chinese trade. Therefore, by some mysterious logic, we must outstrip her yet further in warship construction. Yet while Japan was stealing our Chinese trade, our Chinese imports stubbornly rose from \$30,000,000 in 1910 to \$227,000,000 in 1920, and our exports from \$16,000,000 to \$119,000,000. It is all very odd. Somehow even the total figures of our Asiatic trade, though running well over two billions in 1920, make the two-thirds of a billion asked next year by the Navy look like expensive insurance, especially as it is apparent that a war would automatically cut off nearly half that trade.

The common-sense of the situation is plain enough. So long as both Governments go on building battleships, we may have polite speeches and international deputations *ad nauseam*, but the underlying process of developing suspicion and fear will go right on—and the more fear the more navy. Neither people, it is plain enough, has any reasonable ground for building a navy against the other, except a desire to put battleships behind its foreign investors and traders. If either people wants to do that, knowing the cost and consequences, such is its privilege. But neither people need let itself be fooled with specious pleas of national defense, protection of commerce, and like bosh that covers the real meaning of the policy. If the peoples really want national safety and commerce and peace they have got to pierce through the veil of solemn humbug that enshrouds this suicidal navy building and tell their governors, in words that cannot be mistaken, to disarm. Until that day comes, it is vain to talk of peace. Has not the day arrived?

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE BOGY¹

The World prints elsewhere on this page the full text of the Anglo-Japanese treaty as cabled to the New York Evening Post by its Paris correspondent, who obtained it from Viscount Ishii.

The Anglo-Japanese treaty is the favorite boggy of most of the American opponents of the limitation of armament, in Congress and out of Congress. It is commonly described by statesmen of the Senator Reed type as an offensive and defensive alliance directed primarily against the United States, the conclusion being that the United States must continue to arm against this unholy coalition.

If the Anglo-Japanese treaty were an offensive and defensive alliance which might be made inimical to the United States, this might be a legitimate argument against reduction in sea-power while the menacing agreement continued in force, but anybody who takes the trouble to read the treaty for himself will readily see that it admits of no such far-fetched interpretation. But if there be timid souls who decline to be reassured, Article IV, of the treaty provides that neither party has any obligation to go to war with a country with which it has an arbitration treaty. By so simple a process as an arbitration treaty with Great Britain the United States can obtain all the protection from this alliance that the most timid Senator could desire.

The Anglo-Japanese agreement applies only to the Far East, and there is not the remotest possibility that the United States will be drawn into war with either Japan or Great Britain over any question in the Far East, where British and American interests at least are virtually identical. As an argument against the limitation of armament the treaty is devoid of force and can be disregarded so far as the United States is concerned in any discussion of the practical reduction of naval power.

Secretary Daniels has submitted a statement to the House Naval Affairs Committee which shows that on the basis of the existing building programs the United States would achieve supremacy in sea-power by the end of 1925. Assuming the correctness of Mr. Daniels's estimates, what should we do with this supremacy when we had it? What benefit would it bring

¹ From New York World. January 14, 1921.

us? What good could it do us? We should have paid approximately \$3,000,000,000 for it, every dollar of which would be taken out of American labor and American industry, and it would have brought us nowhere. What earthly reason is there for imposing such a burden on American production?

Even after this enormous expenditure our nominal supremacy in sea-power would not be an actual supremacy. The American Navy would still be weaker than the combined British and Japanese Navies and far weaker than that of half a dozen possible coalitions that could be organized against us. All the billions wasted in this competition of sea-power would have conferred no gains in relation to any practical question of national defense or national interest. We should be no safer on the seas and we should be the weaker at home because of the diversion of vast sums of money from productive industry to military folly.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty

The complete text of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty follows:

"The Government of Japan and the Government of Great Britain having in view important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement on the 12th of August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to the general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as said agreement, namely:

"(a) Consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

"(b) Preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities in commerce and industry of all nations with China.

"(c) Maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India and the defense of their special interests in said regions.

"Article I—It is agreed that whenever in the opinion either of Japan or Great Britain any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully

and frankly and consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests.

"Article II—If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising on the part of any powers, either high contracting party should be involved in war for the defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, either high contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally and will conduct the war in common and make mutual peace in agreement with it.

"Article III—The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter separate arrangements with another power to prejudice the objects described in the preamble.

"Article IV—Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

"Article V—The conditions under which armed assistance would be afforded by either power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement, and the means by which such assistance would be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the high contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

"Article VI—The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of signature and remain in force ten years from that date; in case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of said ten years its intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if or when the date fixed for expiration arrives and either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall ipso facto continue until peace is concluded.

"In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the agreement and affixed thereto their seals, done in duplicate, at London, the 13th day of July, 1911."

A FRENCH VIEW¹

I should first like to make clear that in what I am going to say I in no way officially represent France, either her people or her government. But the views which I shall present are my own deductions of the discussion on this interesting topic which is going on in France. To us it seems, from the words of an old Spanish proverb, that one cannot walk in the procession and at the same time ring the bells in the church. You either are for disarmament or you are against it. If you are for it, you act that way. If you are against it, you act the other way. In view of that fact and in view of our analysis of the whole subject in that way, I am going to tell you how we have acted, in what way public opinion, because after all no matter how bad governments are they eventually follow the trend of public opinion—how this public opinion has forced or has directed the action of the French government along such and such lines.

As this is our constructive contribution to the question, I shall deal with it at some length. We recognize at the outset that it is very difficult for any one country to show the way to the rest of the world by drastically reducing its army and navy. We therefore propose that there be drawn up an international program of disarmament; that this program be based upon (a) each country's carefully undertaking the elimination of all its military and naval elements in those spheres in which it believes itself to be immune from attack (a practical example of the possibility of doing this is the agreement between the United States and Canada not to fortify their respective borders and not to maintain powerful naval units on the Great Lakes); (b) the gradual limitation of armaments in those spheres in which danger of attack is believed to lie, in proportion to the disappearance of this danger.

The second portion of this program is evidently much more difficult to realize than the first, because a people once attacked from a certain direction or convinced of the fact that it will again be attacked by its former enemy at an opportune

¹ By J. A. M. de Sanchez. From Bulletin. League of Free Nations Association. 4:8-9. March, 1921.

moment, is difficult to wean from its conviction. The necessary preliminary to the realization of this proposal therefore appears to us to be a joint international guarantee, after certain possible adjustments, of the present territorial *status quo*. We do not conceive the maintenance of the present *status quo* to be incompatible with a joint disarmament agreement if it is accepted in good faith by all nations, nor do we believe impossible the organization and maintenance of such an agreement. We do believe that it is essential to the enforcement of such an agreement that it be endorsed not only by the governments but by the peoples of all the countries party to it. The sanction of the various peoples of the world to such a plan depends upon the leadership of their public men and upon a truthful and unprejudiced discussion of the whole subject. We have sufficient faith in the common sense of men to believe that such leadership and such discussion will make it possible to obtain this sanction.

As far as we ourselves are concerned, we have already obtained it. We are convinced that we are in no danger of attack by sea. We have, therefore, not only discontinued building capital ships, but have further reduced the building of all other naval units to such an extent that only a portion of one of our navy yards is devoted to new work. The few destroyers which we are constructing are destined to replace obsolete vessels at present in use in our colonial service. The ways on which battleships were built have been given over to the builders of tramp steamers and passenger lines. Much of the money which would have formerly been spent upon our navy is now being diverted to the development of our colonies and to the reconstruction of our devastated regions. In 1920, we spent less than \$26,000,000 on new naval construction.

During the past year, we have not only greatly reduced our naval establishment, but we also made provision for the reduction of our army from seven hundred thirty thousand men to four hundred ninety thousand men, of whom two hundred twenty thousand will be French and the balance colonial troops, a force which is not excessive when our colonial engagements are considered. This reduction means a saving to us of about three billion francs a year and we are prepared to reduce our army further as the situation in Europe becomes more settled.

I think, in view of these facts, that you will find France favorable to any scheme for the limiting of armaments which is international in its scope and practical in its possible application. We have given proof that we are imbued with more than good intentions; we are ready and willing to join hands with the rest of the world in any feasible attempt to eliminate the greatest waste known to man: War.

THE UNITED STATES WILLING TO DISARM¹

There are three big navies in the world, the American, the British, and the Japanese. The cost of maintaining them is an extremely onerous burden in every case. There is no reason for any one of the three navies being as large as they are except that the navies of the other two are as large as they are. Mr. Harding has said that the United States is willing to meet the other nations half way in any reduction of armaments. There is evidence that the British are of the same mind, and it is presumed that Japan would likewise be willing. The situation resolves itself into which one of the three will invite the cooperation of the others. Mr. Harding has intimated also that he might call a conference to discuss the limitation of armament. It would be most fitting that the United States, the most powerful and least threatened, should take this step.

A naval rivalry between the United States and Great Britain can hardly be founded on any reasoned set of facts. No conceivable British navy could prevent the United States from attacking Canada or could blockade the long coast of the United States sufficiently to keep American cruisers from interrupting the flow of commerce to England in the Atlantic. On the other hand no conceivable American Navy could control the narrow waters around Great Britain and prevent her getting food from the Continent. Such being the case both sides might as well reduce their costs and continue in the assumption of the last hundred years that there would be no quarrel, an assumption to which Great Britain testified by maintaining an undefended Canadian border and to which the United States testified by building her fleet without reference to Great Britain.

¹ From *World's Work*. 42:121. June, 1921.

If, as happened, we had other reasons for enlarging our Navy from the old standard there is no reason why Great Britain should distrust us any more than we distrusted her. The simplest method for both is to fix some parity which will not overtax either treasury and maintain that.

If that were done it would be reasonable to expect the Japanese to limit their building to maintaining the relation they now hold to the other two navies. If they should refuse they would be in the unenviable position which Germany put herself in when she refused the naval holiday suggested by Great Britain. She would, moreover, inevitably arouse the people of Australia, Canada, and the United States, if not the British as well, to a grave suspicion of her intentions. As the Japanese have no hostile design, such an alienation of the English-speaking people merely to satisfy the expensive vanity of a competition with them in naval armament would seem an impossibility on the part of a shrewd nation like Japan.

There have been many speeches of late in Congress concerning a reduction in naval armament, most of them reasonable in spirit and calculated to aid the cause they advocate. There are some, however, notably one of Representative W. Bourke Cockran which will tend in the other direction. Mr. Cockran and his followers plan to have the United States notify the world that it must disarm on penalty of having the United States "outarm" any other nation, and in the further penalty of having us demand full payment for all money owed us immediately from any country that will not surrender its sovereignty to us in this matter. If Mr. Cockran thinks we lent the Allies money during the war like a crooked money lender in order to foreclose our advantage immediately afterward, he is very wrong. Nor does the United States wish to announce as a national policy that we are prepared to whip the world singly or all combined. Mr. Cockran's proposal comes down to having the United States take the place of international bully that Germany recently relinquished.

If we put fair and friendly proposals to Great Britain and Japan we shall get results. There is no other way to attack the problem consistent either with our own character or with any prospect of success.

AMERICA AS AN OBSTACLE TO DIS-
ARMAMENT¹

"If a dependable international agreement comes into being whereby all naval powers should agree to restrict their naval forces," says Vice Admiral Kato, Japanese Minister of Marine, "I would be glad to join to a reasonable extent if a suitable formula could be found." In joining the League of Nations, adds the Vice Admiral, the Japanese Government "supported the principle of the reduction of armaments." But Japan, with a navy much smaller than that of Great Britain or the United States, does not feel like leading the way in revising her building program.

Great Britain does not care to lead the way either, but the spokesmen for her Government have made it inescapably plain to the United States that they will enter into an agreement if we will. Both Japan and Great Britain are financially handicapped in the armament race and would gladly call a halt. Only the United States, rich in gold, bold, young, successful and unscarred, remains unconvinced. And if the United States keeps on with its building plans, Japan and Great Britain must follow as well as they can. Though Americans have not as yet realized it, their Government now constitutes a greater danger to the peace of the world and—in political eyes—a graver menace to its neighbors than any other on earth.

Bearing in mind that the arming of Great Britain, Japan and the United States is in preparation for a war among themselves, and that further war within our generation could mean for all the powers concerned nothing but moral and financial ruin, any reluctance to limit the size of navies shows an incredible stupidity. Yet, incredible or not, it exists in official circles in sufficient proportion to render this Nation the last stumbling-block in the way of an international pact for disarmament. Is a steady persistence in this attitude to give us in time the place one occupied in Western civilization by that William II. who is remembered as the last of the Hohenzollerns?

¹ From New York World. March 29, 1921.

A PRECEDENT FOR DISARMAMENT¹

It was a happy thought in this season of peace and good will for the New York World to dispatch a message to leading men throughout the world, asking for their sentiments and opinions on the subject of disarmament. The replies reveal a practically unanimous and evidently very sincere desire on the part of civilization to get rid of the enormous financial war burdens which we are still carrying, in spite of the fact that a great World War for the vindication of justice and humanity was recently brought to a victorious conclusion.

It was at first sight illogical, but on second thought perfectly consistent that this questionnaire should have been sent out from the United States. It was illogical because our Navy Department is the one power which has an enormous program of warship construction in hand; it was fitting because, outside of the Secretary of the Navy and a small minority of naval officers, the Navy as a whole and the citizens of the United States as a whole believe that we should cut down rather than increase our naval appropriations, and that as a people we should take the lead in disarmament and the substitution of reasonableness and justice for the arbitrament of the sword.

It is in the nature of things that this appeal should find a more ready response among civilians than in naval and military circles; but we would remind the latter that the history of the two leading powers in the world today affords a notable case, in which an agreement for the discontinuance of armed protection was drawn up and put in force at the close of a bitter war in which they had been engaged. We refer to the war of 1812 and the agreement of the United States and Great Britain to set no fleets of fighting ships afloat upon the Great Lakes, and to limit their construction in these waters to one or two small gunboats designed purely for police and patrol duties. This momentous and extremely significant agreement was drawn up and signed over a century ago and has been most faithfully

¹ From *Scientific American*. 124:22. January 8, 1921.

followed. Moreover, along the whole stretch of mutual frontier, reaching for over three thousand miles, there has not been erected during the intervening century a single fortification.

Nobody, of course, demands that any such sweeping elimination of warships should be made upon the high seas. The policing of the seas and the keeping open of the trade routes call for the maintenance of fleets, whose relative strength should be drawn up after a careful and friendly consideration of the relative responsibilities and liabilities of the two nations—a delicate and difficult problem, but one that is entirely possible of solution if the representatives of the two powers gather together in a spirit of mutual confidence and fair play. In the one case we have an inland empire, self-contained and so strong in population, wealth and natural resources that it is unconquerable by any conceivable hostile combination. In the other case we have an island empire that is scattered over every quarter of the globe, and whose very existence depends upon the freedom of the seas and the maintenance of the highways of commerce, so that her ships and those of the nations of the world may come and go as they please.

If such a happy solution of the problem was so quickly found at the close of a bitter war between the two countries, it should certainly be possible to find an equally happy solution at the close of the late war for civilization, in which the two countries fought side by side as loyal and mutually appreciative allies. It is the belief of all thoughtful Americans that our beloved country stands just now at the parting of the ways. The fortunes of war have left us in a commanding position, and with an influence in international affairs which not even the most sanguine among us believed would be ours for many a decade to come. Upon the use which we make of this heritage depends to an immeasurable extent the future peace and happiness of the great world of which we form a part. If our statesmen are guided by the spirit of Washington and the spirit shown by his worthy successors in the ever-memorable agreement as to armaments on the Great Lakes, they will have the opportunity, during the next few years, to write some of the most glorious and honorable chapters in the history of this country.

MILITARY NATIONS WAIT FOR PRESIDENT HARDING TO OPEN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS¹

In the opinion of the average American citizen the United States is the sole country in the world opposed to armaments.

According to the opinion expressed daily in the foreign press, it is the policy of military preparedness pursued by the Washington government that is chiefly responsible for the failure of nations to disarm. All agree that the call for disarmament must come from President Harding. Up to the present, President Harding has kept a diplomatic silence on this subject.

The situation is indeed peculiar. That the American people, the press and even an overwhelming majority in Congress are in favor of disarmament is quite evident. Millions of members of women's, labor and church organizations are taking an active part in such movements. Senator Borah's recent amendment for disarmament was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 74 to 0, and now the house adopts it by a vote of 330 to 4. But despite this amendment the naval bill authorizing the appropriation of about \$500,000,000 was passed by congress. Despite the vote of congress for the reduction in the size of the army, a sum almost equal to that of the naval budget was allowed for the maintenance of the reduced army.

Militarists Preach Pacifism

One of the standard features in all our parliamentary discussion on army and navy appropriations are the pacifist speeches of the supporters of these measures. The advocates of increased militarism and navalism are loud in their professions of love for peace and of the sincere hope that armies and navies will disappear eventually. "But until that day comes, until the time arrives when we shall convert our swords into pruning forks we must manufacture more swords," some of these uniformed pacifists suddenly announce with tears in their eyes. Immediately the bill is passed and the appropriation is made.

After the closing of the World War when jingo patriotism ran high in the United States as in the rest of the world, our

¹ By Philip A. Adler, the Star's foreign editor. From *Minnesota Daily Star*. July 1, 1921.

pacifist president and war secretary, Wilson and Baker, realized that the moment was opportune for militarism and covered the United States with a net of recruiting offices, offering physical, mental and normal perfection, if not a complete beatitude, to every volunteer. By the time the danger of the Wilson-Baker measure was realized by congress and a limit to the army was set at one hundred eighty thousand, Baker had already recruited two hundred thirty thousand men. Our republican congress has further cut down this army of unproductive labor to one hundred fifty thousand.

It is understood that Secretary Weeks of the war department feels moral compunctions on this matter and regards the reduction of the army as a break of contracts with the enlisted men.

Leads to Armament Race

It thus turns out that men who occupy high military and naval offices as well as those who look forward to a prospective American empire, which in their opinion cannot come without our defeating Mexico, Japan and possibly England, manage to maintain their hold on the growing army and navy and, contrary to the expressed desires of the American people, upset the anti-militarist policy of our liberal statesmen. Japan and England, on the other hand, are well aware of the political situation in this country. They reply with sweet rhetoric to all pacifist orations of our army and navy departments and continue to build warships and drill soldiers so as to keep up with the military preparations of the United States. The grand total is a wild armament race, by far greater than that conducted by the military powers of the world prior to 1914 and which made the world war possible.

Admitting for a moment that our military and naval authorities are sincere in their desire to do away eventually with armaments and urge the passage of the appropriation bills by congress as a purely defensive measure, the entire international armaments problem reduces itself to the question which country should be first in opening the way to universal disarmament. The attitude of Britain was made clear by Premier Lloyd George in his address to the imperial conference of premiers.

"The life of the empire—the whole basis of its existence—is built upon sea power," he said. "We have therefore to look to measures which our security requires." As for disarmament

Lloyd George announced that Britain was willing to discuss with American statesmen "any proposal for limitation of armaments."

Japan's Point of View

As for the attitude of Japan, Rokusaburo Nakanishi, chairman of the Japanese parliamentary delegation announced in the course of his recent visit to Washington:

"While the primary object of adequate provisions for war may be to keep the balance of powers among nations, due to international misunderstanding and suspicion each is bound to aspire to hold the favorable end of the scale; hence, the oft repeated and regrettable race for armament which has led the world to many a war. Should the United States take the lead as the march of events would seem to indicate, it would receive an enthusiastic welcome at the hands of the Japanese people."

Thus runs the situation in a toxic circle. From the standpoint of the impartial spectator it must seem certain that England and Japan—two island countries—are less than the United States in position to attempt to initiate disarmament.

As Britain Sees It

The situation that confronts the Washington administration has been well summed up in a recent editorial in the Manchester Guardian:

"The situation in Washington is sufficiently difficult," says the Manchester Guardian. "Mr. Weeks, the secretary for war, has just made a speech in favor of a powerful army and universal military training. His colleague, Mr. Denby of the navy department, is for the largest navy. The senate majority, while voting to limit the army to one hundred fifty thousand men, asks for an increase in the navy bill to a figure approaching one hundred twenty million sterling. At the same time the massing of popular sentiment against this prospective burden is unmistakable, and it can hardly be doubted that, with Mr. Hughes at the state department pressing steadily toward international cooperation, an announcement of Mr. Harding's decision will not be long delayed."

This decision, the Manchester Guardian points out, is to open negotiations for disarmament in accordance with the popular wish of the American people and despite the sentiments

of the army and navy departments and even not fully in accordance with President Harding's individual inclinations.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF DISARMAMENT¹

With sombre eloquence, Maximilian Harden of Germany has warned us that "he who prepares for the next war is preparing the sheet of paper on which a new St. John will write the Apocalypse of our civilization." On the same solemn theme, involving issues of life and death for the human race, Viscount Grey observes, "I prefer the chance of utopia to the certainty of destruction," while William G. McAdoo, with terse vigor cries, "disarm or bust." All of us realize, then, that armaments ought to be limited. In the churches of the United States, Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, a day has just been devoted to the matter, and resolutions in favor of disarmament, more or less complete, have been passed by bankers, Chambers of Commerce and organizations of women whose votes now count. While from Japan and Britain similar movements are reported. The time has come, therefore, for assuming the generalities and descending to particulars. We want disarmament; then what do we mean by it?

The first attempt to limit armament by international negotiation was made by the British Government of Gladstone in 1870, when trouble with France and Germany was developing. In Paris, the British Ambassador was Lord Lyons, who approached the subject frankly as a skeptic, but he induced the Emperor Napoleon III to support Britain in an application to Prussia, through Queen Victoria and others, as intermediaries, which overtures, however, were brusquely rejected by Bismarck, as Lord Lyons had foreseen. The idea lapsed and a few months later the Franco-German War broke out.

In 1898, a second attempt to disarm the world was made by the late Czar Nicholas II of Russia, as a result of whose famous rescript, The Hague Court was established and peace conferences there held. The court, sitting judicially, has given about a dozen decisions, and it has been shown that where

¹ By P. W. Wilson. From the New York Times Book Review and Magazine. p. 8-9. July 10, 1921.

States sincerely want peace, they can settle differences by such international litigation. The claims of creditor nations on Venezuela were so determined. The Canadian Fisheries dispute was adjusted, as was the maritime boundary between Norway and Sweden. The far more dangerous collision between France and Germany at Casablanca was abated by reference to The Hague, and if the parties had been willing, so also could have been the responsibility for the murders at Serajevo which plunged the whole of Europe into war. As the decision on the Aland Islands shows, the League of Nations is continuing the task of arbitration, and a new method, now accepted, is the plebiscite on sovereignty, as applied to Silesia and Schleswig-Holstein. The case of Silesia, as of Panama and Costa Rica, shows that behind arbitration and the plebiscite there may have to be a superior authority if tranquillity is to be maintained. But in applying the judicial function to international differences, there has been made a real beginning. At the same time, the Gladstone and Hague precedents show that nothing is so perilous to ultimate preservation as endeavors to secure disarmament which do not succeed.

In one important respect The Hague has failed. Rules were there adopted against the use in war of toxic gases, of bombs against unfortified cities, against frightfulness on the high seas and on land. We take it as established by experience that, in the future, there can be no legal mitigation of war, when once war has broken out. Any weapon, even disease germs, will be employed, if advantage can be gained without a recoil on one's own forces. The United States is said to have a poison of which three drops on the skin will kill, and other nations are not less busy over chemicals. In the old days, war was a tournament or prize-fight between selected combatants, and there were civilians outside the arena. In the next war, there will be no civilians. Men, women and children of all ages will fight or be fought. There will be no sanctuary. Churches and homes alike will be hammered to dust.

The Hague, failing thus to mitigate the practices of war, also failed to limit armaments or preparation for war. The reason of this was that Germany peremptorily vetoed any such discussion. To put the subject on the agenda was regarded by her as "an unfriendly act." In London the main result of

the war is held to be that neither Germany nor any other nation is able thus to prevent this discussion by a mere non possumus. The Treaty of Versailles contains these words:

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses as follows: etc.

Mr. Lloyd George has given figures which show that on land and on sea the German war machine has been smashed.

Under the League of Nations there is already sitting a commission to examine disarmament. On this commission the United States has no representative, but the commission reports to the Council of the League, which is not far from the Supreme Council, where the United States holds, at any rate, a watching brief. A second line of advance is suggested by Senator Borah, who wants a naval conference between the United States, Great Britain and Japan. A third proposal, understood to be favored by the President, is for a conference to include armies as well as navies, with Italy and France brought in; and on these lines Mr. Harding is said to be sounding other powers. Senator Borah and his friends are credited with the view that talk behind closed doors merely helps the militarists of every nation, and that disarmament must be carried, if at all, by open diplomacy and an overwhelming popular movement.

In what follows, it will be assumed that a nation is disarmed when its forces on land and sea are reduced to no more than the number and equipment needed to guarantee internal order. In the case of Germany, the Treaty of Versailles allows one soldier for six hundred of population. And according to this test, it is a fact that the whole of the British Empire, of Africa, of China, and of North and South America are already disarmed on land so far as man power is concerned. The only armies seriously to be considered are those of Russia, Italy, France and Japan. Similarly, there are no navies of substance save those of Britain, the United States and Japan. We thus arrive at the conclusion that, complicated as disarmament must always be, it is a policy dependent at this stage on the goodwill of the few great powers. If they agree, the small nations must follow, and war will be severely localized. On the other hand, if the great powers refuse to disarm, they will involve in a common peril, not themselves only but all the small nations and undeveloped races, say of Africa.

Considering the four great armies, of Russia, Italy, France

and Japan, we may ask, first, whether these powers are prepared in time of peace for a general world-wide abandonment of conscription which would thus become strictly a war measure. Is that possible? Next, having placed themselves thus on a voluntary basis, are nations ready to limit the man power of their standing armies to the German, British and American proportion of not more than one soldier to every six hundred of population or thereabout?

Let us take the four military powers, one by one. Over Russia, at the moment, diplomacy has no control. This, however, is not a situation which can be permanent, for Bolshevism is a phase that must be temporary, at any rate in its extreme and logical form. And in the meantime the industry and finance of Russia are so disorganized and her commercial isolation is still so complete that disarmament elsewhere need not await her returning sanity.

In Italy, finance will operate toward demobilization while the fear of unemployed masses of discharged soldiers will retard it, but this latter condition is, once more, let us hope, temporary.

France still fears the recovery of Central Europe and, with her, disarmament would be much helped if her frontiers could be guaranteed against further attack. The misgivings of France are the more plausible because Germany, like all the great belligerent states, while she has demobilized, still remains a nation trained to war. Such knowledge of war can only be, at it were, cured by the passage of the years and the rise of a new generation.

For the Japanese Army, at least seven hundred thousand strong, it is difficult to find either explanation or reasonable pretext. Before the Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations Baron Uchida stated that Japan could not disarm on land or sea while another country was arming. On land, at any rate, the United States has now reduced her forces to one-fifth those of Japan for a larger population and in India the armed forces on land per head of population are one-tenth those of Japan. The conclusion appears to be that Japan, though an island power, maintains this army either as a means of retarding her people's progress toward constitutional liberty or for some unavowed purpose beyond her present frontiers, or for bargaining reasons.

In the days of Bonaparte you could calculate armaments

by three simple measures of strength: men, guns and ships. All the guns were muzzle-loaders and all the ships were wooden, uniform in general structure and propelled by sails. To-day the mechanism of war is infinitely complicated and, so far as I can see, no arithmetical comparisons can now be regarded as convincing. You have to take into account men, training, equipment, transport, big guns, little guns, shells, rifles, trench mortars, bombs, gas and flame projectors, aircraft and their projectiles, including dirigibles and seaplanes, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Then there are tanks—even submersible tanks—steel helmets, gas masks and an infinitely varied paraphernalia of attack and defense. Other factors of incalculable moment are control of raw materials, of metals and oil, and of industries adaptable to making munitions. All these are indices of a nation's preparedness. And probably it is a fact, now as throughout history, that when you have reckoned up all the men and war material, it will be the nation with the longest purse that will win in the end. It is the wealth accumulated by peace that insures victory in war.

Still, with all these reservations, it remains broadly true that a nation's militarism is measurable by the men, the money and the material put into the business from year to year—in a word, by the annual appropriations placed at the disposal of the army and navy and air departments. Some of this expenditure may be masked by allowing undisclosed credits to accumulate, as in Germany before 1914, but if a parliamentary system be fairly worked, bureaucracy cannot long conceal what it is spending. And here the habit of Congress of announcing enormous appropriations which are afterward cut down lays the United States under a charge of militarism which is not justified by the final decision. In Britain, the estimates presented by the Government are usually the estimates adopted by Parliament. I doubt very much whether the extent of demobilization of the American Army is appreciated abroad.

Expenditure is not, of course, a guarantee of war efficiency. Money may be squandered, let us say, on extravagant pensions and futile but showy expensive devices; and a conscript army is obviously cheaper than voluntary service. A sum of \$40,000,000 may be spent on one battleship, when many of the highest experts doubt whether battleships will ever again go into effective battle. It was not Germany's outlay on battleships that

finally worried Britain, but the much smaller sum devoted to a handful of submarines—of a negligible tonnage. Let nations beware of estimating preparedness by what can be exhibited at the movies by means of films. And here I must, with respect, challenge the theory of General Tasker H. Bliss that “no navy without an army can conquer and hold foreign territory” and that abolishing armies thus goes far to solve the problem of disarmament. In the case of Britain the only fear today is conquest by purely naval forces—that is, blockade by submarines. Britain can be conquered without the use of a single soldier, and no soldiers, however numerous, can ever, of themselves conquer Britain. The problem of Britain is almost wholly naval, and never, in a naval sense, has Britain been so vulnerable as today. This point illustrates, perhaps, the difficulty of nations appreciating the respective standpoints of one another. The United States is of wide extent and self-contained. England is no bigger than Newfoundland and, cut off from foreign commerce, would have to reduce her population by half.

[No analysis of disarmament is real and sincere which fails to recognize that war is a vested interest. Enormous numbers of men and women, soldiers, sailors, manufacturers and their families, live by militarism, are bound up with the system, usually through no fault of their own and, in the main, under a high sense of patriotic duty. The industries involved are, of necessity, associated closely with the spending departments of the State, and in all countries it has been found that Ministers for Armies and Navies, if efficient, have become inevitably expansionists. It seems to be so with Mr. Baker and Mr. Daniels, Mr. Weeks and Mr. Denby, just as in Britain it was so with Mr. Churchill and Mr. McKenna, who had stood for economy until they entered the Admiralty. All of us, watching airplanes and examining battleships, are captured by the wonder of the mighty machine and of the courage that operates it. We see the shining levers and hear the thunders of reverberating artillery, without envisaging in our minds the ultimate effect—the pathetic little homes blown to smithereens, babes crying for food and warmth on the wayside, mothers driven insane, and fathers to suicide. So entrenched in our political systems is this organization for war that one thoughtful student of affairs, Mr. Darwin P. Kingsley, has come to the conclusion that there can be no assurance of peace until separate

sovereignties are merged, as among the forty-eight States of the American Union. The British Empire itself has been defined as a convenient arrangement whereby four hundred fifty million people agree not to cut one another's throats.

For such a super sovereignty the world is not prepared, though it may be held that the Supreme Council has been an attempt in that direction. For the moment it is enough to argue that the combative side of sovereignty is fed by naval and military expenditure and that the best safeguard against imperialism is economy. It is quite probable that we shall see in Germany the rising prosperity of a nation which, relieved of armaments by her own defeat, is thus able to concentrate wholly on productive enterprise. That object lesson may profoundly affect all other countries.

Limiting expenditure will also abate the danger of the export of arms from one country to another. Of this there have been recently some startling instances—guns to be sent from Danzig into Mexico and from New York into Ireland; and British airmen assisting Japan, while British dirigibles are going to the United States and a Japanese order for a warship to Brooklyn! In time of peace the armaments industry is, and must be, like all other trades, international in scope, and this means that nations industrially are constantly arming their own rivals against themselves. The only reason why guns did not go to Dublin was that the Irish Republic is not recognized, and that was the reason why guns did not go to Mexico. The airplanes for Japan were adjudged a perfectly legitimate commercial transaction.

Are we prepared to say, then, that the export and import of munitions shall be prohibited by international agreement? If so, then the armament firm will have but one customer—the Government under which it is carried on—and independent experiments on weapons of destruction will be much discouraged. Having reached this point, do we consider that all private manufacture of arms, with the profits involved, should be stopped and that Governments alone should conduct this manufacture? And what are munitions? How do you differentiate between boots for soldiers and boots for civilians, between airplanes for mail and airplanes for bombs, between coal products for dyes and perfumes and coal products for poisons and explosives, between rubber for private and for military

tires? The war has shown that all industry can be rationed and all materials scheduled, but I can hardly believe, myself, that such measures would be needed as a step in disarmament. They would constitute a grave interference with trades which are entirely pacific and, presumably, the inspection would have to be international and, therefore, in a sense, foreign and unsympathetic. If the State is not spending money on munitions, it will be to nobody's interest either to make or to invent munitions. Trade and profits will flow along other channels. The handmaid of disarmament is thus simple economy, practiced by nations in friendly concert instead of by each nation individually, as hitherto attempted.

DISARMAMENT AND ARBITRATION¹

We entered the war to stop war, and we did it, and now we have reached the half-way point in our work—in our destiny, and we have the right to demand that the nations join us in a plan, having to do with nothing else than to prevent future wars. Wars have always taken place from the dawn of time right down to our own days. Every attempt to save the world from future wars has been a dismal failure. From the Congress of Vienna; through the times of the Treaty of the Declaration of Paris and the Hague Conferences and the Declaration of London, which, however, failed of adoption—all Conferences, having to do with peace, have, sooner or later, been followed by war. The question, essentially, has become a moral one and time is very precious—it will not long wait its presentation. Now, or never, before desolation, the question must be considered; it seems to be in the air. Clearly, the United States should be the nation to present its plan to the world.

Everything—the League of Nations is, as yet, in its infancy—has been tried and everything has been found wanting, and, at last, it has been brought home to the world that there are only two ways in which war can be prevented:

Disarmament, and Compulsory Arbitration—else blockade, embargo and boycott.

¹ By R. Mason Lisle. From *Compulsory Arbitration Instead of War*. Reprint from *The Legal Intelligencer*, December 17, 1920 and *Addenda*, February 1, 1921.

And, first of the curtailment of war shipbuilding for some definite period. This is not at all "disarmament" and, really, how little it has to do with disarmament—it was never to so apply—will be seen in a moment, in what we will say of disarmament. It has one virtue, however—it will give the already overtaxed Treasuries of the Nations an opportunity to catch up in their finances, and, it will also give time to work out a true and honest disarmament. But, it must always be remembered how tricky nations are about disarmament. Once upon a time, an agreement was proposed to limit the Prussian Army to two hundred thousand men. It was quickly accepted by Prussia's great statesman—Stein, was it not?—who saw the loophole. When two hundred thousand men had been trained, as only Prussia could train them, they were returned to civil life and another two hundred thousand recruits were trained in the same perfect way and so on, until the whole of Prussia became a nation of trained soldiers. And now, of disarmament.

(1) Disarmament would stop future wars, of course,—but, there are so many ways in which disarmament can be simulated that a faithless nation would have at its mercy the honest nation which kept faith and, therefore, in these days, disarmament, so to speak, is a delusion and a snare. It could very easily be thought that "disarmament" was being carried out, when as a matter of fact, modern invention, physical science and ever-progressing scientific research may have produced some unthought-of weapon of warfare which would render useless every weapon hitherto thought supreme and true and effective "disarmament" would be as far off as ever. For instance, of course, there are two sides to the question, but Admiral Sir Percy Scott is of opinion that capital ships should be scrapped—his country thinks so, too, perhaps, for she is not building them. Planes and poison gases seem to be the coming weapons and who knows, but that, very soon, the electricity in the air—the lightning—may be controlled by man, and, at this very moment, that terrible weapon destructive of every thing that floats—the torpedo Plane—is being studied the world over, by most capable men. It will at once be understood that disarmament is always just overlapped by some new type of armament.

(2) Nations will not agree to disarmament of Sea-Power—that's for defense, alone, they maintain, not heeding the fact—

Napoleon always so contended—a quick offense is the best defense. For instance, in a war between the United States and any European Power, the ships of each contestant would rush to the other side of the Atlantic, to launch planes to drop poison gases and liquid fire over the country of its opponent. And Torpedo Planes would be launched to be used in attack. It is idle to maintain that Sea Power is not for offense. President Wilson sees clearly the peril of this [failure to understand] the difference between “offense” and “defense”—see his letter, page 7, *supra*, to the President of the Assembly of the League of Nations: “The great impediment to peaceful reconstruction in these troubled territories is caused by the utter confusion between “offense” and “defense,” which, if not clearly defined, there is not only *small* hope of peace but *no* hope of a clear perception of who is responsible for new wars.”

But so rapidly are things changing in these days that only the other day, a very prominent Britisher said: It is lamentable but we might as well realize it—such a thing as “Command of the Seas” does not exist. Kindly look at our paper “Freedom of the Seas.” And, really, if nations are willing to give up “Sea Power Armament,” it means so little, unless “disarmament” is honest and true disarmament. Battleships may be scrapped by agreement—Admiral Sir Percy Scott says they are scrapped *per se—nolens volens*, hence, an agreement to scrap them is not at all necessary.

[Plants for the manufacture of planes and dyes cannot be scrapped—planes are for peaceful travel and for peaceful commerce and dyes are for domestic use, and yet, dye plants can be made to produce the most deadly poison gases, of which one, today, can hardly conceive—so vigorously are chemists working on these things, we understand. Will disarmament close these useful peaceful establishments?]

(3) The lack of the certainty of disarmament is this: It is, so to speak, a sort of postponed action. A nation cannot know if nations have kept faith in truly pursuing “disarmament,” until the time comes for using “armament,” and then—if faith has been broken—the knowledge of that fact is valueless—it comes too late, for the faithless nation may be ready to fight with the latest weapons in modern warfare, that is, a true, honest and complete disarmament may find itself faced by a subtle disarmament, which, under the guise of peaceful pursuits, may permit

of the creation of plants already equipped for the immediate production of the most destructive weapons of war.

Whilst, on the other hand, arbitration—enforced by blockade, embargo and boycott—the subject of this paper—demands instant positive action in its initial movement. If two nations go to war instead of to arbitration, blockade, embargo and boycott are right to the fore at once. A nation which does not respond to its agreement to enforce—against nations proposing to fight—arbitration by blockade, etc., etc., would be breaking faith and, at once, would, herself, become a pariah nation.

Disarmament should go, hand in hand with Arbitration—“These two be the Great Twin Brothers to whom the Dorians pray.”

THE INADEQUACY OF PARTIAL DISARMAMENT¹

This is the plain tale of the way a man, a lifelong foe of armament, was almost persuaded to start a League for Universal Armament. To understand my story, you must know that I read General Bliss' denunciation of armament with great joy. At last a Daniel had come to judgment out of the very ranks of the army itself! My joy was increased when a paper of the prestige of the New York World started its disarmament campaign. With the powerful backing of General Bliss, the New York World, General Pershing, and numbers of politicians and business men alarmed at the rising tax rate, even the clergy began to speak boldly. Senator Borah's resolution for a sort of naval holiday excited my cordial approval. World peace seemed nearer than I had hoped. In this frame of mind it chanced that I was obliged to take a railway journey to a distant city.

In the smoking car I fell in with a clean-cut young man wearing an American Legion button. He saw me reading that morning's World and began conversation.

“I see you are interested in this disarmament stuff. It's the right dope. I'm all for it.”

“Good,” I replied. “If you American Legion men are for it nothing will stop it.”

¹ By Stephen Laurie. From *The World Tomorrow*. February, 1921.

"Yes," was the answer, "a lot of us are for it, but get me straight. It is not for the sentimental reasons that these ministers are spouting. I do not like war, but I know we'll never get rid of it, and I want America prepared to hold up her end. But these great expenditures on big armaments do not do the trick. I don't claim to be a military expert, but I found out some things in the war. One of them is that a lot of military and naval expenses of the sort included in our budget hitherto are pretty badly out of date. I suppose if other people build battleships we have to, but they're a terribly expensive luxury, out of date as soon as they're finished. They can't fight shore batteries. They aren't very effective in protecting commerce against submarines—and think of the money they cost! So it is with a lot of these military expenses. Now, the next war is going to be fought by science. You don't like it and I don't like it, but it is so. Instead of wasting millions on fancy battleships, we have got to go to work and build up the best system of gas and chemical warfare and of aeronautics possible. I know something about it, because I used to drop bombs out of an aeroplane. Maybe we'll have to experiment with germs. It isn't nice, but it is the logic of war, and I have seen that the British generals are already talking about it. Now my idea is this: Let's have a naval holiday and agree with the other powers to reduce expenditures on armaments. Then let's spend a reasonable sum wisely: first on the development of scientific warfare, second on educating a lot of officers, and third on short-term universal military training. Soldiers can't be trained for war in times of peace, but the war showed that you can give the young man the right kind of psychology and educate out of him any mollicoddle pacifism within a few months. Give him some idea of what he owes his country and all that. Then we can keep a lot of well-trained officers to act for us when the right time comes. I see they are talking about that in France now. Yes, sir, I am all for this disarmament campaign. No use wasting the tax-payer's money—but with the partial disarmament I have suggested we have got to have a constructive program for the right use of what is spent."

What I replied does not much matter. I am afraid I was too bewildered to make adequate rejoinder. To have my earnest young friend advocate partial disarmament in the name of military efficiency was a surprise. But worse was to follow.

I was late going into the dining-car. Almost everyone had left and about my only companion was a young Hindu whom I had noticed before on the train. He seemed an intelligent chap, so I sat down with him. (He explained that he found it rather desirable in America to wait until near the end before going into a dining-car because when the car was crowded he had suffered some unpleasant experiences at the hands of people who thought he was a Negro and resented his presence at the table.) In the course of our conversation I brought up this question of disarmament and asked him if he did not find new hope for this old planet in the spectacle of generals and preachers and the New York World uniting on so idealistic a program.

My very courteous Hindu friend almost forgot to be polite.

"Not a bit of it," he said. "It is the old story—a conspiracy on the part of those in power to keep their power with the minimum of trouble. You will notice that none of them are proposing a genuine disarmament which would give the oppressed any chance. It doesn't help England to keep India in order to have a race in armaments with the United States. Japan can handle Korea and China and Eastern Siberia better if she is not obliged to build a navy large enough to fight America. And as for the United States, I do not think the little Latin-American countries will profit by a 50 per cent reduction in your naval program. You will pardon my saying so, but all this disarmament talk seems to us the usual sort of Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy. It is to your advantage to save money and to cut down on a competition in armaments that the business interests of the world simply cannot stand at the present time. I should never mind a frank acknowledgment of the wisdom of this point of view. What I object to is the attempt to make a virtue of it."

I shall not try to repeat all his conversation. He went on to give me facts which I had never before realized about oppression under British rule in India and the terrible drain of capitalistic imperialism upon that exhausted country.

"As a matter of fact," he concluded, "it isn't disarmament that I want but armament and more armament. Let the western powers wreck themselves by their own folly. Let them more and more call upon Asiatics and Africans to fight their battles. By and by they will educate armies of colored men capable of winning their own freedom. So long as India is disarmed a little

British force can hold its power, but in a time of universal armament there may be hope at last for the freedom of India."

Once more I felt considerably annoyed at the inadequacy of my reply. I had been unexpectedly put upon the defensive and the heat and earnestness of my companion had made a tremendous impression upon me, although of course he did not bring complete conviction.

But this was not the end of my education. I am interested in labor forums, and having some time upon my hands in the city to which I had gone, I dropped into a large forum which advertised that open discussion was permitted. I entered late and found that the principal speaker of the evening was talking on disarmament very much in the vein of the New York World. I was surprised that the audience, mostly made up of working-class folk, was not more responsive. There was some applause when he denounced the horrors of war, but I have seen far greater enthusiasm at dozens of meetings. When the time came for open discussion, an earnest young chap got up who spoke somewhat as follows:

"No class-conscious worker likes war, but, Comrades, we ought not to be fooled by this pacifist idealism. It isn't the real thing. They are not going to disarm the troops that serve the master class in every strike—not the Federal troops nor the Cossacks in western Pennsylvania, nor the militia in the Alabama coal fields. Not a bit of it. They simply want to pay as little as possible for keeping us in order. I have read some history and I know that in the great struggle of the bourgeois against the aristocracy they made much of the demand that the citizen should be allowed to carry arms, that it should no longer be a privilege of the noble class. The Second Amendment to our own Constitution guarantees the right of the people to keep and bear arms, and the people who got that amendment knew what they were about. I have got just two objections to this disarmament stuff. First, it is not going to prevent war. A cut in armaments or a naval holiday won't stop the economic rivalries of the United States and Great Britain or the United States and Japan for trade mastery, the possession of oil fields, and all the rest. None of us like war, but if the capitalist system is going to blow up in one more big war, the sooner the better. The workers will have to take hold as they did in Russia and build the new commonwealth. That is my first criticism of the

speaker. My second is this: Whether the speaker knows it or not, this talk about disarmaments chiefly serves the purpose of keeping the workers quiet, of promoting pacifist ideas among them so that they will be content to have the guns in the hands of the police and small regular army. The few have always wanted the many disarmed, and they have grown afraid of their big armies after they saw what the army finally did in Russia and even in Germany. I'd like peace as well as the next man, but there never will be peace while the workers are slaves. What we need to be told is not about disarmament but armament."

He sat down amidst the most hearty applause of the evening, but I confess I was too busy with my own thoughts to notice what was said; nor did I pay much attention to the somewhat ineffective summary of the principal speaker.

Ever since, I have been thinking the matter over. This is my conclusion, which I should like to see discussed in the pages of *The World Tomorrow*:

On the one hand I confess that the more I think about it the more I sympathize with my Hindu friend and the young worker at the forum, but the less I agree with them. To begin with, modern militarism is not the simple matter it was in the early days of gunpowder. The American colonist was a comparatively easy match for any regulars the British crown might send against him under the conditions of warfare that then prevailed. But the old conception of the power of the free man with his gun over his door simply is not adequate in the present situation. It is not the oppressed Hindu or the American worker who can best command the new engines of destruction, machine guns, artillery and the instruments of chemical warfare. These things are likely to remain in the possession of the ruling governments, who will have an enormous superiority in them. A League for Universal Armament giving a rifle into the hands of every worker or every oppressed East Indian won't much avail against small bodies of disciplined men in possession of aeroplanes, machine guns, and the latest resources of modern warfare. Against such means of destruction the man with the rifle might make a bloody fight, but he would be almost as powerless as was the American Indian with his bow and arrow against the early settlers. His only hope would be to win over the army, or by economic means to stop the manufacture of the weapons his master uses against him. But of

course that is only part of the story. Sane men ought not to look with equanimity upon universal warfare as a road to universal freedom. The destruction of life and of the things that make life beautiful would be altogether too great. The survivors of such a conflict, when they at last crept out of the holes and caves of the earth where they had finally taken refuge, might indeed be free to frame a Cooperative Commonwealth or a Federation of Cooperative Commonwealths, but they would face a desolate world with vital energies sadly exhausted. According to the ancient Hebrew legend, God himself once tried to get a better world by drowning all its inhabitants except one family; but it is not recorded that the method was entirely successful: a new population did not make a new earth. I am skeptical whether a universal war would prove any more efficacious than the flood. Meanwhile, I am certain that the great expenditures on armaments are at the cost of the feeding and education of thousands upon thousands of the children to whom we must look to bring the new social order which is our heart's desire. Simply on the ground of proper concern for the care of the children, it is immensely important to limit armaments. More than that, it is probable that the limitation of armaments may serve somewhat as a brake upon war. In the old frontier days the unarmed man was less likely to start quarrels than the armed man, and the two-gun man was often more provocative than his one-gun neighbor. Something of the sort may hold good in national affairs. Especially is it true that universal military training in the United States will make for war, not peace; for narrow nationalism in politics, and conservatism in economics. So far, it is only defeated armies which have become revolutionary, and neither in Germany nor in Russia has the old army trained by the militarists been able to do the constructive work of the new Commonwealth. This needs to be said with emphasis; yet at the same time we who desire peace must very fairly face the fact that partial disarmament, and even the defeat of universal military training, are by no means a guarantee of peace, still less of justice. The ex-soldier was probably right; simply from a military standpoint the old-fashioned type of preparedness may rapidly be scrapped. Before the end of the war the English military expert, Mr. Sidebotham, wrote an important article (published, I think, in the *Atlantic Monthly*), in which he suggested that there might

be a complete alteration in military preparations owing to the advance in chemical warfare. It is highly significant that England has forbidden the importation of German dye-stuffs for ten years, not merely for commercial reasons but avowedly to stimulate in Britain an industry which is closely allied to the making of chemicals for war purposes. It cannot, therefore, be too emphatically insisted that disarmament of the partial type now being discussed does not go very far toward ending the deadly menace of war. This is true, if for no other reason than because all partial schemes of disarmament presuppose maintaining the relative military or naval strength of the powers at their present point. Ambition, fear, greed, hate—a hundred and one passions—will not long permit discordant nations to accept the present ratio of power as ordained of God. Even if the powerful nations could be persuaded to enter a permanent imperial trust in which their respective shares of power were about as they are now,—a wholly improbable supposition,—it is certain that the Hindu, the Chinese, the Negro, the Irishman, the exploited toilers of all nations, have nothing to hope from a naval or a military holiday. Nor will they regard the attempt to create such a respite as an idealistic measure.

The consistent advocate of a peace which is dependent upon justice and good-will cannot, therefore, be content with any plan now under serious discussion. By all means let him support Senator Borah's resolution, but with the conviction that it is only a short step forward. Disarmament for peace means total disarmament, not some half-way measure. To be completely effective it must be attended by a resolute refusal on the part of individuals to render military service to the war lords. Above all, it must be accompanied by a new purpose to obtain social justice. The pacifist is futile and worse than futile who does not see that there can be no true or worthy peace so long as the few possess and use the power to make social classes and subject races obey their will and minister to their comfort or their ambition. The struggle for peace and the struggle for justice is one. It is a struggle for the establishment of right economic and social relationships. We who are persuaded that these relationships can never be secured by war are challenged to devote far more vigorous attention than in the past to the perfection of other methods which will

make war as obviously unnecessary a means to secure freedom as it is disastrous to the human race.

THE HARD ROAD TO PEACE¹

"Why have you not given more eager support to the encouraging disarmament campaign instituted by Senator Borah and backed so widely by the churches? Here at least is a movement which is in line with your purposes. Why do you not rejoice in it more generously and in your rejoicing urge along the cause?" Such is a fair summary of several questions addressed to us within the last weeks. The answer necessarily will involve repetition of arguments often advanced in these pages.

We have steadfastly supported Senator Borah's plan for the calling of a naval conference between the three powers, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, among whom alone is naval rivalry possible, and who, together, absolutely control the situation. It affords at the very least a possible escape from a crushing burden of taxation and an opportunity to reduce friction and suspicion between the three great powers. Cooperation in disarmament (or rather, the limitation of armaments) might lead to cooperation regarding various other issues which tend to divide our countries.

But concerning the limitation of armaments there are two observations that must be made: (1) That effective public opinion in America has by no means swung heartily behind it, and (2) that its advocates deceive themselves and the people if they believe that any limitation of armament conference, however excellent, is likely to remove the danger of war. Recent political events are very instructive. Mr. Harding is a kindly man. Like all sane men in this age and generation, he is moved by the tragedy of war. He was quite sincere when he wept over the coffins of men who died in France and declared: "It must not happen again." But at the same time he has not as yet taken one public step to make war less likely. We have only the vaguest intimations that he may take some initiative in calling a general disarmament conference. His

¹ From *The World Tomorrow*. 4:201-3. July, 1921.

Secretary of State has become the exponent of a vigorous policy toward Mexico and the world in general, which is not less imperialistic because Mr. Hughes has to a high degree a talent for moralizing what are essentially imperialistic interests. And while Secretary Hughes writes vigorous notes to Mexico, Japan, and Russia, and refuses to see the Haitian mission, the Secretary of War preaches pure Prussianism to the graduating class of New York University. Mr. Weeks openly regrets that public opinion is at present opposed to universal military training. He renders lip service to the ideal of disarmament, but he says never a word in favor of even so modest a proposal as that the United States should call a conference on the subject. The gist of his declaration is that it would be "the height of folly for the United States to be the first to disarm." Other nations, it appears, are arming, but after warning us Mr. Weeks hurries to deny the possibility of war with Great Britain. Who is left? It doesn't take a very bright boy to answer "Japan." Congress has no more principle in this matter than a weather vane; the House, and to a less extent the Senate, just now feel the anti-high-tax wind.

Of course, all our statesmen explain that our arms are purely for defense—"We desire nothing that is not ours." But so say all statesmen; so said the Kaiser. New battleships speak louder than pacific speeches.

The government's disappointing attitude on disarmament reflects dominant American sentiment. The World (New York) makes the telling point that if our military and naval appropriations are maintained for forty years at the rate of the closing fiscal year we shall have paid \$33,000,000,000 for our next war, which is the maximum sum the most optimistic expert believes Germany can pay as an indemnity for her last war! Facts like this may keep the size of the standing army low, and force reductions in the Senate's naval appropriation. It is even possible that public opinion may bring about a disarmament conference, for which prominent Japanese and English leaders have declared. Of course, there is no doubt that the people want peace. But it is very doubtful if they want it enough to pay the price. They want disarmament, but they want some things more than disarmament. The passion for peace is nothing like so intense in various groups as the passion for supremacy over Mexico, or "security" against

Japan, or freedom for Ireland. No fact in politics is better attested than that the intense desire and purpose of a minority is more effective than the less intense though more widely diffused conviction of a majority.

But if the only trouble were the weakness of the desire for disarmament it might be our duty merely to get behind the Borah proposal and push it on the general principle that we ought not to despise the day of small things. But the Borah resolution hasn't in it the seed of world peace. Peace will never be won until men prepare for it and risk for it as they have prepared and risked for war. The current—and true—argument that the Borah disarmament proposal involves no risk is a reason why it holds so little hope of securing peace. Some nation must be so swept by a passion for brotherhood and a conception of the worth not only of human life, but of those ideals which war destroys, that it will take the risk of being the first to disarm. It must trust for its own security not to arms, but to the friendship that disarmament may evoke, and the contagious power of a reasoned refusal to be bribed, bullied, or hypnotized into the shambles. If organized Christianity has any message for our times it ought to be saying this from all its pulpits instead of giving watered-down versions of General Bliss' fine statement and the New York World's editorials.

This disarmament is more than a matter of getting rid of forts and guns. It is universally admitted that the warfare of the future is chemical warfare. Through chemistry and bacteriology men have acquired power to enrich and prolong life, but that same power is also a power for death and destruction. As long as there are large chemical industries and a small personnel trained in the science of destruction there is a possibility of warfare so deadly that it will amount to the suicide of civilization. No reduction in standing armies, therefore, no reduction in the size of navies—important as these may be—can amount to disarmament until mankind has by an effort of the will deliberately renounced even the thought of developing or of using chemical warfare. Organized science will fail us as completely as organized religion unless scientific men take the lead in refusing to put at the service of war-makers the triumphs of their skill.

So complete a renunciation as this cannot possibly grow

out of our present way of life without being accompanied by, or rather springing from, a spiritual and economic revolution. Here we have space only to state the problem in its baldest outline. So long as chauvinistic nationalism and, still more, the extreme race feeling of our present time continue, real disarmament is impossible and would not be completely effective. Unless we can realize in our habit of thought of one another that "God hath made of one all nations for to dwell upon earth" we cannot look for peace. Again we repeat: If it is utopian to believe that men can be made to think of one another as brothers, brothers differing perhaps in temperament and capacity, but still brothers, then it is utopian to think of any decent future for mankind in an age when renewed warfare means wholesale destruction.

What has been said of the problem of race feeling applies with even greater force to the problem of the economic order of society which is so interwoven in the warp and woof of racial and national relationships. The primary effective cause of modern warfare is economic. Wars spring from the search of surplus capital for investment in countries where it is possible for investors to collect larger rates of interest than they can get at home. Its roots are in the private ownership of land, natural resources, and all the principal means of production. The established owners get surplus profits; these they invest abroad; they come in conflict with the outraged people of the exploited country or rival exploiters and seekers after raw material from other nations. They use the extravagant feeling of nationality to make the people accept this quarrel for gain as a matter of national concern. Secret diplomats, jingo editors, emotional flag-wavers, professional militarists, do the rest. War is an expansion of the ruthless competition of business, the supreme way of getting the better of one's fellows even if it hurts one's self. That spirit cannot be kept within bounds. If it is the primary motive in industry it will become the primary motive in political relationships. It is absurd to expect that the exploiter who has worshipped wealth, success, and power all his life will suddenly have the vision to perceive, or the will to draw back from, the abyss of war to which his economic rivalry and his lust of mastery lead him. There can be no sure peace without reconciliation; no reconciliation without revolution. That revolution may not be achieved all at once; it must be purposed now without delay.

"What nonsense," some impatient reader may here interrupt, "to preach revolution as a way to peace. Revolution means war, not peace." It is all too true that social revolution is usually accompanied by war and that it is commonly understood as involving war. The Intercollegiate Socialist Society Conference has been discussing: "Is Peaceful Revolution Possible?" No one can glibly say, "Yes." Yet we do affirm that the growing extension and intensity of war's destruction, psychological and physical, will soon bring it to pass that we can have no valuable revolution that is not peaceful. That is why the effort of the Hindu saint, Gandhi, to bring about a real revolution, not by violence, but by non-cooperation, is so extraordinarily significant. Our supreme task as lovers of peace is to find a way of effecting a constructive social revolution without war, and this *The World Tomorrow* will repeat with all the persistence of Cato insisting that Carthage must be destroyed. Unless they realize the force of this argument many sincere supporters of disarmament will find themselves in a most unwelcome ethical predicament. The present so-called disarmament movement looks toward no change in the relation of subordinate races or exploited classes to their masters; it is consciously or unconsciously (like the Versailles League of Nations, or the Supreme Council of the Allies) a device for making easier the task of maintaining supremacy of the imperial powers by reducing friction among them. That may be expedient for the citizens of those powers (though scarcely likely of attainment by reason of the inevitable competition among them); it is not particularly edifying and cannot be expected to evoke any enthusiasm in, let us say, Ireland, Egypt, India, Korea, China, Haiti or Mexico. A worth-while disarmament requires the end of imperialism. Or, to put matters more positively, world peace requires world cooperation.¹

Are we, then, opposed to the various measures looking toward peace? By no means. On the contrary, we are glad to accede to the suggestion of a correspondent and list some of them with brief comment:

We favor a disarmament conference and in particular a naval conference between Great Britain, Japan, and the United States.

¹ Not necessarily, however, a world state, whose oppressive weight might be very great.

We favor arbitration of disputes and every step toward a League of Nations or Association of Peoples—call it what you will—which is something more than a fair mask for an imperialist trust.

We favor a constitutional amendment making a popular referendum a necessary preliminary to a declaration of war.

We admire the international movement in labor circles and among young men in which organizations and individuals set themselves to take no part in war between nations. In particular, we should applaud concerted action by scientists to refuse to develop chemical warfare.

We advocate the formation of international friendships through labor bodies and scientific, cultural, and religious organizations.

We favor open diplomacy.

We urge the adoption (which we do not expect from imperialist governments) of the so-called Calvo-Drago doctrine, which forbids any nation to use arms to collect debts owed by another nation to its citizens. This doctrine was formulated by Latin-American statesmen and seemed likely once to be accepted by the United States, as it is accepted by the South American nations. It is a monstrous absurdity that governments should be debt-collecting agencies.

We favor a long view of foreign policies and an effort to forestall wars by education of the public. We are, for example, concerned for an end of the Irish tragedy because of its urgent bearing on world peace. We are opposed to the belief, as futile as it is unjust, that one nation is not concerned with another nation's atrocities and robberies. The power of international public opinion to secure fair dealing has never been sufficiently exerted.

One or another or a combination of these measures may avert particular wars. No panacea will conquer war, but only a new way of life. The opponent of war must be intent upon the discovery of ways to establish justice between men and nations and the end of the dominance of mankind by a privileged class. It may be that our generation is called upon to choose between life and death, if not for ourselves then for our children. We in America are very near to the parting of the roads. On the one hand is the path that leads to imperial mastery. Along that road lies wealth and power greater than

that which the strong have ever won upon the face of the earth, but the end is death. The other road is the road that leads to cooperative human brotherhood. It cannot be trod without difficulty. Those who walk it may sometimes miss the way; they may stumble and fall, but only in following it is there life or hope for men.

FOR CONTINUED ARMAMENTS

A STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT HARDING¹

"I want to see the day when America is the most eminent of maritime nations. A big navy and a big merchant marine are necessary to the future of the country. I believe in partial but not permanent disarmament, and I see the time when this will be realized, but until that time comes I want a navy for America's defense that is equal to the aspirations of this country."

WE HAVE NOT REACHED THE MILLENNIUM²

Disarmament would save the Government an immense amount of money. It would reduce taxation that has become a burden to most of the world, and would restore to economic uses a vast amount of labor and material, which would tend to lessen the present economic crisis, but in order to accomplish this much-desired result we must not fail to fully protect ourselves. We have not reached the millennial age, where the lion and the lamb will lie down together. A universal peace and brotherhood has not been established and it is absolutely necessary for our peace and protection that the United States shall continue to build battleships, and to keep our Navy equal to that of the great powers of the earth. If they all disarm—and the United States would be willing to meet them more than half way—well and good; but it is neither the part of wisdom nor prudence for the United States alone to begin disarmament.

¹ From a speech at Norfolk, December 3, 1920. Quoted in Hearings on H. J. Res. 424.

² From a personal interview with Charles Evans Hughes by William H. Crawford. *World's Work*. 42:133. June, 1921.

SHOULD WE BE THE FIRST TO DISARM?¹

We have been extremely interested in the graphic and true survey, really a report of facts, of what Mr. MacDonald saw during his visit in the different countries in Europe, and I think that we all agree that he accomplished a very great feat to be able to sum up the situation and give even a slight discussion of certain of the remedies for it within a half-hour. . .

It was very significant, what Mr. MacDonald saw there—that in the countries of the victors the conditions were only relatively better than in the countries of the vanquished, that it was rather a Pan-European than a central-European problem of economic anarchy and of political confusion and suspicion.

Mr. MacDonald, at the end of his talk, spoke of four things as standing out among many. In three out of four I am in hearty accord with him. Upon the fourth I disagree with him utterly. In regard to the seizing of property of aliens in this country, we acted not only directly contrary to international law but also to our own law, and directly contrary to treaties we have signed. I am sure that in supporting the move to give back the private property of private citizens which had nothing to do with war that we are taking a step in the right direction. There was nothing done throughout the whole war which was more truly Bolshevik than the confiscation of private property of enemy citizens.

In regard to the second point—the fixing of the German indemnity; Mr. MacDonald has covered it very well in pointing out the crying need of a second mortgage and the inability of Germany to get a second mortgage until the first mortgage is fixed.

With the third thing Mr. MacDonald advocated I am also in hearty accord—the importance of an early peace with Germany and with Austria.

In regard to the fourth point, the question of disarmament and the whole treatment of the subject by Mr. MacDonald, I heartily and profoundly and radically disagree with him. Here we come up against one of the gravest perils of the situation.

¹ By Herbert Adams Gibbons. From Bulletin. League of Free Nations Association. 4:10-12. March, 1921.

We have come safely through the discussion over ratifying the League of Nations in order to support and help to rehabilitate the world and we defeated it. Mr. MacDonald exposes the fallacy of those who feel that if America were in the League our participation would immediately put the world on a new basis. Now, there are always some people who are absolutely impenitent. You know that. Once they get through with one hobby, they go on to something else; and that has been the case with these disarmament people, headed by the New York World here in America. Having been thoroughly defeated in their League of Nations without ratification, they now take up the disarmament hobby, and are riding it just as hard, to try to get a new issue.

I think it is as illogical to argue for a naval holiday or a limitation of armaments, or anything of that sort, as it was to argue that the United States should swallow the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles without ratification and enter into it.

The great difficulty, I think, with all liberal movements as opposed to reactionary movements—and we all want to be liberal if we can—is that zeal seems to be accompanied by a tremendous amount of optimism without considering the end at all or how that end is going to be arrived at. You have your eyes fixed upon a goal, and you think the path toward it must be easy because the goal is so great and so wonderful, and you are tempted to try to jump over the intervening space to arrive at it.

In the case of disarmament, what Mr. MacDonald has suggested is what the French would call *trop simpliste*—too easy. He speaks of several different things. Of course, coming back from Europe, he is overwhelmed by the misfortunes of the recent war and the burden of taxation and everything, and to see us continuing to build a navy, or rather launching forth toward the building of a navy, seems to horrify him. But if we want to get at the heart of the disarmament proposition, we must recall the origin of the Daniels Naval Building program. Now, I have not had much admiration for Mr. Daniels on a good many points. But there is one thing you can never question, and that is that Mr. Daniels is a very good patriot and a very good liberal and he has been so throughout his whole career. He is not a reactionary; he has not been under

the spell of jingoism; and he has not been under the spell of the armor plate manufacturers at all. There was a good reason for the American Naval Building program in 1916, and before we attack it now and say that we ought to abandon it for the sake of economy, as it is written here in these declarations of policy of the League of Free Nations Association, we should go back and see why this naval program was started.

Have conditions been so changed that there is no reason for continuing it? If in 1916, before our entry into the war, there was a reason why we should vote these tremendous sums for building a huge navy, let me tell you that the reason is still stronger today, and we have four years of experience, nearly five, behind us.

The Naval Building Program of 1916 was the answer to the Orders in Council of the British government in 1914, in 1915. It was due to the fact that our various notes on the policy of carrying on maritime warfare were unanswered. Now, there was a great difference between Germany and Great Britain, and I don't want you to think that I don't see this difference in what I am going to say now, for I want to say here that I wrote the editorial about the "Barrel of Pork" in the New York Herald, in 1915, that you may remember, that human lives are worth more than a barrel of pork. But while we cannot compare in any sense at all the German violations of warfare on the sea, with the violations by Great Britain, yet we must remember that as far as the United States, then a neutral nation, was concerned, these violations by the British of the rules of warfare that we have advocated ever since the foundation of this nation were a very serious thing; and they would have been a far more serious thing had it not been for the fact that we were in universal sympathy here with the Entente Allies. We were so much in sympathy with France and England during the first two or three years of the war that we were willing to let the end justify the means in regard to the interference with our commerce on the high seas by the British. We saw very clearly that it was impossible for us to protest against encroachments of this most friendly nation—our brothers—our own blood brothers. It was impossible to protest at that critical time against England's interpretation of the rules of warfare in accordance with its own interests—

disregarding some, changing some, abandoning some—and expect that we could in the future live in peaceful and friendly relations with that country.

I am sure that the question of the liberty of the seas is one of the most vital questions that is facing the world today. We have always stood for it since the beginning of our national life. From the time of the American Revolution up to the time of the American Civil War these were vital policies because we were on the Atlantic seaboard. We had not started our period of expansion across the American continent. We were dependent upon our foreign trade. We had a large portion of the carrying trade in our own hands, when we fought the War of 1812. We lived by our relations with Europe. Our prosperity depended upon keeping the sea open and having the sea free and we did not want American commerce interfered with by any war to which we were not a party and which was not in accord with our interests.

Back in the early history of the nineteenth century, when the British were fighting the French for mastery in the Napoleonic wars, you will see very clearly that the prosperity of the United States for some years before we finally went to war with the British was hurt to such an extent that the war became finally inevitable, even though I think there was no one in this country who really wanted to fight the British in 1812. Now from the Civil War on up to the early part of the present century we were in the period of full expansion across the American continent. We are building our transcontinental railways. We were developing the central west and then the far west. In this period of expansion we could say to ourselves that we had the largest free trade area in the world within our own borders. We certainly were able to produce enough for the mouths of our own consumers. We had no surplus of agricultural products. We had no surplus of manufactured products. We had no surplus of capital.

But recently the situation has radically changed. There are two considerations that control the foreign policy of any nation. Strike out idealism; idealism does not enter into international relations. We enter into relations with other nations first of all for our security, and second, for our prosperity. We struggle with them for markets.

About this second consideration, the United States for the

fifty years preceding the recent war, did not really have to think very much at all, for we were kept so busy here that we did not need foreign markets. We did not need any outlet for our capital. Have we changed? Most people think we have. . .

Now, if we are going to develop the merchant marine, if we are going to develop a foreign commerce, the most important thing for us and for the peace of the world is that we have some sort of an international maritime law. We should put an end to the present anarchy on the seas. We must put an end to the present situation which is, frankly, that the nation with the largest navy interprets international law on the seas as it sees fit. It is not bound by rules for contraband, by rules for blockade. It may interfere with the commerce of any nation, of neutrals with neutrals, in order to win its own war, and then say to the nations, "We are fighting your battle as well as our own." In the recent war the British were more or less fighting our battle and therefore I was not much opposed to what Great Britain did. But there may come a time when we may not feel that Great Britain is fighting our battle, if she happens to be fighting France, or Italy, or Russia, or is engaged in some other war, and interferes with our commerce.

The initiative in regard to disarmament must come from the British and not from ourselves. Why? For the simple reason that the British at the present time have the largest number of ships. If we agree with the British to have a five years' naval holiday, or to suspend our building program for the present, or to limit armaments or anything of that kind, what we are doing is this: we, a nation of one hundred ten million people, depending very largely now for our prosperity, for our security upon sea-power, are saying to a nation which does not number seven million white men, "See here, we will give you the privilege of continuing to guard the seas and interpret international law as you want." We cannot do that.

Let me say, that I don't think it would make for peace. It would not make for good relations between this country and Great Britain if we renounced our rights to equal power on the high seas. It would not make for world peace. What we want to do in regard to disarmament is to say, "Yes, we'll stop our building program, conditionally—"if" . . . There is a great big "if." Now the "if" is this: we should say, "Look

here, Great Britain, you have the supremacy of the seas. We don't want to wrest it from you. It is not because we want to have more ships than you that we adopted this shipbuilding program, but we have had a few unpleasant experiences in the past few years. We are coming to a period when we'll have a great foreign trade in competition with yours. We have a large merchant marine. We don't know how to run it yet, but after all, while there is life there is hope, and we want to be sure that on the sea international law rules in the same manner as on land. Let us get back to 1913 and back to the Council of London. Let us get back to the London Declaration of 1913. You sign the London Declaration and we will stop building our great fleet, and if you don't sign the London Declaration, we would be untrue to ourselves and untrue to our children, and we would be false to the ideals of world peace if we agreed to abate one single whit this naval program that we have at the present time." We should put England up against the proposition either of agreeing to the Declaration of London or to some fair law. We don't want to dictate our will to the British at all. We are willing to compromise with them. But on the seas we want it to be a case of live and let live. If necessary to come to some agreement, then we can begin to talk about disarmament and we can begin to talk about limiting our present building program.

Let us take the other side of it. What would happen if we did what Mr. MacDonald argues for? If we stop our building program now we should be still in a position of inferiority. We should not have the sea-power Great Britain has. Now giving the British all the credit for good-will in the world, if we stop our naval building program and say to them, "We are taking the lead," as Mr. MacDonald says, "We have given up our naval building program. We have confidence that you will immediately give up yours,"—well, they might, and again they might not. And even if they did give it up they still would have a superiority over ours. And if, having already thrown away all our trumps, we were then to find that the British were unwilling to argue international law and maritime law, if we then go back to Congress, do you think we could get Congress to vote such a naval building program again? We could not say to the British, "Look here, if you don't come to terms we are going to start our naval building program again." If

it is a question of good faith, it must come from London and not from Washington.

Similarly, the question of the Japanese alliance with Great Britain. Now it is said that the British are not bound to help Japan in a war upon us. Well, in the reading of the treaty as it stands at present, that is a contingency. There is an "if" in that also. It depends upon our adherence to a certain arbitration treaty which has not yet been definitely arranged. So it is not a thing which is a binding clause in the contract as yet. They say that when this new alliance is made between Japan and Great Britain, there will be a clear provision in it stating that under no circumstances will Great Britain ever combine with Japan against us. Well, if the British want us to stop our building program, let the British cabinet make such a declaration and send it to Washington, and say, "In renewing the alliance with Japan we propose and we promise that we shall put a clause in that will prevent under any circumstances or any contingency our uniting with Japan against you." Then they would show us by that promise that there was not any possibility of this contingency.

In conclusion, I want to come back to what I was saying about the two compartments in any foreign policy—security and prosperity. It is possible to envisage foreign policy from the standpoint of security and the standpoint of prosperity from an idealistic point of view. It is possible to see where idealism and our material interests combine. The truest and best kind of internationalism is where a number of nations come together and frankly recognize each other's interests and try to see if they cannot by pooling them get together and each one of them be better off for it. I have always felt in regard to the League of Nations that we should never have a League of any kind that would be successful, that would not be simply meaningless phrases unless we were able to convince the individual nations that their own interests were bettered by joining it.

Now when we come to that—and our propaganda should be directed toward that aim—some people say, as on the question of disarmament—"Let someone lead. Let someone start." But can we—can any other nation, abandon its own security? Will any nation jeopardize its own prosperity when it sees that others are not doing it? I think that is the very heart and secret of the whole trouble here. How are we Americans going

to influence Europe? Are we going to influence Europe by forgiving them the war debts? I don't think so at all. I don't think I ever forgave a man a debt, that I did not feel either that I was an ass or that he thought I was. Can we do it by saying to them, "Well children, you go and settle your own quarrels—we are going to sit back?" I say it depends upon the question of our trade in the future. Is this country able to consume everything that is produced in it? Is our prosperity at all dependent upon foreign markets? If it is dependent upon foreign markets, then we shall have to insist upon having equal facilities, equal opportunities in all this foreign commerce with every other nation. We have to insist, in other words, upon the open door. So when we come to look upon the relations of Europe, one nation with the other, we cannot ask any of these nations to take the initiative in doing something that would be against its security and its prosperity any more than we can with a good heart advocate that our own nation should do so.

DISARMAMENT AND PREPAREDNESS¹

From the beginning of the World War in August, 1914, until months after the armistice was declared on November 11, 1918, the military unpreparedness of the United States was a matter of discussion that transcended everything of public interest in this country. The newspapers considered it a topic of first importance both editorially and as to news. Weekly papers, monthly magazines, technical journals, all devoted a great part of their space to our lack of military preparedness. Books on every conceivable angle of this subject poured from the publishers' presses. Senators, Representatives, city officials, publicists and clergymen talked as often as anyone would listen to them on the "crime" of our unprepared state in the military sense. Preparedness societies were organized and did admirable service in the cause. An amazing and very earnest total effort went into this outpouring of criticism that was meant to be constructive and was also filled with the spirit of resolve that the United States never should be caught in such a condition again. To Army and Navy officers, however, this outburst wore an aspect that either filled them with a profound regret

¹ From Army and Navy Journal. p. 540-1. January 8, 1921.

or awakened a sense of grim humor. They felt, and with justice, that the American people were paying for their indifference to military affairs in bitterness and mortification of spirit, enormous sums of money, in lives. Our Army and Navy officers hoped, more earnestly, perhaps, than any other one class of Americans, that out of all this turmoil and effort the American people would learn the one vital lesson taught by the war, the need of the adoption by our country of a suitable military policy and the strict maintenance of it.

From the present craze for disarmament that is sweeping over the country and from the expressed attitude of leaders in Congress as to the reduction of the personnel of the Army and Navy it is plain that this lesson has not been learned. Since the publication of the article on "Plans to Reduce Naval Construction," on page 458 of our issue of December 18, there has been an extraordinary spread of the idea for the reduction of the Navy in particular through the adoption of the plan for a "naval holiday" to be agreed to by Great Britain, Japan and the United States. From Boston to Portland, Ore., the daily papers have taken up this idea with an earnestness worthy of a better cause and are either warm advocates of it or lukewarmly opposed to it. The Portland Oregonian says that "disarmament will be effected through a league reorganized on the lines to be agreed on between President Harding and the Senate." The Boston Transcript, one of the few papers openly opposed to the general idea, says "that disarmament, that unpreparedness, and not new battleships is exactly what we are now paying for with heavy taxes on our breakfast tables and our backs."

The Scientific American says editorially: "Outside of the Secretary of the Navy and a small minority of naval officers the Navy as a whole believe that we should cut down rather than increase our naval appropriations." The editor of this same publication in a personal statement favoring disarmament says: "If we persist in this policy [of carrying out the Navy building program] we shall take the place of Germany as the war pace-maker of the world." The New York World, which is carrying on an extensive campaign in favor of disarmament, is doing so only for economic reasons, as it states in these words: "What The World is concerned about at this time is not the relation of a reduction of armament to the maintenance of peace, but the relation of a reduction of armament to the pressing question of national and international bankruptcy. It is now primarily an

economic issue, and it should be considered as an economic issue." Japanese newspapers either are heartily in favor of this disarmament plan or else put the sole responsibility for its being carried out on the United States. British papers generally appear to favor the idea, but the Navy League of Great Britain urges the United States and Great Britain to combine in policing the seas "and in framing a sane naval policy to which other powers must perforce conform."

Senator Borah, who introduced a resolution in Congress proposing a disarmament scheme, declared to the Washington correspondent of the Philadelphia Public Ledger that "among hundreds of commendatory letters and telegrams reaching the Senator from Idaho from widely separated sections of the United States he has had but two voicing opposition." The paper adds, "from his colleagues in the Senate, Mr. Borah declares, he has received assurance of support on all hands." Only one member of the Senate has expressed hostility to the idea of the "naval holiday," we learn from the same source. Chairman Kahn, of the House Committee on Military Affairs, says in a statement on this question: "The tax upon the peoples of the leading nations is a terrific burden, due largely to the participation of those nations in the World War. To add to the burden by building up enormous fleets, fortifications and the manufacture of munitions, in my belief, is a vital question that the statesmen of all great nations ought to seriously consider. I hope that an agreement may be effected that will prevent the increase of the load now being borne by the taxpayers of these nations." A Philadelphia ministers' association and a woman's peace society have added their official voices to this demand for disarmament.

There is one nation that is not led astray by this disarmament talk. As might be expected, that nation is France, which usually has the correct instinct in military matters. General Fayolle sent a message to the New York World in which he declared that until Germany executes the terms of the peace treaty she has signed, "nothing can be done" in the way of disarmament. General Maude d'Huy expressed the same sentiments, only more forcibly. General Sarraill believes that disarmament should begin first on land and then on the sea and blames competition in armaments to the militarists. Denys Cochin, the French Minister of Blockade in the war, says that when America signs the peace treaty she may then "come to us

and invite us to disarm," and Stephen Lausanne, the editor of *Le Matin* of Paris, says that while France is ready to disarm on the sea, "we cannot disarm on land until Germany shall have begun to repair the ruin she has created." The nation that first saw that wars meant the employment of the whole nation and not merely its military elements, as France did by its famous proclamation of 1793, is not likely to be misled again by its pacifist and Socialist elements. Is it possible that we failed to learn this lesson as we fought side by side with the French at the Marne, at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne?

Dangerous as is this "naval holiday" plan, it should not overshadow the importance of the expressed determination of some Representatives in Congress to so reduce the appropriations in Congress that the Army may have no more than one hundred seventy-five thousand men, Mr. Good stating that he would like to reduce this number to one hundred fifty thousand, and that the Navy enlisted personnel should be reduced to a figure as low as seventy-five thousand men. In spite of the fact that the Fleet lacks the very important element of battle cruisers and fleet submarines, it is in so much better condition, so far as numbers are concerned, that the adoption of the "naval holiday" plan would be of infinitely less harm to the country than such proposals as that of reducing the Army and Navy personnel to the extent indicated by members of Congress. A modern army and a modern navy cannot be made to "work" with a number of men limited to such an extent as is proposed for our Army and Navy. Costly as is the waste of war, it can be outdone by the wastes of peace in a military establishment not maintained at a proper strength. The problem at the present time is how to make the people and Congress realize this fundamental truth that we began avoiding on June 2, 1784, when we reduced our Army to eighty men.

DRIFTING TOWARD UNPREPAREDNESS¹

That the combined movements toward the reduction of the Army and Navy personnel, the delimitations of Service appropriations with the consequent harmful effect on matériel that

¹ From *Army and Navy Journal*. p. 669. February 12, 1921.

is likely to ensue, and the spirit shown in Congress to interfere with purely technical matters concerning weapons and ships, all show a strong trend toward unpreparedness, is a conviction of many Army and Navy officers. Major General Peter C. Harris, The Adjutant General, made a statement to the Washington correspondent of the New York World on this general subject of the danger of unpreparedness on February 6, in the course of which he said: "The loss to the world in money and lives during the last year of the war is the direct result of the failure of the United States to make reasonable preparation during the first three years of the World War. Ask the fathers and mothers of the young men who now fill soldiers' graves, and of those who are maimed for life, if they would have been willing to have their taxes increased could they have realized that by doing so their sons now probably would have been alive and well. In 1917 there were in the Regular Army and National Guard about three hundred thousand enlisted men. There are today in the National Guard seventy-five thousand enlisted men, and Congress will no doubt limit the Regular Army to one hundred seventy-five thousand or possibly one hundred fifty thousand. So now, three years after the close of the war, we are to have an Army smaller by fifty thousand enlisted men, Regular Army and National Guard, than in 1917. Experience is a wise teacher, but not every one profits by its lessons, however plain they may be."

LESSONS FROM OUR RECENT HISTORY¹

In view of the policies of other governments, and the conditions existing throughout the world, Congress would be acting imprudently and in disregard of the plain lessons of the past ten years if it should now proceed upon a program of rapid American naval disarmament. We ought to have adopted a plan of immense naval expansion in 1914, to be carried out in the three following years. If we had done this, we would have saved ourselves much of the loss and calamity that befell us because of our failure to act responsibly and intelligently. Such a policy on our part would also have served to shorten the

¹ From Review of Reviews. 64:4. July, 1921.

European war, and to save the lives of at least a million of the best young men of the European countries. There were well-meaning persons in the United States who wrote and spoke constantly in the years from 1914 to 1917 in favor of scrapping even such naval armament as we then possessed, on the theory that this would be a beautiful object lesson to warring Europe and would lead the world to peace and harmony. If we had possessed three more good battleships in 1898, we could easily have settled the Cuban question by negotiation with Spain and avoided a war. If we had spent a \$1,000,000,000 a year for army and navy preparedness, in addition to the ordinary appropriations, during the fiscal years ending in the summers of 1915, 1916 and 1917, we would have saved ourselves the subsequent expenditure of at least five times the \$3,000,000,000, and we should have saved the world at least \$100,000,000,000 of the stupendous economic loss that the war has entailed.

We have expressed such views upon preparedness, consistently and steadily, in this periodical for twenty-five years. And surely at this time, when their soundness is so evident to all those capable of seeing things as they are, and of thinking from premises to just conclusions, it would be absurd to oppose the naval armament policies supported alike by the Wilson and Harding Administrations and by both parties in Congress. Does it follow, therefore, that in upholding the present armament policy we repudiate the idea of disarmament, and accept the doctrine of militarism? On the contrary, we hold militarism in abhorrence, and demand disarmament as essential if we are to save what is valuable in our civilization. The United States is recognized everywhere as potentially foremost on the side of justice, order, independence and equality among the nations and peoples of the earth. If those who have their own ends to gain, regardless of the equal rights of their neighbors, insist upon the use of force, there is no way by which war can be kept from spreading far and wide except by the show of firm strength on the part of those who stand for right and justice. In the sphere of local affairs we do not disarm the police as they confront criminal rioting in the streets. On the contrary, we employ and arm extra policemen, call in the sheriff with his deputies, and if necessary ask the Governor to send State troops.

OUR NEEDS WITH RESPECT TO AN ARMY¹

The war demonstrated certain things about our Army:

1. Under a skeletonized peace strength system we have no units properly equipped to fight—witness the period necessary for training the 1st Division for active combat;

2. To raise a large army, conscription is the only fair and effective method;

3. A large army can be raised and trained very quickly if the officers and equipment are ready;

4. To equip a large army quickly a plan for the mobilization of industry to war affairs must be prepared beforehand.

Since the Civil War our army has engaged in the Indian Campaigns, the Spanish War, the Relief of Peking, the Peace Expedition into Mexico, and the World War. In all of these but the World War well-equipped expeditionary forces were all that were required. For anything in the future of similar character four divisions of infantry (eighty thousand men) with the proper other arms would in all probability be sufficient, but we should have at least four divisions at full strength and in perfect condition ready at all times. If we should get into another large war we should have to rely on conscription as we did in the World War to provide the men. At present there is no law granting to the President the power to apply conscription in case of war. There certainly should be such a law on the statute books so that the War Department might know its provisions and have plans ready for carrying them out.

Before the United States entered the World War the Council of National Defense drew up a plan for a census of all plants capable of war work and a system for keeping these plants informed and prepared for what they would have to do in case of war. This plan called for very little expense. Had it been in operation it would have saved millions of dollars and months of delay. Some such plan should be inaugurated now.

We can have a small but highly trained and completely ready force for expeditionary work, and the plans for the mobilization of men and industry for a national war for very little if any more than the cost of the system of skeleton units which are

¹ From *World's Work*. 42:125. June, 1921.

now immediately ready for any service and no provision at all for a great struggle.

The Secretary of War has announced that General Pershing is to be the head of an "expeditionary" staff ready for instant action. For possible small expeditions this would imply at least the four prepared full strength divisions mentioned. For the possibility of a larger war it would imply that a plan for the mobilization of men and material will be on the statute books, for not even General Pershing can make preparations to lead an army unless he knows what resources he can count on and that can only be fixed in advance by law.

The President is committed to a voluntary training policy similar to that which Mr. Garrison suggested when he was Secretary of War. How much value this will be to the national defence depends upon how many young men volunteer for the training. The theory that the support of the country by taxes is compulsory but that the defence thereof is optional, is hardly tenable, but nevertheless if some young men realize the obligation to prepare for the possible necessity of fighting for their country it will be that much gain.

REGULAR ARMY NEEDS TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND MEN¹

Within a few days the Senate will be engaged in the debate of the Army Appropriation bill, which as passed by the House provided funds estimated to pay for a force of one hundred fifty thousand enlisted men. This action, in the face of a recent act providing for reduction of the Army to one hundred seventy-five thousand men, and of the testimony of Brigadier General Herbert M. Lord, Chief of Finance, that the average enlisted strength of the Army during 1922 will be approximately one hundred eighty-one thousand men, has so confused the situation that it is expected the Senate will take some action making for clarity and also for following the provisions of the Army Reorganization act, by which the War Department will be enabled to carry out the mission laid down for the Regular

¹ From Army and Navy Journal. p. 696-7. February 19, 1921.

Army in that act of June 4, 1920. But the Senate should go further and provide an appropriation for a larger Army for the measure of national defense provided in the Reorganization act cannot be carried out in conformity with the law with less than two hundred thousand enlisted men. We suggest to the Senate, and to the conferees-to-be on the Army Appropriation bill—which, with the Naval Appropriation bill and other supply bills, the President-elect has indicated he desires shall be enacted before the end of the present session of Congress—these few facts bearing upon the required strength of the enlisted personnel of the Regular Army:

First, the strength and character of our overseas garrisons. For the Philippine Islands, in addition to the native troops, for Porto Rico, Panama, Hawaii, China and Alaska, the force to meet peace requirements cannot be cut under thirty-five thousand men.

Second, to garrison the fixed fortifications of the coast defenses within the United States requires at a minimum twelve thousand men.

Third, the training of the National Guard; the Organized Reserves and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, requires enlisted men detailed permanently with these forces; also certain units of the Regular Army at the annual training camps and maneuvers. The minimum for these purposes is twelve thousand men.

Fourth, the overhead of the Army, embraced in the administrative and supply services at all posts, camps and stations, the school detachments and school troops at general and special Service schools and the United States Military Academy, must be developed and maintained in time of peace. For these purposes not less than thirty-eight thousand men are required.

Fifth, for the special and technical units which go to make up the great bulk of corps and army troops and the General Headquarters Reserve, not less than thirty-five thousand men are required. For it is necessary for the Army to know in time of peace what organization and what equipment it needs in time of war and how to use them.

Sixth, for one division at war strength and three divisions at peace strength—the irreducible minimum—fifty thousand men are required. This minimum contemplates a division at war

strength on the Mexican border, and divisions at peace strength located near the Pacific coast, in the middle west and near the Atlantic coast.

Seventh, the Cavalry arm requires not less than eighteen thousand men.

Adding these seven requirements, we find that the minimum peace strength of the Regular Army (exclusive of Philippine Scouts) demands the services of two hundred thousand men. A Regular Army of two hundred thousand enlisted men and 17,117 commissioned officers functioning under normal conditions can be maintained for approximately \$300,000,000 a year. In addition to the Regular Army, the military part of the preparedness program established in the act of June 4, 1920, requires a reasonable amount of funds specifically appropriated for the development of the National Guard, the Organized Reserves and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in order that these forces, with the assistance of the Regular Army, may be completely organized, partially equipped and partially trained in time of peace. With this allowance of funds, and all other expenses required for purely military purposes, the total annual amount of money necessary for the effective development of the military program will be well under $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1 per cent of the national wealth; surely a low rate of national insurance through national defense.

The Regular Army of 17,117 officers and two hundred thousand enlisted men is unquestionably the minimum peace establishment that can effectively carry out a mission which is based upon the American principle of national defense and which has for its purpose a reasonable degree of military preparation in time of peace to meet a war emergency. To maintain this minimum force and thereby accomplish the purpose for which the Regular Army exists, is wise and economical. To maintain less than this minimum force and thereby fail to accomplish the purpose for which the Regular Army exists is both foolhardy and wasteful. For the great controlling factor in determining the strength of the Regular Army is its mission in this matter of preparation. Since the Regular Army is a body of professional soldiers maintained in time of peace for the purpose of insuring preparation for war, that is the reason for its existence, that is its mission. Success or failure in war is largely determined by the proper or improper functioning of the combat troops. That every officer should see service in time of peace in the type of

division he is to serve in time of war is beyond question. That the units which make up a division should be tested in time of peace in organization, equipment and armament is also undebatable. As many officers as possible should have experience as division staff officers. But we urge in the final consideration of the appropriation bill that Senators and Representatives ask themselves how it will be possible to win success through the proper functioning of combat divisions under the proposed reduction in personnel. When approximately one hundred five thousand enlisted men are required for the minimum of one war-strength and three peace-strength divisions, and a minimum of some ninety-seven thousand enlisted men are required for fixed duties apart from the combat divisions, how can the Army properly function with appropriations which would limit the total enlisted strength to one hundred fifty thousand? We leave the answer to the Senate and the conferees-to-be on the Army Appropriation bill in the confident belief that they will reach an adjustment which does not demand the impossible from the Regular Army. We ask them to contemplate the act of Congress of June 4, 1920, wherein they laid down the law authorizing war preparation in time of peace so as to insure a reasonable degree of efficiency and economy in expenditures of vast sums of money that war will cost when war comes, also a reasonable degree of efficiency on the battlefield that will give our youths who go out to fight a reasonable chance for their lives. Can these things be done within the reasonable expectation of a nation of one hundred five million people with an enlisted strength cut below two hundred thousand? It is for those Senators and Representatives alone to answer these questions, for theirs is the great responsibility.

THE FUTURE OF OUR NAVY¹

The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger, U.S.N., president of the General Board, which appears on page 622, directs the board to present a report on the question of the Navy's building program. The Secretary's purpose is evidently to bring out expert opinion which may clarify the general discussion of naval armaments.

¹ From Army and Navy Journal. p. 620-1. January 29, 1921.

disarmament, and of the vulnerability of surface ships to attack from the air and from under the surface. This is in connection with the Senate's endeavor to establish whether a suspension for six months of naval building progress is practical and with discussion in the press of the types of ships to be considered most effective in future warfare.

Among line officers of the Navy in Washington who commented on the Secretary's letter the opinion was expressed that the part of the navies in the World War, if it proved anything, proved that the capital ship was the preponderant fighting unit. These officers also hold that the naval operations of the war produced only general principles as a guide to a country like the United States, lying between two oceans and with very great coast lines, since these operations were restricted to areas no greater than the Gulf of Mexico. It is pointed out that the differences of opinion as to what constitutes an adequate Navy for the United States are inextricably bound up in the question whether this nation intends to maintain a Navy for defense, pure and simple, or whether the Navy shall be built up to assume the offensive if need be, and be powerful enough to win in any field of battle a naval war into which this nation may be drawn. A nation lacking in wisdom, to be sure, may commit itself to a policy of throwing a cordon of defense ships about its coasts and waiting for attack. In the war with Spain the United States sent a fleet to Manila under Dewey, but it did not cross the Atlantic to seek battle with Cervera's fleet. It strengthened the enemies of Spain in a nearby Spanish possession and forced Spain to cross the Atlantic to meet the gauge of battle, with what result is history. Assuming, because the example is suggested by much of the discussion in the public press, that Japan followed our example of 1918, then "the shoe would be on the other foot." The naval analysts ask, "What would Japan be expected to do?" And they answer the question by saying: "To seize the Philippine Islands?" Would the United States then countenance a policy of let-alone and demand that our Navy be kept near our coasts under such a condition and allow the capture of the islands to be unopposed? Such a situation, they add, is unthinkable to the American mind; consequently our Navy would be expected to have the ships and the power to fight for the recapture of the islands and to win that fight. Such being the situation,

these officers say that the adequate Navy the United States must have is that Navy which can cope with any situation successfully and be ready to win decisively a battle seven thousand miles from a Pacific coast base.

Admitting the swift advance of attacking devices operating in the air, these line officers are still doubtful whether aeronautics from the war point of view has developed to the point where it can be seriously considered as a material factor for weakening the fighting power of surface ships. Articles in the daily press which have stressed the effect of air bombs exploded in a test lacking wholly in battle conditions, they add, are unsound when they seek to impress the minds of people with the effect of explosives under test conditions as bearing a true relation to the possible damage to fighting ships from the air during actual battle.

The Navy's Strength and Our Foreign Policies

Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, U.S.N., retired, member of the General Board, in his testimony before the Senate committee during the inquiry into the Navy's conduct of the war, spoke of the fact that while the strength of the Navy to be maintained during peace or mobilized for war is a matter of policy for which the Government is responsible, the Navy Department is responsible for advising the Government as to the naval strength which will be required to enforce our foreign policies. "A navy," he said, "cannot be built and trained in a year or two years, and consequently the foresight necessary to provide for the construction and maintenance of a navy adequate to its future task is of the utmost importance. The expenditure of less money than required for a navy strong enough to enforce our foreign policies is folly, for failure to make adequate preparation during peace causes the waste of millions when war is eventually forced upon us." The disarmament enthusiasts in Congress and out of it should face this simple truth enunciated by Admiral Mayo. "The differences of opinion as to what constitutes an adequate navy," he further said, "can be traced to our lack of definite foreign policy." This is the cause of much of the discussion as to naval appropriations which takes place annually before the Congressional naval committees. The remedy, Admiral Mayo said, lies outside of the Navy Department. Those responsible for our

foreign policy should definitely inform the War and Navy Departments as to the foreign policies which the Army and Navy are to be prepared to enforce. Until the Navy is provided with a definite ideal in the form of a definite statement of the foreign policies which it is to be prepared to enforce the management of the Navy cannot formulate building programs and war plans except upon a mere hypothesis as to such policies.

The Admiral lays down the mission of the Senate in this controversy and does it with precision and logic. The General Board may anticipate the future type of fighting ship, basing its report on an analysis of naval warfare of the immediate past. But back of this whole question is the fundamental one of this nation's relation to other nations and to foreign affairs. Therein the Senate may have its word and an administration its policy. But no Senate, no administration, not ourselves as a nation, can wholly read the future. Granting the good-will of the world at the present moment toward a policy of reduction in armament, none can determine when economic conditions or self-interest may tempt some nation to seek to evade the conditions of any agreement on the subject of disarmament. In the future, as the past has shown, there is only one adequate policy for this country, and that is to be prepared with adequate armed forces to meet any eventuality that may arise. On this basis should the strength of the Navy be maintained.

A NAVY TO MATCH ENGLAND'S¹

If the United States stops building battleships it will be because some other nation hasn't got the money to build and wants us to stop, Rear Admiral H. McL. P. Huse, U.S.N., the new commandant at the New York Navy Yard, declared last night at a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria given by the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of New York in commemoration of the one hundred eighty-ninth anniversary of the birth of George Washington. He added that it was his opinion that it would not be a bad idea for us to keep on building.

Admiral Huse asserted that the statement often made that this is the end of the battleship must be qualified with such a big "if" that none must be misled. He said that so far nothing

¹ From New York Times. February 23, 1921.

has shown that the battleship does not continue the ruling power of the seas. He referred to the cost of battleships, which is now about \$40,000,000 each, he said, and added that this might cause us to have fewer rivals.

In the determination of naval strategy, regarding the size of the navy, Admiral Huse said, the Navy officials must first know the policy of the Government—that the Navy officials must know against what country we are planning to arm. He said that the same thing applied to the Army.

"I know that it will make some of you catch your breath," continued Admiral Huse, "if I say we will have to have a navy large enough to fight England." It might be said, he added, that such talk should not be indulged in, that there is no talk in England about a possible naval engagement with the United States.

The Admiral has just returned from Europe and he said that England is openly discussing just what would be needed in the way of a navy in case there is trouble with the United States. The English papers, he said, come out openly in discussing the question, and he inquired why there should not be an open discussion in this country.

Only Three Great Navies

There are only three great navies in the world, he pointed out, those of the United States, England and Japan. So, then, in answering inquiries from Congress as to what are the naval requirements, it must be necessary first to determine what is to be the policy of this country. If it is England that we are to arm against, then we must equal England's navy, he said. He added that it must be remembered that Japan and England are allies, and that it would then be necessary to have a navy to meet that alliance.

As an analogy, Admiral Huse cited the construction of a bridge. If the bridge reaches only three-quarters of the span of the stream, then it is of no service and had best not be built at all, he said. He added that the same is true of the navy. If it will not do what it is built for, it is of no service. He repeated that it is a question of policy and that if we are to build a navy against England, then we must equal it, and if we are to build against Japan, then we must double that country's naval strength.

"Take Germany," continued Admiral Huse, "We know she built her navy against England." He said that we must build destroyers able to cross the Pacific Ocean and still have fuel when they get there. "England," he said, "has had her fuel stations. We have our fuel ships. This is something that England has not. England needs a defense against a submarine blockade. A submarine blockade would not be effective against us.

"We have to know in the navy against whom we build ships. This is necessary, so that we can decide on what kind of ships we must build. We must construct different ships against Japan than against England.

SHALL ENGLAND CONTINUE TO LEAD?¹

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was given an insight today into the complications that surround the question of naval disarmament.

With Admiral Koontz, chief of naval operations, before it, the committee learned some of the fine technical points raised in the minds of naval men by Senator Borah's resolution for a concerted reduction of armament by Great Britain, Japan and America.

The committee was made aware also that no United States naval officer is willing to consider a change in program that will prevent America's naval strength equalling that of Great Britain.

Koontz denied to the committee that President Wilson or the State Department had consulted with him concerning a call for a world conference on disarmament under the authority of the naval act of 1916. Koontz said that so far as he was aware, nothing had ever been done, and an official of the government was considering action under that provision, which suggested that the President invite other nations to send representatives to a disarmament conference in Washington.

It is the view of American naval men that Borah's resolution, in its present general terms, would permit Great Britain to clinch her present predominance and forestall the otherwise inevitable equalization of the navies of the two countries.

¹ From New York Call. January 4, 1921.

The greatest obstacle to a three-cornered naval disarmament scheme by England, Japan and the United States is admittedly England's unwillingness to see any other fleet take the seas on equal terms with her own. To allow this would be to abandon her naval policy of centuries. For several days there have been hints in Washington that Great Britain has conveyed the word to representatives of the incoming administration that she is now willing to admit the existence of a naval power equal to herself. No confirmation of this could be had, obviously, even if it were true, since it would mean the admission that the British Government had been going over the head of the State Department in an important matter, and it would certainly result in a real diplomatic break.

However, there are many reasons to believe it is not true. Persons close to the British Embassy declare Great Britain never was more unwilling to allow her naval supremacy to be questioned. There is real sentiment, and lots of it, they say for mutual disarmament, but this does not contemplate bringing England's strength down to the point where she would cease to lead the world. All the old arguments for the maintenance of her supremacy are still in force, they say. Principal of these is England's peculiar geographical position and the fact that only her navy connects her with her vast overseas dominions. England could be starved in a short time by a nation possessing a stronger navy, they say, but to starve the United States would be impossible.

"It is my business," a First Lord of the British Admiralty once said to the writer, "to watch the naval programs of other countries and to study what they mean. When any such program appears to me to threaten our supremacy, it is my business to see that this threat cannot be carried out. That means merely that I must see that our strength is increased so that we keep consistently out of danger.

"Inasmuch as the United States can outbuild England, if this presages a clash between the two navies the time for us to have it is while we still can defeat the American navy."

It is this feeling that disarmament advocates in England will have to overcome before a program can be agreed upon whereby the navies of these two countries will be equal, after both have been reduced.

"Any movement toward disarmament," Secretary Daniels

said today, "should include all the nations, but when the United States sits down at a conference to disarm, the United States should sit as a nation equal in naval strength to any other naval power."

NAVAL SUPREMACY: GREAT BRITAIN OR THE UNITED STATES¹

While the nations of Europe are tending the grievous wounds they received during the Great War, the creation of naval armaments in the United States and Japan is being continued with greater activity than ever before and at a far higher cost; a post-war battleship involves an expenditure of from £7,000,000 to £8,000,000 as compared with about £1,000,000 less than twenty years ago. The shipyards, engine ships, and armament factories in America and Japan have never been so busy as they are at present while similar establishments in this country and on the European continent have in hand not a single capital ship.

Now that peace has been signed there remain only three navies of importance—the British, the American and the Japanese. The relative strength of these three forces in 1924 can now be estimated with some confidence. Disregarding vessels projected but assuming that those now under construction will be completed in the next four years, the standing of these Powers in capital ships will be as follows:

	GREAT BRITAIN		UNITED STATES		JAPAN	
	No.	Dis- placement Tons	No.	Dis- placement Tons	No.	Dis- placement Tons
Battleships and Battle Cruisers						
First Class: 14-in. Guns and Over....	18	487,450	27	983,000	14	438,000
Second Class: Smaller Guns	18	395,840	8	167,650	3	59,950
Totals	36	883,290	35	1,150,650	17	497,950

In the light of the activity in America and Japan, on the one hand, and inactivity in Europe, on the other, two arresting facts emerge from an examination of the naval outlook.

(1) By 1923, or at latest by 1924, the British Fleet will have

¹ By Archibald Hurd. From *Fortnightly Review*. 108:916-30. December, 1920.

ceased to occupy pride of place on the seas, which it has held for over three hundred years. The Trident will have passed into the hands of the American people unless some unforeseen event occurs on this or the other side of the Atlantic, thus fulfilling, by a process he did not foresee, the prophecy of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who, in the Memorandum which accompanied the German Navy Act of 1900, remarked that even if "a great naval Power" should succeed in meeting the German Fleet with considerable superiority of strength, "the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet."

(2) If we ignore the new program of eight capital ships which Japan is about to put in hand and take into account only such capital ships as are now on the slips and advancing toward completion, it is apparent that in 1924 Japan will be the "runner up" as the second greatest naval Power in the world, being weaker than Great Britain and far stronger than France or Italy, neither of these two countries having laid down a capital ship during the past six years. Indeed, as first-class naval Powers, France and Italy have already disappeared below the horizon.

The hope that acceptance of the principles embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations would lead to a general limitation of naval armaments must be abandoned. Neither the United States nor Japan is prepared to acquiesce in any such policy, whatever may be the inclination of other Powers. Both these countries are pressing forward programs of naval construction which will change radically the balance of power by sea, as has been shown. Six years have elapsed since it was asserted, on the outbreak of the Great War, that it would prove the last of all wars and would lead to the adoption of a policy of, at least, partial disarmament, affecting navies as well as armies. Since this confident prophecy was made, the United States and Japan have embarked upon notable projects for strengthening their naval as well as their military forces. Both these States were far removed from the main seats of the late conflict; the United States, in particular, remained free until the spring of 1917 to pursue her own national policy with little or no distraction, while, from first to last, the part which Japan

took in the struggle was comparatively small. In these circumstances the Great War swept on toward its close, drawing into its vortex the manhood and wealth of the principal nations of the Old World, while leaving the United States and Japan practically unscathed, except in so far as they suffered from the reaction of events in Europe.

On the other hand, there appears on the Statute Book of the American Congress a significant clause which was inserted at the instance of President Wilson in the Navy Appropriation Act of 1916; this measure authorised the construction of what amounts to a new American Fleet at an expenditure which will probably fall not far short of £250,000,000. This clause foreshadowed conditions in which the President would be authorised to arrest naval construction in the United States. After reference to a nebulous proposal to hold a world conference, "not later than the close of the war in Europe," to formulate "a plan for a court of arbitration or other tribunal, to which disputed questions shall be referred for adjudication and peaceful settlement and to consider the question of disarmament," it was added:

"If at any time before the construction authorized by this Act shall have been contracted for there shall have been established, with the cooperation of the United States of America, an international tribunal or tribunals competent to secure peaceful determination of all international disputes, then and in that case such naval expenditures as may be inconsistent with the engagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals may be suspended when so ordered by the President of the United States."

What has happened since that notable clause was incorporated in the Navy Appropriation Act of 1916, which was passed when Europe had already been plunged into the crucible of war and men of vision were entertaining the hope that the struggle would signalize the end of all wars? The world, it was suggested, would emerge from the horrors witnessed by sea and by land determined at whatever risk to abate the feverish competition in naval and military armaments, and would hold out its hands eagerly toward any reasonable prospect of finding a peaceful solution of international problems. It was in those circumstances that the United States committed itself to a larger naval program than had ever been entertained by any of

the Powers of the Old World, not excluding Great Britain and Germany. For during the period of naval competition which Germany forced upon successive British Governments, neither country adopted a program which, in the number of units or in the cost involved, was comparable to that which was presented to Congress by Mr. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy Department, and supported by President Wilson with all the authority over American public opinion which he then exercised.

The League of Nations, so far as the United States is concerned, is indeed dead. Senator Borah holds that the result of the Presidential Election is "a clear indication of the people's decision against any League," and he has affirmed that "America must not be dragged in by the back-door." There is less difference of opinion between the President-elect and this Senator than might appear on the surface, for the former is also opposed to "a surrender of the United States," and there is no indication that his administration will lift a finger to arrest the expansion of the American Navy in accordance with the plans adopted by Congress in 1916. The work of building all the vessels will undoubtedly go forward, and the hopes which were once entertained by the advocates of a policy of partial naval disarmament must be abandoned, at any rate so far as the United States is affected. Expectations have been raised throughout the United States of a triumph of American sentiment in a war fleet supreme above all other fleets, operating in association with a great mercantile fleet, and, whatever purpose President Wilson had in view when he inserted the limiting proviso in the Navy Appropriation Act of 1916, it is now, after an interval of four years, a matter of the dead past.

The naval conditions which are now rapidly coming into view are calculated to deal a blow at the prestige of the British people, for the United States will soon have the strongest battle fleet under any flag and Japan will, if she pursues her considered plans, possess a battle fleet at least comparable with, and, all things considered, probably superior to, the British Fleet. Moreover, although the British Fleet still includes a larger number of light cruisers than any other navy, it is already weaker in destroyers and submarines than the American Navy, and the disproportion will steadily increase as the American program of construction is brought to completion. It is fallacious let it be admitted, to judge the standing of fleets merely

by "a counting of noses"; but whether comparisons in future be based upon the number of units of contemporary construction in the various classes, gunpower, torpedo strength, armour protection, or other basis, it is apparent that in material the British Fleet is about to suffer an eclipse. It may be argued that, after all, ships constitute only one element of sea-power, and that not the most important. It is true that it is the men who convert the steel boxes into mobile engines of violence. We pride ourselves on possessing the sea instinct, and place high confidence in the efficiency of the officers and men of the British Navy. The Great War has shown that that confidence is well justified. But the Americans have no reason to blush for the officers and men who composed the crews of their battleships, destroyers, and auxiliary craft which took part in naval operations in European waters.

In the new conditions which are now emerging, not only the people of the British Isles, but the peoples of the Dominions will be compelled to ask themselves two straight questions. In the first place, is it true that the Battle of Jutland has shed such fresh light upon the problems of naval construction that no battleship or battle-cruiser built before that battle can be regarded as fully efficient? On that matter there is no difference of opinion among the naval authorities of the world. This leads up to the second question: Are the people of the British Commonwealth content that the men who hazard their lives in protecting British interests should serve in ships inferior in power and endurance to the vessels under other flags? To those two questions answers must be given at no distant date, in the knowledge that the people of the British Empire, estimated to number four hundred forty million, are dependent upon the sea for their liberty as well as for their prosperity, and that once the sea communications are endangered the confidence which supports credit and facilitates commerce will disappear, even if the Empire itself does not undergo a process of disintegration. For next to the Crown, the British Fleet, existing in high prestige and strength, is the visible link of this Commonwealth of free peoples. On its sufficiency and efficiency depend the security against invasion of all sections of the Empire and the safety of the ocean tracts over which British merchant ships pass, maintaining that system of exchange and barter which

is the lifeblood of the British peoples. Shall the key of the oceans be surrendered to any other Power, however friendly? That is a matter which can be decided neither by the Board of Admiralty, by the Cabinet, nor even by Parliament. One or the other, or all three in unison, may give a lead to public opinion, but in the last resort the answer must be supplied by the peoples of the Empire themselves, and, in the main, by the voters of the United Kingdom.

In introducing the Navy Estimates for the present year, the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that, "looking around the world to find what is the Navy which at this moment is the next strongest to our own, we find that the only one is the Navy of the United States of America." Commenting on this relationship, Mr. Long remarked that "the naval policies of all past Governments, whichever party they represented, have at least included this common principle, that our Navy should not be inferior in strength to the Navy of other Powers, and to this principle the present Government firmly adheres." He expressed the hope that, if there were to be any emulation between the United States and the British Empire, "it is likely to be in the direction of reducing that ample margin of naval strength which we alike possess over all other nations." Whether the expectation that the United States will cooperate with us in limiting naval armaments will be fulfilled, must, in the light of later events, be a matter of some doubt. But, at any rate, the British Government remains pledged to the maintenance of a fleet not inferior in strength to that of any other country. The First Sea Lord in his recent Rectorial Address in Edinburgh reminded us of the wide-sweeping influence exercised by sea-power on the peoples who constitute the British Empire. He recalled that on our strength by sea depends in large measure the security also of weaker nations of the world. He reminded his fellow-countrymen that "history shows no instance of sea supremacy once yielded being regained." Earl Beatty remarked: "We have established a great world-wide Empire based upon the sea—an Empire which is linked up by the sea. It is a trust, a heritage, which has been handed down to us for safe-keeping from the days of the great Elizabethan adventures—Gilbert, Raleigh, Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, Davis, Grenville, and Cavendish. We have to prove ourselves worthy by maintaining it inviolate."

THE 1916 BUILDING PROGRAM¹

[With] the World War the United States woke to the fact that it was comparatively weak in the most essential element for its defense, a battle fleet. So evident was this, that public opinion asserted itself, and in 1916 Congress authorized the present building program.

It should be strongly emphasized that this fact of the people and Congress in 1916 fixed the terms of our building program, which is now suddenly causing so much comment in Great Britain. It involved no change or threat. Our program is only the result of a timely realization among our people that our necessary defense must be a strong navy. There was at the time no definite thought in the public mind of using this naval force against any particular nation, although naturally the unbridled ambitions of Germany showed our need of defense. But defense alone was the object of increase, and defense alone is the reason for its continuance, impersonal and not directed against any power.

This instinct for defense on the seas has been most fortunately aroused in our people. Our country is bounded by two great oceans, and the only real defense of our boundaries is the far-flung use of our battle fleet upon these wide stretches of sea. For the United States navy, more than for any other, the ultimate service is a battle of fleets. In all human calculation, our country is safe from attack as long as we maintain a battle fleet that is able to defend our sea approaches in a naval action.

Consequently for the United States a battle fleet that can hold its own in an action of fleets is a necessity—and the possession of such a fleet has been assured by the building program of 1916. That is the whole story—and in this wise policy, which our country adopted four years ago, there is no trace of new influences at work for “fanning into flame the instinctive national jealousies of the two nations—to quote from Mr. Hurd. Any American knows that our country is barren ground for jealousy of any other nation.

¹ From *Increased Strength of the United States on the Sea*, by Thomas G. Frothingham (Captain U.S.R.). In *Current History*. 12:943-52. September, 1920.

FOLLY TO DISARM NOW¹

Complete disarmament, or even partial disarmament, is impossible at present in the face of "active and feverish military preparations among those with whom we might possibly come in contact," Secretary of War John W. Weeks yesterday told the graduating class of New York University and their friends on the campus behind the Hall of Fame on University Heights.

It would be the "height of folly" for the United States to be the first to disarm, said Secretary Weeks, although he believed the time was coming when a reduction of armaments and possibly total disarmament would be obtainable. In warning that there were great military preparations among some peoples of the world, he said that he did not give a moment's consideration to the possibility of war with Great Britain. The need for expansion of territory by other nations was one of the causes of danger in the future, he said, and the taking of territory by might could not be permitted.

The United States must depend more and more upon its trained citizenry for its future protection, said Secretary Weeks, in praising the National Defense act which made possible a trained reserve, and only by such preparation could a nation avoid becoming the "murderer" of its people in time of conflict. He called attention to the fact that in the one hundred forty-five years of our national history the United States has been for one-sixth of its existence involved in major wars.

Our Policy Not Understood

"The military policy of our Government is not very generally understood by the public, and, judging from the attitude of some of our citizens in places of responsibility toward the army, I must conclude that they have not a correct idea of the military requirements of the nation," said Secretary Weeks. "Because I discuss this subject, however, I do not wish to be misunderstood, for I do not love war. I abhor it. No rational being who has a clear realization of its meaning wants to have his country become engaged in war, but conditions may arise which

¹ From New York Times. June 9, 1921.

make it, with all its horrors, the only alternative to a dishonorable peace. Then every patriotic citizen wants war."

He said he was personally in sympathy with every wise and sane endeavor to bring about the adoption of a world-wide movement for disarmament, "but," he added, "we must remember that the passions of war and the disturbances to society, as well as to individuals, cannot be overcome or forgotten in a day. Only time, and a great deal of time, will bring people and nations back to a normal condition.

Sees Normalcy Returning

"I believe there is a great improvement in conditions both at home and abroad and that the world is gradually returning to a state of mind where, with a vivid recollection of the horrors of the past war, it can take definite action in bringing about a reduction in armament and possible complete disarmament. Under present conditions, however, it would be the height of folly for the United States to be the first to disarm. World-wide disarmament must come as the result of an international agreement and must be done simultaneously. Prudence would not permit us disarming while others hold weapons in their hands.

"I do not anticipate war, but there are active and feverish military preparations among those with whom we might possibly come in contact.

"I am not, however, solicitous that we maintain the largest military or naval force in the world. I want to say here and now that I cannot give a moment's serious consideration to the possibility of war with Great Britain. We have lived more than a hundred years with an unprotected border line of more than three thousand miles between the United States and Canada and there has never been the slightest friction between the two countries. In my opinion, a war between Great Britain and the United States would be the end of civilization, and whatever may be the folly of the leaders in either or both nations, the peoples of Great Britain and the United States would never support, indeed they would not permit, a contest between these two countries.

Isolation Impossible, He Says

"Everywhere America symbolizes the things making for the betterment of humanity," he said. "The logic of events seems

to give us a place in world affairs from which we can hardly honorably withdraw. This does not imply, however, that we should recognize and become part of a super-government, or that we should take any action affecting the rest of the world in which the initiative is not entirely in our own hands."

Secretary Weeks said he regretted that the National Defense act did not contain provision for universal military training, although he realized that the people of the country were not in sympathy with that idea because they did not realize its advantages to the nation and to the individual. Voluntary military training would in a small way take its place, however, he said and would aid in developing a military policy.

"If all men were honest and law-abiding there would be no necessity for maintaining a police force," he said. "But all men are not law-abiding and all nations not unselfish, and therefore we need policemen and armies.

Sees Danger in Covetousness

"In many cases, too, in some parts of the world, there is developing large excesses of populations requiring expansion of territory. The future can only add to the requirements of nations for increased territory and the difficulties in acquiring such additional domain, and there can be no assurance, notwithstanding our own disinterestedness, unselfish motives and desire for peace, that our wealth will not be craved by others less fortunate."

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ APPROVES¹

Admiral von Tirpitz, the German naval authority, who was Minister of the Navy during the critical period of the war, in the course of an interview today discussed the American naval program and its reference to the prospective relations of the United States with Great Britain and Japan.

"The United States is about to build a great fleet," said the Admiral. "As the country borders on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and lacks outlying naval bases, America will presumably give special attention to the radius of action of her ships. That holds good equally for surface ships such as battle-

¹ From New York Times.

ships and battle cruisers, and for submarines and aircraft, both dirigibles and airplanes. In creating a navy Americans should remember that the great decision lies not with coast defenses, but on the open sea."

Admiral von Tirpitz contrasted America's position today with that of Germany a few years ago, and said:

"America's great industrial growth and the consequent increase of her merchant marine require increase of the navy, and it is my belief that America will not make the mistake Germany did of trusting the life and prosperity of her commerce and industry merely to 'the brotherly feeling of the English.'

"It is all very well to regard the brotherhood of nations as a distant aim worth striving for, but meantime Providence has ordained a rivalry in order to keep alive the impulse for national advancement. Whether they like it or not, the United States will be forced to give their international trade a solid protection, either through their own power or through gaining political friends.

Sees American Rivalry With Japan

"While England for the moment has only to consider America's commercial rivalry, yet the United States must contemplate the natural development of conflicting interests in the Pacific that call for decision, and must inevitably face the economic, military and political hostility of Japan. France, although still a factor in world politics, is of a secondary order and is so completely dependent on England that for a very long time France cannot be a political asset for the United States as she was in revolutionary days when France was England's sea rival.

"When and in what manner the issue between the United States and Japan will be decided cannot be foreseen today," continued the Admiral. "In the interest of the whole world, war will be avoided. But behind that conflict will always be a growing conflict between England and America.

"Conscious of her youthful power, America is prone to underestimate England's power. It is not America, but England with her numerous outposts acquired in the course of centuries and with her bridgeheads advanced against other countries—even against the United States themselves—that rules the waves and rules the world. Such will be the case, though in a less degree, when America owns a strong navy. In a certain way

the position of the United States will be the same as Germany's situation before the war.

"It must further be considered," proceeded Admiral von Tirpitz, "that England has gained absolute supremacy in Europe; that her power covers all Africa, Mesopotamia and India, and that she now holds the keys to the Mediterranean at Constantinople, the Suez Canal and Gibraltar. This control counterbalances the compactness of America's territory."

The Admiral referred in rather caustic terms to British political foresight, and declared that regardless of England's treaty with Japan and friendship with America, she would turn where her political interests lay in case of a conflict between Japan and the United States. "The English," he said, "would do as they have successfully done for centuries in European conflicts, with the result that the continent of Europe is now ruined while England herself, as always stands there lord of the world."

Declares Battleships Won the War

Battleships won the World War and will win future wars, in the opinion of Admiral von Tirpitz. He reaffirmed his faith in above-water craft and declared that, strangely enough, owing to the peculiarities of the war, the submarine had been given greater importance than was warranted by the facts.

England, Japan and the United States recognized the fact, he said, that in the world struggle for supremacy, outside of Europe, land forces would be secondary. He asserted that such a struggle must necessarily be one of sea supremacy, but added that the sort of maritime forces to be constructed, in the light of the experiences of the latest war, was a great open question.

"There was no decisive action between opposing fleets during the World War," he said, "because, in misconceiving the political situation and poorly assessing the inherent power of the German fleet, the Berlin Government did not risk it during the decisive first years of the conflict. When the favorable time for naval action was past England had to suffer directly only from German submarines. Against them she had no preparation.

"In reality the war, so far as the sea was concerned, was won by the English High Sea Fleet, and the verdict could have been reversed only through battleships."

Admiral von Tirpitz said he had little patience with the

controversy now raging in England over the submarine and the surface warship, and declared it was largely due to a lack of information among many disputants, a conflict of personal interests, and a "desire on the part of the English Cabinet to keep the world ignorant of the real official views."

THE QUESTION OF THE PACIFIC¹

Admiral Jellicoe's plan for augmenting British sea power in the Pacific, set forth in The Ledger-Minneapolis Tribune News Service dispatches, comes at a timely moment.

It reminds us that the question of the Pacific confronts the United States, Great Britain and Japan. Great Britain and Japan are tackling it with that combination of wisdom, energy and determination, which has made those little islands the masters of their parts of the world.

The enormous United States on the other hand, is not tackling it at all. On the contrary, it is ignoring it. Certainly we are not showing one-tenth of the wisdom, energy and determination that Great Britain and Japan are showing.

Is the United States going to weaken at this crisis?

"There is a tide in the affairs of men that taken at the flood leads on to fortune," and that tide is at the flood right here and right now. Will the United States take it or not?

Congress to Decide

The question is up for decision now, and Congress is doing the deciding, because it is deciding whether or not we shall have enough men to handle our ships and guns with reasonable effectiveness. According to the decision which Congress now shall make, the United States will be led on to fortune, or will abandon the fortune to Jellicoe and Japan.

Admiral Jellicoe's plan is merely one for perpetuating a state of affairs that has lasted for many years—namely, British sea trade supremacy in the Far East. That is the hidden spring of Jellicoe's activity. The facts of history during more than four thousand years prove that sea trade needs naval power to protect it against competitors. By reason of the si-

¹ By Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. Minneapolis Tribune. June 22, 1921.

multaneous advances of the United States and Japan, Great Britain's supremacy in the Far East is seriously threatened. Admiral Jellicoe, as a patriotic and able statesman, suggests an increase of British naval power in the Pacific, in order to maintain it.

Not Academic Matter

If the maintaining of that supremacy were merely an academic matter, Admiral Jellicoe would not be busying himself about it. Neither would the British nation. But it is a practical matter. It is fundamentally a matter of trade with the vast territories of China that are about to be exploited and developed; it is the biggest commercial question before the world today.

Of course, the defensive necessities of the British over-sea dominions—Australasia and Canada, enter into the question, but the fostering of British trade in the East is the ultimate objective. How long would the British Empire live if British trade should die?

But Admiral Jellicoe and the entire world besides have overlooked the key to the whole Pacific question, though it lies directly in front of them. The Philippine Islands, the beautiful and wonderfully fertile Islands lie right across the ocean tracks from the Pacific to China, except where Japan, just north of them, lies similarly.

Doors to China

The Philippines and Japan constitute doors from the Pacific to China, and lie on the flank of the roadway to China from the Mediterranean. They command all the ocean roads to China.

Japan is larger than the Philippines, but not much larger. Japan has an area of one hundred forty-nine thousand square miles, but Doubleday-Page and Company's atlas says: "On account of the mountainous nature of the country, not more than one-sixth is available for cultivation."

The Philippine Islands have an area of one hundred fifteen thousand square miles, but virtually all of it is cultivatable. Even the mountain forests bear trees of ebony, cedar and other valuable woods; while gold and other precious metals enrich the very stones.

Great Britain and Japan are the best friends we have in the world. We have the greatest possible admiration for them,

and the peace of the world depends upon their continuing to be our friends. But the peace of the world depends also on a clear realization of facts and on an acceptance of the conditions that result.

Competitive Rivals

The plain fact is that the United States, Great Britain and Japan are entering into competition for trade with China; and the conditions that result must continuously increase the danger of war, as time goes on.

As I have pointed out many times, the danger of war reaches its maximum when one of the countries involved in the danger leaves its valuables unprotected from attack.

We have left the Philippines unprotected, though they constitute our only naval base and our only commercial base in Asia, and are vitally necessary, if we are to compete for trade in China with Great Britain and Japan. We can easily protect them with airplanes, submarines, mines, etc., to the extent that they could hold out until our fleet could reach them.

More Men Needed

But even this protection will not avail, unless our fleet is given enough men to handle its mechanisms skilfully; for a fleet consists mainly, not of ships and guns, but of men. The ships and guns are merely the tools that the men use; and the ultimate result is merely the product of the possible work that perfectly skilful men could do with the tools, multiplied by the fraction representing the actual skill which their training has given them. Fifty ships, handled with 100 per cent skill, would accomplish (theoretically) exactly the same as one hundred ships handled with 50 per cent skill.

To give our Far Eastern trade a fair chance in the coming competition with Great Britain and Japan, the United States navy must have enough men, or United States' trade will fade and die, as it did after the Civil War.

THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES¹

Ever since the battle of Manila Bay that took place on May 1, 1898, the people of the United States have been in considerable doubt as to what they should do with the Philippine Islands.

¹ By Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U.S.N. (Retired). *North American Review*. 213:721-4. June, 1921.

Many have insisted from the first that they should be given to the Filipinos, outright; others have insisted that the Filipinos should be allowed to govern them, under the protection of the United States. There have been many shades of opinion in the matter; but what has happened is that the United States has actually governed them, but permitted the Filipinos to occupy certain governmental positions, and to have a considerable influence in the conduct of affairs.

The result has been that the Philippine Islands have prospered more than ever before, and that their commercial value to the United States has impressed an increasing number of people. Their most obvious value lies in the natural riches of the soil and the consequent opportunities for selling to the Islands the agricultural, commercial and other appliances needed for developing those riches, and for importing the products raised. But a greater, though less obvious, value lies in the nearness of Manila to the vast undeveloped territories of Eastern Asia, and the fact that the many fine bays and harbors of the Philippines could be made to supplement the very few good harbors on the eastern coast of Asia, and give to the United States a base of commercial operations, unequalled by that of any other country, save Japan itself.

But—the Philippines could be taken by anyone who might desire to take them! This casts doubt on the security of our possession of them, and would make any attempt by Americans to develop them of more than questionable wisdom. Furthermore, the great distance of the Islands from America has made the problem of defending them by the ordinary methods an undertaking virtually prohibitive, because of the cost in money, time and effort.

So, the commercially and strategically valuable Philippine Islands still lie spread out on the counter, for anyone to take who will. It is a dangerous and foolish thing thus to leave any property wholly unprotected; and the most dangerous thing possible is to leave property unprotected from a sudden assault by any nation with which causes for friction exist. In such conditions (history tells us) some unlooked for contingency may at any time precipitate a state of popular excitement taking the form of overt action, if a chance for such overt action were in sight. Now, in case some suddenly arising situation should cause a popular outburst against us in Japan, the chance to seize

the Philippines might prove too strong a temptation to be resisted.

The last Congress refused to give the navy the very moderate amount it asked for, in order to take advantage of the possibilities of aeronautics. If Congress persists, we may find ourselves with a navy that is very expensive, but so old-fashioned as to be ineffective. Some people think that the more ineffective a navy is, the less danger there is of war. Their attention is respectfully invited to the historical fact that aggression has usually, if not always, been caused by the temptation presented by a valuable property left unprotected from attack.

I need not say that I do not suggest using only airplanes to defend the Philippines; all the usual weapons would, of course, be needed, especially submarines. I do wish, however, to call attention to our amazing backwardness in utilizing airplanes, and to point out the special attributes that make them valuable as preventers of actual invasion.

These attributes are:

1. Great speed, and consequent ability to concentrate in large numbers against parts of more slowly-moving bodies, such as ships, boats and troops.
2. Ability to rise high and discern objects at great distances.
3. Ability to carry high explosives in convenient forms that have merely to be dropped.

By reason of these three attributes, a force of say one hundred first-class airplanes, properly equipped and manned, if distributed at different points in Luzon (the northernmost island), would be able to concentrate at any threatened point on the coast before the invading troops could start from the transports to the shore.

The only defense against our airplanes would be a greater air force possessed by the enemy. But it must be clear that *no country in the world could compete with us in building airplanes*. The cost to us of a force of airplanes able to protect the Islands would probably be less than 1 per cent of the cost of any endeavor to recapture them.

One of the possible objections to be urged against defending the Islands may be the supposed fact that the Filipinos have been led to believe that they would be given the Islands as soon as they should prove their capacity for self-government.

Passing over a number of questions, such as who could have the authority to give the Filipinos any cause to believe this, it

may be pointed out that, even if the Filipinos should prove their capacity to govern themselves, they cannot possibly prove their capacity to protect themselves against any strong nation desiring to possess them; and that no islands of their great area and richness in all kinds of natural resources, can safely be left unprotected in these days of annexation and colonization.

Again, if the Islands were given to the Filipinos, would they retain them long? Is there any other equally large and valuable tract of land in the possession of any people, so helpless against attack as the Philippine Islands would be if our protection should be withdrawn?

Four courses of action seem to be open to us:

1. Defend the Islands: a thing easily done, using airplanes, submarines, mines, etc.

2. Leave them defenseless as they practically are now, with the virtual certainty that they will be taken by an enemy some day, and we forced to send the most expensive expedition ever known to retake them. If we should succeed, the Islands would continue to belong to us.

3. Give them to the Filipinos with no guarantee of protection from us. In this case, the Islands will surely be taken not long afterward by some country.

4. Give them to the Filipinos with the guarantee of our protection. In this case, the difficulties and cost of the expedition to retake them after capture will be identical with those in case 2; but the Islands, instead of belonging to us after the crushing expense and loss of life of the expedition, will (in case of success) belong not to us but to the Filipinos.

But there is a powerful reason for defending the Islands that is apart from any question of having to retake them: that then we shall be as strong in the West Pacific as any other nation. We shall be just as able to protect our merchants and our shipping and just as well placed for trading direct with China. We shall be even better placed in some ways: for while the Philippines have as good harbors as Japan, they are nearer to the ports of Europe by way of the Mediterranean. In fact, they are directly between the Mediterranean and Japan.

It is unnecessary to consider the suggestion, sometimes made, that to attempt to defend our coast and our over-seas possessions adequately, would constitute a threat to other nations; because its foolishness is proved by the facts of history and the principles of International Law.

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW¹

Consider the international situation as it concerns us today. The World War is over, but it can hardly be said that world peace is yet in sight. The world is now disturbed by propaganda which menaces alike the world and the political integrity of nations, propaganda, which, whether we speak of it as bolshevism or Sinn Fein, or whatever name we call it, nevertheless does most certainly disturb and menace the peace of the world.

The world as we see it today is obviously a world in which no nation can allow its war insurance policy to lapse. Turning from the international situation let us look at the League of Nations. The League represents a noble idea and its acceptance by the greater part of the civilized world is the only hope of enduring peace. On its ultimate success depends the future of civilization. But the League is yet in its infancy and it is utopian to expect from the League in its present stage of development that protection which would render unnecessary any precaution for our own defense.

Great Britain for instance could not submit the freedom of the seas as interpreted by Germany to the arbitrament of any league. America could not submit the Monroe doctrine, and we could not submit the question of a white Australia.

Britain and America must be prepared to fight to the death for these principles, which we believe to be vital to our existence. The most vital point of our policy is the white Australia. . . We cannot hope to maintain a white Australia policy by mere pious or blatant declarations of our intentions and determination. Behind this, there must be some force and it cannot be anything less than the utmost resources of this nation.

INTO THE HANDS OF THE CHEMISTS²

While men talk about disarmament and fill the newspaper columns with learned discussions as to the wisdom of curtailing our naval program by international agreement, hour by

¹ From address by Prime Minister W. A. Hughes. Quoted in *New York Times*, November 8, 1920.

² From *Manufacturer's Record*, January 13, 1921.

hour the day of our real disarmament approaches, and approaches so stealthily the great public is in entire ignorance of the fact.

In the next war leaders will laugh at battleships and artillery when they launch their assaults of poison gas and invisible destruction. The machinery of warfare has passed into the hands of chemists, and the soothsayers, in predicting results, will look not to stars or entrails, but into the test tubes of the laboratory.

An inkling of the truth may be obtained from a cable dispatch, written by Wythe Williams, which appeared in the Washington Herald of January 10. We quote from it:

"There is evidence in Paris, where a large force of dye experts now are gathered to help the reparations commission, that the German dye attack is to be centered most vigorously upon the United States market. France has a tariff law that enables her to build up her dye industry unmolested. England has a new law, operative January 15, that excludes dyes such as she produces and admits those she does not produce, but which her consumers need. Japan is taking steps to protect her chemical industry. The United States is the only important nation actually at the mercy of German chemists. For the moment America is protected by the War Trade Board, but this barrier will fall when she ends the technical state of war with Germany.

"German dye manufacturers, realizing this, are causing the reparations commission much trouble by refusing to produce, except under pressure, the dyes most needed in the United States. They are willing to offer large quantities of dyes in competition with the output of the new American dye industry, but still are making excuses for failure to produce noncompetitive dyes. Thus they hope to encourage consumers to demand an open market. Also, in this manner, with the experience of her fifty years' world monopoly of dye manufacture against five years of American experience, Germany hopes to throttle the American industry and leave America helpless in this respect should there be another war.

"German production of dyes is so closely allied with her production of munitions that a separation is impossible. Destruction of one would mean the destruction of both. Students of

the German proposals now in Paris consider that America is the last hope the German manufacturers have, and they will not give up as long as America does not protect its dye industry by a law similar to that of Great Britain. They see, further, that real chemical disarmament can be accomplished only by breaking Germany's monopoly of the dye industry and encouraging the building up of a similar industry in all the countries of the entente, and especially in the United States.

It is the absolute truth that the "United States is the only important nation actually at the mercy of the German chemists."

The War Trade Board, which now protects the American dye industry, will go out of existence March 4 unless funds to finance its activities are provided, and it will go out of existence anyhow so soon as peace is concluded. The dye industry, therefore, is nearing hour by hour the day when it will be at the mercy of the Germans. That will not be long. Private industry does not possess the power of taxation and cannot long stand up under heavy financial losses. If there is no inhibitory legislation, enough dyes can be dumped on our shores within a few months to swamp the market.

It is difficult to speak with moderation of those Senators who have resorted to the filibuster and every other technical device of legislators to delay and prevent enactment of the dye bill. Be their motives what they may, the fact remains that their course is exactly the course that is most acceptable to the Germans. There is no one thing Berlin more desires than the failure of the Longworth bill. Men who shape their course in Congress so as to support a policy obviously beneficial to our enemies and destructive to the United States necessarily are objects of suspicion. Men are judged not by their motives, but by the things they do, and when the things they do are fatal to the future well-being of their country, they must expect criticism. This is more than ever true when they obstruct the majority and employ their technical power of delay to prevent an enactment favored not only by the House of Representatives and recommended by the President, but also favored by a large majority in the Senate itself.

There is history back of this entire situation. The statesmen who went to Paris to write the Peace Treaty were well

aware that a mere physical disarmament of Germany would be a grotesque provision against the later attack by that nation. They favored not merely the destruction of the German navy and the disbandment of the German army, but they also expected to compel the Germans to disclose their chemical secrets, vital in warfare, and the dismantlement of huge chemical works was contemplated. This essential and wise course was prevented by President Wilson, who advanced the idea that the Allies and the United States could adequately protect themselves by building up their own chemical industries, shutting out the German product. He favored compelling the Germans to disclose their chemical secrets, which they have not done, but he wanted each individual nation to protect itself.

That is what all of the chief Allies and neutral nations have done—all except the United States. Over in England the Government listened to all the arguments against protection of the British dye industry and then promptly enacted, last month, the most drastic sort of legislation to assure absolutely that the German chemical industry would not ruin that of Great Britain. She carried out the understanding that had been reached in Paris. It is more than passing strange, however, that every effort to carry out the same understanding in the United States has been prevented by filibusters or threats of filibusters in the Senate. It is amazing, but it is true.

It is a fact that the Germans have not yet yielded up their war method of extracting nitrogen from the air. The methods we have are obsolete, and we know it. But the final Haber process we have not got. It will be got, in one way or another, but it has not yet been got.

If gentlemen wish to continue the argument on the dye bill, let them do so, but not with the gates open. The barriers must at least be kept up until a definite decision has been reached. This can be done by passage of a joint resolution extending the authority of the War Trade Board and providing funds wherewith to support it. The Longworth bill itself ought to be passed. It is the sensible and proper course. But, failing that, the next best course is emergency protection of the chemical industry pending a final decision by the next Congress on a definite national policy.

The absolutely essential character of the dye industry in

relation to national defense is not a question of conjecture or of theory. It has been demonstrated with mathematical accuracy, and it can be so demonstrated at any time, before any committee or any jury. Indeed, it is admitted even by the opponents of the Longworth bill. They claim, however, that the industry can be protected adequately by tariffs. The facts are all against them. Tariffs are for honest men, in pure commerce. Control of the American dye market by the Germans is not inherently a commercial undertaking at all. Germany can afford to give away dyes in America if by so doing she can destroy the American dye industry. Dyes, with her, is preparedness for war. Dyes, with us, can be nothing else.

We would be safer without a gun factory in the nation, a powder plant or a warship than without a chemical industry and a chemical personnel equal to any others on earth.

CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT¹

Germany is still über alles in dye-production. Everybody who is interested in dyestuffs is concerned about this. The Allied nations are legislating about it, yet few realize that the balance and control of the dye industry is an essential factor in world disarmament. Dye-factories are chemical plants, and to turn their production from dyes to explosives and poison-gas is the work of a very brief period. V. Lefebure, formerly British liaison officer with the French forces, makes the assertion, in an article contributed to *Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering* (New York), that "chemical disarmament is the crux of all disarmament." All the more is this so because we can not disarm chemically by destruction. Guns may be broken up and forts dismantled, but we can not destroy chemical industry, because it is essential to the arts of peace. In this case, Mr. Lefebure asserts, we must disarm by preventing monopoly. Distribute the chemical industries uniformly over the world, instead of concentrating them in Germany, and a menace to world peace will be removed. He believes that the Versailles Treaty contains the machinery for doing this very thing. He says:

¹ From *Literary Digest*. 68:23. February 12, 1921.

"The League of Nations has instituted a definite commission to consider the question of world disarmament. A brief analysis reveals the fact that disarmament must cover three essential factors in warfare—the combatants, mechanical types or armament and war chemicals.

"Chemical armament, very generally, represents the actual death-dealing constituents of projectiles. This must, however, be qualified by the statement that the new type of chemical armament has become in some cases, and may increasingly become, independent of any special projectile. This is a most important item from the point of view of disarmament. It means that the limitation of projectiles may not carry with it limitation of the chemical weapon.

"How do normal disarmament schemes apply to the chemical type? This type of weapon covers, roughly, two classes—explosives and the so-called poison-gases. They have one common characteristic. This is their peace-time use. This refuses to any disarmament scheme the right to disarm in the simplest fashion—that is, by the total destruction of producing capacity. The world must have for normal development a large producing capacity for explosives and for the other types of chemical armament. Germany produced practically every ounce of her hundreds of thousands of tons of poison-gas in dye plants. The infinitely flexible, almost instantaneously converted dye plants are a logical means of production of all organic chemical weapons, including explosives.

"We must now stop to lay emphasis on a general principle. There are two methods of disarmament. In the first class you can disarm very simply by destroying all the means of production and preventing their renewed growth. In the second class, because the means of production—the factories—have a peace-time function, you can not disarm by destruction. How, then, can you disarm in this case?

"There is only one way—it is to insure that no one country possesses a monopoly in the means of production. The brightest and most telling war-chemical invention has no value for and no incidence upon warfare unless it can be produced rapidly and in quantity. Production is the key to its war-use. Let us examine very briefly, therefore, the world distribution of the means of production for this new type of weapon. Be-

fore the war Germany held the almost absolute monopoly of world organic chemical production. Through this monopoly she launched the poison-gas campaign, and for more than two years the Allied reply was relatively feeble. This was not due to Allied lack of invention, but to lack of producing capacity.

"During the war, however, for economic rather than military reasons, dye-producing industries sprang up in France, America, and England. Their development was relatively feeble, owing to numerous obvious reasons. From the point of view of our argument this development left the world in the following situation regarding organic chemical-producing capacity:

"The German dye industry, the source of her war-chemical production, was considerably strengthened. Other countries were left with promising but relatively feeble organic chemical resources which could not immediately, even under normal commercial conditions, hope to break the German monopoly. In other words, altho for most types of armament the pre-war balance in favor of Germany was decreased, yet for this one type of chemical armament the German monopoly was strengthened."

"We are, therefore," declares Mr. Lefebure, "left in face of the following situation: For most types of armament the war has led to a redistribution of producing capacity in the direction of an equilibrium. By diminishing this capacity and controlling and inspecting we may obtain international disarmament; but in chemical warfare, the final situation is just as remote from equilibrium as before. The conclusion is obvious. The world must have organic chemical-producing capacity, but it can not tolerate a monopoly held by those who so drastically abused its possession. There must be a redistribution before we can claim to have even approached disarmament. It would be farcical to proceed with general disarmament schemes and to leave this untouched. In other words, we must break the German monopoly." He continues:

"How can this be achieved? There are two main avenues of approach. The new-born dye industries of France, America, and England, and if you wish, other countries, must be supported nationally through legislation and internationally through some such organization as the League of Nations.

"In America and England legislation designed to protect the dye industry is before both countries. The issue is likely to be fought out on purely national grounds. This alone is entirely unsatisfactory. It must be realized by all concerned that they are legislating on a matter which has infinitely more than commercial significance. They are legislating on world peace.

"Chemical disarmament is a matter which, unfortunately, non-technical people do not fully understand. They think it sufficient to issue an edict against the use of poison-gas, not realizing that this alone is absolutely futile as an effective measure. You can not prevent any discoveries in chemical warfare, because, unlike the development of mechanical invention, such chemical discoveries can occur, when directed by a trained mind, with the mere use of a few pots, pans, beakers, in any unguarded and unsuspected locality. The redistribution of producing capacity is therefore critical.

"Article 168 of the Treaty of Versailles provides for the restriction by the Allied and Associated Powers of the manufacture of war-material and of the approval of those Powers for the continued existence of factories and works for such production in Germany. On these grounds it is logically possible to limit seriously that capacity of the German dye industry which produced poison-gases during the war and may continue to do so. Article 169 provides for the surrender to the Allied and Associated Powers of any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognized as necessary for equipping the authorized strength of the German Army. The execution of this clause, if a proper interpretation of chemical armament be used, would imply the closing down of many of the German dye plants which produced those huge quantities of poison-gases during the war.

"We repeat that the crux of all disarmament is the redistribution of organic chemical capacity throughout the world. This is, without any doubt, one of the most important measures now before the world, and, in addition, one of the few measures with regard to which immediate action can be taken toward the stabilization of world peace."

INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS—ITS RELATION TO NATIONAL DEFENSE, AS SHOWN BY RECENT EXPERIENCE¹

Modern war makes terrible demands upon those who fight. To an infinitely greater degree than ever before the outcome depends upon long preparation in advance, and upon the skillful and unified use of the nation's entire social and industrial no less than military power.

—THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

As the miasma of partisan criticism of the conduct of the war grows less toxic, as the drama itself recedes into the great back-drop of history, there arises a consciousness in the public's mind that perhaps some of the things in the American effort were not so bad as they have been painted, that possibly the country was a bit to blame for some of the matters that went wrong. This is not, however, a postmortem; it is a brief attempt to illumine and safeguard the future by seizing upon some of the lessons of the world war which already our amazing democracy has forgotten.

In taking advantage of the apparent current approach to that true perspective which views historical events in the aggregate, I will deal somewhat plainly with the future in respect of the national defense. I will discuss that aspect of it which I know best: industrial preparedness, the practical application of industrial, economic, and scientific forces to the demands of modern war. This is the starting point of national defense; and it is completely lost sight of in preparedness plans now being matured by Congress.

Without it, armies that have to be expanded overnight from, say one hundred seventy-five thousand to two million men are simply and unequivocally inefficient armies in the modern sense; and, what is more, they are very possibly armies marked for slaughter.

Nitrates, tungsten, jute, tin, steel, shells, guns, shoes, blankets, motor transport, factory capacity, distribution facilities, plant conversion, labor dilution—these are but a few of the basic elements of war today, but a few of the thousands of threads making up the fabric of industrial preparedness.

¹ By Grosvenor B. Clarkson (former Director, United States Council of National Defense; former Chairman, Interdepartmental Defense Board). *Review of Reviews*. 64:71-6. July, 1921.

A Peace-Time Program

This article is of course based on the possibility of another war. The world has grown little wiser, and apparently no less belligerent. For the rest, it is in a welter of commercial dislocation, with material interest nearly everywhere uppermost. That fact alone should make imperative a balanced and scientific peace-time program of preparedness on the part of the United States.

Only a handful of people in this country have anything like a commanding grasp on the theory and practice of utilizing industrial and economic forces in war, and, above all, of drawing upon them coolly before the event without waiting until the hour strikes. Among the military Pershing knows, and Leonard Wood knows. A group of men in business life intelligently and fully know, as do another group who served in the Federal executive departments in the war. A few, just a few, men in Congress know, but they do not know so intimately, nor do they feel so warmly, that their knowledge is a sentient, fortified thing, as it should be.

The majority of persons still think of war only in terms of troops and waving flags. They still think that appropriating for an army and navy ends the duty of Congress. It is not true. Modern war means the linking of industry and science to the military needs, and, lest there be almost criminal waste of money and loss of life, the linking must be arranged for before and not after the actual need. In armed conflict today there can be no preparation when the fight is on, for preparedness now is a scientific thing, and scientific application precludes haste.

Where the War Department Failed

I will be specific. The well-nigh inexcusable lack throughout the war—and one for which every citizen in effect was responsible—was the lack of knowledge on the part of the War Department of its requirements in supplies. Aside from the training and handling of troops, one can almost roughly put into two grand divisions the things necessary for successful prosecution of war today: First, a clean-cut, concrete, continuing ability on the part of the military to state its requirements; second, an equally clean-cut, concrete, and continuing ability on the part of those handling industrial and economic resources to fill the

military needs. The two functions should not be joined for one instant, for the military mind does not understand the language and methods of business; and the business mind does not understand the science of warfare. Thoroughgoing liaison between the two elements of course there must be.

While Chairman of the Interdepartmental Defense Board, organized after the armistice for the express purpose of meeting some of the foregoing problems, the first thing I did, at the initial meeting of the Board, was to ask a question to which I had anticipated the answer; indeed, my certainty that I knew the answer was why I had pressed the board's creation. It was this: "Can the War Department give this Board its requirements for the upkeep of a million men in the field for six months so that the Board, working down through the departments and business units representing the necessary sources of supply, can ascertain in peacetime how, when, where, and in what quantities those supplies may be found?" The reply was, "No."

Now, that was an almost unbelievable thing to be true after we had just come out of the biggest war in our history. But it is a perfectly natural result of lack of scientific study of these things before we went in. Being wholly unprepared in the modern sense, the War Department was forced to spend billions of dollars to offset the fruits of the valor of ignorance. It was impaled on the merciless day-to-day exigency of the war itself. The task of the doer is always trebled when the thinker has not been permitted to precede him.

Leather Needs, As An Instance

I repeat, there can be no scientific preparation when the fight is on. By the same token, when war, based on eleventh-hour preparation, is being waged, there is little or no time in which, day by day, to conserve the knowledge being won in the arena. Doubtless with a 100 per cent perfect organization, and a 100 per cent qualified personnel, these things could be overcome. But there is no perfect military organization, no perfectly qualified military personnel, in the quantitative sense, when a democracy goes to war.

On finding the condition described above, the War Department was called upon to furnish the Interdepartmental Defense Board its requirements in one typical wartime commodity alone, leather. After six weeks these requirements were received, and

when I left office in March, 1920, the Board had begun to trace this commodity back to the raw material, studying substitutes for leather as it went along; and, for the first time in peace under this Government, an attempt was being made to standardize the procurement of one vital element of supply in time of war. The idea was to proceed to other supplies one by one. That is the only way in which the job can be done scientifically, economically, and properly. Very little has been accomplished since the period with which I deal, for reasons that need not be gone into here.

In anticipating and providing for the military and naval needs before the outbreak of war, requirements must be traced from the finished product all the way back to the raw material. Such a study must necessarily include actual, normal production of the goods needed; equipment always in readiness to produce, together with the rate at which such equipment could be produced; and conversion possibilities of equipment, including the items of time and expense, with careful attention as to whether conversion of equipment might withdraw production of other parts essential to defense.

The studies should go particularly to analysis of the production of such items as are very limited in this country. For example, it would include careful study of quantity steel production in the United States, to find out if we were producing or could produce enough steel of specific qualities needed in time of war. It would go into shortage of war materials, the lack of some of which was extremely embarrassing, to say the least, in the recent war. It would include also the study of substitutes such as those for linen in aircraft.

A Dangerous Lack of Nitrates

The subject of nitrates alone italicizes the need for industrial preparedness. I will illustrate: The other day I discussed with one of the world's greatest experts on explosives the question of nitrogen fixation for war purposes. A civilian, a dollar-a-year man in the World War, he probably contributed more of value to the American explosives program than did any other one man. His standing and judgment are accepted by everybody familiar with the economic and technical side of modern war. After this authority had detailed to me, in a most moving way, the fundamental importance of the continu-

ance by the United States Government of its development of nitrogen fixation so that it may be independent of an external supply of nitrate, I asked him:

"If we went to war today, where would we be with regard to this matter?"

He replied: "If our ports were blocked, or if the element of submarine attack were developed to such a point that our merchant ships could not load nitrate, the war would be of short duration and we would be at the mercy of the enemy."

"How long would it be before we could bring our domestic source of supply up to an available point?"

"Two years, at least."

Industrial mastery of the chemistry of high explosives, identical with successful commercial manufacture of coal-tar dyes, perfumes, and medicines, is the work of years, involving the creation and reconstruction of whole industries.

There is a field distinctly advantageous to the national defense interests of the nation in the peace-time consumption by the public of goods prepared according to army standards. There is no reason, for instance, why the public should not use buckets built on army specifications, just as well as buckets slightly different, so that there might be on hand a full supply in the market at the coming of war. This practice could be carried out with benefit to government, business, and the public alike as to very many of the articles used by the War and Navy Departments in wartime. Even the standardization of automobile chassis in terms of military requirements should be included, so that army service bodies might be fitted immediately to civilian-owned automobiles for swift troop movements at the outbreak of war.

Since all production for war purposes or otherwise depends on the availability of electric, gas, and water service, special study should be given to public-utility development. Unless I am mistaken there is no place in the government where such development can be studied and information as to resources and cost of service obtained.

A Card-Index System for Army Supplies

Whatever is done, it is elementary that current index lists should be kept of all concerns experienced in making the different types of army supplies. These lists should be double-indexed;

that is to say, there should be a subject-matter index series referring to manufacturers, and a manufacturers' card series referring to subject matter. The individual cards (for business houses) should carry a very brief summary of the products made, rate of output, and other simple data with such comments respecting kinds of service and the like as might be needed. Here would be an organization in compact form for instant use. It would include houses, products, machinery, and materials which the actual army contractors use. It would be easy to supplement it as occasion arose.

Public requirements in wartime should be studied. One of the things that we should know about in advance is the wartime need of this country for sugar, coffee, or any other essential which might be cut off by interruption of any part of our commerce. If defense be interpreted in terms of internal problems, and it must be, similar studies should be made of shortages which might result from sectional disturbance of transportation.

Somewhere under the government—if we are to have any kind of preparedness worthy the name—peace-time studies must be made of the problems of production, distribution, consumption, prices, employment, and labor conditions in connection with commodities. It is essential that the Government be kept currently informed concerning the industries of the United States, and especially concerning those of national defense importance. This knowledge now, either as to peace-time production or as to war-time potentialities, is of the most helter-skelter sort. It is collected by about twenty different bureaus of the Government, in about twenty different kinds of ways, and it is correlated nowhere in any comprehensive way. Such information is useless if not kept up to date. Not to keep it up-to-date merely means extravagance, running around in a circle, and general inefficiency when a crisis arrives.

Transportation Data

What are our domestic transportation resources in connection with the national defense? I will illumine what we need to know there by saying that before leaving office I set under way an examination as to the availability and resources of all railroad lines west of Salt Lake to transport troops as quickly as possible to points of defense on the Pacific slope in event of need. The study was to contain detailed information as to all

bridgeheads, termini, freight tonnages, etc., with detailed maps. The point is that no such complete information was then (February, 1920) available.

I have only scratched the surface of what industrial preparedness means. I have not even gone into the major question of where priorities in one industry should be granted at the cost of some other industry, and where labor required for emergency purposes can be obtained and spared with the least disturbance to the country. Priorities in transportation alone is a singularly involved subject. I will leave the question now simply by saying that war-time priorities can only be worked out in a normal and equitable way when the major facts in all of the important industries have for a long time been maintained in a standardized and comparative manner. In any particular emergency, such as the rapid transportation of raw materials, the final value of such data consists largely in the degree in which they are up-to-date. Dead information equals zero minus when war begins. It merely clogs the wheels.

Intensity of Modern War

Modern war—and every American should get this well into his head—means, in its practical working, the utilization of all of the industries in one form or another, to say nothing of the lay citizenship of a country. Among the lay population alone, the Council of National Defense had on Armistice Day one hundred eighty-four thousand organized units in the United States, which it guided through the State and local councils of defense. The world probably never saw another organization like it; it was the non-partisan, ever-ramifying machinery that welded together American citizenship for the confusion of the Central Empires. These units represented millions of active men and women, carrying to the people, through the Council, the measures and needs of all departments and war agencies of the Government and sending back to Washington the mood of the people. America itself has little conception of the field system only of the Council of National Defense, or of what it was called upon to do.

War today means the whole force of a nation in action. It has become a profession to which the military alone has long ceased to be called. The resources of the nation itself must furnish the organized, continuing, tireless force behind the

cutting edge of the army and navy in time of war. As Howard Coffin, that automobile engineer out of the West who was the pioneer protagonist in this country of industrial preparedness, has said: "Twentieth-century warfare demands that the blood of the soldier must be mingled with from three to five parts of the sweat of the man in the factories, mills, mines, and fields of the nation in arms."

Whatever is done under the Government in the contemplation of industrial preparedness, the last place where that contemplation should be lodged is with the military, except in so far as a general study of the subject as related to military needs is concerned. It surely should have become elementary that the specific task must be handled by civilians, and civilians solely.

The Industrial Story of a Gun and a Shell

Finally—to draw together into one picture some of the things I have outlined above—consider the explosion of a shell from the mouth of a modern gun and all of the elements that go into that explosion. I cannot visualize the subject better than by direct quotation from the remarkably impressive final report of the War Industries Board just issued by its former chairman, Bernard M. Baruch, who, in the marshalling and synchronizing of industrial forces, accomplished in the American war machine what nobody else had been able to accomplish, and what a great many pessimists of the static school were sure he could not bring about:

"A shell is made principally of steel, brass and copper. It is filled with an explosive and is fired by either a fixed or separate charge of propellant powder. The production of such a shell involves first the preparation of a plant or plants to forge, machine, and measure it, equip it with a firing mechanism and with a band to take the rifling of the gun. It requires another plant for loading, packing, and shipping.

"Each of these processes involves, directly or indirectly, a vast group of industries turned to a new field. But the steel and copper used in the shell involve another set of forces as they are developed from the ore through the processes of extraction and refinement to the forges. The blast furnaces have to be supplied with coke, with lime, and manganese. They have to be lined with refractory brick. Coke involves mining bituminous coal and passing it through coke ovens. They all involve a large amount of railroad transportation, for the most favored spot on earth does not contain all the elements for a piece of steel.

"Turning to the explosive and propellant for loading and firing the shell, the nitric acid is made from nitrate of soda, which has to be mined and refined in a desert part of Chile, carried to the coast on railroads whose rails, rolling stock, ties, and fuel have to be taken there from distant parts, and then it is carried five thousand miles in vessels to our shores; the sulphuric acid required in great quantities is made from pyrites ore coming from Spain or brimstone from Texas, platinum from Russia being needed for the equipment of the acid-producing plants.

"From some cotton field of the South has to be collected a little of the fine lint sticking to the seed as it comes from the gin to form the basis of the propellant powder. And after all this preparation a shell on the front is fired in a few moments. One day its use is necessary, another day it is not, but its preparation has to go on and on until the conflict is over."

A Plan for Industrial Preparedness

For those who wish to study these matters at more length, I refer to the detailed written proposals that I gave Congress, while director of the Council of National Defense, in December, 1919. They called for an entirely workable plan with the expenditure of only \$300,000 a year. Think of it—those of you who are hypnotized by the billions for military and naval preparedness set forth in the newspaper headlines—only \$300,000 a year! It is about a third less than the peace-time pay-roll of a regiment of cavalry, and the regiment must be subsisted and its equipment maintained besides. It is about one-hundredth of our bill for one day's participation in the World War. If such a plan could shorten a future war by only one day it could, as war is waged under modern conditions, save for one hundred years the operating expense of such a working body as I proposed. The proposals were heartily approved by the Secretary of War, by all of the other five cabinet officers forming the Council, by such men as Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and former chairman of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense; Frank A. Vanderlip, Otto Kahn, ex-Secretary of War Garrison, Homer Ferguson, then president of the United States Chamber of Commerce; by the executive secretary of the National Association of Manufacturers; by a large number of great newspapers and magazines, and by practically the entire business press of the country. Congress appropriated just about enough to mark time on, and marking time has been the situation ever since, though far more could have been done in the past year than has been done.

Yet here exists a great national insurance policy for an almost grotesquely low premium. Sometimes I think that I made a psychological blunder in asking Congress for so little. Lord Bacon, in commenting upon the power of figures, it will be recalled, pointed out that even the most intelligent men will stop to look at a procession of ten wheelbarrows. However, I was trying to submit honest bedrock estimates at a time when retrenchment was beginning to be imperative.

The present need for economy in government is too obvious to dwell upon. But it must be scientific economy, not the mere slicing of appropriations by men whose economic knowledge scratches only the surface of our national needs. You cannot undermine basic things that involve the interest of the people without giving birth to extravagance and tragedy in the end. You cannot dodge grappling with fundamental matters by recourse to false and superficial economy. It means only increased economies when the inevitable circle has been described.

The other day the newspapers stated that the Council of National Defense, created by Congress as a permanent body ten months before we went to war, and the only body at present on the statute books charged with attending to these matters, was denied by Congress an appropriation for its operation after June 30, 1921. It seemed to be a startling evidence of the lethargy of the times as to our national destinies, of the fact that reactions from the war have made the pendulum swing too far back.

Utilizing Existing Channels and Records

It is not essential that this work be done in the Council of National Defense, although it can probably be done there, all things being equal, better and more cheaply than in any other place under the Government. Failing a dominant personal equation that may be relied upon to put over a given job, it is always best to utilize existing channels in government where one cannot get the perfect set-up, which in the present temper of the country it would be wasting time to discuss here. The main thing is that we are in danger of not having any set-up at all.

But mark this: Precisely these things will happen if some central body is not permitted to make their happening impossible:

(1) There will be no adequate centralization and study of the priceless industrial economic records of the World War in which, for the first time, we struck a national balance of our economic and industrial resources. They will simply become a tragic waste so far as there is concerned drawing from them lessons for the future. They will probably be broken up and sent into the turgid streams of the old executive departments, where they will never be heard of again. This is particularly the danger in the case of the files of the War Industries Board, which after much effort, and thanks to Mr. Baker, I had lodged with the Council of National Defense after the armistice, where

they have been analyzed and classified and made available as a whole to the economic and national defense purposes of the government. They should never be scattered. The only reservation that I make to this is that if Mr. Hoover gets hold of the files for the purposes of the Department of Commerce, some good will probably come of it.

(2) There will be initiated in peace-time no efficient and scientific, and therefore no economical, study or plan for the application of our industrial, economic and scientific forces to war; that is, a study or plan in which the lay and military minds shall be balanced for a proper preparedness. The balance cannot be had otherwise.

(3) There will be no continuing correlation and interpretation of the figures of our industrial production. Today nothing is more important, either for government or business, for national defense purposes or for peace-time economic considerations. The public and the Federal problems of the future in this country are economic problems. They cannot be solved without the required facts, added to that clarifying interpretation of the facts which makes them dynamic and of practical use.

Commercial Advantages

To the business world I offer this thought in connection with utilizing our industrial and economic national defense records:

It is, in my judgment, essential for the common advantage of government and business that a great deal of this material, which under the old economy was often considered confidential trade information, should be released. More and more does modern business mean trade cooperation. Men must know more about one another's business. There is no reason why direct economic national defense research measures, which need cost but very little, should not be tied into the legitimate needs of business. Industrial production figures for the benefit of business, and the same figures for national defense research, are inseparable. A small coordinating and correlating staff could supply a fund of information which ordinarily could be had only by the expenditure of millions of dollars. Thus two highly valuable ends would be served, and a great deal of money saved both in the peace-time world of business and if war should come.

It is folly, it is silly, it gets one nowhere, to attack this official or that political party for lack of preparedness. To do

so merely exhibits a mind, whether its possessor be a congressman, an editorial writer, a party hack, or a layman, that is either hopelessly partisan or hopelessly shallow. The whole thing goes back to the inertness of the people themselves and in great measure, of course, to the bitter lack of scientific thinking on the part of Congress—by whatever party controlled.

It is true, as General Dawes says (and I, too, speak as a life-long Republican), that we did a superb job when we got in. It is true that we made our culminating and decisive industrial mobilization, thanks to Mr. Baruch and his associates, with incredible speed, consummate skill, and great daring. It is true that the raising, training, transport, and conduct in the field of the national armies make a noble and stirring epic that the unilateral minds of prejudiced men cannot affect. But it all, on the military side, cost billions that it need not have cost. And that, in an enlightened age, in an economic age, is a moral crime.

To govern is to foresee. Apparently in the present instance we are not even looking backward.

Military preparedness for modern war, without industrial preparedness as its foundation, is simply beating at the air.

To say more would be bathos; to say less would be to fuse oneself with those who drift and dream.

DISARMAMENT AND EUROPE¹

Before passing to the consideration of the more important events in the past month in Europe it is perhaps timely to deal briefly with a question of general interest which affects both the United States and Europe equally. In recent weeks we have had the old problem of disarmament raised both in a general and a specific fashion. At Geneva the League of Nations, after much discussion, and to the very great disappointment of the smaller states, referred the whole subject to committees for later report. Meantime there had begun in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan public debate over the possibility of placing some limitation of the naval programs of the three nations, through the medium of a "naval holiday."

Taking up first the general question, one is faced with the

¹ By Frank H. Simonds. *Review of Reviews*. 63:146-54. February, 1921.

all-important question: *Is disarmament possible, given the present world situation? The answer is frankly negative.* At the present moment the British are facing demands upon their military strength unprecedented in the peace history of the Empire. More than one hundred thousand regular troops, to say nothing of the various auxiliaries, are occupied in Ireland. An even larger number, partially drawn from India, to be sure, is held in Mesopotamia. And if there are Indian troops in Mesopotamia, the dangerous conditions in India have required reinforcements of the British garrisons there. Moreover, the Egyptian situation is also difficult and British garrisons in that country have to be maintained at maximum strength.

Reading the British newspapers and the American dispatches from London, there can be no mistaking the fact that there is a universal demand for the reduction of military expenses, but the desire cannot materially affect the case, for the peculiar circumstances in various portions of the Empire demand large military establishments, and recent events in the Near East have only served to multiply the calls for troops.

Looking to France, what is the situation? From the French point of view the army is the sole guaranty of the payment by Germany of the reparations sums, which represent solvency or ruin for France. We have had in the past month a new German crisis, with a renewal of the discussion of the possibility of French occupation of additional German territory. The situation in the Near East, and particularly in the new French territory of Syria, calls for a garrison nearly as large as the British are maintaining in Mesopotamia, while there is manifest chance of a real war with the reviving Turkish Empire.

The whole question of the army has recently been aired in the French Parliament, and a Minister of War has just resigned because the Chamber insisted upon the reduction of the period of service in the army from three years to eighteen months. This reduction, agreed upon in the end, will not take effect until next year and may be ignored if conditions seem at that time to hold out peril. Such a reduction of the French Army, however, represents the maximum of French demobilization conceivable at this time and is viewed with suspicion by many Frenchmen.

Italy has just made a final settlement with the Jugoslavs and will unquestionably follow the French example in reducing

her military establishment, but, with conditions in the Danubian area as disturbed as they now are, Italy is hardly likely to go further than the French. In point of fact both France and Italy are bound, for a future which cannot be measured, to continue to maintain standing armies raised by conscription. The French Army, now eight hundred thousand, may be reduced to six hundred thousand or even five hundred thousand; the Italian will probably not exceed four hundred thousand, but this does not represent disarmament.

Looking at the smaller countries, Belgium is at work on a program, fixed in her recent convention with France, which will raise her field army from one hundred thousand, the figure of 1914, to two hundred fifty thousand, and proportionately expand her standing army. Poland, with Germany on one side and Bolshevik Russia on the other, cannot reduce her military strength. Rumania, actually menaced by a fresh Bolshevik offensive, is reported to have remobilized her whole army. The situation in Yugoslavia is little different. In fact, if one take Europe as a whole it may be said that, while there is a marked effort being made to reduce the armies from the semi-war strength which has been maintained since the Armistice, there is nowhere any hopeful sign that disarmament is either at hand or even conceivable.

To sum up this phase of the discussion, then, it must be said that Europe finds itself condemned to continue the system of universal service and large standing armies which existed before the World War. Given the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it is totally unlikely that France will even consider disarmament during the period which must cover the payment by the Germans of their reparation obligations. Given the situation in the British Empire, one may fear an expansion rather than a contraction of the British armed strength, while the Russian conditions and the surviving rivalries between the Succession States in the Danube area insure a continuation of the system of armed peace between the Baltic and the Black Seas.

The Treaty of Versailles and the Russian Revolution combined to create conditions which cannot be disposed of in any measurable time. To meet these conditions, practically every European nation will be compelled to maintain standing armies for at least a generation. All discussion of actual disarmament

at the present time is idle. Even the examination of the possibility of a limitation of armament is unlikely to lead to any useful result, because the problem today is not that of the years before the war. Nations are not now increasing their armaments in a mad competition, they are not arming against each other, but they are with extreme reluctance retaining their standing armies because of the situation which exists about them, or, as in the case of Great Britain, within their own frontiers.

And this, after all, was the real conclusion reached at Geneva, although it was disguised by the appointment of commissions to report at the September session. What the report will be can be foreseen and was foreshadowed at the precise moment the commissions were appointed.

A "Naval Holiday"

So universal has been the recognition of the impossibility of any disarmament at the present time that the discussion has gradually been restricted to the situation existing between the three remaining seapowers—Britain, Japan, and the United States. Here the debate has been precipitated by the fact that, following the war, the British have practically stopped all naval construction and British naval experts have begun to sound a note of alarm, declaring that if the British policy is pursued, the United States, merely by following its own program of 1916, will in 1923 possess a battlefleet actually more powerful than that of Great Britain.

Some slight difference exists among the experts of the world as to whether this assertion is literally accurate, yet it may be said, in passing, that at the least, if Britain does not build and we continue to fulfil our program of 1916, by 1923 British sea supremacy will have become a thing of the past, unless—and this qualification is enormously important—the developments of the next three years shall prove that the era of big ships has passed and that sea supremacy will rest with the nation possessing command of the air and of the most powerful submarine fleet.

It is a fact that one explanation for the British cessation of building is to be found in the growing belief among British naval authorities that the war demonstrated the folly of putting millions into capital ships. Sir Percy Scott, who foretold something of the submarine developments of the war, has recently carried on a brilliant and damaging attack upon the older ideas. More-

over, inside our own navy the same controversy is raging. Thus it might be that when we had sunk millions in our new constructions these would prove archaic at the precise moment in which our battlefleet had reached its maximum of expected strength.

There is, then, a practical reason why the whole question of naval construction should be passed in review once more. But this, after all, is a detail. What one has to face now is the blunt question whether we are to engage in a naval competition with the British, recognizing all the perils such a competition has for friendly relations between two countries or by contrast are to reach some agreement with the British by which we can adjust our respective building programs.

If we undertake a competition—in fact, if we continue our present program, without some friendly understanding, it may be accepted as axiomatic that the British will meet our program and probably seek to outbuild us. The truth is that the British Government would be forced by the sentiment of its people to take such a stand. But to do this would be to put a fresh and enormous additional strain upon British finance. It would delay British readjustment following the war. Above all, it would excite a profound resentment in the hearts of the British people.

Unfortunately, the whole question is complicated by the Japanese circumstance. We have never consciously constructed against the British. Our 1916 program, which now raises the whole issue, was adopted at a time when we were neutral and the whole world at war, with one possibility of the struggle the emergence of a victorious and predatory Germany. Our navy program of that time represented insurance against the possible consequences of the world struggle.

But if we have never regarded the British as a possible rival, it is useless to blink the fact that we have watched with apprehension the expansion of Japanese naval strength. We have felt that it was a matter of national safety to maintain our sea power at such strength as to be able to envisage an attack from the East, while there has been an ever-growing desire to avoid any such unhappy circumstance.

Since Britain and Japan are allies the question is complicated, although the terms of their alliance specifically exclude the possibility of Anglo-Japanese cooperation against the United States. Again, the whole question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance

must come up again, shortly, and there are unmistakable signs that the British Dominions, notably Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, are opposed to its renewal and recognize the American feelings in the matter. Actually, it is accurate to say that were there no question of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Anglo-American question might be far more easily adjusted.

In Washington the whole issue had been raised by a resolution introduced by Senator Borah calling for conversations with both Japan and Great Britain to discover the possibility of some kind of a naval holiday.

But at bottom there is still patent one major difficulty. Even if the Anglo-Japanese alliance should not be renewed, there would rise the problem as to the basis on which Great Britain and the United States should negotiate. In all the Anglo-German discussions which preceded the war, no formula could be found. The British naturally declined to accept the basis of equality of strength, the Germans declined to recognize any other basis as a matter of right, although in practice they did not attempt to equal British strength because of the enormous expense involved.

Now it is certain that the United States would not agree to a basis of adjustment which would concede British sea supremacy. It is just as certain that the British Government would similarly decline to surrender the last semblance of that sea supremacy which has been held for so many centuries. But it is probable that the British would be ready to deal with us on the basis of frank equality, recognizing the total difference between our policies and purposes and those of Germany in the years before 1914.

The first real step in the direction of the limitation of armaments in the world would unmistakably be an agreement between the United States and Great Britain to restrict building. The supremest folly of which it is possible to think would be a competition between the two countries, who have already celebrated the centennial of unbroken peace. No question of any importance serves to divide the countries, and recent partnership in victory supplies one more argument against insane naval competition.

It is, nevertheless, all too true that there are elements in the United States, who, because of hostility to Great Britain, growing out of European and not American circumstances, are bound

to work against any Anglo-American understanding. We are passing through a period of Anglophobia, perhaps not more intense than many which have preceded, but still unmistakable and making more difficult the task of statesmanship. But it is not less true that we have arrived at one of the critical moments in history. Our own and British history must be profoundly influenced for the future, if, instead of agreement, naval competition shall now follow.

Any understanding with Great Britain covering the subject of naval programs would inevitably be followed by a similar agreement with Japan. The alternative would be the impossible attempt of the Japanese to outbuild both Great Britain and America, for if we agreed with the British to restrict our respective building programs we should logically have to agree to act with them against any nation which might seek naval supremacy by building while the English-speaking nations were restricting construction.

British public opinion is entirely favorable to a policy of dividing sea supremacy and sea regulation with the United States. British statesmen have long recognized that the alternative to Anglo-American understanding was a rivalry which would have a fatal menace, not alone to world peace, but to the present and future development of both countries. If, instead of a friendly understanding, there should follow a senseless competition for sea mastery, Great Britain would inevitably be thrown back upon her historic policy of alliances. We should be led into the formation of a rival combination of powers and, in becoming a partner of such an alliance, we should be even more dangerously mixed up in European affairs than by any possible application of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

A frank and open agreement with the British to restrict naval construction seems to me the sole possible escape now from undertaking a policy of competition which can only lead to dangers too great even to be mastered and too terrible to be discussed. It is significant, moreover, that a Senator, who counts as one of the irreconcilable opponents of the League of Nations, namely, Senator Borah, should have been the author of the resolution which has provoked the whole discussion. It is a clear demonstration of the fact that the proposal itself carries with it nothing of the character of an alliance, none of the details which have proved fatal to the fortunes of the League of Nations

in the United States, so far, but by contrast constitutes the single intelligent and possible contribution to world peace and the sole and simple step in the direction of disarmament yet discoverable.

As to all other proposals looking toward world disarmament, for a multitude of reasons, some of which I have indicated, discussion of this great question must necessarily be adjourned to a time when there is at least a possibility of even a modest achievement. Alone of the great powers, our circumstances permit us to consider and even to carry out a reduction of our military forces. Similar reductions would be welcomed by the war-impooverished European nations, but existing conditions at their frontiers preclude all but very limited reductions at the present hour. And if the United States should now set out upon an aggressive policy of naval expansion, the chances of eventual disarmament would be well-nigh abolished.

Disarmament is, after all, a misleading term, which provokes much unnecessary controversy. No country in the world today seriously considers actual disarmament. At best all but a few extremists hope for no more than the restriction of armed strength to the minimum which represents security. But today that minimum seems to impose the retention of the system of conscription and the continuation of the training of the young men of all European nations. Even in Great Britain the talk of a return to conscription has been heard in responsible quarters in recent time. This will hardly come, but the talk of it is significant. It is only on sea that the recent war seems to have opened the way for far-reaching reforms, useful reductions in expense and waste. But even here the whole question turns upon an Anglo-American agreement. Failing this we are likely to see rather a multiplication than a reduction of armaments.

WHY THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A BIG NAVY¹

The United States should have a navy equal to any that sails the seas. That is the goal to which our naval authorities have long aspired, which statesmen of vision have recognized as a

¹ By Josephus Daniels. Saturday Evening Post. p. 8-10+. March 19, 1921.

national need—the policy set forth by the General Board of the Navy years ago, which found its concrete expression in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, authorizing the building of one hundred fifty-seven fighting ships within three years.

Nothing but the exigency of the World War delayed their construction. When this country entered the conflict our capital-ship building program was displaced because the immediate demand was for antisubmarine craft. It was in that field that we could render the most effective service, and without a moment's hesitation we discontinued work on these big ships, which had already been contracted for, and concentrated on the production of destroyers, submarine chasers, mine layers and patrol boats.

This was quite as much in our own interest as in that of our Allies, for ruthless U-Boat warfare threatened all commerce, and had it not been put down we could not have transported troops or supplies overseas. All the other Allied navies, as well as our own, were exerting every effort, and our forces were combined to overcome this menace. But the fact remains that when the war ended the United States was left, so far as capital ships were concerned, in much the same position it was in at the beginning. The battleships and battle cruisers authorized in 1916, which would give us the equality set forth as our naval policy, were still to be completed.

Claims to Supremacy Waived

There were two theories in the United States as to its Navy before, in 1915, I directed the General Board to prepare a program of construction that would place our Navy on an equal footing with that of any other nation. There was an element contending that the United States should confine itself to building a few ships and be content with a navy second in rank, thereby recognizing that some other nation should be accorded first place in sea power. The other element, led by the General Board, took the firm stand that the only wise and safe policy of the United States was to maintain a navy unsurpassed by that of any other country. This national purpose was thus expressed by the General Board:

The Navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. It should be gradually increased to this point by such a rate of development, year by year, as may be permitted by the facilities of the country, but the limit above defined should be attained not later than 1925.

That doctrine is as sound since the war as it was when it was first penned and approved. It is, too, unaffected by the discussion whether the world will go on building competitive navies or by international agreement reduce armament. If the United States elects to be a hermit nation, to live unto itself and enter into no association with other countries, then it must continue to build, so as to be prepared to defend itself against any nations with which it may have disagreement. If, however, some wise and honorable way shall be found—whether it is called a league or an association or a concert—for our entrance into an agreement to safeguard the peace of the world, then the United States should furnish as large a proportion as any other nation of the naval force required to maintain peace.

In the event of arbitration and peace by reason, the amity and permanence of the association would be best preserved if no nation had a dominating force in the joint policing of the seas. I do not mean to imply that if the United States or Great Britain or Japan should furnish a superior force, any one of these would wish to enforce its will upon the world. Far from it. But if any one country was powerful enough to dominate, it might cause resentment among nations having smaller fleets. Although the United States excels in wealth and resources, and could better afford to maintain a great naval force than any other land, we would not invite even remote suspicion or jealousy by claiming the right to have the first naval power. By the same reasoning we could not with good grace consent for any other nation to claim as its right that position in the world.

The Friendship of Equals

It is not dominance we seek, but equality in sea power; and that is all that the First Lord of the British Admiralty now asks for his country. In a recent statement Mr. Walter Long said: "Great Britain has had different standards; our strength was at one time superior to the three next strongest Powers; then to the two; now all that we are suggesting is that our strength be equal to the next Power"; and he asks, "Is not this proof of our desire for general reduction of armament?"

It is, in fact, identical with our position that no nation ought to ask to have commanding power. Our country should be content with neither more nor less than that maintained by the next Power. Between individuals it has been said that perfect

friendship exists only between equals. It is the same with nations, and is particularly true with regard to sea power in any league or association. Those who feel that we could afford to be satisfied with second or third place must believe the millennium has already arrived.

I hope it is on its way, and I earnestly believe in hastening it by associated agreement for reduction of armament, but as we look toward the better day it is well enough to await at least its dawn before accepting an inferior place either on the sea or at the council table.

That we do need a big navy the incoming and outgoing Presidents agree. "There is no other navy in the world that has to cover so great an area of defense as the American Navy, and it ought, in my judgment, to be incomparably the most adequate navy in the world," President Wilson declared in his address at St. Louis, February 3, 1916, and he has held consistently to this policy.

In his first important public utterance after his election, at Norfolk, December 4, 1920, President-elect Harding declared: "I want to acclaim the day when America is the most eminent of maritime nations. A big navy and a big merchant marine are necessary to the future of the country. I believe in partial but not permanent disarmament, and I see a time when this will be realized. But until that day comes America must have the biggest and most powerful navy afloat."

President Roosevelt in his first message to Congress, in 1901, pointed out that we must have a thoroughly trained navy of adequate size "or else be prepared definitely and for all time to abandon the idea that our nation is among those whose sons go down to the sea in ships."

When the civil war came it was the Navy which enabled the Federal Government to blockade the Southern ports, to cut off outside sources of supply, and which eventually starved out the Confederacy. And during the war, under Abraham Lincoln, with Gideon Welles as Secretary of the Navy, the largest navy in the world was built up.

Yet that navy was allowed to decline until within twenty years it had all but vanished, and we had no navy worthy of the name. No new vessels were built, some that had been begun were allowed to rot on the stocks, and the appropriations scarcely sufficed to keep the old ships afloat. And this occurred

despite the warnings of President Grant, who pointed out that "this policy must, of course, gradually but surely destroy the Navy," and said: "It can hardly be wise statesmanship in a government which represents a country with over five thousand miles of coast line on both oceans, exclusive of Alaska, and containing forty millions of progressive people, with relations of every nature with almost every foreign country, to rest with such inadequate means of enforcing any foreign policy either of protection or redress. Separated by the ocean from the nations of the eastern continent, our Navy is our only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad, or for the enforcement of any foreign policy."

Lessons From the Past

We are facing today a decision in regard to our Navy more momentous than that which followed the Civil War. Shall we make the same mistake that was made then?

When at last the country, after long years of naval decline, awakened to its plight, it had to begin at the bottom and build a new navy from the keel up. This was begun by William E. Chandler, who was Secretary of the Navy under Arthur, and only those who enjoyed the confidence of that far-sighted leader could know the difficulties under which he and his successor, the able and brilliant William C. Whitney, labored in inaugurating, enlarging and carrying out that undertaking. It was a struggle at every step, for they had to create the public sentiment which made possible the appropriations for the beginning of the new types of fighting ships. Fifteen years were spent, under Arthur, Cleveland and Harrison, in building up the navy we had at the outbreak of the Spanish War. And, even after the energy and effort that had been put forth by Chandler and Whitney, Tracy, Herbert and Long, by able constructors and officers, it was only a third-rate navy then. But if we had not had it, if the Navy had been in the same condition it was ten or twenty years before, we could not have challenged Spain. It was the victory of Dewey at Manila Bay and the destruction of Cervera's fleet at Santiago which broke the Spanish power. If Spain had possessed even a second-rate navy that war might have been measured in years instead of months. Had we engaged a first-rate naval power the results might have been disastrous.

Germany Cut Off

The events of the World War are too fresh in our minds to need recounting. History records no more striking exemplification of the effectiveness of sea power or the futility of a navy less than adequate. Vast and well trained as were her armies, Germany could not win because she could not gain control of the sea. Her commerce swept from the ocean, her ports closed, she was practically cut off from the outside world. The great High Seas Fleet she had built up at such enormous cost was penned up in its harbors. The daring exploits of her commerce raiders, the success of Admiral von Spee at Coronel, were mere flashes without decisive result. She was at last dependent solely on her submarines, which were effective only because they operated as pirates, violating the laws of God and man. And in the end they failed, failed ignominiously, and long lines of them followed the proud High Seas Fleet in surrender, the most inglorious end in naval history.

There is no discouragement to belligerency so potent as superior power, and the country that possesses it does not often have to use it. Great Britain has had, for more than a century, except for a brief interval at the end of our Civil War, the greatest of navies, and yet until the Battle of Jutland her main fleet had not been in a major engagement for a hundred years. Her armies were insignificant compared with those of Germany and Austria, France and Russia. She had colonies all over the earth, merchant ships on every sea, and interests in every clime that often conflicted with those of other countries. Yet she was exempt from successful attack while that mighty fleet was in existence. She did not stop building ships whenever wars ended, or wait to build them until conflict was imminent. She steadily pursued the policy of maintaining a navy as large as those of any two other nations combined; and its mere existence protected the whole British Empire. It prevented more wars than were ever fought.

A great navy in the possession of a people who have no selfish ends to serve is a power for peace. Theodore Roosevelt declared that:

"So far from being in any way a provocation to war, an adequate and highly trained navy is the best guaranty against war, the cheapest and most effective peace insurance. The

cost of building and maintaining such a navy represents the very lightest premium for insuring peace which this nation can possibly pay."

"Probably no other great nation in the world is so anxious for peace as we are," said President Roosevelt. "There is not a single civilized power that has anything whatever to fear from aggressiveness on our part. All we want is peace; and toward this end we wish to be able to secure the same respect for our rights from others which we are eager and anxious to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the American people."

Whether power is a menace or a blessing to the world depends upon the country that possesses it.

O! it is excellent
To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous
To use it like a giant.

America can be trusted with power, with the confidence that it will never be exercised save in a righteous cause. We will never invade the rights of other nations, and we do not intend that they shall invade ours. Germany could not be so trusted. Her great fleet, her military power, were created for aggression and were a menace to humanity. They had to be destroyed before the world could be made safe.

Profitable Destruction

I was in Paris for a short time during the peace conference, where the representatives of all nations and lands were gathered. Leaving America in the glow of faith in the new-born altruism of a nation grateful for peace after war, it seemed to me that the only thought that could be uppermost in the minds of men would be to perpetuate that peace by any and every sacrifice. The war had given a baptism of real religion and brotherhood, a regeneration which I hoped would endure. But I had not been in Paris many hours before I learned, to my disillusion, that the topics mainly discussed were not how to perpetuate peace but how to strengthen this country or that, how to form boundaries that would add to national prestige and power.

Outside the circle of "idealists," as they were even then sneeringly called, who were planning for safe reduction of armament, the vast majority of those gathered in Paris from

all parts of the globe were concerned almost wholly with readjustments, indemnities, reparations, trade and like questions. They did not speak the same language as President Wilson and other leaders who had the vision to see that world prosperity waited upon the undergirding of world peace. These choice spirits had the vision splendid, and their voice prevailed in the written terms of the treaty drafted.

The League of Nations was founded, the solemn covenant was signed. It was not all its advocates had hoped for; but it was a noble beginning, it did link nations together in a body where their differences could be discussed and many of them settled; and if some such international agreement had not been arrived at before the Paris conference adjourned, conditions would have been more chaotic in the months that have followed the armistice.

Victors in War Defeated in Peace

Some of those in Paris who did not dare directly oppose a league sought to discredit it, predicting that it would soon degenerate into a "mere debating society." And this might easily be the case if there were no force behind it, giving weight to its deliberations and making effective its decisions. Any association backed by great governments, united in the determination that right shall rule, must be of tremendous effect. But even the most ardent advocates of international agreement realize that the real test will come when some unruly country breaks out of its boundaries, refuses to submit its contentions to arbitration, and threatens to draw the sword. Then argument is at an end, and force must be invoked to prevent war. That force is of three kinds—moral, economic and military, and the third will be the last resort, to be used only after the others have been invoked in vain. But it must be in existence, for there are times when only guns will bring to reason nations crazed for revenge or bent on conquest.

This force, as was apparent to those who studied the situation, must be largely naval. Warships are the most mobile form of military power and that which can be most promptly exerted, being ready to proceed instantly to distant points. There is no more impressive symbol of majesty and might; nothing so effective in a demonstration of warning. Yet there is none that can be so safely exercised. For navies do not invade

countries or hold territory. General Tasker H. Bliss, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and one of the American peace delegates, in his speech a few months since, advocating limitation of armaments, said we could safely agree that each nation may maintain its navy, as "no navy can conquer and hold foreign territory." Navies are efficient in repelling invasion, strong in defense.

To the European authorities I met abroad I expressed the conviction that until the world recovered from shell shock, as long as disturbed conditions existed in so many quarters of the globe, it was necessary for nations which were determined to preserve peace to maintain navies sufficient to suppress strife and prevent aggression; to act, in effect, as an international force. It seems obvious that our country, possessing such wealth, and earnestly and consistently exerting its influence for peace, should make at least as large a contribution to this mobile police force as any other country, and to render this service it would be our high duty to continue to build up our Navy along the lines laid down before our entrance into the war.

Our Three-Year Program

There were not wanting those who thought the United States ought not to complete the big ships now building, but their attitude seemed to be due largely to the fact that it would result in the United States eventually having a navy equal or superior to any in strength, with more powerful capital ships. It was argued that forty-three-thousand-ton battleships and battle cruisers would set a new standard, relegating lesser ships to the second line. The same arguments were made against the dreadnought and the battle cruiser when those types were originated, but it did not prevent their construction, and they are now a vital part of all modern navies. And we were not the first to project forty-thousand-ton ships. During the war Great Britain built the Hood, forty-one thousand five hundred tons, and laid down three others though they were not completed. Japan had projected a number of even larger tonnage before the keels of ours were laid.

Perhaps the principal objection among our own people to completing the big program begun in 1916 is the cost involved; and that narrows down to how much more money will be required, in addition to what has already been appropriated or

expended. The contracts for these vessels were made before or during the war, and all but two of them are under construction. Quantities of structural steel have already been delivered, and are being produced in various plants. Work is proceeding on all the parts of the huge and complicated engines and machinery. The greater portion of the armor has been completed, and the big guns and other armament are far advanced.

The three-year program, so far as cost is concerned, is nearly half done. The total present estimated cost of construction of hulls and machinery is \$643,950,000. Approximately \$311,000,000 has already been appropriated for this purpose, and it is estimated that \$332,950,000 more will be required. More than two-thirds of the \$328,981,837 estimated for armor, armament and ammunition has been expended or provided for, the additional appropriations needed amounting to \$102,000,000.

The total cost of completing all the vessels now under contract will be about \$435,000,000, extending over a period of three years—that is, about \$145,000,000 a year.

These new battleships and battle cruisers under construction will more than double the actual fighting strength of the fleet. Considering dreadnoughts alone, the six 43,200-ton battleships, the six battle cruisers of 43,500 tons, and the five battleships of 32,300 to 32,600 tons nearing completion will add 680,000 tons, as compared with the 435,750 tons of the modern dreadnoughts now in commission, and the 750,000 total tonnage of all our battleships, single or mixed calibers; and a number of the latter will soon be obsolete, not to be classed as fighting ships.

Admiral Dewey's Opinion

A navy that is not adequate is like a gun that has not range enough to reach its target. The General Board has set forth its opinion that "any navy less than adequate is an expense to the nation without being a protection," and that no navy is adequate until it is "strong enough to meet on equal terms the strongest possible adversary."

Germany's navy, strong as it was, was inadequate and, so far as effectiveness against the Allies' navies was concerned, her High Seas Fleet might as well never have been built. Authorities agree that the United States should have an adequate navy, but there is considerable disagreement as to what this means. The General Board—Admiral Dewey was then

its head—gave its opinion in 1915, declaring that the United States Navy should be equal to any in the world, saying:

"A navy in firm control of the seas from the outbreak of war is the prime essential to the defense of a country situated as is the United States bordering upon two great oceans. A navy strong enough only to defend our coast from actual invasion will not suffice. Defense from invasion is not the only function of the Navy. It must protect our sea-borne commerce and drive that of the enemy from the sea. The best way to accomplish all of these objects is to find and defeat the hostile fleet or any of its detachments at a distance from our coast sufficiently great to prevent interruption of our normal course of national life."

Congress authorized such an adequate navy in 1916. We are building it, and if construction proceeds it will have been brought up to the desired point within the time fixed by the General Board, 1925.

What will be the result if we stop building now? We have no battle cruisers. Japan has 4, Great Britain 10—6 of the first line, 4 of the second. The United States has 16 first-line battleships; Great Britain, 26; Japan 6. Of first-line capital ships the tonnage is: Great Britain, 811,050; Japan, 288,320; the United States, 435,750. Considering only the most modern fighting craft, according to late figures prepared in the Navy Department, Great Britain has 538 ships, 1,588,442 tons; the United States, 330 ships, 779,193 tons; Japan, 43 ships, 340,596 tons. The total tonnage is of course much larger, the United States having, exclusive of small craft and auxiliaries, 424 vessels, of 1,181,884 tons; Japan, 75 vessels, 486,252 tons; Great Britain, 717 vessels, 2,412,146 tons. These figures include a number that are regarded as not of fighting effectiveness according to modern standards. If we cease construction now, this country will be left a poor second in naval rank.

Let us consider the case if we complete the three-year program. The United States is building a hundred vessels—11 battleships, 421,900 tons; 6 battle cruisers, 261,000; 10 light cruisers, 71,000; 38 destroyers and 43 submarines—a total of 842,109 tons. Great Britain has practically suspended construction of capital ships for the time being, building only a few light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer leaders and large submarines, totaling 36 ships, 76,890 tons. Japan has authorized the building

of 41 ships aggregating 328,460 tons, but its naval authorities have proposed the building of 68 more, of 368,370 tons, though these have not yet been authorized. Japan's original building program was known as the "8-8"—that is, 8 battleships and 8 battle cruisers, by 1923. This work has been delayed and can hardly be completed in the time specified. The larger program proposed is for a total of 12 battleships and 12 battle cruisers, to be completed by 1927. Of the battleships included in the 8-8 program 4 are of 33,800 tons, a little larger than our Tennessee; 4 are of over 40,000 tons, comparable with the North Carolina class we are now building. The 8 battle cruisers projected are over 40,000 tons. All the additional 4 battleships and 4 battle cruisers proposed by Japan but not yet authorized or appropriated for are to be of the largest type, above 40,000 tons, probably quite as large as our 43,200-ton battleships and 43,500-ton battle cruisers.

If the construction already authorized or projected by these three countries be completed according to schedule, with no enlargement of programs, the United States will, by 1925, rank first in effective fighting strength, though still exceeded by Great Britain in tonnage. A number of what are now counted as first-line ships will by that time be relegated to the second line. Allowing for this, of first-line battleships the United States will have 21, totaling 722,000 tons; Great Britain, 22, totaling 548,250 tons; Japan, 8, totaling 258,920 tons. This country will have 6 first-line battle cruisers, totaling 261,000 tons; Great Britain, 6, totaling 175,400 tons; Japan, 8, totaling 270,000 tons. The total fighting tonnage will be: Great Britain, 1,665,332; United States, 1,617,282; Japan, 689,656.

If Our Plan is Abandoned

If Japan completes its 12-12 program—12 battle cruisers and 12 dreadnoughts—projected for completion by 1927, this will make a radical difference in comparative effectiveness. Though the 8 additional ships have not yet been authorized it seems altogether probable that they will be begun when the 8-8 schedule is completed, if there is no international agreement to limit construction. If these should be undertaken—and in any consideration of strength that probability cannot be disregarded—and neither Great Britain nor the United States authorizes any further construction, the standing in first-line capital ships in

1923 would be: Great Britain, 28, totaling 723,650 tons; Japan, 24, totaling 848,920 tons; the United States, 27, totaling 983,000 tons.

These comparisons are particularly pertinent at this time in view of the proposal that this government at once take up with Great Britain and Japan, without waiting for the cooperation of any other nation, the question of coming to an understanding to reduce their naval building programs.

If the proposal is to abandon the present program, to reduce by 50 per cent the number of vessels to be built, it means that the United States will not have a navy "equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation"; that it will bind itself not to build a navy of the first class; that it will deliberately and finally accept a secondary position among the naval Powers of the world.

Great Britain has nothing to lose but all to gain by such an arrangement. Without the expenditure of a shot or a shilling it confirms the position she has spent billions of money and generations of effort to maintain, that of possessing, without dispute, the most powerful of navies, without a rival on the seas. Japan has little to lose. Great Britain is her ally. Japanese construction is far behind schedule, and even the present appropriations are burdensome.

But this country is in a different situation. Congress long ago authorized the vessels in its program, and they are actually under construction and can be completed in three years. Reduction in naval armaments means a very real sacrifice for us, of both actual and relative power. It would be a sacrifice well worth making if it would prevent war and assure world peace. Recent disarmament proposals, however, merely look to a reduction in navies, but do not propose any limitation on armies, which are the real menace to peace. Any of the contracting Powers could maintain an army of millions of men without violating any terms of such an agreement. Any nation outside the trio proposed could build as many warships as it pleased, without interruption or protest. England, Japan and the United States are on friendly terms with one another and the rest of the world. In limiting armaments they would set a wholesome example to other countries. But more than an example is needed. We need to bring all nations into a lasting agreement as binding

upon them as upon us, and one that will limit armies as well as navies. Naval holidays contain no assurances of disarmament. If such a general arrangement can be brought about it can be made effective. But I do not believe armaments will be really and permanently limited until there is a practically universal agreement.

Two Courses Open

There are, in my opinion, just two courses, and only two, open to the United States:

To secure an international agreement with all, or practically all, the nations, which will guarantee an end of competition in navy building, and reduction of armed land forces, reduce the national burden and lead in the movement to secure and buttress world peace.

To hold aloof from agreement or association with the other nations as to the size of armament. This would require us to build a navy strong enough and powerful enough to be able on our own to protect Americans and American shipping, defend American policies in the distant possessions as well as at home, and by the presence of sea power to command the respect and fear of the world.

There is of course the third course of being content with a small navy in a world of big navies, exposed to certain destruction in case of war with a great Power or Powers. I dismiss that course without discussion because it is a waste of money to spend money on an agency of war that would be helpless if needed.

Whatever else the American people may approve, they will not approve such an ineffective policy.

The whole world is disturbed today. Conditions were never more unsettled or the future more uncertain. Is this a time for the United States alone, or in conjunction with a few nations, to weaken its naval force, to reduce the power which makes for world stability?

There are five outstanding reasons, apart from obligations following the World War and the Navy's traditional function as our first line of defense, why the United States must maintain

a powerful navy, all growing out of our well-defined national policies. They are:

The Monroe Doctrine.

The Freedom of the Seas.

The Merchant Marine.

The Open Door in China.

The Security of the Panama Canal.

The Monroe Doctrine has been for a century the very keynote of our foreign policy. That no foreign Power shall take one foot of territory in this Western World—in North or South or Central America—is one thing upon which this country is as determined today as it was when President Monroe laid down the principle.

We had the courage to assert that policy when this was a small nation with slender resources, facing a powerful combination of European monarchies. There is no thought of abandoning it now.

That doctrine was the protection of South and Central America, Mexico and other countries when they were weak and struggling commonwealths. It has for a century preserved them and us from aggression. It has done more—it has been the preserver of democracy in the world. It prevented in America exactly what has happened in Africa in recent years, when a continent has been parceled out among European Powers. But for the Monroe Doctrine who believes that in the age when the avaricious dream of colonial possessions dominated Europe the countries of South and Central America would have been permitted to remain independent republics?

The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine, however, was but a scrap of paper if America was not always ready to send its Navy to enforce it. If contested by any great nation in some such period as, say, in the seventies, when our Navy was a negligible factor, we would have lacked the ability to give it effect. It has life and vigor only when it can be backed by force.

The Monroe Doctrine is as strong as the American Navy. Reduce the Navy to impotency or make it less than equal to the navy of any other country, and by that token the doctrine is weakened. When Russia laid claim to possessions on the Pacific

Coast, John Quincy Adams exclaimed: "I find proof enough to put down Russian argument, but how shall I answer the Russian cannon?" If some nation should covet the wealth and resources, say, of Brazil or Mexico, of what value would be the Monroe Doctrine if we should reduce our Navy to a second-rate force?

Highways of the World

The seas are the world's highways, and mankind was never so dependent on shipping as it is today. Civilization and progress, the growth of peoples with higher standards of living, have brought about changes in international relations as radical as in social and commercial conditions. Great masses of people are widely separated from their food and clothing supply, industrial enterprises from their raw materials, merchandise from its necessary markets. Immense populations are dependent upon manufacturing with the necessity of drawing raw material and fuel from overseas. For these America is the largest source of supply, producing a considerable surplus of food and vast quantities of raw material that is needed by other countries. Our prosperity was never so dependent upon commerce; foreign trade was never so important as now; and this necessity will not diminish but constantly increase as time goes on. Our future lies upon the seas.

The world is open to us, and must be kept open. Any obstacle to free transportation, any interruption to commerce will inevitably react upon our national life.

If any one nation controls the seas, with consequent control of markets, fuel and communications, every other country will be put at a disadvantage, its trade and industry handicapped in peace, its foreign markets cut off in war.

Freedom of the seas is one of the fundamental doctrines of this country. In contending for this, America is not moved by selfish considerations. Other nations are as much interested in it as is this country, for it is of vital importance to the prosperity of the world. Sea power alone makes this freedom certain and secure.

What Admiral Mahan Said

The interdependence of a navy and a merchant marine was strikingly set forth by Admiral Mahan, who said:

"The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the

word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences."

Shipbuilding was one of the earliest industries of the infant American colonies, and the colonists not only carried on an extensive coastwise and river trade but built up a considerable commerce with the rest of the world. Following the Revolution our commerce was rapidly extended and it was the hundreds of fast sailing ships outfitted as privateers which, supplementing our small but gallant Navy, enabled us to win the War of 1812. When our shipping was freed from impressment and the many handicaps other nations imposed, there followed a great development of our merchant marine. The swift sailing ships of New England, the vessels of New York and Philadelphia, the Baltimore clippers, carried our commerce to all quarters of the globe. By 1855 American vessels carried \$405,000,000 of our \$540,000,000 foreign trade—75 per cent of it. The Civil War disrupted our foreign commerce and halted shipping development. In 1870 our ships carried only 33 per cent of our commerce.

Our merchant marine steadily declined, and in a generation it had dwindled to that of a tenth-rate nation. By 1910 we were carrying in American vessels only 7.1 per cent of our foreign trade, which had grown to \$3,000,000,000. Nine-tenths of this was carried in foreign bottoms, and American freights went to the building up of the vast merchant services of Germany, England, Norway, Sweden, France, Italy, Holland and Japan. We had practically placed the American carrying trade in the hands of foreign shipping. Other nations did the work and took their toll. We paid out enough freights in forty years to have built and paid for the largest merchant marine on earth.

Men of vision pointed out the folly of such a policy. The matter was debated in Congress at almost every session, and all kinds of schemes were proposed, but none worth while were put into effect.

War came, and the cry was "Ships! Ships! And more

ships!" All the world was clamoring for shipping. Only then did our people realize how pitiful was the handful of vessels flying our flag, how dependent our commerce was on other nations. Fortunately for us, America was the storehouse on which Europe drew for its supplies. Our wheat and corn, our cotton and tobacco, nearly everything our farms produced was in demand. Our factories were kept busy producing munitions. Foreign vessels carried our products because they were for their own people. This relieved, to a large extent, our shipping situation, which otherwise would have been critical.

Even after the outbreak of the European war, when our situation was plain enough to all, it was not easy to induce Congress to take action toward building up our merchant marine. President Wilson, in 1914, urged the passage of a shipping bill that would encourage shipbuilding and operation, but this was defeated. Had Congress passed that bill and the work been begun then, we would have saved two years' time and hundreds of millions of dollars. We did later establish an immense shipbuilding industry, we created a great merchant fleet as best we could under the circumstances. But it was a heavy price America had to pay for the years of neglect of our merchant marine.

When the armistice was signed there was under control of the Shipping Board a fleet of 2122 seagoing vessels, 5,514,448 gross tons, and we had put into service 583,000 gross tons of enemy ships and 354,000 gross tons of Dutch ships which we had requisitioned. In 1904 our merchant fleet comprised only 1,495 vessels of 500 tons and over, with little more than 2,000,000 tons engaged in foreign commerce.

Our Merchant Marine Today

America now has a merchant marine second only to that of Great Britain, comprising 28,183 vessels of 16,324,024 gross tons, and, even more important, 44 per cent of all our huge foreign commerce of \$13,349,664,000 last year was carried in American vessels, as compared with 7.1 per cent before the war. American vessels are now plying to all quarters of the globe.

Can any American who has the interests of his country at heart, who regards its future, consider for a moment permitting a decline in our merchant marine or in the Navy which protects it?

The United States is committed to the Open Door in China. The American note to the other Powers requested an agreement "to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaties and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." It was the acceptance of this note by the Powers which prevented the partition of China and reaffirmed the policy of equal trade opportunity. How can the United States maintain this position if it lacks a great navy?

Completion of the Panama Canal fulfilled the dream of centuries, shortening trade routes and benefiting all commerce. It was also designed to give us naval strength in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, and one of the strongest arguments for its construction was that it would double the effectiveness of the Navy.

Naval Use of the Panama Canal

It is the canal which makes possible the maintenance of a great fleet in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, enabling us to exercise our naval strength freely in both oceans. This was impracticable so long as our eastern and western shores were separated by a continent, and to sail from one to the other vessels had to go through the Strait of Magellan or round Cape Horn. But with the canal affording easy passage, permitting squadrons to effect a rapid juncture, the increased number of fighting ships enabled us, without dividing our aggregate strength, to put into effect a new fleet organization, with a powerful force in each ocean.

The people of our West Coast felt a new sense of security, a thrill of pride, when the new Pacific Fleet steamed through the canal to its home ports. They felt that ours had become truly a national Navy, affording protection to all our shores. This move has not only greatly increased the interest in the Navy in that vast region but has directed general attention to the necessity of providing new bases for docking and repair of our vessels. And with our thousands of miles of coast, our growing trade with the Orient, our Island possessions like Hawaii, Samoa, Guam and the Philippines, our interests there are scarcely less important than in the Atlantic.

This was recognized by Mahan, who wrote, as long ago as 1910: "It may even be questioned whether sound military policy may not make the Pacific rather than the Atlantic the station for the United States battle fleet."

The joint operations of the two fleets in Pacific waters in January, their cruise to the west coast of South America demonstrated how readily these two main divisions of our forces could effect a juncture, and how harmoniously they could operate together as one fleet. The ease with which the Atlantic fleet with its many vessels—battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, auxiliaries—passed through the canal demonstrated the military effectiveness of that thoroughfare. And as the canal is of vital importance to the Navy, so is the Navy essential to the canal's protection.

It must never be forgotten that behind all government in the last analysis lies potential force. We do not see the form of the sheriff and the *posse comitatus* and the whole military power behind the Chief Justice as he renders a judgment which depends for validity in the last resort to the armed force. Peaceful nations like our own obey court decrees so readily that we see only the gloved hand and rarely the mailed fist. But it is there, ready to be invoked to uphold the supremacy of law. Without its unseen strength courts would be impotent. Andrew Jackson voiced this dependence when, indignant at an opinion of Marshall, he declared, "John Marshall has made the decision. Now let him enforce it."


When It Will Be Safe to Disarm


If the League of Nations functions—and it cannot function in the way to carry out its beneficent purpose fully unless the United States becomes a member—the goal will be reduction of armament and peace by agreement or arbitration. But it will be another Hague tribunal if somewhere there cannot be invoked by responsible authority sufficient force to give effect to the decisions of the nations. The friends of a world concert of Powers believe the most effective agency to secure acceptance of joint international action will be the economic boycott. This should always precede actual force. To be sure, armies might be called upon to help execute an economic boycott, but it would be a naval force that would be relied upon to make a blockade effective. Therefore, one of the arguments of peace lovers for

naval strength is as a guaranty of peace if jeopardized by selfish nations. This must be secured through ostracism of offending countries, cutting them off from association and commerce with their fellows, preventing ingress or egress, denying supplies. This rigorous policy would effectually teach the lesson that the enlightened and organized will of all peoples is supreme to the selfish aim of any nation or nations. For, after all that is said, the impelling world duty is the preservation of free nations and the protection of the rights of small nations.

Can we dare disarm and leave all that civilization has gained to the greed of nations which, if now quiescent, have not changed their point of view? The dominant thought of a nation sooner or later finds expression in its laws and government. Can we truly say that the world has been converted fully to the gospel of freedom and self-determination? Is there no danger, with returning stability, that nations which are unrepentant of the crime of aggressive warfare, may not look to retrieving lost fortunes if their neighbors, in sublime faith in peaceful processes, have thrown away their arms?

There may be reduction of armaments, and that will be welcomed if it can be brought about by general agreement. But it will be safe to disarm only when stable conditions, buttressed by international association, have existed long enough to become a world habit, and when universal acceptance of arbitration is in the warp and woof of the thought of all mankind. Until that day comes navies will be needed, and by no country more than our own.







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